ABC Loan Co. of Martinez, LLC v. Gruner Enterprises, LLC et al
Filing
31
ORDER granting 19 , 24 , and 28 Motions for Default Judgment, directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $443,080.55, and close this case. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/04/2024. (jlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
ABC LOAN CO. OF MARTINEZ, LLC,
*
★
Plaintiff,
*
*
*
V.
*
GRUNER ENTERPRISES, LLC;
*
CARISMA FINANCIAL CORP.; and
*
ROBERT GRUNER, III,
CV 123-097
*
*
Defendants.
*
*
*
ORDER
Before
the
Court
are
Plaintiff's
motions
for
default
judgment. (Docs. 19, 24, 28.) Defendants have not appeared, pled,
or otherwise defended this action.
For the following reasons.
Plaintiff's motions are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Because
Defendants
failed
to
respond
to
Plaintiff's
complaint, the Court deems all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint as true for purposes of its analysis.
See Surtain
V. Kamiin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the Court finds the following facts admitted.
On
February
17,
2022,
the
Parties
entered
a
settlement
agreement resolving litigation in Gruner Enters., LLC v. ABC Loan
Co. of Martinez, LLC, No. CV 121-007 (S.D. Ga. June 5, 2020) (the
"Underlying Action").
(Doc. 1, at 2, 7-14.)
Under the settlement
agreement, Defendants were to pay Plaintiff $500,000.00 in thirtysix equal installments of $13,888.89.
(Id. at 2.)
The settlement
agreement further provided if Defendants failed to timely make a
payment, they would be in default upon receipt of written notice
from Plaintiff and would have ten days thereafter to cure it.
at 3, 9.)
(Id.
If Defendants failed to cure their default, the Parties
agreed Plaintiff's sole remedy would be "the entry of a judgment
in the [Underlying Action] (or a subsequent action initiated by
[Plaintiff], if necessary) equal to the unpaid balance of the
[s]ettlement
[p]ayments
(i.e.,
$500,000.00
minus
[i]nstallment [p]ayments made by [Defendants])."
10.)
the
total
(Id. at 3, 9-
But the Parties also agreed, if legal action was required to
enforce the settlement agreement, "the prevailing Party shall be
entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."
(Id. at 3, 11.)
Defendants failed to make the installment payments due on
October 15, 2022 and November 15, 2022.
time.
Plaintiff
provided
Defendants
(I^ at 3, 20-21.)
written
notice
of
Each
their
default and informed them they had ten business days from the date
they received the written notice to cure it.
failed to do so.
(Id. at 3.)
(Id.)
Defendants
Thus, on May 1, 2023, Plaintiff
sent Defendants written notice that the outstanding balance was
due and payable in full and, if they did not pay the outstanding
balance in full within ten days of receiving the notice, they would
be responsible for paying costs and reasonable attorney's fees
under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11.
(Id. at 3, 27-29.)
failed to cure their default.
Defendants again
(Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 20, 2023, asserting two
claims: (1) breach of contract; and (2) attorney's fees pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11.
(Id. at 3-4.)
Plaintiff seeks $443,080.55
in damages, including $402,777.77 Defendants owe Plaintiff under
the settlement agreement and $40,302.78 in attorney's fees and
costs.
(Id. at 4-5.)
Defendants Gruner Enterprises, LLC (''Gruner
Enterprises") and Carisma Financial Corp. ("Carisma") were served
on" July 22, 2023.
(Doc. 10, at 1, 3; Doc. 11, at 1, 3.)
On
November 1, 2023, Plaintiff moved for Clerk's entry of default
against Defendants Gruner Enterprises and Carisma, and the Clerk
entered default against them the same day.
(Docs. 12, 13.)
On October 13, 2023, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time
to serve Defendant Robert Gruner, III ("Gruner") by publication
based on evidence he was attempting to evade service.
(Doc. 9.)
The Court found Defendant Gruner was likely evading service and
granted Plaintiff's motion. (Doc. 14.)
The Clerk served Defendant
Gruner by publication on November 8, 2023.
(Doc. 17.)
On January
9, 2024, Plaintiff moved for Clerk's entry of default against
Defendant Gruner, and the Clerk entered default against him the
following day.
