Reagin et al v. Glynn County et al
Filing
54
ORDER granting Defendants' 26 Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims. The Clerk is directed to enter the appropriate judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/18/2012. (ca)
3n the Intttb Atattg Dttrttt Court
for the 'out$itrn Marta of georgia
33runobtti Athtoton
A.M.R., a minor, by and through DARLA Y.
REAGIN, as Mother and Next Friend; and
RONALD K. REAGIN, as Executor of the
Estate of MARTIN PARNELL REAGIN,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA; CHIEF
MATT DOER1NG, in his official capacity as
Glynn County Chief of Police; and
SERGEANT CRAIG BROWN, individually
and in his official capacity as Officer of Glynn
County Police Department,
Defendants.
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CV 211-003
!)P
Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Defendants Glynn County, Sergeant Craig Brown, and
Chief Matt Doering. See Dkt. No. 26. For the reasons stated
below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the tragic death of Martin Reagiri
("Reagin") . The task before this Court is a narrow one. The
issues raised in this lawsuit require the Court to decide only
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the issue of whether these Defendants violated the United States
Constitution when Reagin was fatally shot following his lengthy
standoff with police. The undisputed facts show that Reagin,
who suffered from mental illness, had threatened police
officers, changed into camouflage, refused repeated commands to
cooperate, pointed a gun at officers, and shouted that he
desired to shoot an officer in the eyes. Taking into
consideration the entirety of the undisputed facts, no violation
of the United States Constitution occurred.
On the afternoon of September 10, 2009, two Glynn County
Code Enforcement Officers—Mickey Milton and Robin Hummel—were on
patrol on St. Simons Island when they saw an auction sign in the
right-of-way in front of a house. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 1.
Because a Glynn County ordinance prohibits signs in a right-ofway, Milton and Hummel stopped their vehicle, a truck marked as
"Glynn County Code Enforcement." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 2; Dkt.
No. 37, 37:15-18. The officers intended to give the homeowner a
copy of the sign ordinance and to explain that the sign needed
to be moved. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 2. Milton and Hummel had
removed two or three signs several weeks earlier from the same
residence. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 3. The homeowner, Reagin, had
not been home when they had removed the earlier signs. See Dkt.
No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 4.
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Reagin noticed Milton and Hummel's presence on his property
and ran outside to confront them. See Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 6.
Reagin, a forty-six year old man, had a long history of mental
illness, including bipolar disorder. See Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶
5.
Reagin screamed at Milton and Hummel and grabbed a trashcan
and threw it towards the code enforcement officers and their
truck. Dkt. No.
37, 38:16-25.'
Milton also testified that
Reagin proceeded to hit the side of the truck with his hands.
Dkt. No. 37, 41:12-16.
Reagin did not, however, cause any
damage to the truck. Dkt. No. 37, 42:5-9.
Milton called 911
and described the situation to the operator. Dkt. No. 37, 43:78.
While Milton and Hummel waited for the police officers to
arrive, Reagin threatened to kill them. Dkt. No. 37, 58:3-10.
Glynn County Police Officers Talbert and Blades arrived on
the scene. See Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶91 12, 17.
Reagin, still
extremely upset, yelled at the officers to "[g]et the fuck off
' The Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party to the extent those facts are supported by the
record. Penley v. Enslinger, 605 F.3d 843 (11th dr. 2010)
Plaintiffs generally controverted several paragraphs of the
Defendants' Statement of Material Facts. See Dkt. Nos. 26 Ex. 2, 30.
However, Plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that would undermine
or contradict the factual assertions made by Defendants in those
controverted paragraphs, nor have they provided an alternate account
of the controverted paragraphs. "To controvert something is 'to
oppose or contest by action or argument; to dispute or contest' or
'to dispute or oppose by reasoning." Ballecillo v. Wall to Wall
Residence Repairs, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Thus, merely stating that a paragraph is controverted is insufficient
to actually do so. Additionally, the Court has undertaken an
independent review of the entire record and found no facts to
controvert the noted assertions.
