Clark v. Gregory et al
Filing
101
ORDER granting 77 the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's Compliant is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Signed by Magistrate Judge James E. Graham on 2/6/2012. (csr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUII2 FEB -6 AM lI )
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION
CLEUJI
,
Z_
SO, OST. F' GA.
STEVEN CLARK,
N
Plaintiff,
!ffi
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV209-164
TOMMY GREGORY, Sheriff;
LARRY HAMILTON, SR.; JOSHUA
BAKER; ERIC A. WATSON;
LUCERTA Y. DYALS; CAROL
COATS; and GERRI S. WATERS,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Central State Prison in Macon, Georgia,
filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his
confinement at the Camden County Jail in Woodbine, Georgia. Defendants filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff filed a Response'. Defendants filed a
Reply. Based on the following, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff states that: the Jail was overcrowded; inmates had to wear the same
uniforms for two (2) weeks at a time; there were no linens for the beds; inmate-oninmate attacks occurred; the law library was inadequate; inmates were not receiving
Plaintiff filed a pleading entitled "Counter Motion for Summary Judgment. The undersigned considers
the assertions in this pleading as Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion. To the extent this pleading
is a motion, Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.
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incoming mail on a daily basis; inmates were being denied access to newspapers,
cleaning supplies, and a real mirror; there were inadequate food supplies; and there
were no protective custody procedures. In addition, Plaintiff sent the Court a letter in
which he states that the conditions at the Jail did not improve and that he was assaulted
by Officer Coats .2
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and they are
entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment "shall" be granted if "the movant[s] show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant[s are] entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute about a material fact is genuine
and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. However, there must exist a conflict in
substantial evidence to pose a jury question." Hall v. Sunjo y Indus. Grp ., Inc., 764 F.
Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobb y , Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986)), and (Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Cor p ., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
The moving parties bear the burden of establishing that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phili p Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003)
Specifically, the moving parties must identify the portions of the record which establish
2
The undersigned addresses the three (3) parts of Defendants' Motion, as the undersigned directed
service of Plaintiffs Complaint based on Plaintiff's conditions of confinement, excessive force, and access
to the courts claims. To the extent Plaintiff's varied assertions cannot fit within one of these three (3)
categories, his allegations will be addressed under the Conditions of Confinement Claims" in Section III
of this Order.
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that there are no "genuine dispute[s] as to any material fact and the movant[s are]
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011). When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the
moving parties may discharge their burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to
prove his case at trial. See id. (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
In determining whether a summary judgment motion should be granted, a court must
view the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Peek-A-Boo Loun ge of Bradenton, Inc. v.
Manatee Co., Fla., 630 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
I.
Access to the Courts Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not claim he suffered any injury as a result
of being denied access to the courts. In fact, Defendants contend, Plaintiff was able to
pursue any litigation he wished. Defendants assert that Plaintiff brought this claim on
behalf of other prisoners who allegedly were unable to pursue litigation while those
prisoners were housed at the Camden County Jail. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff
cannot show that he suffered an actual injury while pursuing a specific, nonfrivolous
cause of action, and thus, lacks standing to support this First Amendment claim.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gregory, the Sheriff at the time he was housed
at the Camden County Jail, was responsible for providing him and the other inmates an
adequate law library, which he failed to do. Plaintiff avers that all prisoners are entitled
to access to the courts
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"Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First
Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment,
and/or the Fourteenth Amendment." Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir.
2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). In order to pass
constitutional muster, the access allowed must be more than a mere formality. Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1282. The access must be
"adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bounds, 730 U.S. at 822. For an inmate to state
a claim that he was denied access to the courts, he must establish that he suffered
"actual injury" by showing that the defendant's actions hindered his ability to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 797 (11th Cir. 2003). The pursuit of claims which are protected
are those in which a plaintiff is attacking his sentence, directly or collaterally, or
challenging the conditions of his confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996). Stated another way, the "only specific types of legal claims [which] are
protected by this right [are] the nonfrivolous prosecution of either a direct appeal of a
conviction, a habeas petition, or a civil rights suit." Hyland v. Parker, 163 F. App'x 793,
798 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998)).
There is no issue of material fact when the non-moving party has failed to prove the
existence of an element essential to his case. Regions Bank v. Provident Bank, Inc.,
345 F.3d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). "Actual injury" is an essential element to a claim
asserting the denial of access to the courts. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
This right to access to the courts also "requires prison authorities to... provide
prisoners with adequate law libraries..." Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290
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(11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). This right is not an "'abstract,
freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance,' so a prisoner bringing a
deprivation of access to court claim must allege actual injury as a 'constitutional
prerequisite." Taylor v. McSwain, 335 F. App'x 32, 34 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis,
518 U.S. at 351-52). In other words, "in an access-to-courts claim, 'a plaintiff cannot
merely allege a denial of access to a[n adequate] law library. . ., even if the denial is
systemic." Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Sabers v. Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th
Cir. 1996)). "To prevail, a plaintiff must provide evidence of such deterrence, such as a
denial or dismissal of a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights case, that results
from actions of prison officials." Miller v. Donald, 132 F. App'x 270, 272 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290-91).
Plaintiff fails to present any evidence whatsoever that he suffered an actual injury
in the pursuit of a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights case because of the
purported inadequate law library at the Camden County Jail. In fact, during his
deposition, Plaintiff stated that he has been able to pursue "all the litigation [he had]
wanted" while he was housed at the Camden County Jail. (Doc. No. 77-5, p. 28).
Plaintiff admitted that he had not been prevented from challenging his criminal
proceedings, nor had he missed any filing deadlines based on Defendants' failure to
have an adequate law library. (Id. at pp. 28-29). Plaintiff has presented no genuine
dispute as to a material fact regarding his access to the courts claim, and Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
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II.
