Hardy v. Georgia Department of Corrections et al
Filing
53
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Chatman, Burnside, and Gore as parties and any deadlines pertaining to them. The remaining Defendants shall file their answers to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with in fourteen days of this Order. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 09/24/2019. (thb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
GEORGE W. HARDY,
*
5
Plaintiff,
*
*
V.
*
CV 117-172
■A-
GEORGIA
DEPARTMENT
CORRECTIONS,
OF
*
et al. ,
*
*
Defendants.
*
ORDER
Before
the
Court
is
Defendants'
Partial
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
Motion
{Doc. 43. )
to
Dismiss
For the reasons
contained herein. Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN
PART.
I.
Defendants
Richmond
removed
County,
this
Georgia.
BACKGROUND
matter
(Doc.
from the
1. )
Superior
Subsequent
to
Court
of
removal.
Plaintiff has amended his complaint twice, and his Second Amended
Complaint (''Complaint") is the operative pleading.
42. )
42
The Complaint alleges a federal cause of action pursuant to
U.S.C.
need
(Compl., Doc.
§ 1983
(Count
(Count
II) ;
I)
for deliberate
indifference
to
serious medical
and state law claims for professional negligence
negligence
(Count
III);
negligent
infliction
of
emotional distress (Count IV); and negligent hiring, retention,
training, and supervision (Count V).
further claims punitive damages.^
(Id. SISI 41-91.)
Plaintiff
(Id. at Prayer for Relief.)
A. Confinement and Medical History
Plaintiff
is
confined
at
the
Georgia
Diagnostic
and
Classification Prison (^^GDCP") in Jackson, Georgia, and was held
at GDCP at all times except as otherwise stated.
(Id. SI 17.)
As
a result of his history with cardiovascular disease and type II
diabetes. Plaintiff is prescribed Plavix, a medication intended to
prevent the formation of blood clots.
it
was
determined
salivary gland.
(Id. SISI 18, 19.)
that Plaintiff required
surgery to
In 2015,
remove
a
(Id. SI 19.)
B. Amputation
On June 24, 2015, Plaintiff was transported to Augusta State
Medical Prison
(Id. SI 22.)
C'ASMP") to undergo the salivary gland surgery.
Prior to his surgery on July 2, 2015, Plaintiff
noticed numbness in his right foot eventually leading to leg pain.
(Id. SI 23.)
Over more than two weeks following surgery. Plaintiff
continued to experience leg pain and numbness.^
28, 30-33, 35.)
(Id. SISI 24, 26-
After Plaintiff's return to GDCP, medical staff
^ Plaintiff generally requests punitive damages without specifying which claims
entitle him to punitive damages.
Although Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages in connection with the state law claims,
Defendants do not make the same motion in regard to Plaintiff's Section 1983
claims. Therefore, the Court only addresses the punitive damages as they relate
to the state law claims.
2 Plaintiff also contends he experienced chest pain on at least one occasion.
(Compl., 132.)
examined Plaintiff and discovered blood clots in his right leg and
determined Plaintiff had contracted gangrene.
(Id. SI 36.) Shortly
thereafter, at the Atlanta Medical Center, Plaintiff's leg was
amputated six inches above the knee.
(Id. SI 37.)
C. Personnel and Alleged Conduct
Plaintiff
alleges
that
the
stoppage
his
Plavix
prescription
primarily caused the
amputation.
(See id. SISI 19-22, 25, 51-52, 55-56, 59-60, 70-71,
78, 87-88.)
Plaintiff blames a host of entities and personnel for
the loss of his leg.
blood
of
clots, gangrene, and
(See id. SISI 5-14.)
For convenience, the
Court discusses the alleged conduct of the various personnel in
turn.
1. Edward Hale Burnside II, M.D. and Mary Gore, R.N. (GDCP)^
Nurse
Gore
prescription
in
ordered
the
suspension
anticipation
of
of
Plaintiff s
Plaintiff s
salivary
Plavix
gland
surgery. (Id. SI 19.) Prior to his transfer and surgery. Plaintiff
expressed concerns about the suspension of his prescription to Dr.
Burnside.
(Id. SI 20.)
Dr. Burnside informed Plaintiff that he
need not worry and ASMP would tend to his issues. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that neither Nurse Gore nor Dr. Burnside attempted to
notify ASMP
of
Plaintiffs
prescription.
(Id.
SI 21.)
Upon
3 Dr. Burnside, Nurse Gore, and Warden Chatman are collectively referred to as
the "GDCP Individual Defendants."
Plaintiff's post-operation return to GDCP, Dr. Burnside discovered
the blood clots and diagnosed Plaintiff with gangrene.
(Id. 5 36.)
2. Warden Bruce Chatman (GDCP)
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Chatman failed in his duties to
supervise personnel (id. 511 60, 61, 87, 89), train personnel (id.
55 61, 89), hire personnel (id. 55 61, 89), terminate personnel
(id. 55 61, 89), and promulgate and enforce policies (id. 55 60,
63, 79, 87) at GDCP.
3. Wardens Stan Shepard and Betty Lee McGrew (ASMP)
While
under
ASMP's
care.