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3
of [his] property" and warned them that if they did not, they
would "regret it." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 19. Reagin would
wander in and out of his house. On one of his trips outside,
Reagin went to his car, which was parked in the front yard, and
retrieved a small box. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 21. Because of the
size and shape, Officer Blades recognized the box as a box of
ammunition. Dkt. No. 32, 20:7-11. Shortly after Reagin
reentered the house with the box, both Officers Blades and
Talbert saw, through a window, Reagin carrying a long-barreled
gun. See Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 22.
After a few minutes, Reagin again exited the house and
appeared to be unarmed. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 91 24. Reagin
threatened the officers, yelling, "You have got three seconds to
get off my property or you're going to regret it." Dkt. No. 26,
Ex. 2 ¶ 25. Because Reagin appeared unarmed, Officer Blades saw
an opportunity to take Reagin into custody. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2
¶ 26. Officer Talbert aimed his taser at Reagin and told Reagin
to show both hands. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 27. Instead of
complying, Reagin turned and ran. Dkt. No. 38, 44:1-2. Officer
Talbert pursued him but tripped, giving Reagin a chance to
retreat back into his house. Dkt. No. 38, 442-10. Officer
Blades stated that, after this failed arrest attempt, Reagin
changed into camouflage clothing. Dkt. No. 32, 37:18-21.
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Another Glynn County Police Officer, Defendant Sergeant
Craig Brown arrived on the scene. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 31.
While Sergeant Brown exited his vehicle, he was warned by
another officer to "[1100k out" because Reagin had a gun. Dkt.
No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 31. When Sergeant Brown then looked toward the
house, he could see Reagin holding a gun. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶
32. Sergeant Brown positioned himself on the second-story porch
of Reagin's next-door neighbor. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 33. From
that vantage point, Sergeant Brown could see inside Reagin's
house and was able to observe Reagin walking through the house
with a gun. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 33.
The next officer to arrive on the scene was Officer Eric
Naugle, who knew Reagin well because he was Reagin's nephew by
marriage. Dkt. No. 34, 6:10-11. Officer Naugle knew, and
communicated to the other officers, that Reagin was an avid
hunter and owned "scoped firearms." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 35;
Dkt. No. 34, 30:13-22. Because of his relationship with Reagin,
Officer Naugle received permission from his supervisor to speak
directly with Reagin in an effort to end the standoff. Dkt. No.
26, Ex. 2 ¶ 36. Using a public address system, Officer Naugle
coaxed Reagin into stepping outside of the house. Dkt. No. 26,
Ex. 2 ¶ 37.
Reagin first spoke with his nephew stating repeatedly that
he had "not done anything." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 40. However,
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Reagin then turned his attention to Officer Blades, who was
providing cover for Officer Naugle. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶91 39,
41. Reagin walked toward Officer Blades shouting at him. Dkt.
No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶91 41-42. Reagin told Officer Blades that he was
"going to die" because Reagin was "going to shoot [him] right in
[his] glasses." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 191 43-44.
Reagin also
taunted Officer Blades by shouting that Reagin was "going to cut
[Officer Blade's] head off." Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 191 43-44.
Then, Reagin abruptly went back into his house and picked up a
rifle he had placed next to the door. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 45.
Sometime later, Reagin called 911 and asked to be connected
to Officer Naugle. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 46. During their
conversation, Reagin said that he was looking at officers
Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 47.
through the scope of his rifle.
Officer Nagule passed this information on to the other officers,
including Sergeant Brown.
Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 91 48; Dkt. No.
33, 23:1-5. Sergeant Brown was also told that Reagin had
specifically mentioned Sergeant Brown by describing Sergeant
Brown's location on the neighbor's porch. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶
48; Dkt. No. 33, 23:1-5. Sergeant Brown adjusted his position
on the porch as a result. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶91 48-49. At some
point, Sergeant Brown and the other officers were told that
Reagin had told Officer Nagule that the officers needed to
"hunker down" because Reagin was going to come out of the
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residence and presumably attack them. Dkt. No. 36, 49:1-11.
Sergeant Brown was also informed that an officer had seen a
knife tucked into the back of Reagin's waistband. Dkt. No. 33,
48:16-49:12.
