Watkins v. Haynes et al
Filing
44
ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART the 32 Report and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. The Defendants' 23 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims is GRANTED. The Clerk is instructed to enter an appropriate judgment and close the case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 3/27/2013. (ca)
3n the iIntteb Atatto flttritt Court
for the boutbern Martet of Deorgta
runtntck Atbioton
ERIC WATKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTHONY HAYNES,
RAYMOND HOLT,
ROBUTA M. TRUMAN, and
HARRELL WATTS,
Defendants.
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CV 212-050
ORDER
Presently before the Court are the parties' Objections to
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. Nos.
34, 37. After careful consideration and an independent and de
novo review of the record, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 32.
Defendants' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 37) are SUSTAINED IN PART, and
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 23) is GRANTED.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This action is predicated on the alleged violation of
Plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment rights. See Dkt. No. 1.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied
Plaintiff meals that comported with his religious beliefs while
he was incarcerated at the Federal Correction Institute in
Jesup, Georgia. Id. Plaintiff further contends that members of
other religious faiths were provided meals that comported with
their religious beliefs. Id.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. See
Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion. See
Dkt. No. 28. The Magistrate Judge then reported his
recommendation to deny Defendants' motion. See Dkt. No. 32.
Both parties objected to the Report and Recommendation. See
Dkt. Nos. 34, 37, 40. This Court conducted an independent and
de novo review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
district court must "construe[] the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept[] all well-pled facts
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alleged . . . in the complaint as true." Sinaltrainal v. CocaCola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). To survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b) (6), a complaint need not contain "detailed factual
allegations" but must include enough facts to raise a right to
relief above the "speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must allege
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face" meaning that the factual content "allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010).
"A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6)
when its allegations—on their face—show that an affirmative
defense bars recovery on the claim." Marsh v. Butler Cnty.,
Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing
Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th
Cir. 1984), vacated on petition for reh'g, reinstated b
764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this Court
liberally construes his pleadings. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654
F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("Pro se pleadings
3
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are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys and are liberally construed." (citing Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted))
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is predicated on two grounds:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, and (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
A. Statute of Limitations
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. See Dkt. No. 23.
Plaintiff responds that, if the limitations period is properly
tolled, his claim is timely. See Dkt. No. 28. The Magistrate
Judge recommended that Defendants' motion be denied, reasoning
that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled while
Plaintiff pursued his administrative appeal. See Dkt. No. 32,
at 5-6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's claims as untimely is DENIED.
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1. Legal Standard
Plaintiff's claims contest certain conditions of his
confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
Dkt. No. 1, at 3.
a. Limitations Period
The statute of limitations for Bivens claims is the statute
of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Walker
v. United States, 196 F. App'x 774, 776 (11th Cir. 2006).
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a limitations period,
federal courts "borrow" the applicable state's statute of
limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387 (2007) ("[T]he length of the statute of
limitations [for § 1983 actions] is that which the State
provides for personal-injury torts.") . Plaintiff brought his
claim in Georgia, where the governing limitations period for
personal injury claims is two (2) years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33
("Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two
years after the right of action accrues . . . ."); Interial v
Chippi, 427 F. App'x 842, 843 (11th Cir. 2011)
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b. Accrual
A statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of
action accrues. Although the applicable statute of limitations
of a § 1983 action is determined by state law, "the accrual date
is a question of federal law that is not resolved by
reference to state law." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; see also
Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987)
Section 1983 and Bivens claims "accrue[]—and the statute of
limitations begins to run—when the facts which would support a
cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person
with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Hafezv.
Madison, 348 F. App'x 465, 467 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walker, 196 F. App'x
at 776 ("A cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute
of limitations in § 1983 and Bivens cases when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of an injury and who has inflicted
it." (citing Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir.
1996) ) )
c. Tolling
For Bivens actions, state law determines tolling of the
limitations period. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394 ("We have
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generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we
have for the length of statutes of limitations." (citations
omitted)); Salas v. Pierce, 297 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir.
2008)
("[In regards to whether the court should have tolled the
statute of limitations for [the] § 1983 action, state law
generally determines tolling rules." (citation omitted)). Under
Georgia law, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that the statute of limitations should be tolled. See McClure
v. Raper, 463 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. 1995).
2. Factual Background
On July 24, 2001, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury for
drug violations. Dkt. No. 1, at 3-4. He was sentenced to
121 months imprisonment. Id. at 4. In October of 2009,
Plaintiff was transferred to Jesup Federal Correctional
Institution ("Jesup FCI") . Id.