Warden
Shepard
purportedly
threatened to relocate Plaintiff for yelling out in pain.
5 29.)
Plaintiff
asserts
Plaintiff's treatment.
Additionally,
Warden
Shepard's
warning
(Id.
impacted
(Id. 5 62.)
Plaintiff expressed
McGrew on three occasions.
his distress to
(Id. 55 24, 26, 29.)
Warden
Plaintiff states
that Warden McGrew was aware of Plaintiff s medical history, his
prescription for Plavix, and the subsequent suspension of that
prescription.
(Id. 5 25.)
Finally, Plaintiff makes the same allegations against Wardens
Shepard and McGrew as those made against Warden Chatman.
55 60, 61, 64, 79, 87, 89.)
(Id.
4. ASMP Medical Personnel"^
Plaintiff alleges that upon arriving at ASMP, he informed Dr.
Kimberly Fountain of the fact that he was no longer taking Plavix,
and his fears were ignored.
(Id. ^ 22.)
Further, Plaintiff
asserts that throughout his time at ASMP, the tending medical staff
was aware of Plaintiff's medical history, his prescription for
Plavix, and the subsequent suspension of that prescription.
SI 25.)
(Id.
Plaintiff notified ASMP medical staff of his numbness and
pain on multiple occasions.
(Id. SISI 23-24, 26-33.)
In response,
ASMP medical staff provided Plaintiff Percocet to assist with the
pain (id. SISI 31-32) and warm compresses (id. SISI 26-27).
medical
staff
problems.
externally
(Id. SI 33.)
examined
Plaintiff s
leg
ASMP
finding
no
The treating staff at ASMP did not consult
with other medical providers or perform scans of the leg.
(Id.
SISI 26, 34.)
5. All Individual Defendants
Plaintiff contends that throughout Plaintiffs treatment, the
Individual
Defendants
were aware that Plaintiff was prescribed
Plavix for his history of cardiovascular and clotting issues.
(Compl.,
SI 51.)
Plaintiff
continues
that
the
Individual
Defendants knew Plaintiff ceased taking Plavix prior to his surgery
and refused to resume his Plavix treatment following his surgery
^ Wardens Shepard and McGrew and the ASMP medical staff alleged to have treated
Plaintiff are collectively referred to as the "ASMP Individual Defendants," and
collectively with the GDCP Individual Defendants, the "Individual Defendants."
notwithstanding
Finally,
his
despite
Plaintiff s
Plaintiff s
numerous
the
medical
Individual
and
medication
complaints.
Defendants'
medication
was
(Id.
suspended,
history,
and
51,
knowledge
awareness
receipt
of
53.)
of
that
numerous
complaints from Plaintiff regarding his discomfort, the Individual
Defendants deprived Plaintiff of the medication and care for a
possible clotting issue.
(Id. SISI 51-53.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) — failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted — Defendant moves
for partial dismissal of the Complaint on a number of grounds.
The Court addresses the Parties' competing positions regarding
dismissal herein.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court tests the legal sufficiency of the Complaint.
Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Davis V. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief" to give the defendant fair notice of both the claim and
the supporting grounds.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555
"detailed
(2007).
Although
factual
allegations" are
not
required. Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555).
^'To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,^ to ^state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'"
U.S. at 570).
allows
the
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
The plaintiff must plead ''factual content that
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
defendant is liable for the misconduct."
inference
Id.
that
the
"The plausibility
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully."
Id.
A plaintiff's pleading obligation "requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do."
at 555.
Twombly, 550 U.S.
"Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked
assertions' devoid of further factual enhancement.'"
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Iqbal, 556
Furthermore, "the
court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)] when, on
the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no' construction of the
factual allegations will support the cause of action."
Marshall
Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174
(11th Cir. 1993).
^ The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint as true and
construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (llth Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court begins with Plaintiff s federal claim — a violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical
need as protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
A. Section 1983 Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need Count I
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims should
be
dismissed
as
to
all
Defendants
because
(1)
the
Eleventh
Amendment grants immunity to the Georgia Department of Corrections
(^'GDC"), the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
{''BOR"),
and
the
Individual
Defendants
in
their
official
capacities; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a Section
1983
violation;
and
(3)
Defendants
are entitled
immunity in their individual capacities.
to
qualified
(Br. Supp. Partial Mot.
to Dismiss, Doc. 43-1, at 5-23.)
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff brings the present action against two government
agencies and the Individual Defendants in both their official and
individual capacities.
Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment
immunity
bars
Plaintiffs
agencies
and
the
capacities.
(Id.
Section
Individual
at
5.)
1983
claims
Defendants
Plaintiff does
in
not
against
their
state
official
dispute
that,
generally, he may only assert a Section 1983 claim against the
8
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
Partial Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 45, at 5-6.)
(Opp'n to
Instead, Plaintiff
argues that Defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
protection for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff's Complaint asserts both
federal
and
state
law
claims,
and
(2)
The
present
action
was
initially filed in state court and removed to federal court. (Id.)
The
Court finds
Amendment
against
neither
immunity
Defendant
argument
prohibits
GDC,
persuasive.