The SWAT officers formed a plan to take Reagin into custody
by using non-lethal force. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 IT 52-54.
Officer Nagule would draw Reagin out of the house by telling him
that, if he came outside unarmed and received a citation, the
officers would leave. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 54. The plan
contained two lines of attack. Once Reagin was on his front
porch, a SWAT officer would tase Reagin. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 IS
52-53. If the taser did not work, then a second SWAT officer
would begin firing non-lethal rounds at Reagin. Dkt. No. 26,
Ex. 2 ¶ 53. The SWAT team had not devised a third line of
attack if both the taser and the non-lethal rounds failed. Dkt.
No. 39, 34:6-10.
Sergeant Brown was not informed of the SWAT team's plan
because all SWAT team communications are broadcast over an
encrypted network. See Dkt. No. 32, 10:19-22. This is a safety
measure so that SWAT communications cannot be accessed by
members of the public through equipment such as a police
scanner. See Dkt. No. 32, 10:19-22. Thus, patrol officers,
such as Sergeant Brown, did not have access to the SWAT team's
communications. Dkt. No. 33, 26:5-10.
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Officer Naugle was able to convince Reagin to come outside
to receive a citation. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 54. According to
the plan, the first SWAT officer fired a taser at Reagin. Dkt.
No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 40. When the taser prongs hit Reagin and the
taser discharged its shock, Reagin began falling forward, but
the taser prongs were either dislodged or failed to make a good
connection.
Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 59. Thus, Reagin stumbled
off the steps but then stood up, apparently unfazed by the
taser. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 60. The second SWAT officer then
began firing non-lethal rounds at Reagin. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶T
61-63. Although two of the rounds made contact with Reagin,
neither incapacitated him. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 62. Reagin
managed to run around the side of the house and into his back
yard despite the fact that being hit by a taser and non-lethal
rounds generally is more "than the typical person can handle."
Dkt. No. 39, 31:9-15.
Sergeant Brown, who was unable to see what had occurred in
the front yard, saw Reagin run into the backyard and dart behind
a sizeable boat parked near the side of the house. See Dkt. No.
26, Lx. 2 ¶[ 64-71; Dkt. No. 36, 69:21-24. Sergeant Brown
stated that, when he first saw Reagin running, he did not see a
gun, so Sergeant Brown was going to chase Reagin. Dkt. No. 33,
28:22-24. However, once Reagin had ducked down behind the boat,
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Sergeant Brown thought he saw a weapon in Reagin's hand even
though Reagin was, in fact, unarmed .2 Dkt. No. 33, 29:1-5.
Sergeant Brown concluded that Reagin was positioning
himself so that Reagin would be able to attack the officers
pursuing him. Dkt. No. 33, 34:20-23. From where Reagin was
crouching, he was partially covered by the boat, and the
pursuing officers would have difficulty spotting him. Dkt. No.
33, 34:20-23. Sergeant Brown yelled for Reagin to stop, but
Reagin kept moving. Dkt. No. 33, 29:7-9. Sergeant Brown then
fired three shots at Reagin. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 191 76-77.
Reagin ran into his house. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 191 76-77. After
waiting approximately forty minutes, the police fired tear gas
into the house and entered. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 80. Once
inside, they found Reagin dead, killed by one of Sergeant
Brown's shots. Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 2 ¶ 81.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary
judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no
2
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Plaintiffs argue that this Court cannot consider Brown's testimony
that he thought he saw a weapon handle in Reagin's hand because, for
summary judgment purposes, the court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Dkt. No. 29.
Plaintiffs' argument, however, is misguided. While this Court
certainly must view the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have not disputed that Sergeant Brown thought
he saw a weapon; they have disputed whether Reagin did in fact have a
weapon. Thus, while this Court is required to assume that Reagin did
not have a weapon when Sergeant Brown shot him, this Court is not
required to disregard Sergeant Brown's testimony about his belief
that Reagin did have a weapon.