After his transfer to Jesup FCI, Plaintiff "quickly
discovered" that the food provided at Jesup FCI was inconsistent
with his religious dietary beliefs. Id. at 7. Plaintiff
complained about the deficiencies of this food from October 2009
until his release in June 2010. Id.
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Specifically, Plaintiff sought administrative remedies from
the appropriate personnel at Jesup FCI. The timeline of
Plaintiff's pursuit of administrative remedies is as follows:
On November 8, 2009, Plaintiff initiated the administrative
remedy process by submitting an administrative remedy request,
BP-9, to Jesup FCI's warden. Id. at 11. On December 1, 2009,
the warden responded. Id. On December 11, 2009, Plaintiff
submitted an administrative appeal, BP-10, to the Regional
Director's Office. Dkt. No. 23 Ex. A.' On December 21, 2009,
the regional director responded. Id. at 11-12. On January 10,
2010, Plaintiff submitted a final administrative appeal, BP-11,
to the Board of Prison's Central Office. Id. at 12. On May 7,
2010, the Central Office responded. Id. Plaintiff was
dissatisfied with each response to his administrative complaint.
See Dkt. No. 1.
On June 7, 2012, the Bureau of Prisons released Plaintiff
from custody. Id. at 4. On March 5, 2012, Plaintiff brought
this action. See Dkt. No. 1.
1
This date is provided for completeness. It is not critical to the Court's
analysis. Plaintiff's Complaint omits the date of this appeal. Defendant's
motion to dismiss includes a copy of Plaintiff's handwritten appeal.
Plaintiff did not object to its accuracy. Thus, this fact is both immaterial
and undisputed.
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3. Application
Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights
while incarcerated in Georgia at Jesup FCI. Specifically,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants "willfully violate [d]
Plaintiff's (First and Fifth Amendment rights) and discriminated
against him when they directly and indirectly denied Plaintiff's
request for a religious diet consistent with his religious
dietary belief." Id. at 5.
a. Limitations Period
Plaintiff's personal injury action is subject to Georgia's
two-year statute of limitation. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim is barred unless it accrued after
March 5, 2010 (i.e. two (2) years prior to the filing of this
suit on March 5, 2012) or was tolled such that the two-year
limitations period is satisfied.
b. Accrual
i. Knowledge of Injury's Existence and Cause
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the facts
supporting the action were apparent. See supra Part III.A.1.b.
Plaintiff and Defendant contend that the cause of action accrued
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in October 2009, when Plaintiff discovered that the food
provided by FCI Jesup was incompatible with his religious
belief. See Dkt. Nos. 28, at 3; 23, at 3-4. However,
Plaintiff's claim is that Defendants—in their individual
capacities 2— willfully violated Plaintiff's rights "when they
directly and indirectly denied Plaintiff's request for a
religious diet consistent with his religious dietary belief."
Dkt. No. 1, at 5. Thus, Plaintiff's claim depends upon the
actions of each individual Defendant.
Accrual occurs when a plaintiff knows both the existence
and the cause of an injury. See supra Part III.A.1.b; Fisher v.
Office of State Att'y 13th Jud. Cir. Fla., 162 F. App'x 937, 942
(11th Cir. 2006) ("Plaintiffs must know or have reason to know
that they were injured[] and must be aware or should be aware of
who inflicted the injury." (citation omitted)) . Therefore, the
action accrued against each individual Defendant when Plaintiff
became aware of that Defendant's individual actions. More
specifically, the cause of action against each Defendant accrued
2
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants in their official capacities were
dismissed by the Court. See Dkt. No. 13 (adopting the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation) . Therefore, Plaintiff's remaining claims are
against the Defendants in their individual capacities.
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when Plaintiff received the administrative response from that
Defendant. See, e.g., Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8
(1981)
("[T]he proper focus is on the time of the discriminator
act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become
painful." (emphasis in original; citation omitted)). 3 As such,
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Haynes accrued when
Plaintiff received the administrative response from Defendant
Haynes on December 1, 2009. Dkt. No. 1, at 11-12; Dkt. No. 23
Ex. A. Similarly, Plaintiff's claim as to Defendant Holt
accrued when his response was received on December 21, 2009.
Id. Finally, Plaintiff's claims as to Defendants Truman and
Watts accrued when their response was received on May 7, 2010.