{Docs. 22, 23.)
On November 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for default
judgment against Defendants Gruner Enterprises and Carisma, and on
January 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment
against Defendant Gruner. (Docs. 19, 24.) Because Plaintiff seeks
attorney's fees, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file detailed
documentation of the fees and costs it incurred and deferred ruling
on Plaintiff's motions.
(Doc. 27.)
On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff
complied with the Court's April 10, 2024 Order, and the Court took
Plaintiff's motions under advisement.
(Doc. 28.)
However, in
considering Plaintiff's motions, the Court discovered Plaintiff
inadequately pled diversity jurisdiction and ordered Plaintiff to
file
a
supplemental
brief
that
properly
listed
Plaintiff,
Defendant Gruner Enterprises, and Defendant Gruner's citizenships.
(Doc. 29.)
The Court once again deferred ruling on Plaintiff's
motions for default judgment until Plaintiff complied with the
Court's April 25, 2024 Order.
(Id. at 4.)
supplemental brief on May 15, 2024.
Plaintiff filed its
(Doc. 30.)
The Court can now
address Plaintiff's motions for default judgment.
28.)
(Docs. 19, 24,
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), "a court may
enter default judgment against a defendant when (1) both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction exist, (2) the allegations in the
complaint
state
a
claim
plaintiff
shows
the
against the
damages
to
defendant,
which
it
is
and
(3)
entitled."
the
Senn
Brothers, Inc. v. Heavenly Produce Palace LLC, No. CV 119-196,
2020 WL 2115805, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 4, 2020) {citing Pitts ex
rel. Pitts V. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356-58
(S.D. Ga. 2004)).
Final judgment is appropriate so long as ''the
pleadings state a substantive cause of action and contain a
sufficient basis to support the relief sought."
Kennedy v. NILA
Invs., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-090, 2020 WL 3578362, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July
1, 2020) (citing Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App'x
860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245
(holding default judgment is merited
sufficient
basis
in
the
only "when
pleadings for
the
there is a
judgment
entered"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Further,
a
"defaulted
defendant
is
deemed
to
admit
the
plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact" set forth in the
complaint.
Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Cotton v. Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005)); Eagle
Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1307
(11th
Cir.
2009)
("A
defendant,
by
his
default,
admits
the
plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on
those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on
appeal the facts thus established." {internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
Although well-pleaded allegations of fact are
deemed admitted, a defendant "is not held to admit facts that are
not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law."
Surtain, 789
F.3d at 1245 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
As stated previously. Defendants failed to appear, plead, or
otherwise defend themselves in this action.
Accordingly, default
judgment is appropriate if the requirements are met.
See Senn
Brothers, 2020 WL 2115805, at *1 (citation omitted).
The Court
addresses each requirement in turn.
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court first considers jurisdiction and venue.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Venue
Plaintiff filed its complaint on July 20, 2023, invoking the
Court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1, at 1.)
(Doc.
Section 1332 provides district courts subject-matter
jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states where
the
amount
§ 1332(a)(1).
in
controversy
exceeds
$75,000.00.
28
U.S.C.
Plaintiff is a limited liability company ("LLC")
whose sole member — Georgia Finco Holding Corporation — is a
corporation incorporated and with its principal place of business
in Georgia.
{Doc. 30, H 18.)
Therefore, Plaintiff is a Georgia
citizen for § 1332 purposes.
See Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v.
Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
Defendants are all citizens of
Texas because: (1) Defendant Gruner resides in Texas and intends
to remain there indefinitely; (2) Defendant Gruner Enterprises is
an LLC whose sole member is Defendant Gruner, a Texas citizen; and
(3) Defendant Carisma is a corporation that is incorporated and
has its principal place of business in Texas.
(Doc. 30, HH 19-
21); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted); Rol1ing Greens, 374 F.3d at 1022; 28
U.S.C.
§
1332(c)(1).
Moreover,
Plaintiff
$443,080.55 under the settlement agreement,
controversy requirement is met.
seeks
damages
of
so the amount-in-
(Doc. 1, at 3.)
Therefore, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 provides the Court subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's complaint.
Additionally, venue is proper in the Augusta Division of the
Southern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because
the settlement agreement was formed to resolve litigation then
pending before this Court.