9
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court must view
the evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157-59 (1970) . The party seeking summary judgment must first
identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24
(1986). To discharge this burden, the movant must show the
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325. The burden then shifts to
the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative
evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
However, "[i]n the context of qualified immunity analysis,
the Supreme Court has cautioned that if a court were 'to deny
summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on
the excessive force claim,' it might 'undermine the goal of
qualified immunity to 'avoid excessive disruption of government
and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.'" Penley, 605 F.3d at 849 (citing Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, (2001)). Therefore,
When a district court considers the record in [the
light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury], it eliminates all issues of fact. By
approaching the record in this way, the court has the
plaintiff's best case before it. With the plaintiff's
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best case in hand, the court is able to move to the
question of whether the defendant committed the
constitutional violation alleged in the complaint
without having to assess any facts in dispute. Thus,
because material issues of disputed fact are not a
factor in the court's analysis of qualified immunity
and cannot foreclose the grant or denial of summary
judgment based on qualified immunity[,] we decline to
entertain [a plaintiff's] arguments concerning the
allegedly disputed facts.
Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005). In
other words, "[a]t the summary judgment stage, ... once we have
determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the
record, the reasonableness of [the officer's] actions ... is a
pure question of law." Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n. 8 (citations
omitted)
DISCUSSION
Because Reagin's Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated, summary judgment is appropriate. Excessive force
claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective
reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388
(1989). This "calculus - . . ernbod[ies] allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in
a particular situation." Id. at 396-97. "[T]he question is
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II
whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them
Id. at 397. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has articulated
three factors for evaluating the use of force. See Oliver v.
Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) . These factors are:
(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect
pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others; and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or
attempted to evade arrest by flight. Id. Applying those
factors to the present case, this Court finds that Sergeant
Brown's use of deadly force was reasonable. All three of the
factors weigh in favor of granting summary judgment.
In terms of the first factor, Reagin committed extremely
serious offenses. While the incident arose initially from a
sign ordinance violation, that is not the crime that summoned
the police to the scene. The police were called because Reagin
had threatened the code enforcement officers and had thrown a
large trashcan towards them. Once the police arrived, the
offenses Reagin committed became increasingly more severe.
Reagin's actions were equally, if not more serious, then
the decedent's actions in Penley v. Eslinger. 605 F.3d at 851.
In Penley, a middle school student brought a toy gun to school,
threatened the lives of students, and refused to comply with
officers' commands that he drop his weapon. Id. at 851. The
12
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Eleventh Circuit, in determining that using lethal force against
the student was reasonable, described those actions as
"undoubtedly serious crimes." Id. Likewise, in this case, the
severity of Reagin's behavior weighs heavily in favor of
Sergeant Brown's actions. Reagin committed numerous assaults
against peace officers and repeatedly ignored officers'
commands.
The second factor evaluates the threat Reagin posed to the
officers or others. This factor "can be reduced to a simple
question: 'whether, given the circumstances, [the suspect] would
have appeared to reasonable officers to have been gravely
dangerous." Id. In evaluating the second factor, this Court
must consider the reasonableness of Sergeant Brown's conclusion
that Reagin was armed. See Riordan v. O'Shea, 448 Fed. App'x
928, 931 (11th Cir. 2011) (determining whether it was reasonable
for an officer to conclude the suspect had a "dangerous weapon,"
even though the object "turned out to be a wooden chair
spindle")
Even though mistaken, 3 Sergeant Brown's conclusion that
Reagin was armed was entirely reasonable. Reagin had repeatedly
made the officers painfully aware that Reagin owned an array of
As mentioned above, this Court will assume that Reagin did not have a
weapon when he was shot. Whether that was indeed the case is
certainly in dispute. When he was found dead, Reagin had both a
rifle and a "big butcher knife" with a "brown handle" lying nearby.
Dkt. No. 39, 43:21-25, 44:3-5, 47:7-10.
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deadly weapons and that he was skilled at using them. Sergeant
Brown had himself seen Reagin holding firearms. Fellow officers
had also informed Sergeant Brown that Reagin had previously
hidden a knife in his waistband. Reagin's position behind the
boat could easily have been interpreted as an effort to prepare
to attack the officers pursuing him. Furthermore, Reagin's
change into camouflage clothing could indicate that Reagin had
at least contemplated using stealth. Reagin had also threatened
to shoot an officer in the eyes. An officer is not required to
be absolutely certain that a suspect is armed in order to use
deadly force. See id. Given the situation, it was reasonable
for Sergeant Brown to conclude that his fellow officers' lives
were at risk.
Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that Reagin
had agreed to come out unarmed to receive a citation and that,
because of Chief Doering's actions, Sergeant Brown was not aware
of that information. However, even if Sergeant Brown had known
that Reagin agreed to be unarmed, it would still be reasonable
for Sergeant Brown to conclude that Reagin possessed a weapon.
Reagin had previously demonstrated that he was defiant,
volatile, and capable of concealing weaponry in his clothing.
Plaintiffs analogize the present case to cases holding that
deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing suspect is
unreasonable. See Dkt. No. 29 (citing Hernandez v. City of
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Miami, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2004)). Those cases are
readily distinguishable because, from Sergeant Brown's
perspective, Reagin was neither unarmed nor fleeing. As
discussed above, Sergeant Brown's mistaken belief that Reagin
was armed was reasonable. Furthermore, Reagin was not fleeing
when he was shot. Reagin had stopped running and was crouched
behind a boat, possibly so that he could attack the officers
following him. In sum, Reagin posed a legitimate threat to the
officers on the scene and the second factor also weighs in favor
of Sergeant Brown's use of deadly force.
The third and final factor this Court must evaluate is
whether Reagin was resisting arrest. Clearly he was. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine what more Reagin could have done to
resist arrest. Plaintiffs contend that Reagin had stopped
resisting arrested and had "surrendered" to police authority
when he agreed to walk outside, unarmed, to receive a citation.
See Dkt. No. 46. That argument is unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, Sergeant Brown did not shoot Reagin when he
walked out on the porch to receive a citation. Reagin was shot
after the SWAT team's two-pronged attack failed. Second, Reagin
never agreed to be taken into custody. He only agreed to
recieve a citation. Third, even though Reagin may have been
calmer when he walked out onto his porch, he had proven himself
to be volatile and unpredictable. Fourth, after being both
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tased and shot with non-lethal rounds, Reagin, rather than
surrendering to police authority, ran off and demonstrated that
he was still actively resisting arrest. For these reasons, the
third factor also supports this Court's conclusion that Sergeant
Brown did not violate Reagin's constitutional rights.
All of Plaintiffs' other remaining claims must also be
dismissed. If Sergeant Brown did not commit a Fourth Amendment
violation, Chief Doering cannot be held liable as his
supervisor. Plaintiffs argue that Chief Doering's actions
created a risk that Reagin's constitutional rights would be
violated. Without a resulting violation, however, Plaintiffs
cannot prevail on a § 1983 claim. See Penley, 605 F.3d at 85455 (concluding that a sheriff could not be liable in his
official capacity under § 1983 for allegedly formulating use-offorce policy that allowed deadly force to be used without prior
warning if the policy did not cause a Fourth Amendment
violation). Nor can Glynn County be held liable in the absence
of an underlying constitutional violation. City of Los Angeles
v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that to succeed on
a § 1983 claim against municipality, the plaintiff must have
suffered a constitutional injury) . Additionally, Plaintiffs
admitted during the June 19th motions hearing that they were no
longer pursuing the conspiracy claim or any of the state law
claims. See Dkt. No. 52. Under Georgia law, sovereign immunity
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would clearly bar Plaintiffs' claim against Glynn County. See
O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4. Georgia law would also not allow Plaintiffs
to recover from Sergeant Brown or Chief Doering on state law
claims. Georgia's doctrine of official immunity protects an
official from liability for discretionary acts unless the
official acted with malice or intent to injure. Gilbert v.
Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753 (1994). The actions of Sergeant
Brown and Chief Doering were undoubtedly discretionary and
Plaintiffs have never alleged that their actions were taken out
of malice. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on all claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment is appropriate
with regards to all Defendants on all claims. Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 26, is
GRANTED.
The Court of Clerk is directed to enter the
appropriate judgment.
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of December, 2012.
ISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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