Plaintiff's
Defendant
BOR,
Thus,
Section
and
Eleventh
1983
the
claims
Individual
Defendants in their official capacities.
The Eleventh Amendment states: ''The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. Const, amend. XI. Controlling interpretations
of the Eleventh Amendment firmly "establish that an unconsenting
[sjtate is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. V. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
equally applies to
a
state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity
agencies and
departments.
Id.
Furthermore, Eleventh Amendment immunity "remains in effect when
[s]tate officials are sued for damages in their official capacity."
Kentucky
v.
Graham,
473
U.S.
159,
169 (1985).
The
Eleventh
Amendment bars Section 1983 suits absent state waiver of immunity
or congressional override.
491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
Will v. Mich. Dep^t of State Police,
Plaintiff contends neither that Georgia
has consented to suit under Section 1983 nor that congressional
override permits the claim.
Plaintiff does assert, however, that this matter presents two
exceptions to sovereign immunity.
First, Plaintiff recognizes
that although Graham acknowledged 'Mt]he [Supreme] Court has held
that [Section] 1983 was not intended to abrogate a [s]tate's
Eleventh Amendment Immunity," Graham was before the Supreme Court
^'as if it arose solely under [Section] 1983."
(Opp'n to Partial
Mot. to Dismiss, at 6 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 n.l7).)
Because he asserts both federal and state law claims. Plaintiff
seems to argue that the reasoning in Graham, and Eleventh Amendment
immunity in general, is inapplicable to the present case.
The
Court
is
unfamiliar
with,
and
Plaintiff
offers
Eleventh Circuit authority adopting Plaintiff's position.
no.
Courts
in this Circuit have repeatedly found Eleventh Amendment immunity
despite the action containing both federal and state law claims.
See, e.g.. Gray v. Royal, 181 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1246-47, 1254-55
(S.D.
Ga.
2016);
Marzec
v.
Toulson,
No.
CV
103-185,
2007
WL
1035136, at *3, *8 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2007); Garnett v. Georgia,
No. CV 106-032, 2007 WL 9701364, at *1-3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2007).
As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's assertion of
10
state law claims has no bearing on whether the Eleventh Amendment
protects two governmental entities and the Individual Defendants
in their official capacities from Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims.
Second,
Plaintiff
argues that
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
at 6.)
Defendants'
removal
(Opp'n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss,
In support. Plaintiff directs the Court to Lapides v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
As
the
waived
Eleventh
Circuit
misinterprets Lapides.
has
stated.
Plaintiff's
(Id.)
reasoning
Lapides ^^held that a [s]tate's removal to
federal court waives ^its immunity from a federal forum' — that
is, its immunity from suit, not from liability."
Page v. Hicks,
773 F. App'x 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Stroud v. Mclntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2013)).
In Stroud, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lapides does not
apply to facts presently before this Court.
722 F.3d at 1302.
Lapides addressed sovereign immunity in the context of a state law
claim to which Georgia ^^has explicitly waived immunity from state-
court proceedings."
Id. (citing Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617).
Therefore, Stroud determined Lapides is not controlling where the
claim is federal and the state has not waived immunity protection
as to that federal claim.
Id. at 1299-1302.
Put another way, Stroud recognized two classes of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
First, a state, and arms of the state, are
immune from suit in federal court (^^forum immunity").
11
Id. at 1302-
03.
Second, a state is immune from liability as to certain claims
(^^claim immunity"). Id. In affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim, Stroud found
Lapides's
reasoning
as
to
waiver
of
forum
applicable when federal claims are involved.
immunity
equally
Id. at 1302.
Thus,
by removing the present action, the state actors waived immunity
from suit in federal court.
As to claim immunity, however, Stroud
concluded removal did not constitute waiver.
Similarly, although
GDC,
in
BOR,
and
the
Individual
Defendants
their
official
capacities waived forum immunity, they did not waive claim immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims.
Finding Eleventh Amendment claim immunity applicable and no waiver
of the constitutional protection, dismissal of the Section 1983
claims is proper as to BOR, GDC, and the individual defendants in
their official capacities.^
6 Additionally, the Section 1983 claims against BOR, GDC, and the Individual
Defendants in their official capacities are appropriately dismissed because
Section 1983 does not contemplate liability against them.
Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . , subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proceeding for redress . . . .
The United States Supreme Court has held that "neither a [sjtate nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ^persons' under [Section]
1983."
Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Similar to states and their officials, state
agencies are not "persons" as contained in Section 1983.
Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018).
12
Newton v. Duke Energy
2. Failure to State a Claim and Qualified Immunity
Defendants additionally move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
claiming that (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate
indifference against the Defendants and (2) Individual Defendants
in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.
(Br. Supp. Partial Mot. to Dismiss, at 6-23.)
Qualified
immunity
is
a
judicially
created
affirmative
defense under which ''government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar
as
their
conduct
does
not
violate
clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
For qualified immunity to apply, a public official first has to
show she was "acting within the scope of [her] discretionary
authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred."
Lumley v.