Excessive Force Claim
Defendants assert that Plaintiff admits that he was arguing with the Jail nurse
and that he was yelling at Defendant Coats, which Defendants contend created a
security risk and a threat to order requiring a response. Defendants allege that
Defendant Coats pushed Plaintiff back into the ceilbiock from the hallway where he was
standing. After this, Defendants assert, an inmate (perhaps Plaintiff) called Defendant
Coats a "bitch", and Defendant Coats pushed Plaintiff again and placed him in
handcuffs. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff was seen by medical staff later that day,
and Plaintiff did not state that he sustained any 'significant injury" as a result of this
incident. (Doc. No. 77-1, p. 5). Defendants further assert that the amount of force
Defendant Coats used fell well short of malicious or wanton conduct and was used only
to stop Plaintiff from arguing and to restore order and discipline.
Plaintiff asserts that there was no investigation into the assault he suffered at
Defendant Coats' hand and that Defendants Gregory, Hamilton and Baker did not speak
to any of the officers on duty. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Coats' attack on him
was unprovoked.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the use of cruel and unusual
punishment governs the amount of force that prison officials are entitled to use.
Cam pbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). An excessive force claim has
two requisite parts: an objective and a subjective component. Sims v. Mashburn, 25
F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994). In order to satisfy the objective component, the inmate
must show that the prison officials' conduct was 'sufficiently serious." Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The subjective component requires a showing that
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the force used was "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm"
rather than a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). In order to determine whether the force was used for the
malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm or whether the force was applied in
good faith, the following factors are relevant: the need for the exercise of force, the
relationship between the need for force and the force applied, the extent of injury that
the inmate suffered, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and other inmates, and
any efforts taken to temper the severity of a forceful response. Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559
F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). In other words, to establish a claim for excessive
force, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendants acted with a malicious and sadistic
purpose to inflict harm, and (2) that more than a de minimis injury resulted. Johnson v.
Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Coats acted in a malicious or sadistic
manner. Further, Plaintiff fails to show that he suffered any injury as a result of this
incident or that any alleged injury was more than de minimis. At most, Plaintiff, during
his deposition, characterized Defendant Coats as having shoved" him initially, and then
shoved him a second time and twisted his arms behind his back because she thought
Plaintiff was the person who called her a "bitch". (Doc. No. 77-5, pp.45-48). Plaintiff
admitted that medical staff checked him for headaches, which were not related to this
alleged assault, later that day and that he never requested to have medical staff
examine him again. (Ld., at pp. 51-52). As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot sustain his
excessive force claim against Defendant Coats.
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Ill.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
Defendants assert that, taken in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff's
allegations concerning his conditions of confinement claims do not satisfy the objective
standard of the Eighth Amendment. 3 Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's
claim that he and other inmates were forced to sleep on the floor of the cell on several
occasions only infers that there were more people than beds in the cell block, which
does not establish a constitutional violation. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs
claims that he did not have sheets or a pillow does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs claim that he and
other inmates were forced to wear the same uniform for two (2) weeks does not
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not
complain that he received meals of insufficient nutritional value, only that he was not
getting enough milk and fruit. Defendants assert that there is no evidence that the
meals provided were nutritionally deficient or that Plaintiff suffered any injury due to
these meals. Finally, Defendants assert that they were unaware of a threat of inmateon-inmate violence resulting from the alleged conditions of confinement at the Jail.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had a duty to protect him from other inmates.
Plaintiff also states that Defendant Gregory had a duty to provide him with a pillow, a
mirror, cleaning supplies which were strong enough to clean black mold, and a clean
jumpsuit on a weekly basis. (Doc. No. 94-2, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Gregory, Hamilton, Baker, Watson, and Dyals are liable for denying access to
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when he was housed at the Camden County
Jail. Plaintiffs claims of excessive force and unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims have been
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment because cases involving convicted prisoners and decided under
the Eighth Amendment apply equally to cases involving pretrial detainees." Ellis v. Pierce Co., Ga., 415
F. App'x 215, 217 (11th Cir. 2011).
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newspapers, magazines, or books. Plaintiff also alleges that he did not receive enough
milk while he was housed at the Camden County Jail.
The Eighth Amendment "forbids punishments that are cruel and unusual in light
of contemporary standards of decency." Hernandez v. Fla. Deø't of Corr., 281 F. App'x
862, 865 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). "Accordingly, the Eighth
Amendment governs the conditions under which convicted prisoners are confined and
the treatment they receive in prison." Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)). In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim under section 1983, a "prisoner
must allege facts to satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison
official's conduct." Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d. 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). "Under the objective
component, a prisoner must allege a prison condition that is so extreme that it poses an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's health or safety. To satisfy the
subjective component, the prisoner must allege that the prison official, at a minimum,
acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate indifference." Id. "[D]eliberate
indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm;
(2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence." Id. "[A]
prisoner's mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment."
Hernandez, 281 F. App'x at 865.
At most, Plaintiffs general allegations concerning the conditions of his
confinement at the Camden County Jail reveal that he was made to suffer discomfort.
However, as a matter of law, these allegations do not satisfy the Eighth Amendment
requirements that Defendants knew of a risk of serious harm and that they ignored that
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risk. For example, Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that he had never had trouble
with cellmates who he contends assaulted him and that the alleged assaults occurred
'out of the blue". (Doc. No. 77-5, pp. 38-41). Thus, Defendants cannot be liable for
failing to protect Plaintiff from unknown threats. In sum, Plaintiff fails to create a
genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding his conditions of confinement claims.
It is unnecessary to address Defendants' contention that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
the appropriate judgment of dismissal.
SO ORDERED, this
day of February, 2012.
AES E. GRAHAM
ITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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