(See id. at 2-3.)
2. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
To
determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction, the Court must perform a two-part analysis.
United
Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009).
First, the Court must determine whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is proper under the forum state's long-arm statute as
that statute would be interpreted by the state's supreme court.
Id.
Next, the Court must determine whether there are sufficient
"minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash.
Off, of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
a. Georgia's Long-Arm Statute
Georgia's long-arm statute provides in relevant part;
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts[ or] omissions
enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as
if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person
or through an agent, he or she:
(1) Transacts any business within this state[.]
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. To exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who transacts business within Georgia, Plaintiff must
establish:
[(1)] the nonresident must have purposefully done an act
or consummated a transaction in Georgia; [(2)] the cause
of action must arise from or be connected with such act
or transaction; and [(3)] the exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts of this state must not offend traditional
[notions of] fairness and substantial justice.
Gateway Atlanta Apartments, Inc. v. Harris, 660 S.E.2d 750, 757
(Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
The Court finds each of these requirements met.
First, by-
negotiating and agreeing to the terms of the settlement agreement
in the Underlying Action, Defendants purposefully acted or engaged
in a transaction in Georgia.
See Innovative Clinical & Consulting
Servs., LLC v. First Nat^l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga.
2005) (holding "O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) grants Georgia courts the
unlimited authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nonresident who transacts any business in this State," subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment's constraints (emphasis added)).
this
case
asserts
a
breach
of
contract
claim
Second,
arising
from
Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff as required by the settlement
agreement, satisfying the second prong.
(Doc. 1, at 3-4.)
Third,
on the facts and for the reasons discussed in further detail below,
the Court finds the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not
offend traditional notions of fairness and substantial justice.
See Lima Delta Co. v. Glob. Aerospace, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 135, 140-
41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265,
1277 (11th Cir. 2022) (applying factors substantially similar to
those
applied
exercising
in
Lima
Delta).
personal jurisdiction
Therefore,
the
over Defendants
Court
finds
proper
under
Georgia's long-arm statute.
b. Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
Turning
analysis,
the
to
the
second part of
the
personal jurisdiction
Court finds Defendants have sufficient "minimum
contacts" with Georgia to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
may
exercise
See Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.
two
forms
of
personal
"A federal court
jurisdiction:
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction."
Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1208 {S.D. Fla. 2021).
individual,
the
paradigm
forum
for
the
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile."
571
U.S.
117,
137
(2014)
(citations
general
exercise
"[F]or an
of
general
Daimler AG v. Bauman,
omitted).
And
general
jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign corporation only where
the
corporation's
"affiliations
with
the
[s]tate
are
so
'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum [sjtate."
Id. at 139 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
General
jurisdiction does not apply here because Defendant Gruner is
domiciled in Texas, and there is no indication Defendants Gruner
Enterprises
or
Carisma
systematic"
affiliations
have
the
with
requisite
Georgia
essehtially at home in the state.
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137, 139.
that
"continuous
would
make
and
them
(Doc. 30, HH 19-21); see
Thus, the Court must have specific
jurisdiction to have personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
To
determine
whether
the
Court
may
exercise
specific
jurisdiction over Defendants, it examines whether (1) Plaintiff's
claim "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to" one of Defendants' contacts
with
Georgia;
(2)
the
nonresident
10
Defendants
"purposefully
availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in
Georgia; and (3) "the exercise of personal jurisdiction is in
accordance with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The Court finds each of these prongs is
met.
"The first prong — which addresses the concept of relatedness
— focuses on the causal relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation."
citation omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks and
Although direct causation is not required, the
first prong is satisfied because Plaintiff's breach of contract
claim
arises directly from
Defendants'
contact
with Georgia;
specifically, the creation of the settlement agreement in the
Underlying Action and their alleged breach of that agreement.
(Doc. 1, at 2-4); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021) ("[W]e have never framed the
specific
jurisdiction
inquiry
as
always
requiring
proof
of
causation — i.e., proof that the plaintiff's claim came about
because of the defendant's in-state conduct." (citation omitted)).