City of Dade Cty., 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
To determine whether a government official was acting
within the scope of her discretionary authority, courts consider
whether the official "was (a) performing a legitimate job-related
function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means
that
were
within
[her]
power
to
utilize."
Holloman
ex
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004).
rel.
Here,
the Parties do not dispute that the Individual Defendants were
13
acting within their discretionary authority, and the Court finds
no reason to conclude otherwise.
Once a defendant establishes that she was "acting within [her]
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate."
Lumley,
327 F.3d at 1194; see also Bowen v. Warden Baldwin State Prison,
826 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying same burden-shifting
framework in Rule 12(b)(6) analysis).
Accordingly, the Court must
look to the Complaint to see if Plaintiff included sufficient facts
demonstrating that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1319.
In doing so, the
Court must consider two issues: (A) "whether, taken in the light
most
favorable
to
[Plaintiff],
the
facts
alleged
show
[Defendants'] conduct violated a constitutional right, and, ([B])
if so, whether the right was clearly established."
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citation
Because the failure to
state a claim argument overlaps with the first prong of the
qualified immunity test, the Court analyzes them together. Keating
V. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 760 (11th Cir. 2010) ("At the
motion to dismiss stage in litigation, 'the qualified immunity
inquiry and the
Rule
12(b)(6) standard become intertwined.")
(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1366
(11th Cir. 1998)).
Here, the constitutional right complained of
14
is an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need."^
In
although
Estelle
v.
Gamble,
the
United
States
Supreme
Court,
not finding deliberate indifference, extended Eighth
Amendment protections to medical care determining a prisoner has
a ''cognizable claim" when the prisoner "allege[s] acts or omissions
sufficiently
harmful
to
serious medical needs."
evidence
deliberate
indifference
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The Parties do
not dispute that Plaintiff makes out a serious medical need.
Supp. Partial Mot. to Dismiss, at 6 n.2.)
to
(Br.
Therefore, at this
stage, only deliberate indifference is at issue.
As to the requirements to successfully state a claim for
deliberate
indifference,
there
is
no
indifference requires "(1) subjective
dispute.
Deliberate
knowledge of a risk of
serious harm; and (2) disregard of that risk (3) by conduct that
is more than mere negligence."
Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff,
Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (llth Cir. 2017).
Subjective
knowledge demands that "the defendant 'must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious
harm
exists,
and
he
must
also
draw
the
inference."
"The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and usual punishment is made applicable
to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment." Carter v. Galloway, 352
F.3d 1346, 1347 n.l (llth Cir. 2003) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962)).
15
Caldwell v» Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 {11th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
In
Eleventh
Circuit decisions,
deliberate
indifference to
medical needs has included: ^Ml) grossly inadequate care; (2) a
decision
to
take
an
easier
but
less
efficacious
course
of
treatment; and (3) medical care that is so cursory as to amount to
no treatment at all.'' Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th
Cir. 2011).
Also, "
[a]negations of a delay in medical care for
^serious and painful injuries' . . . can state a claim for a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, especially where delay in
treating
a
^known
unexplained."
or
obvious'
serious
medical
condition
is
Granda v. Schulman, 372 F. App'x 79, 83 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir.
1994); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990)).
But, ^^a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment."
U.S. at 106.
Estelle, 429
Medical treatment violates the Eighth Amendment only
when it is "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness."
Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986).
Under his-
Section 1983 claims, the Court determines that Plaintiff fails to
state a claim for relief against some Individual Defendants.
16
a. Deliberate Indifference
i. Defendants Chatman, Burnside, and Gore
The analysis begins with the GDCP Individual Defendants:
Warden Bruce Chatman, Dr. Edward Burnside II, and Nurse Mary Gore.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Burnside and Nurse Gore discontinued
Plaintiff's Plavix prescription in preparation for surgery.
The
Complaint is void of any indication that stopping the Plavix
prescription in preparation of surgery was medically improper.
At
that point. Defendant was transferred to ASPM and out of the direct
care of the GDCP Individual Defendants.
Upon returning to GDCP,
the Complaint alleges that Dr. Burnside detected numerous blood
clots, and Defendant was immediately transferred to the Atlanta
Medical Center.
The only wrongful conduct Plaintiff alleges
against Dr. Burnside and Nurse Gore is their failure to advise
ASMP ''as to how long Plaintiff could safely be kept off Plavix and
at what point after surgery he should be placed back on Plavix."
(Compl., H 21.)
At the same time. Plaintiff alleges the personnel
at ASMP knew that Plaintiff was prescribed Plavix and was not
taking it.
Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, the conduct does
not nearly rise to the level required for a constitutional claim.
Based
on
Plaintiff's
allegations,
there
was
no
subjective
knowledge of risk because Dr. Burnside allegedly told Plaintiff
that
ASMP
would
handle
his
concerns
17
regarding
the
Plavix
prescription.
Although
Plaintiff
attempts
to
attribute
to
Defendants Burnside and Gore his complaints made to ASAP personnel
concerning
his
leg^
collective
knowledge
is
not
properly
considered when evaluating a claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical need.
(11th Cir. 2008).
Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F. 3d 1325, 1331
Properly analyzing the alleged conduct of Dr.