ME
ii. Continuing Violation Doctrine
Plaintiff asserts that the continuing violation doctrine
applies to his claim. See Dkt. No. 28, at 3. The continuing
violation doctrine affects the accrual date of a cause of
For example, where plaintiffs asserted that their equal protection rights
were violated by furthering a pattern and practice of siting landfills in
predominantly minority areas, the accrual date of the action was found to be
the date on which the government officials voted to choose the specific site
at issue. Even though other actions lay ahead (e.g., receiving a state
permit and purchasing the land), the act alleged to be unconstitutional was
the vote itself. Thus, the action accrued on the date of that vote. Rozar
v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 562-63 (11th Cir. 1996)
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action. As such, it is governed by federal law. See supra Part
III. A. 1.b.
"The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to
sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations
of the law occur within the statutory period." Robinson v.
United States, 327 F. App'x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted) . If the alleged violation involves continuing injury,
"the cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins
to run, at the time the unlawful conduct ceases."
Id. (citation
omitted). "The continuing violation doctrine is a narrowly
limited exception to the usual rule that statutes of limitations
are triggered at the time the alleged discriminatory act
occur[s]." Steele v. City of Port Wentworth, Ga., No. CV405135, 2008 WL 717813, at *15 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2008) (footnote
omitted)
The Eleventh Circuit focuses on two (2) aspects of an
alleged continuing violation. See id. First, the Eleventh
Circuit notes that "[tllhe critical distinction in continuing
violation analysis is whether the plaintiff complains of the
present consequence of a one time violation, which does not
extend the limitations period, or the continuation of a
violation into the present, which does." Robinson, 327 F. App'x
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at 818 (citations and editorial marks omitted) . Typically,
"non-action" should not be construed as a continuing violation.
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1336
(11th Cir. 2006)
Second, the Eleventh Circuit gives considerable weight to a
plaintiff's awareness of his rights and his duty to bring a
timely claim. See Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d
1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The continuing violation doctrine
is premised on the equitable notion that the statute of
limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive of
the cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably
prudent person similarly situated." (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)); Steele, 2008 WL 717813, at *16.
Therefore, the continuing violation doctrine is limited in the
Eleventh Circuit "to situations in which a reasonably prudent
plaintiff would have been unable to determine that a violation
had occurred." Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335. "If an event or
series of events should have alerted a reasonable person to act
to assert his or her rights at the time of the violation, the
victim cannot later rely on the continuing violation doctrine
." Id. (citations omitted).
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Under the Eleventh Circuit's application of the continuing
violation doctrine, there was no continuing violation here.
First, Plaintiff claims a one-time violation, not a continuing
violation. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants'
willfully violated his rights "when they directly and indirectly
denied [his] request for a religious diet consistent with his
religious dietary belief." Dkt. No. 1, at 5. Responding to
Plaintiff's administrative remedy request was a single act. The
Defendants each acted one time. Their responses were not
ongoing. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege a
continuing violation.
Second, Plaintiff was immediately aware of his injury. He
"quickly discovered" that Jesup FCI's meals were incompatible
with his religious diet. See Dkt. No. 1, at 7. Moreover, he
promptly pursued the administrative remedies available to him.
See Dkt. No. 1. It cannot be said that a reasonable person in
Plaintiff's position would be unaware of the injury resulting
from the three (3) administrative denials of his request for
relief. In fact, Plaintiff's pursuit of administrative remedies
reveals his immediate awareness of the alleged injury. As such,
there was no continuing violation, and Plaintiff's cause of
action accrued as to Defendant Haynes on December 1, 2009; as to
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Defendant Halt an December 21, 2009; and as to Defendants Truman
and Watts on May 7, 2010. See supra Part III.A.3.b.i.
c. Tolling
Plaintiff's claims arose while he was incarcerated at Jesup
FCI. While he remained incarcerated, 4 the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, prevented Plaintiff from
bringing suit in federal court unless and until he exhausted his
administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (stating that
"[n:Jo action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted"); Porter
V.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002)
("s 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoners
seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.")
Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies while in prison. When
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, he was not a "prisoner" within the
statutory definition provided in the PLRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) ("As
used in this section, the term 'prisoner' means any person incarcerated or
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.") . Therefore, the PLRA does not apply to this case. The issue is
whether the limitations period should be tolled due to Plaintiff's compliance
with the PLRA's provisions when they were applicable to his claims.
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Because exhaustion of Plaintiff's administrative grievance was a
mandatory precondition of filing suit in federal court, 5
Plaintiff asserts that the limitations period should be tolled
during the time in which he exhausted his administrative
remedies. See Dkt. No 28.
