Reaves et al v. Hester et al
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the U.S. Magistrate Judge that re #5 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 15 Right to Amend; MOTION To Pay Filing Fee in Installments should be denied and the #1 Complaint should be dismissed and this civil action should be closed. Objections to R&R due by 11/12/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 10/24/24. (loh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
SIOBHAN REAVES and JASMINE
PATRICE,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
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CV 124-159
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VICKIE W. HESTER; DAVID LEVERT
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KYLER; HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF
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EDU.; MARY ELIZABETH DAVIS; CARL )
KNOWLTON; and MICHAEL CODY
)
GUINED,
)
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Defendants.
)
_________________________________________________________
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
_________________________________________________________
Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Plaintiffs’ complaint
must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785
(11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs assert nearly identical factual allegations and claims as brought in a long line
of federal cases filed in Georgia and South Carolina, each of which arises out of the issuance
of a Georgia arrest warrant for Kathy Reaves, her later arrest in South Carolina, and the
subsequent denials of employment based on her inability to pass a background check because
of her arrest. See, e.g., Reaves v. Blackwell, et al., No. 1:24-CV-132, doc. no. 4 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 13, 2024); see also Reaves v. Washington, et al., No. 4:23-CV-3847, doc. no. 8 (D.S.C.
Aug. 8, 2023) (collecting cases), adopted by doc. no. 25 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2024) (recognizing
case as twelfth concerning Georgia warrant and South Carolina arrest and imposing filing
restrictions in District of South Carolina); Reaves v. Guined, et al., No. 1:23-cv-00778, doc.
no. 88 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2024) (identifying six cases filed in Northern District of Georgia and
imposing filing restrictions in that District).
The instant case is the sixth case filed in the Southern District of Georgia, with the most
recent cases – including this one – apparently aimed at attempting to circumvent the abovenoted filing restrictions in other courts. See Reaves v. Blackwell, et al., CV 124-132, (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 13, 2024) (hereinafter “CV 124-132”); Reaves v. Blanchard et al., CV 124-083 (S.D.
Ga. June 3, 2024); Reaves et al. v. Kyler, et al., CV 124-065 (S.D. Ga. May 9, 2024); Reaves
v. Hucko et al., CV 123-148 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023); Reaves v. Foster et al., CV 121-120 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 11, 2021). On September 18, 2024, United States District Court Judge J. Randal
Hall adopted the undersigned’s recommendation to impose filing restrictions on Kathy Reaves
in the Southern District of Georgia. See CV 124-132, doc. no. 12, pp. 2-3. The order imposing
these filing restrictions further prohibited Kathy Reaves’ attempts to “enlist[] surrogates . . . to
file new lawsuits alleging the same meritless facts,” stating “[s]uch obvious circumvention
efforts will not be tolerated.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs Siobhan Reaves and Jasmine Patrice filed the instant case on September 6,
2024, twelve days before imposition of filing restrictions on Kathy Reaves. (Compare doc.
no. 1, with CV 124-132, doc. no. 12.) Notably, the current complaint does not name Kathy
Reaves as a plaintiff. (See doc. no. 1.) However, despite lacking Kathy Reaves’ name in the
case caption, the complaint exclusively alleges claims about the same series of events
challenged by Kathy Reaves in her multitude of previous lawsuits: the allegedly improper
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Georgia arrest warrant, her arrest, and her rejection from employment opportunities as a
teacher. (Id.) The complaint contains very little discussion of Plaintiffs Siobhan Reaves and
Jasmine Patrice. (Id.) Beyond the caption of the case, Siobhan Reaves and Jasmine Patrice
are only mentioned by name in the complaint a few times. (Id. at 10, 12.) The complaint notes
the “Georgia warrant[] [brought] in innocent other parties (Siobhan, Jasmine, Tiesha,
Mishauna, Emanuel, and J. Reaves, Sr.) . . . who have nothing to do with this complete debacle
of a background check . . .” (Id. at 10.) The complaint also states Siobhan Reaves and Jasmine
Patrice are “associated with the invalid county warrant regarding the alleged crime in 2018
and the county warrant application in Dec. 2020.” (Id. at 12.)
Beyond the limited references to either named Plaintiff, the complaint generally refers
to “Plaintiffs” being involved with or injured by the alleged improper Georgia arrest warrant
issued against Kathy Reaves. For example, the complaint uses the language “Plaintiffs and
Kathy” in multiple paragraphs regarding the causes of action alleged. (Id. at 15.) Moreover,
the complaint states “Plaintiffs (Kathy) plead claims of gross IIED against all defendants” and
“Plaintiffs don’t appreciate their name being filed or used in association with a county
warrant.” (Id. at 17, 19.) The complaint ends by stating “Plaintiffs did not ask to be involved
in this witch hunt against Kathy.” (Id. at 20.) Ultimately, the complaint centers around Kathy
Reaves and her claims against various defendants for alleged misconduct, not around any
independent claims by Siobhan Reaves or Jasmine Patrice. (See generally doc. no. 1.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Dismissal Is Warranted Pursuant to Filing Restrictions
As described above, Judge Hall imposed filing restrictions on Kathy Reaves in the
related case CV 124-132 on September 18, 2024. See CV 124-132, doc. no. 12, pp. 2-4.