Burnside and Nurse Gore as isolated from ASMP, Plaintiff has failed
to state Section 1983 claims against Defendants Burnside and Gore.®
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges supervisory liability and failure
to train against Defendants Burnside and Chatman.
Plaintiff has
not alleged facts sufficient to state a deliberate indifference
claim for conduct occurring while Plaintiff was under the care of
GDCP or showing that Defendants Burnside and Chatman possessed
supervisory authority over persons at ASMP.
Determining Plaintiff
failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against Defendants
Burnside
and
Defendants
Gore,
Burnside
failure to train.
Plaintiff
and
cannot
Chatman
for
state
a
claim
supervisory
against
liability
or
Dang, 871 F.3d at 1283 (supervisory liability
requires underlying violation); Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 955
(11th Cir. 2008) (failure to train requires underlying violation).
®
In
addition
to
the
conduct
not
reaching
the level of a
constitutional
violation, the Court finds no clearly established law advising that the failure
to note the discontinuance of a prescription is unlawful.
Therefore, Dr.
Burnside
and
Nurse
Gore
are
also
entitled
to
qualified
Plaintiff's failure to show the clearly established prong.
18
inununity
due
to
Accordingly,
the
GDCP
Individual
Defendants
are
entitled
to
qualified immunity.
ii. ASMP Medical Officials - Direct Actors
As
for
capacities,
the
the
ASMP
Court
survive dismissal.
to
the
ASMP
medical
personnel
concludes
that
in
their
Plaintiff's
individual
allegations
Defendants argue that, particularly in regard
medical
personnel.
Defendants
did
not
draw
the
inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed.
In
light of the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, the
Court disagrees.
Plaintiff alleges that the treating ASMP personnel were aware
of Plaintiff s medical history; of his Plavix prescription; that
he was no longer taking his Plavix prescription; that if he did
not resume anti-clotting medication. Plaintiff was at risk of
forming blood clots; and that the ASMP medical personnel deprived
Plaintiff
of
his
needed
medication.
These
allegations
make
plausible that the ASMP medical personnel drew the inference that
Plaintiff was at serious risk of forming blood clots without his
medication.
See Kothmann v. Rosario, 558 F. App'x 907, 911-12
(11th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court's denial of motion to
dismiss
medical
indifference
claim
when
complaint
alleged
the
defendant knew of the plaintiff s hormone therapy to treat Gender
Identity Disorder and refused to provide hormone therapy); Weeks
V. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1302-03 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 1986)
19
(finding plaintiff stated a deliberate indifference to serious
medical
need
claim
when
inmate
died
deprivation of necessary medication).
of
heart
attack
after
The plausibility of the
ASMP medical staff's knowledge of the risk is heightened when
considering
that
Plaintiff
repeatedly
complained
of
his
deteriorating condition and expressed concern regarding medication
over a month's time.
See Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th
Cir. 1989).
At this stage, the Court is required to accept Plaintiff's
allegations as true. Although the Court agrees that misdiagnosis,^
failure to apply certain diagnostic testing,
and a disagreement
regarding course of treatment^^ are not grounds to state a Section
1983
claim
for
violation
of
the
Eighth
Amendment;
knowledge
regarding Plaintiff's prescription, the interference with this
medication, and Plaintiff's repeated complaints that his condition
was not improving permits a factfinder to infer that knowledge of
the need for anti-clotting medication and the refusal to provide
the
anti-clotting
medication
constituted
deliberate
^ "[Medical personnel] cannot be held liable for failing to diagnose . . . colon
cancer."
McElliqott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999).
"A medical decision not to order [certain diagnostic tests] does not represent
cruel and unusual punishment."
11 "
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
simple difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical staff
and the inmate as to the letter's diagnosis or course of treatment' does not
support a claim for deliberate indifference." Ross v. Corizon Med. Servs., 700
F. App'x 914, 916 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris v. Thiqpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir. 1991)).
20
indifference.
See McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1258-59
(11th Cir. 1999); Carswell v. Bay Cty., 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th
Cir. 1988).
iii. Wardens Shepard and McGrew - Direct Actors
To
the
extent
Plaintiff
asserts
direct
liability
against
Defendants Shepard and McGrew, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts
to
state
a
appropriate
treatment.
claim.
Prison
measures
to
officials
ensure
a
are
required
to
take
prisoner
receives
adequate
In doing so, prison officials ''are entitled to rely on
medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for
prisoner care.'' Williams v. Limestone Cty., 198 F. App'x 893, 897
(11th Cir. 2006); see also Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (11th
Cir. 1991) ("We do not dispute [a prison official's] right to rely
on medical professionals for clinical determinations.") (emphasis
omitted).
Here,
Defendants
however.
Shepard
Plaintiff
and
McGrew
does
more
deferred
to
than
allege
medical
that
judgment.
Generally, collective knowledge is insufficient to satisfy a claim for
deliberate indifference. Although multiple defendants are named, "imputed or
collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate
indifference. Each individual defendant must be judged separately and on the
basis of what that person kn[ew]." Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331
(11th Cir. 2008). The Court notes that this is a close call because Plaintiff
alleges he complained numerous times to several ASM? Individual Defendants.
