ABC Loan Co. of Martinez, LLC v. Gruner Enterprises, LLC et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting 19 , 24 , and 28 Motions for Default Judgment, directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $443,080.55, and close this case. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/04/2024. (jlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

ABC LOAN CO. OF MARTINEZ, LLC,

*
★

Plaintiff,

*
*
*

V.

*

GRUNER ENTERPRISES, LLC;

*

CARISMA FINANCIAL CORP.; and

*

ROBERT GRUNER, III,

CV 123-097

*
*

Defendants.

*
*
*

ORDER

Before

the

Court

are

Plaintiff's

motions

for

default

judgment. (Docs. 19, 24, 28.) Defendants have not appeared, pled,
or otherwise defended this action.

For the following reasons.

Plaintiff's motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Because

Defendants

failed

to

respond

to

Plaintiff's

complaint, the Court deems all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint as true for purposes of its analysis.

See Surtain

V. Kamiin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, the Court finds the following facts admitted.
On

February

17,

2022,

the

Parties

entered

a

settlement

agreement resolving litigation in Gruner Enters., LLC v. ABC Loan

Co. of Martinez, LLC, No. CV 121-007 (S.D. Ga. June 5, 2020) (the

"Underlying Action").

(Doc. 1, at 2, 7-14.)

Under the settlement

agreement, Defendants were to pay Plaintiff $500,000.00 in thirtysix equal installments of $13,888.89.

(Id. at 2.)

The settlement

agreement further provided if Defendants failed to timely make a

payment, they would be in default upon receipt of written notice
from Plaintiff and would have ten days thereafter to cure it.

at 3, 9.)

(Id.

If Defendants failed to cure their default, the Parties

agreed Plaintiff's sole remedy would be "the entry of a judgment
in the [Underlying Action] (or a subsequent action initiated by
[Plaintiff], if necessary) equal to the unpaid balance of the

[s]ettlement

[p]ayments

(i.e.,

$500,000.00

minus

[i]nstallment [p]ayments made by [Defendants])."
10.)

the

total

(Id. at 3, 9-

But the Parties also agreed, if legal action was required to

enforce the settlement agreement, "the prevailing Party shall be
entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."
(Id. at 3, 11.)

Defendants failed to make the installment payments due on

October 15, 2022 and November 15, 2022.
time.

Plaintiff

provided

Defendants

(I^ at 3, 20-21.)
written

notice

of

Each
their

default and informed them they had ten business days from the date

they received the written notice to cure it.
failed to do so.

(Id. at 3.)

(Id.)

Defendants

Thus, on May 1, 2023, Plaintiff

sent Defendants written notice that the outstanding balance was

due and payable in full and, if they did not pay the outstanding
balance in full within ten days of receiving the notice, they would

be responsible for paying costs and reasonable attorney's fees
under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11.

(Id. at 3, 27-29.)

failed to cure their default.

Defendants again

(Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 20, 2023, asserting two
claims: (1) breach of contract; and (2) attorney's fees pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11.

(Id. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff seeks $443,080.55

in damages, including $402,777.77 Defendants owe Plaintiff under
the settlement agreement and $40,302.78 in attorney's fees and
costs.

(Id. at 4-5.)

Defendants Gruner Enterprises, LLC (''Gruner

Enterprises") and Carisma Financial Corp. ("Carisma") were served

on" July 22, 2023.

(Doc. 10, at 1, 3; Doc. 11, at 1, 3.)

On

November 1, 2023, Plaintiff moved for Clerk's entry of default

against Defendants Gruner Enterprises and Carisma, and the Clerk
entered default against them the same day.

(Docs. 12, 13.)

On October 13, 2023, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time
to serve Defendant Robert Gruner, III ("Gruner") by publication

based on evidence he was attempting to evade service.

(Doc. 9.)

The Court found Defendant Gruner was likely evading service and

granted Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. 14.)

The Clerk served Defendant

Gruner by publication on November 8, 2023.

(Doc. 17.)

On January

9, 2024, Plaintiff moved for Clerk's entry of default against

Defendant Gruner, and the Clerk entered default against him the

following day.

{Docs. 22, 23.)