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Referencing the instant case, the September 18th Order describes “[a]fter the Magistrate Judge
recommended imposition of these sanctions, [Kathy Reaves] enlisted surrogates . . . to file new
lawsuits alleging the same meritless facts and claims the Court has previously rejected.” Id.
at 4. Accordingly, Judge Hall applied filing restrictions not only to Kathy Reaves as a plaintiff,
but also “to any lawsuit alleging the same or substantially similar facts . . . regardless of who
is listed as the plaintiff.” Id. The case sub judice, filed after the undersigned recommended
filing restrictions but before Judge Hall adopted the recommendation, is obviously a surrogate
lawsuit brought for the sole purpose of avoiding the filing restrictions. The filing restrictions
thus apply, as Judge Hall’s order plainly states, and summary dismissal is warranted because
the Complaint has no plausible merit and fails to allege a plausible claim for relief. While
nothing else need be said, the Court has also conducted below a formal screening of the
Complaint and has determined it should be dismissed for lack of standing, failure to state a
claim, and improper venue.
B.
Dismissal is Warranted Due To Lack of Standing, Failure to State a Claim,
and Improper Venue
1.
Legal Standard for Screening
The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure
to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure
to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App’x 49, 51
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
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To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” or if it “tenders ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w]
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant’s pleadings, holding them
to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction does not
mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314,
1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2.
Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Bring This Lawsuit
“A federal court has the obligation to review sua sponte whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003). Article III of the U.S.
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Constitution, which provides the constitutional limitation on standing, states that federal courts
may only hear “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (discussing Article III standing).
To establish
constitutional standing under Article III, a plaintiff must show: (1) plaintiff suffered a concrete
injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
(3) that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Regarding the first element, an injury in fact is one that is “concrete
and particularized,” as well as “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id.
(citations and quotations omitted). Next, a causal connection must be “fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41-42 (1976)). Finally, to be redressable, “it must be ‘likely’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. at 561 (quoting
Simon, 426 U.S. at 43).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to establish constitutional standing because they do not show injury,
causation, or redressability. The twenty-page complaint barely addresses Siobhan Reaves or
Jasmine Patrice, demonstrating the lack of a concrete, particularized injury for either Plaintiff.
Moreover, when the complaint does allege injury specific to Plaintiffs Siobhan Reaves and
Jasmine Patrice, the alleged harm suffered is too conjectural and hypothetical to be concrete
because it is merely their association with the “witch hunt” against Kathy Reaves. (Doc. no.
1, p. 20.) Beyond conclusory statements alleging Plaintiffs were injured, (see, e.g., id. at 10),
the complaint fails to detail how merely being associated with the circumstances surrounding
the Georgia arrest warrant injured Plaintiffs. Indeed, the complaint acknowledges Siobhan
Reaves and Jasmine Patrice had “nothing to do with” the background check and alleged false
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arrest, further demonstrating a lack of injury. (Id.) Because the complaint fails to establish
Plaintiffs suffered a concrete, particularized injury, Plaintiffs do not have constitutional
standing to bring this lawsuit.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ failure to establish injury thereby
precludes a finding of redressability, as redressability requires showing it is likely a favorable
decision will redress a plaintiff’s injuries. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
Even if Plaintiffs could establish the injury element of standing, they do not
demonstrate causation because Defendants’ alleged conduct is not “fairly traceable” to any
alleged reputational injury suffered by Plaintiffs, as Defendants were allegedly involved in
denial of Kathy Reaves’ teaching certification in Henry County, Georgia. (Id. at 12.) Two of
the named Defendants, Vickie W. Hester and David Levert Kyler, are allegedly responsible
for sending the arrest warrant to Henry County School District. (Id. at 14.) The remaining
Defendants, the Henry County Board of Education and Henry County employees Mary
Elizabeth Davis, Carl Knowlton, and Michael Cody Guined, allegedly played a role in denying
Kathy Reaves employment as a Henry County teacher. (Id. at 12-13.) The complaint fails to
connect the decision not to hire Kathy Reaves for a Henry County teaching position to
Plaintiffs’ purported injury of association with an arrest warrant for Kathy Reaves. Because
Plaintiffs have failed to establish constitutional standing, this complaint must be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to bring this lawsuit on behalf of Kathy Reaves, they
similarly fail to show third-party or representational standing. Generally, an individual can
only assert his or her own legal rights or interests and cannot bring claims of third parties.
