Walsh v. Jeff Davis County et al

Filing 128

ORDER denying 112 Motion for Certificate of Appealability and denying 125 Motion for Expedited Ruling. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 6/11/2012. (csr)

tn the aniteb otateg Wartet Court
for the Aouthern Atotrtct of &otgta
runtuttk Aibtoion

MIKE WALSH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFF DAVIS COUNTY, et. al.,
Defendants.

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CV 210-075

ORDER

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for
Certification of Final Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b), and Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Ruling and Reply in
Support of Motion for Certification of Final Judgment Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Dkt. Nos. 112, 125. Defendants
oppose both motions. Dkt. Nos. 122, 126.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) "provides an
exception to the general principle that a final judgment is
proper only after the rights and liabilities of all the parties
to the action have been adjudicated." Ebrahimi v. City of
Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997).
Specifically, Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter

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"final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Otherwise,
partial adjudication of a case, in terms of claims or parties,
does not conclude the case, and the partial adjudication is
generally not appealable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Lloyd Noland
Foundation, Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777
(11th Cir. 2007) . Certification of a partial judgment is only
appropriate in "unusual case[s]" and district courts are
"counseled . . . to exercise the limited discretion afforded by
Rule 54(b) conservatively." Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165.
In deciding whether to certify a partial final judgment,
"[a] district court must follow a two-step analysis." Lloyd
Noland Foundation, Inc., 483 F.3d at 777. "First, the court
must determine that its final judgment is, in fact, both "final"
and a "judgment." Id. In this case, Plaintiff seeks 54(b)
certification for the grant of summary judgment to "Defendants
Greg Rainey, Sr., James Laddie Boatright, Jr., Anthony
Disharoon, Spencer Disharoon, Bobby Clack, Tammy Toler, and Greg
Rainey, Jr., in their individual capacities, Jeff Davis County
and Defendants Boatright and Rainey, Sr., in their official
capacities." Dkt. No. 112, at 2-3. The Court's March 29, 2012
order, granting summary judgment to various defendants, was
unquestionably "an ultimate disposition of . . . individual
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claim[s] entered in the course of a multiple claims action and a
judgment in the sense that it [was] a decision upon . . .
cognizable claim[s] for relief." Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc.,
483 F.3d at 777 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Therefore, the first step of the 54(b) analysis is
satisfied.
Assuming the judgment is final, the "court must then
determine that there is `no just reason for delay' in certifying
it as final and immediately appealable." Id. This
determination is within the discretion of the trial court. Id.
The inquiry "requires the district court to balance judicial
administrative interests and relevant equitable concerns."
Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165-66. The focus on judicial
administrative interests, "preserves the historic federal policy
against piecemeal appeals." Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)). The focus on equitable
concerns limits certification to those rare occasions where
"immediate appeal would alleviate some danger of hardship or
injustice associated with delay." Id. (citing Se. Banking Corp.
v. Bassett, 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff presents two arguments in support of why there is
no just reason for delay in certifying the summary judgment
order: (1) failing to certify the order could potentially result
in two separate trials, and (2) the two Defendants who were not
no

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dismissed from the suit intend to immediately appeal the Court's
order, as they are entitled to, given that the order denied
those Defendants the defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff's
stated reasons are insufficient to justify certification of the
Court's summary judgment order as a final judgment.
Arguably, both stated reasons support an argument that
certification would serve judicial administrative interests. It
should be noted, however, Rule 54(b) is not the proper mechanism
for seeking appellate review of dismissed claims in order to
avoid an additional trial. See Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 168
("Where accelerated appellate review of a controlling question
of law is the motivating factor in deciding to enter judgment
under Rule 54(b), an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292 represents the more appropriate course."). Moreover, the
prospect of two trials in this case assumes that Defendants
Conaway and Lewis will lose their appeal, that the matter will
go to trial, that Plaintiff will then appeal the dismissed
claims against all other Defendants, that Plaintiff will prevail
on the appeal, and then the parties will proceed to a second
trial on the remaining claims. Clearly, the likelihood of two
trials is attenuated at best. On the other hand, if the Court
grants Plaintiff's 54(b) motion, certification of the Court's
partial summary judgment order guarantees that the Eleventh
Circuit will be faced with a sprawling appeal, both in terms of
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facts and law. If the order were to be certified, the appellate
court would need to address rulings on municipal liability under
§ 1983, various state law claims, sovereign immunity, and
official immunity. Clearly, the preservation of judicial
administrative interests is better served by not certifying the
partial summary judgment order.
Plaintiff's second argument - that Defendants Conaway and
Lewis intend to pursue an interlocutory appeal on the Court's
qualified immunity determination - is equally unavailing. The
fact that one party will pursue interlocutory appeal on a very
narrow, singular issue should not justify opening the floodgates
on the appellate court.
Plaintiff presents no argument or facts in support of the
second aspect of "no just reason for delay" inquiry: relevant
equitable concerns. As stated previously, the focus on relevant
equitable concerns helps to ensure that immediate appeal is
available where "some danger of hardship or injustice associated
with delay" could be avoided by that appeal. Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d
at 166. Plaintiff has pointed to no hardship or injustice that
would occur if they were required to wait until final and
complete judgment is rendered in this case. Nor is the Court
aware of any such hardship or injustice.
In essence, Plaintiff seeks certification because he would
like to appeal his summary judgment losses sooner rather than
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later. Plaintiff's hope is bolstered by the fact that his
opponents are able to appeal their loss immediately. Personal
preference, however, is not a sufficient reason for the Court to
utilize the exceptional practice of Rule 54(b) certification.
The denial of qualified immunity may buy an express ticket to
the appellate court, but it does not allow all parties to ride
along. Plaintiff's motions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 11th day of June, 2012.

ISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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