On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for default

judgment against Defendants Gruner Enterprises and Carisma, and on

January 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment
against Defendant Gruner. (Docs. 19, 24.) Because Plaintiff seeks
attorney's fees, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file detailed
documentation of the fees and costs it incurred and deferred ruling

on Plaintiff's motions.

(Doc. 27.)

On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff

complied with the Court's April 10, 2024 Order, and the Court took
Plaintiff's motions under advisement.

(Doc. 28.)

However, in

considering Plaintiff's motions, the Court discovered Plaintiff
inadequately pled diversity jurisdiction and ordered Plaintiff to
file

a

supplemental

brief

that

properly

listed

Plaintiff,

Defendant Gruner Enterprises, and Defendant Gruner's citizenships.
(Doc. 29.)

The Court once again deferred ruling on Plaintiff's

motions for default judgment until Plaintiff complied with the

Court's April 25, 2024 Order.

(Id. at 4.)

supplemental brief on May 15, 2024.

Plaintiff filed its

(Doc. 30.)

The Court can now

address Plaintiff's motions for default judgment.
28.)

(Docs. 19, 24,

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), "a court may

enter default judgment against a defendant when (1) both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction exist, (2) the allegations in the
complaint

state

a

claim

plaintiff

shows

the

against the

damages

to

defendant,

which

it

is

and

(3)

entitled."

the
Senn

Brothers, Inc. v. Heavenly Produce Palace LLC, No. CV 119-196,

2020 WL 2115805, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 4, 2020) {citing Pitts ex
rel. Pitts V. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356-58

(S.D. Ga. 2004)).

Final judgment is appropriate so long as ''the

pleadings state a substantive cause of action and contain a
sufficient basis to support the relief sought."

Kennedy v. NILA

Invs., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-090, 2020 WL 3578362, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July
1, 2020) (citing Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x
860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245

(holding default judgment is merited
sufficient

basis

in

the

only "when

pleadings for

the

there is a

judgment

entered"

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Further,

a

"defaulted

defendant

is

deemed

to

admit

the

plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact" set forth in the
complaint.

Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Cotton v. Mass.

Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005)); Eagle
Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307

(11th

Cir.

2009)

("A

defendant,

by

his

default,

admits

the

plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on

those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on
appeal the facts thus established." {internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

Although well-pleaded allegations of fact are

deemed admitted, a defendant "is not held to admit facts that are

not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law."

Surtain, 789

F.3d at 1245 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As stated previously. Defendants failed to appear, plead, or
otherwise defend themselves in this action.

Accordingly, default

judgment is appropriate if the requirements are met.

See Senn

Brothers, 2020 WL 2115805, at *1 (citation omitted).

The Court

addresses each requirement in turn.
A. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court first considers jurisdiction and venue.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Venue

Plaintiff filed its complaint on July 20, 2023, invoking the

Court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1, at 1.)

(Doc.

Section 1332 provides district courts subject-matter

jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states where
the

amount

§ 1332(a)(1).

in

controversy

exceeds

$75,000.00.

28

U.S.C.

Plaintiff is a limited liability company ("LLC")

whose sole member — Georgia Finco Holding Corporation — is a

corporation incorporated and with its principal place of business

in Georgia.

{Doc. 30, H 18.)

Therefore, Plaintiff is a Georgia

citizen for § 1332 purposes.

See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v.

Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

Defendants are all citizens of

Texas because: (1) Defendant Gruner resides in Texas and intends

to remain there indefinitely; (2) Defendant Gruner Enterprises is
an LLC whose sole member is Defendant Gruner, a Texas citizen; and

(3) Defendant Carisma is a corporation that is incorporated and

has its principal place of business in Texas.

(Doc. 30, HH 19-

21); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted); Rol1ing Greens, 374 F.3d at 1022; 28

U.S.C.

§

1332(c)(1).

Moreover,

Plaintiff

$443,080.55 under the settlement agreement,
controversy requirement is met.

seeks

damages

of

so the amount-in-

(Doc. 1, at 3.)

Therefore, 28

U.S.C. § 1332 provides the Court subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's complaint.

Additionally, venue is proper in the Augusta Division of the
Southern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because
the settlement agreement was formed to resolve litigation then
pending before this Court.

(See id. at 2-3.)

