Macaulay et al v. Camden County, Georgia et al

Filing 47

ORDER granting 31 Motion to Dismiss; granting 35 Motion to Dismiss; granting 36 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 14 Motion to Dismiss. For the reason stated, the Defendants' motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal claims. The parties have 10 days to brief the federal claim remaining against Defendant Kings Bay Community Hospital, Inc. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/11/2011. (csr)

El

n the 11niteb Otatto 3ttrtct Court
for the bouthern Motrtct of 4eorgta
runtuttk VibiOion
TARA SAVANA}{ MACAULAY, as
natural child of Eric N. Macaulay,
deceased, and as Administratrix of the
Estate of Eric N. Macaulay, and
TAYLOR MACAULAY, as natural child
of Eric N. Macaulay, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

CAMDEN COUNTY, GEORGIA, CITY
OF ST. MARYS, GEORGIA,
JESS MARTINEZ, M.D., and
KINGS BAY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,
INC., a/ida SOUTHEAST GEORGIA
HEALTH SYSTEM, CAMDEN CAMPUS,
and JOHN DOE 1-6,
Defendants.

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CV 211-011

ORDER

Presently before the Court are Defendant Camden County's
Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 31, Defendant City of St. Marys'
Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 35, and Defendant Jess Martinez's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 36. Upon due
consideration, the motions are GRANTED.

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BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2009, Jack Macaulay (Jack) returned to his
home following a doctor's appointment and noticed that his son,
Decedent Eric N. Macaulay, was "acting strangely." Compi. ¶I 1617. Decedent told Jack that he had ingested approximately 22
morphine tablets and 10 Xanax pills. Jack dialed 911 and
requested emergency assistance.
When the St. Marys Police Department and Camden County Fire
Department arrived at Jack's residence at approximately 7:31
p.m., Jack advised emergency personnel of the situation and
noted that 27 pills, rather than the 22 Decedent claimed to have
ingested, were missing from a prescription morphine bottle
located in the home. Id. at ¶I 19-20. Shortly thereafter, the
emergency personnel spoke to Decedent, who stated that he had
ingested the medication between approximately 1:00 p.m. and 1:30
p.m. that afternoon. Id. at ¶ 23.
The emergency personnel explained the situation over the
phone to Defendant Jess Martinez, a medical doctor employed by
Defendant Kings Bay Community Hospital, Inc. Without taking any
medical history, performing any examination, or speaking to
Decedent, Martinez stated that if Decedent had taken the claimed
amount of medication at the stated time, Decedent would have
died prior to the arrival of emergency personnel. Martinez made
no recommendations as to treatment or further examination. Id.
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at 191 26-27. Although Decedent coughed and had difficulty
staying awake and swallowing food, the emergency personnel on
the scene allegedly refused to take Decedent to the hospital and
ignored Jack's request for treatment. The emergency personnel
subsequently left the residence.
At approximately 12:51 a.m., Jack placed another 911 call
to report that he believed Decedent was dead after having
observed that he was pale in color, unresponsive, and not
breathing. Id. at 91 38. Emergency personnel from St. Marys and
Camden again responded but were unable to revive Decedent.
Martinez was called a second time and advised emergency
personnel to cease rescue efforts and pronounce death at 1:07
a.m. Id. at ¶ 40.
Plaintiffs - the children of Decedent, one of whom is
administratrix of his estate - filed this lawsuit, alleging that
Defendants violated the constitutional rights of Decedent and
are liable under state law for failing to provide Decedent with
adequate medical care.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs' lone federal claim arises under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Plaintiffs allege that by denying Decedent much-needed
medical care, Defendants violated Decedent's "Constitutional and
Civil rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

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to the United States Constitution." Compi. ¶ 1. Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1983, such
that the claim should be dismissed .2
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a district court must
construe the plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded facts alleged in
the complaint as true. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d
1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Although a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient
factual material "to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) . At a minimum, a complaint should "contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory." Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d
1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.
for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
"To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must prove (1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2)
that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law." Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258
' The complaint states that Defendants violated "Plaintiffs' " rights, Compl.
¶ 1, which the Court understands as an error. The Court interprets the
complaint as alleging violations of Decedent's rights.
2 Although Defendant Jess Martinez's motion is styled as a motion for summary
judgment, the relevant portion of his motion adopts Camden County's motion to
dismiss as to the § 1983 claim. See Dkt. No. 36, at 2.
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(11th Cir. 2005). Aside from a handful of conclusory statements,
the complaint offers no explanation of how the facts alleged
amount to violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In discussing the possibility of a constitutional right to
essential medical care, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that
"[i]f such a right exists at all, it must derive from the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, which forbids a state
to deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d
1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987). Perhaps recognizing the complete
inapplicability of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to this
case, Plaintiffs focus exclusively on a possible violation of
Decedent's Fourteenth Amendment rights in their filings opposing
the present motions. See Dkt. No. 20, at 7.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a failure to provide
essential medical services may implicate Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights where a "special relationship" exists between
a state actor and a claimant. Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1035.
Although "the contours of what constitutes a 'special
relationship' . . . are hazy," the Eleventh Circuit has
explained:
a constitutional duty can arise only when a state
or municipality, by exercising a significant
degree of custody or control over an individual,
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places that person in a worse situation than he
would have been had the government not acted at
all. Such a situation could arise by virtue of
the state affirmatively placing an individual in
a position of danger, effectively stripping a
person of her ability to defend herself, or
cutting off potential sources of private aid. The
key concept is the exercise of coercion,
dominion, or restraint by the state. The state
must somehow significantly limit an individual's
freedom or impair his ability to act on his own
before it will be constitutionally required to
care and provide for that person.
Id. at 1035-36. Examples of circumstances giving rise to a
"special relationship" include incarceration, involuntary
institutionalization, pretrial detainees, and arrestees or
suspects in police custody. Id. at 1035 n.7.
In this case, there are no facts evincing a "special
relationship" between any Defendant and Decedent.
Regardless of whether Defendants provided adequate medical
care, they did not affirmatively place Decedent in danger
or somehow restrain Decedent or his family from seeking aid
on their own. As a result, Plaintiffs have not alleged a
constitutional violation and have thus failed to state a
claim under § 1983. The Defendants' motions are thereby
granted.
The Court notes that Defendant Kings Bay Community
Hospital has neither filed nor joined a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment. The parties are granted ten
(10) days from the date of this order to file any briefs

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addressing whether Plaintiff's federal claim against Kings
Bay Community Hospital should also be dismissed. The Court
will decide the issue of supplemental jurisdiction as it
relates to the remaining state claims following the ten-day
supplemental briefing period.

[0)I141(40
For the reasons stated, the Defendants' motions are
GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal claims. The parties have
10 days to brief the federal claim remaining against
Defendant Kings Bay Community Hospital, Inc.

SO ORDERED, this 12th day of August, 2011.

ZOOD,
LISA GODBEi CHIEF JUDGE
Z
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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