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). However, in some circumstances, a party may
assert the rights of others through third-party or representational standing. See id. at 129-130
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(third-party standing); Glob. Aero., Inc. v. Platinum Jet Mgmt., LLC, 488 F. App’x 338, 340
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (representational standing via agent-principal relationship);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (representational standing via association-member
relationship). However, Plaintiffs have not alleged, much less demonstrated, they have any
third-party or representational basis by which to bring these claims on behalf of Kathy Reaves.
In sum, Plaintiffs do not have standing based on their own claims or claims brought on behalf
of Kathy Reaves.
3. Venue is Improper Because the Complaint Fails to State a Claim Against the Only
Two Georgia Defendants, and Transfer Rather than Dismissal is Appropriate
The Court is acutely familiar with the events described in Plaintiffs’ complaint, as this
lawsuit is the sixth one concerning these events filed in this district. Plaintiffs filed this case
in the Augusta Division of this District even though four of the six Defendants are located
outside of the Southern District and the vast majority of events about which Plaintiffs complain
occurred outside this District. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges claims against Henry County Board
of Education and its employees for failing to hire Kathy Reaves due to a background check
that uncovered a Richmond County arrest warrant. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 12-14.) The only
Defendants with ties to this District are Defendants Kyler and Hester, who both worked as
clerks for the Magistrate Court of Richmond County. (Id. at 12.) The complaint alleges Kyler
improperly sent the Richmond County arrest warrant to Henry County, and Hester was Kyler’s
supervisor. (Id. at 12, 14.)
This Court previously determined Kathy Reaves failed to state a claim against
Defendant Kyler because he had authority to send the arrest warrant at issue. Reaves v. Hucko
et al., CV 123-148, doc. no. 29, p. 13, adopted by doc. no. 32. As this complaint raises the
same claims against Defendant Kyler, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against him. The claims
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against Defendant Hester fail for the same reason because she merely supervised Defendant
Kyler. With the remainder of Plaintiffs’ allegations related to activity and defendants located
outside of the Southern District of Georgia, venue in this Court is improper. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
Given that venue is improper in this District, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 817 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) (“[T]he decision whether to transfer a case is left to the sound discretion
of the district court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)).
Because the case is obviously frivolous and brought in bad faith by surrogates, it would not be
in the interest of justice to transfer and instead recommends dismissal. See Martin v. D.C. Ct.
of App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (per curiam) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no
matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources.
A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that
promotes the interests of justice.” (citation omitted)); see also Moore v. Brown, No.
3:22cv02311, 2022 WL 18108679, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2022) (citing Daker v. Ward, 999
F.3d 1300, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2021), and collecting cases for proposition that cases involving
same or substantially similar claims against many of same defendants subject to dismissal as
malicious), adopted by 2023 WL 35215 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2023). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
complaint should be DISMISSED.
C.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay, for Habeas Corpus Relief, and to Pay Filing Fee
in Installments
On September 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion, seeking “habeas corpus to challenge
jurisdiction of this Court and the jurisdiction of a school district listed herein to use such invalid
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county warrant against Kathy.” (Doc. no. 5, p. 5; see generally id.) The motion additionally
asks to stay proceedings to permit Plaintiffs twenty-one days to amend their complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to join additional parties. (Id. at 10-11.) Finally, the motion
requests permission to pay the filing fee in installments in the event the Court denies Plaintiffs’
in forma pauperis motions. (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiffs are not entitled to habeas corpus relief because they are not in custody or
otherwise imprisoned. A writ of habeas corpus is only available to individuals who are in
custody at the time they file the action. Giles v. Lasister, No. 21-0120, 2021 WL 5104544, *4
n.5 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 8, 2021) (“Because it does not appear that [Plaintiff] was in custody when
he filed this action [], the writ of habeas corpus was not available to him.” (citations omitted));
see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“It is clear . . . from the common-law
history of the writ, that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon
the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from
illegal custody.”). Therefore, because they are not in custody, Plaintiffs’ motion should be
DENIED to the extent it requests habeas corpus relief. (Doc. no. 5.)
Moreover, allowing Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint would be futile because
Plaintiffs’ case should be dismissed for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
motion should be DENIED as to the request to stay proceedings to permit amendment pursuant
to Rule 15. (Id.) Finally, because Plaintiffs’ request to proceed in forma pauperis has been
granted for the purpose of dismissal by separate Order, Plaintiffs’ request to pay the filing fee
in installments should be DENIED AS MOOT. (Id.)
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III.
CONCLUSION
Because this lawsuit violates imposed filing restrictions, Plaintiffs lack standing to
bring this lawsuit, and venue is inappropriate in the Southern District of Georgia and a transfer
would not be in the interest of justice, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case
be DISMISSED. The Court further REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ “Motion to
Stay Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 15 Right to Amend; Habeas Corpus; Motion to Pay Filing
Fee in Installments” be DENIED, (doc. no. 5), and this civil action be CLOSED.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of October, 2024, at Augusta,
Georgia.
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