2. Personal Jurisdiction

The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

To

determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to personal

jurisdiction, the Court must perform a two-part analysis.

United

Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009).
First, the Court must determine whether the exercise of personal

jurisdiction is proper under the forum state's long-arm statute as
that statute would be interpreted by the state's supreme court.

Id.

Next, the Court must determine whether there are sufficient

"minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash.

Off, of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
a. Georgia's Long-Arm Statute

Georgia's long-arm statute provides in relevant part;
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction

over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts[ or] omissions
enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as

if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person
or through an agent, he or she:

(1) Transacts any business within this state[.]
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. To exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who transacts business within Georgia, Plaintiff must
establish:

[(1)] the nonresident must have purposefully done an act
or consummated a transaction in Georgia; [(2)] the cause
of action must arise from or be connected with such act

or transaction; and [(3)] the exercise of jurisdiction

by the courts of this state must not offend traditional
[notions of] fairness and substantial justice.
Gateway Atlanta Apartments, Inc. v. Harris, 660 S.E.2d 750, 757

(Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).

The Court finds each of these requirements met.

First, by-

negotiating and agreeing to the terms of the settlement agreement

in the Underlying Action, Defendants purposefully acted or engaged
in a transaction in Georgia.

See Innovative Clinical & Consulting

Servs., LLC v. First Nat^l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga.

2005) (holding "O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) grants Georgia courts the
unlimited authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident who transacts any business in this State," subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment's constraints (emphasis added)).
this

case

asserts

a

breach

of

contract

claim

Second,

arising

from

Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff as required by the settlement

agreement, satisfying the second prong.

(Doc. 1, at 3-4.)

Third,

on the facts and for the reasons discussed in further detail below,

the Court finds the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not
offend traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.
See Lima Delta Co. v. Glob. Aerospace, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 135, 140-

41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265,
1277 (11th Cir. 2022) (applying factors substantially similar to

those

applied

exercising

in

Lima

Delta).

personal jurisdiction

Therefore,

the

over Defendants

Court

finds

proper

under

Georgia's long-arm statute.
b. Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause

Turning
analysis,

the

to

the

second part of

the

personal jurisdiction

Court finds Defendants have sufficient "minimum

contacts" with Georgia to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.

may

exercise

See Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.

two

forms

of

personal

"A federal court

jurisdiction:

jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction."

Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz

USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1208 {S.D. Fla. 2021).
individual,

the

paradigm

forum

for

the

jurisdiction is the individual's domicile."
571

U.S.

117,

137

(2014)

(citations

general

exercise

"[F]or an
of

general

Daimler AG v. Bauman,

omitted).

And

general

jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign corporation only where
the

corporation's

"affiliations

with

the

[s]tate

are

so

'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum [sjtate."

Id. at 139 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).

General

jurisdiction does not apply here because Defendant Gruner is
domiciled in Texas, and there is no indication Defendants Gruner

Enterprises

or

Carisma

systematic"

affiliations

have

the

with

requisite

Georgia

essehtially at home in the state.
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137, 139.

that

"continuous
would

make

and
them

(Doc. 30, HH 19-21); see

Thus, the Court must have specific

jurisdiction to have personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
To

determine

whether

the

Court

may

exercise

specific

jurisdiction over Defendants, it examines whether (1) Plaintiff's
claim "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to" one of Defendants' contacts

with

Georgia;

(2)

the

nonresident
10

Defendants

"purposefully

availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in

Georgia; and (3) "the exercise of personal jurisdiction is in
accordance with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice."

Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

The Court finds each of these prongs is

met.

"The first prong — which addresses the concept of relatedness
— focuses on the causal relationship between the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation."
citation omitted).

Id. (internal quotation marks and

Although direct causation is not required, the

first prong is satisfied because Plaintiff's breach of contract

claim

arises directly from

Defendants'

contact

with Georgia;

specifically, the creation of the settlement agreement in the
Underlying Action and their alleged breach of that agreement.
(Doc. 1, at 2-4); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021) ("[W]e have never framed the

specific

jurisdiction

inquiry

as

always

requiring

proof

of

causation — i.e., proof that the plaintiff's claim came about
because of the defendant's in-state conduct." (citation omitted)).

