Martinson v. Whittle

Filing 12

ORDER denying as moot 3 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; denying as moot 4 Motion for Bond; denying 5 Motion to Stay; the Court overrules Petitioner's objections, and adopts the 8 Report and Recommendations dismissing without prejudice the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition; denying 10 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on 3/6/25. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION

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ANTHONY GENO MARTINSON,

Petitioner,
V.

SHERIFF WHITTLE,

Respondent.

CV 124-235

ORDER

After a careful, de novo review of the file, the Court concurs with the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation, to which objections have been filed. (Doc. no. 11.)
The Magistrate Judge recommended Petitioner’s § 2241 habeas corpus petition be dismissed
because Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his extradition or constitutional

double jeopardy claims.

(See doc. no. 8.)

The Magistrate Judge further recommended

Petitioner’s motion for stay of extradition be denied and the remaining pending motions be

denied as moot in light of the case’s dismissal. (See id.) Nothing in Petitioner’s objections
changes this Court’s determination that Petitioner’s motions should be denied and this case
dismissed without prejudice and closed.

As an initial matter, one change in the publicly available records cited by the Magistrate
Judge warrants brief comment. (See doc. no. 8, p. 6 n.3.) The Magistrate Judge noted publicly
available records revealed no indication Petitioner was subject to extradition proceedings in

Georgia. (Id.) However, since the Report and Recommendation was entered, the publicly

available arrest records on the Charles B. Webster Detention Center website now reilect the

two felony charges of “theft of services” against Petitioner have been dismissed, and instead
state

Petitioner

is

being

held

on

an

other

authority

https://www.richmondcountvsheriffsoffice.com/inmate-inquirv.cfm:

warrant.

select

Agree

See
&

Continue; search “Martinson, Anthony”; click Arrest Date 12/17/2024 (last visited Mar. 4,

2025). The website provides no additional information regarding this warrant, such as from
which jurisdiction it originates.

In his objections, Petitioner maintains “the sole reason for

[his] continued detention [at Charles B. Webster Detention Center] is an extradition hold on a
Florida warrant.

(Doc. no. 11, p. 1.) Even considering this change, Petitioner’s objections

are unavailing for the reasons described below.
Regarding his objections to the recommended dismissal of his § 2241 habeas corpus
petition, Petitioner argues the Middle District of Florida decision, on which the Magistrate
Judge relied in the Report and Recommendation, is void because this court improperly
reviewed his case under § 2254 not § 2241. (Id. at 2-3); see also Martinson v. Whittle, et al..
CV 225-039, doc. no. 7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2025). In this Middle District of Florida case.
Petitioner raised the same constitutional arguments about the pending Florida charges he raises

in the instant petition. Compare (doc. no. 1), with Martinson. CV 225-039, doc. no. 1 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 6,2024). Petitioner’s assertion is incorrect. United States District Court Judge Sheri

Polster Chappell in the Middle District of Florida reviewed the petition pursuant to § 2241 and
agreed “[Petitioner] properly filed the petition under § 2241.” Martinson. CV 225-039, doc.

no. 7. Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument Judge Chappell wrongly construed his previous
petition is misplaced.

'Fhus, the Magistrate Judge’s incorporation of Judge Chappell’s

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reasoning in the Report and Recommendation, which concluded Petitioner did not raise any
claims entitling him to federal habeas relief, remains sound.
Moreover, to combat the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion his petition should be
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, Petitioner’s objections detail his unsuccessful

and repeated efforts to exhaust his state remedies. (Doc. no. 11, pp. 2- 3; see also doc. no. 8,

pp. 4-6.) However, as explained by the Magistrate Judge, even //Petitioner had properly
exhausted his state remedies, his case is nonetheless subject to dismissal because he is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on any ground raised. (See doc. no. 8.) First, Petitioner does

not raise one of the four “extraordinarily narrow” grounds for federal review of state
extradition proceedings in Georgia, the asylum state, and thus he does not establish a case for

habeas relief regarding his extradition. (Id. at 6-8 (citing Stanley v. Md. Dist. & Sup. Cts.. No.
lO-CV-02861, 2010 WL 5060769, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2010)).)