"As to the second prong — which concerns purposeful availment
— there are two applicable tests: the effects test and the minimum
contacts test."
Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275-76 (citing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984)).
Since Plaintiff's only claim is a
11
breach
of
contract
claim
and
the
effects
test
concerns
a
nonresident defendant's tortious conduct in the forum state, only
the
minimum
contacts
test
applies
here.
(Doc.
1,
at
3-4);
Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285-88 (11th Cir. 2008).
The
minimum
defendant's
whether
contacts
contacts
those
test
with
assesses
the
contacts
the
forum
(1)
are
nonresident
state
and
related
asks
to
the
plaintiff's cause of action; (2) involve some act by
which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
privileges of doing business within the forum; and (3)
are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in the forum.
Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1276 (citation omitted).
To apply this
test, the Court identifies all relevant contacts Defendants have
with Georgia and asks whether those contacts, individually or
collectively, satisfy the criteria.
Id. (citation omitted).
Relevant here. Defendants' contacts with Georgia are: (1)
they
negotiated
and
agreed
to
a
settlement agreement in
the
Underlying Action with Plaintiff, a Georgia resident; (2) they
made some payments to Plaintiff as required under the settlement
agreement;
and
(3)
they
allegedly
breached
the
settlement
agreement by defaulting and not curing their default, causing
injury to Plaintiff.
(See Doc. 1, at 2-3.)
The Court finds these
contacts sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.
Valle, 56 F.4th at 1276 (citation omitted).
above.
Plaintiff's
Defendants'
contacts
cause
with
of
action
the
12
forum.
See Del
First, as explained
arises
directly
Second,
from
Defendants
"deliberately 'reached out beyond' [their] home" by "entering a
contractual relationship" in Georgia, thus availing themselves of
the
benefits
and
protections
enforcement of contracts.
of
Georgia's
laws
regarding
Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).
Because Defendants
later allegedly breached this contract, there is "an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy" sufficient to
find Defendants' contacts satisfy the second prong.
Id. (quoting
Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582
U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).
Third, as Defendants negotiated, finalized,
and entered the settlement agreement with Plaintiff to resolve the
Underlying Action, Defendants could have reasonably anticipated
being
subject
to
suit
here
if
they
breached
the
settlement
agreement.
Because each criterion of the minimum contacts test is
satisfied,
the
Court
finds
Defendants
purposefully
availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Georgia.
See Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275, 1276 (citation omitted).
The
whether
third
prong
exercising
of
the
specific
jurisdiction
analysis —
jurisdiction over Defendants comports
"traditional notions of
fair
play and
with
substantial justice" —
considers four factors: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the
forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; and (4) the
judicial system's interest in resolving the dispute."
13
Id. at 1277
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. V. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
supports
exercising
personal
Each of these factors
jurisdiction
over
Defendants.
Although Defendants are Texas residents, they seamlessly litigated
the Underlying Action in this Court for over a year, so any burden
on them is insignificant.
(See Doc. 1, at 2); Gruner Enters., LLC
V. ABC Loan Co. of Martinez, LLC, No. CV 121-007, Docs. 46-88 (S.D.
Ga. Jan. 8, 2021).
The Court finds any burden Defendants may
suffer from litigating in this Court is outweighed by Plaintiff's
interest
in
obtaining
convenient
and
effective
relief
and
Georgia's and this Court's interests in resolving this dispute,
which concerns a contract created in Georgia, related to a case
previously before this Court, and a breach which injured a Georgia
resident.
exercising
(Doc. 1, at 2-4.)
For these reasons, the Court finds
specific jurisdiction over Defendants accords
with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the
third prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis is satisfied.
Based
on
the
foregoing,
the
jurisdiction over Defendants.
Court
finds
it
has
personal
Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.
B. Liability
Since
the
jurisdictional
requirements
are
satisfied,
the
Court turns to the merits of the motions for default judgment.
Plaintiff asserts a single breach of contract claim.
3-4.)
(Doc. 1, at
Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are outlined above in
14
the background section.
Based on those facts, the Court finds
Plaintiff sufficiently stated a breach of contract claim.
"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are
the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who
has the right to complain about the contract being broken."
Norton
V. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 705 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010)
(citations
omitted).