"As to the second prong — which concerns purposeful availment

— there are two applicable tests: the effects test and the minimum
contacts test."

Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275-76 (citing Calder v.

Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984)).

Since Plaintiff's only claim is a
11

breach

of

contract

claim

and

the

effects

test

concerns

a

nonresident defendant's tortious conduct in the forum state, only

the

minimum

contacts

test

applies

here.

(Doc.

1,

at

3-4);

Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285-88 (11th Cir. 2008).
The

minimum

defendant's

whether

contacts
contacts

those

test
with

assesses
the

contacts

the

forum

(1)

are

nonresident

state

and

related

asks

to

the

plaintiff's cause of action; (2) involve some act by
which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the

privileges of doing business within the forum; and (3)
are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in the forum.

Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1276 (citation omitted).

To apply this

test, the Court identifies all relevant contacts Defendants have

with Georgia and asks whether those contacts, individually or
collectively, satisfy the criteria.

Id. (citation omitted).

Relevant here. Defendants' contacts with Georgia are: (1)

they

negotiated

and

agreed

to

a

settlement agreement in

the

Underlying Action with Plaintiff, a Georgia resident; (2) they
made some payments to Plaintiff as required under the settlement
agreement;

and

(3)

they

allegedly

breached

the

settlement

agreement by defaulting and not curing their default, causing
injury to Plaintiff.

(See Doc. 1, at 2-3.)

The Court finds these

contacts sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.
Valle, 56 F.4th at 1276 (citation omitted).
above.

Plaintiff's

Defendants'

contacts

cause
with

of

action

the

12

forum.

See Del

First, as explained

arises

directly

Second,

from

Defendants

"deliberately 'reached out beyond' [their] home" by "entering a
contractual relationship" in Georgia, thus availing themselves of

the

benefits

and

protections

enforcement of contracts.

of

Georgia's

laws

regarding

Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).

Because Defendants

later allegedly breached this contract, there is "an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy" sufficient to
find Defendants' contacts satisfy the second prong.

Id. (quoting

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582

U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).

Third, as Defendants negotiated, finalized,

and entered the settlement agreement with Plaintiff to resolve the

Underlying Action, Defendants could have reasonably anticipated
being

subject

to

suit

here

if

they

breached

the

settlement

agreement.

Because each criterion of the minimum contacts test is

satisfied,

the

Court

finds

Defendants

purposefully

availed

themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Georgia.
See Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275, 1276 (citation omitted).

The

whether

third

prong

exercising

of

the

specific

jurisdiction

analysis —

jurisdiction over Defendants comports

"traditional notions of

fair

play and

with

substantial justice" —

considers four factors: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the

forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; and (4) the

judicial system's interest in resolving the dispute."
13

Id. at 1277

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).

supports

exercising

personal

Each of these factors

jurisdiction

over

Defendants.

Although Defendants are Texas residents, they seamlessly litigated
the Underlying Action in this Court for over a year, so any burden
on them is insignificant.

(See Doc. 1, at 2); Gruner Enters., LLC

V. ABC Loan Co. of Martinez, LLC, No. CV 121-007, Docs. 46-88 (S.D.

Ga. Jan. 8, 2021).

The Court finds any burden Defendants may

suffer from litigating in this Court is outweighed by Plaintiff's
interest

in

obtaining

convenient

and

effective

relief

and

Georgia's and this Court's interests in resolving this dispute,
which concerns a contract created in Georgia, related to a case

previously before this Court, and a breach which injured a Georgia
resident.

exercising

(Doc. 1, at 2-4.)

For these reasons, the Court finds

specific jurisdiction over Defendants accords

with

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the

third prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis is satisfied.
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

jurisdiction over Defendants.

Court

finds

it

has

personal

Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.

B. Liability

Since

the

jurisdictional

requirements

are

satisfied,

the

Court turns to the merits of the motions for default judgment.

Plaintiff asserts a single breach of contract claim.

3-4.)

(Doc. 1, at

Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are outlined above in
14

the background section.

Based on those facts, the Court finds

Plaintiff sufficiently stated a breach of contract claim.
"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are

the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who

has the right to complain about the contract being broken."

Norton

V. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 705 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010)

(citations

omitted).