Overall, however, Plaintiff contends that each of the ASMP Individual Defendants
were
aware
of
information
concerning
Plaintiff's
medical
history
and
prescription. At this stage, based upon his alleged individual interactions
with the ASMP medical personnel, the Court must accept as true Plaintiff's
allegation that the ASMP Individual Defendants were aware of the information
alleged.
21
Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Shepard and McGrew
deferred to the ASMP medical personnel knowing that the medical
staff
was
acting
with
deliberate
serious medical need.
indifference to
Plaintiff's
The alleged conduct, which the Court is
obligated to accept, states a direct claim against Defendants
Shepard and McGrew for deliberate indifference as direct actors.
See Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007)
(reversing grant of summary judgment for prison official in part
because "[r]ather than take any action or even inquire into the
situation, [prison official] referred [inmate] back to the same
medical staff that [he knew] had ignored her daily requests for
aid").
iv. ASMP Supervisors - Failure to Supervise
The
Eleventh
Circuit
has
solidly
established
that
^^supervisory officials are not liable under [Section] 1983 for the
unconstitutional
acts
of
their
subordinates
respondeat superior or vicarious liability."
193
F.3d
1263,
1269 (11th
quotation marks omitted).
Cir.
on
the
basis
of
Hartley v. Parnell,
1999) (citation
and internal
To impose supervisory liability for
Section 1983 violations, a plaintiff must show either (1) ''the
supervisor
personally
participate[d]
in
the
alleged
unconstitutional conduct" or (2) "there is a causal connection
between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged
22
constitutional deprivation."
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,
1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Court begins with Drs. Young and Fountain.
alleges
sufficient
facts
to
infer
that
each
Plaintiff
personally
participated in his treatment and were aware of his medical and
prescription history.
Plaintiff
states
For the reasons stated above in determining
Section
1983
claims
against
ASMP
medical
personnel, Plaintiff has also stated claims against Drs. Young and
Fountain for supervisory liability through their alleged personal
participation in his treatment.
The
Plaintiff
same
cannot
has
not
be
said
alleged
for
facts
Wardens
that
Shepard
the
Wardens
participated in decisions regarding his treatment.
Plaintiff
may
only
advance
his
supervisory
and
McGrew.
personally
Therefore,
liability
theory
against Defendants Shepard and McGrew by establishing a ''causal
connection" between
the
wardens
actions
and
the
constitutional
violation.^'' The necessary "causal connection" may be established
Although the Court concluded in Section III(A)(2)(a)(iii), supra, that
Plaintiff states a claim against Wardens Shepard and McGrew directly for
deferring to ASMP medical personnel treatment they
knew to be violating
Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the Court finds a difference between Warden
Shepard and McGrew's alleged constitutional violations and the alleged
supervisory liability through the constitutional violations of the ASMP medical
staff. Said another way, there are no allegations that Wardens Shepard and
McGrew personally participated in ASMP medical personnel's knowing deprivation
of
Plaintiff's
medication
and
treatment
but,
instead,
committed
their
own
constitutional violations by deferring to ASMP medical personnel's treatment
knowing it to be a constitutional violation.
The following "causal connection" analysis equally applies to Drs. Young and
Fountain.
23
by
showing:
(1)
''a
history
of
widespread
abuse
put[]
the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
[constitutional] deprivation, and he fail[ed] to do so"; (2) ^^a
supervisor's
custom
or
policy
result[ed]
in
deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights"; or (3) "facts support an
inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and
failed to stop them from doing so." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (11th
Cir. 2003)).
Under any of the enumerated theories for supervisory
liability, "the standard by which a supervisor is held liable in
his individual capacity for the actions of a
extremely rigorous."
subordinate is
Id. (citation omitted).
First, Plaintiff has not alleged a history of widespread
abuse.
Second, although Plaintiff asserts in conclusory terms
that a policy or custom resulted in deliberate indifference, no
factual
allegations
though,
to
prove
constitutional
yield
that
harm,
incidents . . . or
a
that
a
interpretation.
policy
plaintiff
multiple
particular employee . . . ."
reports
or
its
must
of
"Either
absence
point
prior
way,
caused
to
a
multiple
misconduct
by
a
Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., 923 F.3d
947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). "A single
incident of a constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a
policy
or
custom
even
when
the
24
incident
involves
several
Id♦
subordinates."
1312
(quoting Craig v.
Floyd Cty.,
(11th Cir. 2011) ) ; accord Goebert,
plaintiff
failed
to
meet
extremely
643 F.3d 1306,
510 F.3d at 1332
rigorous'
(finding
standard
for
supervisory liability" when plaintiff failed to show any other
inmate exposed to policy or custom violating the Eighth Amendment) .
The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff states a claim under
the third prong.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Shepard and
McGrew had supervisory authority over the ASMP medical personnel
and
knew
all
of
the
same
facts
Plaintiff's medical history,
and the time lapsed.
as
true,
a
the medical
prescription,
(Compl., SI 60. )
factfinder
could
staff
did
regarding
continued complaints,
Accepting these allegations
conclude
that
Wardens
Shepard
and
McGrew were aware that ASMP medical personnel's conduct violated
the
Constitution
proscribe
that
C[S]upervisors
and
Defendants
Shepard
conduct.