Instead, Petitioner raises double jeopardy arguments about the pending Florida charges
in an effort to undermine the validity of his extradition and the pending charges. (See doc. no.

1, pp. 6-7.) As already described by the Magistrate Judge, such constitutional arguments

should instead be raised in Florida, the demanding state. (Doc. no. 8, pp. 6-7.) However,
although transfer would be appropriate, as noted by the Magistrate Judge, the Court agrees
dismissal without transfer is warranted. (Id. at 8 & n.6.) The Middle District of Florida court
already analyzed and rejected Petitioner’s arguments, again raised in the instant petition, and
concluded Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on these claims. See Martinson.

CV 225-039, doc. no. 7. The Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed, incorporated by reference.

and recommended adoption of Judge Chappell’s reasoning and conclusion in his Report and
Recommendation. (Doc. no. 8, pp. 8-9.) This Court concurs with Judge Chappell’s decision
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and agrees Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on these grounds. Accordingly,
even if the Court were to accept Petitioner’s objections and determine he sufficiently exhausted
state remedies, his claims still lack merit, meaning his § 2241 petition should be dismissed.

Regarding his motion for stay of extradition, Petitioner disagrees with the Magistrate
Judge’s construction of his motion as a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. no. 11, p.
4.)

Instead, Petitioner argues his request for a stay of state court proceedings was made

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1). (Id.) Petitioner did not cite to § 2251, much less any
statute or other legal principle, in his motion for stay of extradition, rendering the Magistrate
Judge’s construction of the motion reasonable in light of the nature of relief sought.
Nonetheless, even if the Court accepts Petitioner’s objection and considers the motion to stay
extradition as brought pursuant to § 2251, this motion should still be denied.
Pursuant to § 2251(a)(1), “[a] . . . judge of the United States before whom a habeas

corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final judgment... stay any proceeding against the
person detained in any State court or by or under the authority of any State for any matter
involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1). Under this statute, a

judge’s decision to stay state proceedings is discretionary and depends on the application of

four factors: “whether the movant has made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits
and of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted, whether the stay would substantially harm
other parties, and whether granting the stay would serve the public interest.” In re Henry. 757
F.3d 1151, 1163 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted): see also Crumpton v. Kromko. No. 7:12cv-115, 2012 WL 5906884, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2012) (applying § 2251 factors to deny

petitioner’s request to stay state probation proceedings), adopted by2^\2 WL 5906879 (M.D.
Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).
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The four § 2251 factors are remarkably similai* to the factors a moving party must
establish to show injunctive relief is warranted. (See doc. no. 8, pp. 7-8 n.5.) Indeed, both

analyses require the Court to weigh a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury,
and the requested reliefs impact on the public interest. Compare In re Henry. 757 F.3d at
1163 (listing § 2251 factors), with McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson. 147 F.3d 1301,1306 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (listing injunctive relief factors). Although the Magistrate Judge
noted Petitioner failed to establish irreparable injury because there was a lack of evidence

showing ongoing extradition proceedings, (see doc. no. 8, p. 8 & n.5), the Magistrate Judge
also explained Petitioner failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and did not
carry his burden of persuasion on the remaining injunctive relief two elements because he did
not mention them in his motion, (see id. at 7-8 & n.5).

Again, Petitioner fails to show any of the four § 2251 factors weigh in his favor. The
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner’s motion neither establishes a likelihood
of success on the merits nor provides any argument about the public interest. (See doc. no. 5;
see also doc no. 8, p. 7 & n.5.) The Court also notes Petitioner’s motion contains no argument
about whether the stay would substantially harm other parties, further demonstrating Petitioner
does not meet his burden to establish a stay of state proceedings is warranted under § 2251.
Furthermore, even assuming extradition proceedings are ongoing, Petitioner fails to
show he faces irreparable injury from extradition because his assertion the pending extradition

will result in “serious injury” is conclusory. (Id at 1.) Petitioner provides no supporting facts
or further explanation for his claim “that failure to issue the stay will [negatively] effect the
Petitioner by inflicting upon the Petitioner an immediate deprivation of his constitutional
rights.” (Id) For instance, he does not detail the type of injury he allegedly faces, much less
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how this injury is irreparable. (See id.) Thus, because he does not provide any explanation
beyond his blanket assertion he faces harm from imminent extradition, his contention about
irreparable injury remains too speculative. Accordingly, even modifying the analysis about
the irreparable injury factor as described above, Petitioner’s motion for stay of extradition
should be denied, even when construed pursuant to § 2251, because Petitioner does not