Defendants

breached

the

settlement

agreement by not making installment payments in October or November
of 2022 and not curing their default within ten days of receiving
written notice from Plaintiff.

(Doc. 1, at 2-4.)

Defendants'

breach resulted in damages to Plaintiff, which the Court explains

in more detail below, and Plaintiff is the party who has the right
to complain of the breach.

(Id. at 3-4.)

Therefore, Defendants

are jointly and severally liable for any damages.
C. Damages

Even with a default judgment, "[a] court has an obligation to
assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it
enters."

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266

(11th Cir. 2003).

But a court need not conduct an evidentiary

hearing when "the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum
that can be made certain by computation."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1);

S.E.C. V. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff

requests the Court award $443,080.55 in damages, which accounts
for the unpaid balance of $402,777.77 Defendants owe Plaintiff

15

under the settlement agreement and $40,302.78 in attorney's fees
and costs.

at 2.)

(Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 19, at 2; Doc. 24, at 2; Doc. 28,

Plaintiff contends it can be awarded these damages without

the Court holding an evidentiary hearing because they are easily
computed.

(Doc. 19, at 3; Doc. 24, at 2.)

The Court agrees.

As for the outstanding balance, these damages are easily
calculated because they are the total settlement amount from the

settlement agreement minus the amount Plaintiff already received
from Defendants, which Plaintiff represents is $402,777.77.
1, at 4; Doc. 19, at 1-2; Doc. 24, at 2.)

fees and costs Plaintiff

(Doc.

Although the attorney's

seeks require slightly more

work to

calculate, they still fall under the category of calculable damages

the

Court

may

award

without

first

conducting

an

evidentiary

hearing.

O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 provides, in relevant part:

Obligations to pay attorney's fees upon any note or other
evidence of indebtedness, in addition to the rate of

interest
specified
therein,
shall
be
valid
and
enforceable and collectable as a part of such debt if
such note or other evidence of indebtedness is collected

by or through an attorney after maturity, subject to .
. . the following provisions:

2. If such note or other evidence of indebtedness

provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's
fees without specifying any specific percent, such
provision shall be construed to mean 15 percent of
the first $500.00 of principal and interest owing
on such note or other evidence of indebtedness and

16

10 percent of the amount of principal and interest
owing thereon in excess of $500.00; and
3.

The

holder

of

the

note

or

other

evidence

of

indebtedness or his or her attorney at law shall,
after maturity of the obligation, notify in writing
the maker, endorser, or party sought to be held on
said obligation that the provisions relative to
payment of attorney's fees in addition to the
principal and interest shall be enforced and that
such maker, endorser, or party sought to be held on
said obligation has ten days from the receipt of
such notice to pay the principal and interest
without the attorney's fees.
If the maker,
endorser, or party sought to be held on any such
obligation shall pay the principal and interest in
full before the expiration of such time, then the
obligation to pay the attorney's fees shall be void
and

no court shall enforce

the

agreement.

The

refusal of a debtor to accept delivery of the notice
specified in this paragraph shall be the equivalent
of such notice.

O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(2)-(3).

The settlement agreement provides that, if legal action is
necessary to enforce it, "the prevailing Party shall be entitled
to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."

4, 11.)

{Doc. 1, at

On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff provided Defendants notice of

its intent to collect attorney's fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-

1-11 and gave Defendants ten days from their receipt of the notice
to pay the balance owed, but Defendants did not comply.
4,

27-29.)

Because

Plaintiff

satisfied

the

(Id. at

requirements

of

O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees

and costs totaling $40,302.77, which represents 15% of the first
$500.00

owed

($75.00)

and

10%

17

of

the

remaining

balance

of

$402,277.77 ($40,227.77).

together

with

the

O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(2).

Therefore,

outstanding settlement agreement balance

of

$402,777.77, Plaintiff shall recover a total of $443,080.55.

IV. CONCLUSION

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff's motions for default judgment (Docs. 19, 24, 28) are
GRANTED.

The

Clerk

is

DIRECTED

to

ENTER

JUDGMENT

in favor

of

Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount
of $443,080.55 and CLOSE this case.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

day of June,

2024.

HONORABLE

J.

RAN

HALL

UNITED/ STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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