Defendants
breached
the
settlement
agreement by not making installment payments in October or November
of 2022 and not curing their default within ten days of receiving
written notice from Plaintiff.
(Doc. 1, at 2-4.)
Defendants'
breach resulted in damages to Plaintiff, which the Court explains
in more detail below, and Plaintiff is the party who has the right
to complain of the breach.
(Id. at 3-4.)
Therefore, Defendants
are jointly and severally liable for any damages.
C. Damages
Even with a default judgment, "[a] court has an obligation to
assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it
enters."
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266
(11th Cir. 2003).
But a court need not conduct an evidentiary
hearing when "the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum
that can be made certain by computation."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1);
S.E.C. V. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff
requests the Court award $443,080.55 in damages, which accounts
for the unpaid balance of $402,777.77 Defendants owe Plaintiff
15
under the settlement agreement and $40,302.78 in attorney's fees
and costs.
at 2.)
(Doc. 1, at 5; Doc. 19, at 2; Doc. 24, at 2; Doc. 28,
Plaintiff contends it can be awarded these damages without
the Court holding an evidentiary hearing because they are easily
computed.
(Doc. 19, at 3; Doc. 24, at 2.)
The Court agrees.
As for the outstanding balance, these damages are easily
calculated because they are the total settlement amount from the
settlement agreement minus the amount Plaintiff already received
from Defendants, which Plaintiff represents is $402,777.77.
1, at 4; Doc. 19, at 1-2; Doc. 24, at 2.)
fees and costs Plaintiff
(Doc.
Although the attorney's
seeks require slightly more
work to
calculate, they still fall under the category of calculable damages
the
Court
may
award
without
first
conducting
an
evidentiary
hearing.
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 provides, in relevant part:
Obligations to pay attorney's fees upon any note or other
evidence of indebtedness, in addition to the rate of
interest
specified
therein,
shall
be
valid
and
enforceable and collectable as a part of such debt if
such note or other evidence of indebtedness is collected
by or through an attorney after maturity, subject to .
. . the following provisions:
2. If such note or other evidence of indebtedness
provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's
fees without specifying any specific percent, such
provision shall be construed to mean 15 percent of
the first $500.00 of principal and interest owing
on such note or other evidence of indebtedness and
16
10 percent of the amount of principal and interest
owing thereon in excess of $500.00; and
3.
The
holder
of
the
note
or
other
evidence
of
indebtedness or his or her attorney at law shall,
after maturity of the obligation, notify in writing
the maker, endorser, or party sought to be held on
said obligation that the provisions relative to
payment of attorney's fees in addition to the
principal and interest shall be enforced and that
such maker, endorser, or party sought to be held on
said obligation has ten days from the receipt of
such notice to pay the principal and interest
without the attorney's fees.
If the maker,
endorser, or party sought to be held on any such
obligation shall pay the principal and interest in
full before the expiration of such time, then the
obligation to pay the attorney's fees shall be void
and
no court shall enforce
the
agreement.
The
refusal of a debtor to accept delivery of the notice
specified in this paragraph shall be the equivalent
of such notice.
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(2)-(3).
The settlement agreement provides that, if legal action is
necessary to enforce it, "the prevailing Party shall be entitled
to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."
4, 11.)
{Doc. 1, at
On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff provided Defendants notice of
its intent to collect attorney's fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-
1-11 and gave Defendants ten days from their receipt of the notice
to pay the balance owed, but Defendants did not comply.
4,
27-29.)
Because
Plaintiff
satisfied
the
(Id. at
requirements
of
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs totaling $40,302.77, which represents 15% of the first
$500.00
owed
($75.00)
and
10%
17
of
the
remaining
balance
of
$402,277.77 ($40,227.77).
together
with
the
O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11(a)(2).
Therefore,
outstanding settlement agreement balance
of
$402,777.77, Plaintiff shall recover a total of $443,080.55.
IV. CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that
Plaintiff's motions for default judgment (Docs. 19, 24, 28) are
GRANTED.
The
Clerk
is
DIRECTED
to
ENTER
JUDGMENT
in favor
of
Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount
of $443,080.55 and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
day of June,
2024.
HONORABLE
J.
RAN
HALL
UNITED/ STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
18
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