Contra
were
on
not
any
and
Cottone,
McGrew
326
notice
of
failed
F.3d
at
to
1362
[subordinates']
unconstitutional conduct so as to put the supervisors on notice of
the
need
to
correct
or
stop
the
conduct
of
[subordinates]
by
further training or supervision."); Cameron v. Allen, 525 F. Supp.
2d
1302,
1307
correctional
(M.D.
Ala.
officials
a
2007)
(''The
law
does
not
impose
duty to directly supervise health care
personnel,
to set treatment policy for the medical staff,
intervene
in
treatment
upon
decisions
25
where
they
have
no
or to
actual
knowledge
that
intervention
is
necessary
to
prevent
a
constitutional wrong.").
V. ASMP - Failure to Train
Next,
Plaintiff
alleges
Young,
Fountain,
Shepard and McGrew are liable for failure to train.
''^As the
Supreme Court has indicated,
that
Defendants
^a supervisor's culpability for a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns
on a failure to train.'"
Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034,
1053 (llth Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
61 (2011)).
'MU]nder [Section] 1983, a supervisor can be held
liable for failing to train his or her employees ^only where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom the [supervisors] come into contact.'"
Id.
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Therefore, an allegation of ''a constitutional violation premised
on a failure to train must demonstrate that the supervisor had
^actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their
training program causes his or her employees to violate citizens'
constitutional
rights,'"
and,
despite
that
knowledge,
supervisor chose to retain that training program."
"the
Id. at 1052
(quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61). "Actual or constructive notice"
generally requires "a pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees."
Id. at 1053 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S.
at 62).
26
Plaintiff alleges no non-conclusory facts that demonstrate a
pattern
of
ASM?
rights.
Instead, Plaintiff relies on a particular exception set
forth in Harris.
personnel
violating
inmates'
489 U.S. at 390 n.lO.
constitutional
The exception addresses
''moral certainties," such as the need to train police officers in
the constitutional limitations of deadly force.
Id.
No such moral
certainty is present regarding Plaintiff's treatment.
personnel
inherently
receive
training
regarding
Medical
prescribing
medication, such as Plavix's use for treating clotting issues,
outside of the prison setting.
allege
a
employees.
pattern
of
Additionally, Plaintiff does not
constitutional
violations
by
untrained
The Complaint's allegations do not meet the moral
certainty exception or otherwise state a constitutional claim for
failure to train.
b. Clearly Established
Qualified immunity bars government officials' liability for
civil damages so long "as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights."
Morris v. Town
of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pearson
V. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
A right is clearly
established where it would be clear to a reasonable person in the
defendant's position that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted.
Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1359; see also Valderrama v.
Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 2015) ("A principle of
27
constitutional law can be ^clearly established' even if there are
^notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and
the cases then before the [c]ourt, so long as the prior decisions
gave
reasonable
warning
that
the
conduct
at
issue
violated
constitutional rights.'") (quoting Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1277).
As stated herein, Plaintiff has pleaded a violation of his
rights under the Eighth Amendment against ASMP personnel.
The
remaining question is whether the state of the law at the time of
the alleged constitutional violation gave ASMP Defendants ^^fair
warning" that the treatment in question was unconstitutional.
Hope V. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731 (2002).
See
Defendants argue that
when viewing the specific alleged conduct, they were not on notice
their conduct was unconstitutional.
This district has determined ^^a reasonable person would know
that an exceptionally long delay in providing a diabetic inmate
with
medical care
in
light of a
serious,
constitutes a constitutional violation."
painful leg
injury
Walsh v. Jeff Davis Cty.,
No. CV 210-075, 2012 WL 12952564, at *16 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2012)
(ten-day delay) (citing Brown, 625 F.2d at 1538-39; Aldridge v.
Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Considering
that Walsh addressed diabetes, a known prior condition, the same
logic applies to an inmate with a known clotting condition being
deprived of anti-coagulant medication for approximately one month.
28
Based on the foregoing, the ASMP Individual Defendants' qualified
immunity defense fails at this stage.
B. State Law Claims - Counts II-V
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts a number of state law tort
claims against Defendants.
(Compl.,
67-91.)
Defendants argue
that official immunity applies to the Individual Defendants for
any violation of the state law claims.
Dismiss, at 23-24.)
(Br. Supp. Partial Mot. to
Further, Defendants maintain the Georgia Tort
Claims Act C'GTCA") prohibits recovery of punitive damages.
at 25.)
(Id.
The Court addresses each of Defendants' advanced reasons
for dismissal.
1. Official Immunity
Defendants contend that the Individual Defendants named are
entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act
C'GTCA").
Plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in his
response brief, arguably waiving any opposition to Defendants'
argument. See Zarate v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 307 F. App'x 289, 290
(11th Cir. 2009) (''A party . . . waives an issue by failing to
make any substantive arguments with respect to that issue.")
(citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573
n.6 (11th Cir. 1989)); Horton v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:07CV-1069-WSD-LTW, 2008 WL 11320068, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15,
2008) (citing Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clerk Corp., 325 F.3d
1274, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003); Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d
29
1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001)); Blankenship v. City of Russellville,
No. CV-07-J-0740-IPJ, 2008 WL 11379948, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 7,
2008) (finding claim abandoned in part because the plaintiff failed
to respond to defendant's summary judgment arguments as to that
claim); see also Moore v. Guzman, 362 F. App'x 50, 53 (11th Cir.
2010) (^'[L]itigants abandon arguments raised for the first time in
their reply briefs.")
In his sur-reply brief. Plaintiff claims
deciding the immunity question now is premature because it is
unclear
whether
contractors
or
the
Individual
employees
of
the
Defendants
state.
are
(Doc.
independent
49,
at
7.)
Plaintiff's argument belies his contention in the Complaint that
'Ma]11 Defendants were, at all times relevant to this Action,
persons acting under color of state law." (Compl.,
Pursuant
to
O.C.G.A.
§ 50-21-25(a), "A
state
49-50.)
officer
or
employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his
or her official duties or employment is not subject to lawsuit or
liability therefor."
At all times alleged. Plaintiff was a
prisoner of the State of Georgia and subject to medical care as
such.
In Shekhawat v. Jones, the Supreme Court of Georgia held
that physicians acting within the scope of their state employment
were entitled to official immunity.
746 S.E.2d 89, 93 (Ga. 2013).
Although Plaintiff argues, in his sur-reply brief, that some of
the personnel may be independent contractors, the Complaint is
void of allegations to that effect.
30
Cf. id. at 94 ('MW]e observe
that this case does not present a situation involving physicians
who are state-employed but also engage in some type of outside
private practice.").
Plaintiff presents no additional arguments
that official immunity is inapplicable here.^^
Individual
Defendants
are
entitled
to
Accordingly, the
official
immunity
under
Georgia law as to Plaintiff's state law claims.
2. Punitive Damages
Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for punitive damages
to the extent the punitive damages are derivative of his alleged
state law claims.
First, under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-30, the GTCA
prohibits recovery of punitive damages. Second, ^'punitive damages
are not allowed against a governmental entity." City of Kingsland
V. Grantham, 805 S.E.2d 116, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (citing MARTA
V. Boswell, 405 S.E.2d 869, 869-70 (Ga. 1991)).
In response.
Plaintiff cites Durden v. Newton Cty, No. 1;14—CV—01163—RWS, 2015
WL 71446 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2015), to argue that punitive damages
are permitted here. (Opp'n to Partial Mot. to Dismiss, at 7.) In
Durden, the court denied a private corporation's motion to dismiss
punitive damages against it.
The facts
presented
are
Durden, 2015 WL 71446, at *1, *4.
distinguishable from
Durden because
Plaintiff only named governmental entities in the Complaint and
Plaintiff does not assert that the actions in question were ministerial or
Defendants acted with "actual malice or actual intent to cause injury" so as to
pierce official immunity protections. Richardson v. Quitman Cty., 912 F. Supp.
2d 1354, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (applying Georgia law).
31
does not allege private entities were responsible for providing
care.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for state law
punitive damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants'
partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 43) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Specifically,
the following parties and claims are DISMISSED:
(1) Defendants Warden Bruce Chatman, Dr. Edward Burnside, and
Nurse Mary Gore are dismissed from the lawsuit entirely;
(2) To the extent Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims
against Defendants GDC and BOR, Plaintiff's claims are dismissed;
(3) To the extent Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims
against
the
ASMP
Individual
Defendants
in
their
official
capacities. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed;
(4) To the extent Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 failure to
train claims against Defendants Dr. Kimberly Fountain, Dr. Timothy
Young, Warden Stan Shepard, and Warden Betty McGrew, Plaintiff's
claims are dismissed;
(5) To the extent Plaintiff asserts state tort claims. Counts
II-V, against the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed; and
32
(6) Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages premised upon the
alleged state tort claims is dismissed as to all Defendants.
Consequently, the following claims SHALL PROCEED against the
following Defendants:
(1)
Plaintiff's
Individual
Section
1983
claims
against
the
ASMP
Defendants in their individual capacities as direct
actors;
(2) Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for supervisory liability
against
Defendants
Dr.
Kimberly
Fountain,
Dr.
Timothy Young,
Warden Stan Shepard, and Warden Betty McGrew;
(3) Plaintiff's state law claims against the governmental
entity defendants; and
(4) Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages premised upon
Plaintiff's remaining Section 1983 claims.
The
Clerk
is
DIRECTED
to
TERMINATE
Defendants
Chatman,
Burnside, and Gore as parties and any deadlines and motions
pertaining to them.
The remaining Defendants SHALL file their
answers to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint within FOURTEEN
DAYS of this Order.
The Parties are reminded of United States
Magistrate Judge Epps's Order dated September 20, 2018, regarding
the Rule 26(f) Report.
(Doc. 47.)
33
ORDER
ENTERED
at
Augusta,
Georgia,_ _this
day
September, 2019.
UNITED ^ATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN
34
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
of
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