establish any of the four factors weigh in his favor.
Finally, in addition to filing objections. Petitioner moves for leave to amend his petition

due to the finding of newly discovered evidence and information directly related to this case.
(Doc. no. 10.) As a general rule, leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is given freely.
Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Wedemever v. Pneudraulics. Inc.. 510 F. App’x

875, 878 (11th Cir. 2013) {per curiam). That said, leave to amend is not guaranteed, and a
trial court may deny such leave “in the exercise of its inherent power to manage the conduct
of litigation before it.” Reese v. Herbert. 527 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). “In making
this determination, a court should consider whether there has been undue delay in filing, bad

faith or dilatory motives, prejudice to the opposing parties, and the futility of the amendment.
Saewitz v. Lexington Ins. Co.. 133 F. App’x 695, 699 (11th Cir. 2005) {per curiam) (quoting
Foman. 371 U.S. at 182). An amendment is futile when the pleading it seeks to amend would
still be subject to dismissal if the amendment were permitted.

Coventry First. LLC v.

McCarty. 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010) {per curiam) (“A proposed amendment may be

denied for futility ‘when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed.
(quoting Cockrell v. Sparks. 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) {per curiam))). Finally,

[a] plaintiff who moves for leave to amend a complaint ‘must either attach a copy of the

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proposed amendment to the motion or set forth the substance thereof.

United States ex rel.

84Partners. LLC v. Nuflo, Inc.. 79 F.4th 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner’s one-sentence motion seeking leave to amend his petition blatantly
lacks any substance about his proposed amendments. (See doc. no. 10.) Nowhere does he

identify this newly discovered evidence and information, much less how it helps further the
claims alleged in his petition. Moreover, Petitioner did not attach the proposed amendment to
his motion.

(See generally id.) Accordingly, his motion to amend can be denied for this

reason. See Thompson v. Stewart. No. CV 322-045, 2023 WL 11261159, *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar.

27, 2023) (noting plaintiff failed to attach the proposed amendment or otherwise describe the
amendment’s substance in denying motion to amend).
Furthermore, any amendment based on additional facts or evidence would be futile

because the petition would still be subject to dismissal even with such factual amendments.
As already explained by the Middle District of Florida in ruling on the same claims, the
grounds raised in the instant petition do not entitle Petitioner to federal habeas relief See
Martinson. CV 225-039, doc. no. 7, p. 3 (stating “[tjhere is no arguable case to be made that
the State of Florida is attempting to punish [Petitioner] twice for the same offense”).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to amend is also denied for this reason.
Given the above analysis demonstrating his § 2241 habeas corpus petition and motion
for stay of extradition are without merit. Petitioner’s remaining objections are also

unsuccessful. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, ADOPTS the

Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as its opinion, DENIES Petitioner’s
motion for stay of extradition, (doc. no. 5), and DISMISSES this case filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice. The Court further DENIES as MOOT Petitioner’s motion
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to appoint counsel, (doc. no. 3), and motion for issuance of a bond, (doc. no. 4). Finally, the
Court DENIES Petitioner's motion to amend. (Doc. no. 10.)

Further, a state prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 must obtain a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) before appealing the denial of his application for a writ of habeas
corpus. See Sawyer v. Holder. 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[S]tate prisoners
proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a COA to appeal.”) This Court should grant a COA only
if the prisoner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).

For the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation, and in

consideration of the standards enunciated in Slack v. McDaniel. 529 U.S. 473, 482-84 (2000),

Petitioner has failed to make the requisite showing. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a COA
in this case. Moreover, because there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, an appeal

would not be taken in good faith, and Petitioner is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

Upon the foregoing, the Court CLOSES this civil action.
so ORDERED this

day of March, 2025, at Augusta, Georgia.

HONO;

NDAL HALL

UNITEiySTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

^OUTFIERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA