Turner v. Jones et al
Filing
63
ORDER denying 46 Motion to Dismiss; denying 52 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/17/2011. (csr)
Jn the Initeb Otatt Atotrid Court
for t je Aout1jern Dt trta of aeorgfa
krutnbaicb aibioion
JAMES T. TURNER
Plaintiff,
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vs.
JOHN T. JONES and
CITY OF BAXLEY
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CV 209-013
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Defendants.
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos.
46, 52. For the reasons stated below, both motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2007, Defendant John Jones ("Jones") pulled over
a vehicle driven by Plaintiff James Turner ("Plaintiff") for
improper lane change. During the traffic stop, Jones and
Plaintiff apparently made multiple sarcastic comments to one
another. After Jones gave Plaintiff a traffic citation, Jones
began to walk back to his cruiser. Plaintiff got out of his
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vehicle and also began walking towards the cruiser. Plaintiff
claims he was trying to learn Jones's name, and that he said:
"What's your name so when I go to the judge I'll make sure I got
the right man." Dkt. No. 25, at 15.
The parties' versions of the facts differ somewhat.
Plaintiff claims that he walked to the front of Jones's cruiser
with the citation and a pen in his hands. Plaintiff claims that
he was in front of the headlights of Jones's cruiser, on the
driver's side of the vehicle, and that he bent over the hood of
the vehicle, ready to write the officer's name on the citation.
Id. Jones agrees that Plaintiff approached his vehicle with a
pen and the citation in his hands, but states that Plaintiff ran
up behind him and that Plaintiff was very close to Jones. Dkt.
No. 52-1, at 31.
Regardless of Plaintiff's location and the speed of his
approach, all agree that Jones initiated an arrest. According
to the Plaintiff, Jones grabbed Plaintiff's arms, forced
Plaintiff face-down against the hood of the cruiser, and placed
Plaintiff in handcuffs. During all this, Plaintiff's grandson,
who was still in Plaintiff's car, called Plaintiff's daughter,
Teri Thornton. Thornton arrived at the site of the arrest and
asked Jones what was going on. Dkt. No. 18-3, at 4-5. Thornton
claims that Jones said, "Your daddy's smart-ass mouth was the
cause of this" or words to that effect. Id.
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Jones then transported Plaintiff to the Appling County
Detention Center and issued Plaintiff a citation for misdemeanor
obstruction of a law enforcement officer. The citation stated
in the remarks section, "Sub. [Subject] was stopped for improper
lane change. RIO [Responding Officer] was walking back to
[Patrol Vehicle] subject got out of his vehicle following .
talking about what he was going to have done." Dkt. No. 18, at
Plaintiff initiated this suit against Defendant Jones and
the City of Baxley, alleging various state and federal claims
based on the arrest. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff claims Jones's
actions caused Plaintiff to suffer substantial injuries which
will eventually require surgery. Defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Jones is entitled to qualified
immunity on the federal claims, that the battery and excessive
force claims lack merit, and that the Plaintiff fails to
adequately allege claims against the City of Baxley. Dkt. No.
16. This Court granted summary judgment on the qualified
immunity issue, the excessive force claim, and on the claims
against the City of Baxley. Dkt. No. 29. The Court further
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state law claims. Id. Plaintiff appealed the
decision. Dkt. No. 31. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part. Dkt. No. 40. The Eleventh Circuit held
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that Jones was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
law, stating that whether Jones had arguable probable cause is a
matter to be resolved at trial. Dkt. No. 40, at 10 n.4. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the excessive
force claim and on the claims against the City of Baxley. Dkt.
No. 40.
Defendant now asks the Court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
Defendant, in a separate motion, moves for partial summary
judgment on the issue of Jones's official immunity from
Plaintiff's state law claims.
Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Jones moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims
that arise under state law, arguing that the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.
Dkt. No. 46. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (2),
Defendant presents two primary reasons why the Court should
decline jurisdiction.' The Court finds both reasons unpersuasive
and instead elects to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's state law claims.
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Defendant additionally argues that dismissing the state law claims would
conserve resources because if the claims are not dismissed the issue of
official immunity would need to be briefed and argued on summary judgment
prior to trial. At this point, the parties have fully briefed the issue and
the Court resolves the official immunity issue in this Order. Thus,
Defendant's additional argument is moot.
4
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's state law claims
substantially predominate over Plaintiff's federal claims. All
of Plaintiff's claims arise from the same operative facts: the
arrest on June 6, 2007. Plaintiff asserts both state and
federal causes of action based on the circumstances of the
arrest. Because the facts in the state and federal claims are
identical, and because the legal inquiries in the state and
federal claims are similar, it cannot be said that either the
state or federal causes of action substantially predominate in
this case.
Second, Defendant argues that this dispute involves a
complex issue of state law, i.e., determining whether Defendant
Jones is entitled to official immunity under Georgia law. The
Defendant is mistaken. The question of official immunity under
Georgia law is commonly addressed by federal courts. See e.g.,
Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Cit
of Grovetown, 2010 WL 5330563 (S.D. Ga. 2010). Furthermore, the
parties to this dispute agree on the substance of the state law
governing this dispute. They simply disagree on how that state
law should be applied to these facts. Consequently, the
application of Georgia's official immunity law to the facts of
this dispute is not so complex an issue such as to justify
dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims.
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Because the Court has adequate grounds to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's state law claims
under § 1367(a), and because the Court finds no compelling
reason under § 1367(c) to decline jurisdiction, the Court denies
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendant Jones moves for partial summary judgment, arguing
that he is insulated from all state law claims under Georgia's
doctrine of official immunity. Dkt. No. 52-2, at 10.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Collins v.
Homestead Correctional Inst., 2011 WL 4584817 (11th Cir. Oct. 5,
2011) (quoting Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th
Cir. 1990)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the
evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 15859 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first
identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
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(1986). To discharge this burden, the movant must show the
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. The burden then shifts to
the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative
evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
"Where the non-movant presents direct evidence that, if believed
by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial, summary
judgment is not appropriate even where the movant presents
conflicting evidence." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Duckworth, 648 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mize
V.
Jeffferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.
1996) )
B. Defendant Jones's Official Immunity
Defendant Jones argues that he is entitled to official
immunity as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 52. "The doctrine of
official immunity . . . 'protects individual public agents from
personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the
scope of their official authority, and done without wilfulness,
malice, or corruption.'" McDowell v Smith, 678 S.E.2d 922, 924
(Ga. 2009); Taylor v. Waldo, 709 S.E.2d 278, 281 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011). "A suit against a public officer acting in his or her
official capacity will be barred by official immunity unless the
public officer (1) negligently performed a ministerial duty, or
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(2) acted with actual malice or an actual intent to cause injury
while performing a discretionary duty." Lincoln County v.
Edmond, 501 S.E.2d 38, 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Ga. Const.
of 1983, art. I, § II, ¶ IX (d) (as amended 1991) and Teston v.
Collins, 459 S.E.2d 452 (1995)) (emphasis in original).
It is well established that "a warrantless arrest for
conduct occurring in an officer's presence is a discretionary
act." Selvy v. Morrison, 665 S.E.2d 401, 404 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008). Defendant does not dispute that his warrantless arrest
of Plaintiff was a discretionary act for the purposes of
official immunity. Dkt. No. 52-2, at 6.
When determining whether a public agent is entitled to
official immunity for discretionary acts, a court must evaluate
the agent's subjective intent. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350
(11th Cir. 2007) ("Unlike qualified immunity under federal law,
we must inquire into [the public agent's] subjective intent to
determine whether he has official immunity under Georgia law.").
Specifically, a public agent loses the protection of official
immunity if the agent acted with "actual malice or intent to
injure." Cameron v. Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 345 (Ga. 2001).
"Actual malice" refers to "a deliberate intention to do
wrong" which is more than simply "reckless disregard for the
rights or safety of others." Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54,
60 (Ga. 2007) (quoting Merrow v. Hawkins, 467 S.E.2d 336 (Ga.
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1996)). The agent's deliberate intention "must be the intent to
cause the harm suffered by the plaintiffs." Marchall v.
Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71, 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). Like actual
malice, the term "intent to cause injury" means the "actual
intent to cause harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to
do the act purportedly resulting in the claimed injury." Id. at
68-69.
Given that the official immunity determination hinges on an
evaluation of the public agent's subjective intent, summary
judgment is improper where the plaintiff raises a genuine issue
of material fact about a public agent's intent in pursuing the
discretionary act. See, e.g., Mosely, 487 F.3d 1350 (denying
summary judgment on official immunity where plaintiff presented
evidence that defendant pursued an arrest warrant to teach the
plaintiff a lesson and to collect a civil debt); Bateast v.
Dekalb Cnty., 572 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (denying
summary judgment for defendant police officer who arrested
plaintiff for giving a false name where plaintiff presented
evidence that she provided adequate identification at time of
arrest); Gardner v. Rogers, 480 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(denying summary judgment on official immunity to defendant
police officer on plaintiff's assault and battery claims where
plaintiff presented evidence that defendant acted without
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justification in entering plaintiff's home and forcibly subduing
the plaintiff).
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Jones argues
that there is no evidence whatsoever to support a showing that
he acted with actual malice or intent to injure when he forcibly
arrested Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 52. The record reveals otherwise.
Plaintiff's daughter, Teri Thornton, arrived at the scene
of the arrest shortly after Jones arrested Plaintiff. Upon
arrival, Thornton asked Jones "what was going on." Dkt. No. 183, at 4-5. Jones responded, "Your daddy's smart-ass mouth was
the cause of this" 2 or words to that effect .3 Id. Jones's
alleged comments to Thornton are sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding Jones's subjective intent. The
citation Jones issued to Plaintiff for obstruction supports
Thornton's statement. The citation indicates that Jones
arrested Plaintiff for talking about his future intentions to
complain about Jones, and provides no indication of a threat to
2
The Court notes that words alone can, in some circumstances, give rise to
probable cause to arrest for misdemeanor obstruction of justice. Stryker v.
State, 677 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). Indeed, a jury could reasonably
find that Jones's statement reflected his perception that Plaintiff was
being arrested for words sufficient to constitute misdemeanor obstruction.
In denying summary judgment to the Defendant, the Court is not foreclosing
this argument on probable cause, but rather holds that Jones's statements
preclude a finding of official immunity as a matter of law.
Jones later claimed that he arrested Plaintiff because he feared for his
safety. Dkt. No. 52-1, at 34-35. For the purposes of summary judgment the
Court views all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Therefore, the Court views Jones's possibly inconsistent statements as
supporting an inference that Jones arrested Plaintiff for his cantankerous
tone and comments.
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safety or actual obstruction .4 Dkt. No. 18, Ex. 2. Furthermore,
under Plaintiff's version of the facts, Plaintiff was hunched
over the hood of Jones's car, in front of the headlights, in a
writing position, at the time Jones initiated the arrest. Dkt.
No. 25-1, at 15. Together, these facts could lead a jury to
conclude that Jones arrested Plaintiff for comments made during
the traffic stop, and without fear for his safety.
Taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, these
facts - Jones's statements to Thornton, Jones's justifications
for Plaintiff's arrest, and the orientation of the parties just
before the arrest - could support a jury's reasonable inference
that Jones deliberately intended to wrongfully arrest Plaintiff
or to commit battery against Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff has
presented evidence which creates a genuine issue of material
fact about Jones's subjective intent in arresting Plaintiff,
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of
official immunity.
The cases Defendant relies on do not support a contrary
result. Defendant relies heavily on Selvy v. Morrison, 665
S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). In Selvy, law enforcement
officers executed an arrest warrant for the plaintiff's fiancé
The obstruction citation is somewhat illegible, but as Plaintiff reads the
citation, it says, "Sub.[Subject] was stopped for improper lane change. RIO
[Responding Officer] was walking back to [Patrol Vehicle] subject got out of
his vehicle following
talking about what he was going to have done."
Dkt. No. 18, at 5.
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at the plaintiff's home. After the fiance was arrested, the
plaintiff asked the officers to leave her home. While blocking
the doorway to plaintiff's home, one of the officers made a
derogatory comment about the plaintiff's "boyfriends." The
plaintiff again asked the officers to leave. During the
interchange, both plaintiff and the law enforcement officers
used profanity. Shortly thereafter, the officers knocked on the
door, forcibly apprehended plaintiff, and arrested her for
disorderly conduct. At the police station, the arresting
officers denied they were the arresting officers, and told
another officer to "fill it out however you want," referring to
the reason for the plaintiff's arrest.
The Selvy court held that the evidence did not demonstrate
actual malice, and that evidence showing frustration,
irrigation, anger, or ill will is insufficient to overcome
official immunity. Id. at 406. In doing so, the court
carefully distinguished Gardner v. Rogers, 480 S.E.2d 217 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996). Although the arrest in Gardner was factually
similar to the Selvy arrest, the court noted that in Gardner the
plaintiff presented evidence that the arresting officer had
fabricated a ground on which to arrest the plaintiff. Thus,
Gardner presented a jury question regarding the officer's
subjective intent, given the evidence showing fabrication or a
scheme to fabricate the charges.
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Jones's statements to Teri Thornton and the comments
written on the citation could indicate that Jones arrested
Plaintiff for Plaintiff's tone and statements, not for actual
obstruction. Plaintiff's claim that he was in a passive,
vulnerable posture just before the arrest further supports the
allegation that Jones acted with malice when he arrested
Plaintiff.
The other cases on which Jones relies are equally
distinguishable. 5 In Tittle v. Corso, 569 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002), the plaintiff presented evidence demonstrating
rough, but permissible, treatment during a lawful arrest or
investigatory stop, coupled with the officer's use of profanity.
The plaintiff in Corso did not, however, present any evidence
that the arresting officer deliberately intended to do wrong.
The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate where
the undisputed evidence completely fails to demonstrate malice.
See also Kidd v. Coates, 518 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. 1999) (employing
similar reasoning); Valades v. Uslu, 689 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. App.
2009) (employing similar reasoning). Here, as demonstrated
above, the parties present conflicting versions of the facts,
one of which could support a finding that Jones acted with
Defendant also relies on Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir.
2002) for the proposition that the force Jones used when arresting Plaintiff
was not excessive, and therefore supports an inference that Jones did not
act with malice. However, Rodriguez did not address official immunity or
how acceptable levels of force should factor into an actual malice
determination. Therefore, Rodriguez has no bearing on this matter.
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malice. Consequently, Defendant is not entitled to official
immunity as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of October, 2011.
LISA GODBEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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