Davilla v. Anthony Haynes et al

Filing 58

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 39 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's monetary damages claims pursuant to the RFRA are DISMISSED. The undersigned concurs in part with the 52 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff's First Amendment and injunctive relief claims under the RFRA shall remain pending, for now. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/31/2012. (csr)

OURT .....
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT' '
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION
202 AUG 31 P1 2

.

I

1. Lft G A

ANTHONY DAVILLA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL ACTION NO.:

CV212-005

NATIONAL INMATE APPEALS
COORDINATOR, ROBIN GLADDEN,
General Counsel; REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
COORDINATOR, R. E. HaLT,
General Counsel; ANTHONY HAYNES,
and DR. BRUCE COX, Chaplin,
Defendants.

ORDER

After an independent and de nova review of the entire record, the undersigned
concurs, in part, with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, to which
Defendants filed Objections. Plaintiff responded to Defendants' Objections.
In their Objections, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible
First Amendment violation, and, even if he did, his First Amendment claims should be
dismissed because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants allege
that the proper inquiry is not whether Plaintiff generally has a clearly established right to
the free exercise of religion, but rather, whether he has the clearly established right to
receive religious items through unauthorized, unsecured vendors. Defendants also
allege that Bureau of Prisons' officials relied on governing policy in good faith, and they
are not liable for any resulting constitutional or statutory violation.

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In analyzing a motion to dismiss, it is often not possible for a court to judge the
reasonableness of a policy or actions done in reliance on that policy. As Defendants
note, the Magistrate Judge recognized Defendants' assertion that the Bureau of
Prisons' ("BOP") policy they relied upon to deny Plaintiffs requests for items had a valid,
rational connection to ensuring institutional security under Turner v. Safel y, 482 U.S. 78
(1987). However, the Magistrate Judge merely recognized Defendants' assertion that
they relied upon a BOP policy and that the particular policy satisfies at least a portion of
the Turner holding. This is not to say the Magistrate Judge necessarily agreed with that
assertion and then recommended that Defendants' Motion be denied. Defendants'
Motion reads very much like a strong motion for summary judgment. However, at this
stage, given the status of the Plaintiff and the pleadings, it would be improper for the
Court to enter judgment in Defendants' favor regarding Plaintiffs First Amendment
claims. These portions of Defendants' Objections are overruled.
However, the Court sustains Defendants' objections to the Magistrate Judge's
conclusion regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") claim. The
RFRA states that "[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (c). Before the
United States can be sued, the United States must consent to suit. United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). The federal government may waive its sovereign
immunity by statute, but that waiver "must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text."
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). The RFRA's reference to "appropriate relief' is
not the sort of unequivocal waiver necessary because this broad term is susceptible to

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2

more than one interpretation. Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026
(D.C. 2006) (internal cites and quotes omitted). "'[A]ppropriate relief might include
damages[, . . . but] another plausible reading is that 'appropriate relief covers equitable
relief[. G]iven Congress's awareness of the importance of sovereign immunity and its
silence in the statute on the subject of damages," the RFRA does not waive the United
States' sovereign immunity from claims for damages. Id.
As Defendants note, there is no binding precedent which addresses whether the
RFRA bars claims against individual defendants for monetary damages. However,
several courts have addressed this question and have determined that the RFRA does
not allow for the recovery of monetary damages. Oklevueha Native American Church of
Hawaii. Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2012) (the "appropriate relief' provision
does not allow suits for monetary damages under the RFRA); Burke v. La ppin, 821 F.
Supp.2d 244 (D.C. 2011) (the RFRA did not waive the federal government's sovereign
immunity for damages); Jean-Pierre v. Bureau of Prisons,

No.

09-266, 2010 WL

3852338 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2010) (the RFRA does not waive sovereign immunity for
monetary damages); Bloch v. Thom pson,

No.

1:03-CV-1352, 2007 WL 60930 (ED,

Tex. Jan. 5, 2007) (the RFRA does not waive immunity for damages); and Gilmore-Bey
v. Coughlin, 929 F. Supp.

146 (S.D. N.Y.

1996) (the RFRA did not abrogate Eleventh

Amendment bar to actions for monetary damages); but see, Ag rawal v. Briley, No.
02C6807, 2006 WL 3523750 (N.D.

III.

Dec. 6, 2006) (the RFRA does not bar monetary

damages).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not determined whether the RFRA
bars monetary damages claims against individual defendants. However, the United

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States Supreme Court determined in Sossamon v. Texas, - U.S. , 131 S. Ct.
1651, 1659-60 (Apr. 20, 2011), that the "appropriate relief' provision of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), is not
"the unequivocal expression" of consent for states to "waive their sovereign immunity to
suits for damages." In Smith v. Allen, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that § 2000cc-2(a)
"cannot be construed as creating a private cause of action against individual defendants
for monetary damages." 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other
grounds by Sossoman. The "appropriate relief' section contained in the RFRA is
identical to that contained in the RLUIPA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (c) and 2000cc-2(a).
The undersigned has no reason to believe that the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning
in a case pertaining to the RFRA would be any different than that court's reasoning in
Smith, which concerned the RLUIPA and which is a statute of very similar construct as
the RFRA. Accordingly, the undersigned agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs
monetary damages claims under the RFRA against Defendants are barred.
Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 799-801 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting the RLUIPA's
"appropriate relief' provision is not a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity and monetary damages claims are barred), and (citing Webman, 441 F.3d
1022, with seeming approval, that the RFRA does not authorize monetary damages
claims). This portion of Defendants' Objections is sustained. This determination does
not bar any claims for injunctive relief Plaintiff may have set forth against Defendants,
and the undersigned adopts the Magistrate Judge's finding that Plaintiffs remaining
claims under the RFRA are not subject to dismissal at this time.

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4

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs claims made pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named A gents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, -403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Defendants in their official capacities,
Plaintiffs claims pursuant to the RLUIPA, and Plaintiffs monetary damages claims
pursuant to the RFRA are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs First Amendment and injunctive relief
claims under the RFRA shall remain pending, for now.
SO ORDERED, this ____ day of

_, 2012.

GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
ED STATES DISTRICT COURT
HERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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