Tolling is governed by state law. See supra
Part III.A.1.c. Therefore, Georgia's laws regarding tolling
apply. Georgia law does not permit tolling of the limitations
period based on a litigant's incarceration status. O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-90(b). Therefore, Plaintiff asserts other bases for
tolling the limitations period.
Liberally construing Plaintiff's briefs, 6 Plaintiff makes
two (2) alternative arguments. First, Georgia law explicitly
tolls the statute of limitations whenever a plaintiff attempts
to resolve a claim with an administrative body. Second,
Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling because he was
See Leal v. Ga. Dept. of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
plain language of th[e] statute makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an
action in federal court." (citation omitted)); Priester v. Rich, 457 F. Supp.
2d 1369, 1373 (S.D. Ga. 2006), aff'd sub nom., Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368
(11th Cir. 2008) ("Administrative grievance procedures must be exhausted
prior to suit.").
6
As a pro se party, Plaintiff's briefs are liberally construed. See
Hernandez v. Charlotte Correction Inst., 394 F. App'x 667, 668 (11th Cir.
2010) (per curiam)
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prevented from bringing his claims in federal court until he
exhausted his administrative remedies. 7
As discussed more fully below, Georgia has not recognized
an "administrative exhaustion" tolling doctrine apart from
equitable tolling. However, applying the policies and rationale
from Georgia case law, this Court finds that Plaintiff is
entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period for the
time in which he was required to pursue administrative remedies.
i. Explicit Tolling
Plaintiff asserts that Georgia law explicitly tolls the
statute of limitations whenever a plaintiff attempts to resolve
a claim with an administrative body. However, Georgia has no
statutory tolling provisions that address Plaintiff's argument.
Moreover, this Court found no Georgia case law explicitly
tolling the limitations period when a person exhausts his
administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA. Consequently, the
limitations period was not explicitly tolled by Georgia statute
or case law.
Plaintiff also asserts that the limitations period should be tolled pursuant
to the continuing violation doctrine. However, the continuing violation
doctrine affects when a cause of action accrues. It does not address whether
the limitations period tolls. As such, this argument is addressed in Part
III .A. 3 .b. ii.
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ii. Equitable Tolling
This Court found no clear, controlling precedent from the
Supreme Court of Georgia establishing whether the limitations
period is equitably tolled while a plaintiff exhausts the PLRA's
administrative review process. However, case law outlining the
purposes of limitations periods and establishing equitable
tolling rules in other contexts is instructive.
Purposes of Limitations Periods.
"Limitations periods are
intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights . . .
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983)
(citations omitted) . Georgia courts repeatedly emphasize the
importance of limitations periods with respect to preventing
stale claims. See, e.g., Craven v. Lowndes Cnty. Hosp. Auth.,
437 S.E.2d 308, 310 (Ga. 1993) (finding that statute of
limitations' "clear purpose is to eliminate stale claims");
Mullis v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Ga. 1982)
("[A] traditional purpose of a statute of limitations . . . is
to put an end to stale claims which are unlikely to be based
upon competent evidence." (citation omitted)); Wesley Chapel
Foot & Ankle Ctr. v. Johnson, 650 S.E.2d 387, 393 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007) (finding that, if "the initial complaint gives a defendant
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fair notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence called
into question," the defendant is protected from "stale claims"
by the statute of limitation even if the initial complaint is
subsequently amended); Abend v. Klaudt, 531 S.E.2d 722, 726 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000)
("[T]he purpose of the statute of limitations
[us the elimination of stale claims." (citation omitted)). In
particular, Georgia courts find that limitations periods ensure
fair notice to possible defendants and reduce the likelihood of
stale evidence. See, e.g., Antinoro v. Browner, 478 S.E.2d 392,
395 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
("[T]he fundamental purpose of the
limitation period . . . is to ensure that an adverse party has
timely notice of a claim so he can investigate the claim and
prepare a defense while the facts are still fresh." (citation
omitted)).
itable Tolling in Other Contexts.
The Supreme Court of
Georgia addressed the issue of equitable tolling in the context
of class actions. See State v. Private Truck Council of Am.,
371 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 1998). In Private Truck Council, the high
court found that—upon filing a class action—the limitations
periods for the individual claims of all asserted class members
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were tolled during the pendency of the action. Id. at 380
(citing Parker, 462 U.S. 345)•8 To support its holding, the
court relied on the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id.
Specifically, the court found that equitable tolling
"permit[ted] class members to rely on the class action to
protect their rights without concern that the statute of
limitations on their individual claims will have run should
class certification ultimately be denied." Id.
The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
equitable tolling in the context of worker's compensation
claims. See Butler
v.
Glenn Oak's Turf, Inc., 395 S.E.2d 277
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990). In Butler, the plaintiff was pursuing a
workers' compensation claim. Pursuant to Georgia statute, he
was barred from simultaneously pursuing a common law personal
injury claim. Id. at 279. There, the appellate court found
that the filing of the workers' compensation claim accomplished
the purposes of the statute of limitations. Id. at 278. That
is, filing the workers' compensation claim fulfilled the purpose
The Georgia court cited a case from the United States Supreme court to
support its holding. However, the class action was brought under the Georgia
class action statute. Therefore, the court was applying Georgia tolling
rules. See Private Truck Council, 371 S.E.2d at 380.
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"to insure timely notice to an adverse party so that he can
assemble a defense when the facts are still fresh." Id. The
court further found that tolling the limitations period during
the pendency of the administrative hearing did not frustrate
those purposes. Id. at 279. Specifically, the appellate court
held that "because [the employee] was legally barred from
pursuing her common law claim against [her employer] from the
date the [administrative law judge] found she was covered by the
[Workers' Compensation Act] . . . until . . . the date [the
appellate] court held that [the employee] was not covered by the
[Workers' Compensation] Act and reversed the superior court's
judgment . . . , the statute of limitation was tolled during
that period." Id. at 280. The court noted that "[t]o hold
otherwise would place [the employee] in an intolerable 'Catch
22' situation and would be inequitable in view of [the
employee's] active pursuit of a recovery for her injuries under
a mistake of law that was not corrected until the issue was
brought before [the appellate] court." Id. (citation omitted).
Through its holding, the Butler court sought to avoid
duplicative procedures—and to relieve burdens on the superior
courts and parties—wherein cases would be filed and then mooted
whenever an administrative agency determined that it had
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Jurisdiction to grant relief and an appellate court later
determined that the agency lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 278-79.
The Georgia Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of
equitable tolling in the context of voluntary and non-binding
arbitration. See Antinoro v. Browner, 478 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996). In Antinoro, the plaintiff exercised his right—
pursuant to the Supreme Court of Georgia's Alternative Fee
Dispute ("AFD") program—to arbitrate a fee dispute with his
former lawyer. The plaintiff received a favorable award.
However, the defendant-lawyer refused to be bound by the
arbitration. Therefore, the plaintiff exercised his right under
the AFD program to initiate a civil action to get a personal
judgment against the lawyer in the amount of the award.
The plaintiff in Antinoro made his arbitration demand
before the statute of limitations for any civil action ran.
However, he did not bring the civil action to enforce the
arbitral award until after the running of the limitations
period.
The appellate court held that the plaintiff's "timely
filing of a petition to arbitrate under the AFD program prior to
the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation applicable
to the civil action sought to be arbitrated tolled the statute
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of limitation during the pendency of the AFD proceedings." Id.
at 395. In so doing, the court noted that the AFD program
provided the lawyer with requisite notice of the "complaint."
Id. Consequently, tolling the running of the civil law statute
of limitations "d[id] not frustrate the fundamental purpose of
the limitation period which is to ensure that an adverse party
has timely notice of a claim so he can investigate the claim and
prepare a defense while the facts are still fresh." Id. The
court also found that tolling the statute of limitations gave
effect to the AFD program's purpose, which was to resolve
disputes without resort to traditional litigation. Id.
Application to Present Case.
A common theme of the Georgia
case law cited above is that an earlier proceeding—be it a
class action suit, administrative claim, or arbitration—can
provide a defendant with sufficient notice of the plaintiff's
claim so that he can "prepare a defense while the facts are
fresh." See id.; Butler, 395 S.E.2d at 278. These earlier
proceedings fulfill the purposes of the limitations period by
putting defendants on notice of adverse claims and by preventing
plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights. Moreover, requiring a
plaintiff to file a claim that will be mooted by another dispute
resolution mechanism burdens the parties and the courts. See
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Butler, 395 S.E.2d at 278-79. To avoid this result while still
fulfilling the purposes of statutes of limitations, Georgia
courts have equitably tolled the running of the statutes while
plaintiffs diligently pursue these alternative dispute avenues.
Applying the rationale from the cases above, this Court
holds that the statute of limitations was tolled while Plaintiff
complied with the PLRA by pursuing possible administrative
remedies prior to filing suit. 9 Like the plaintiff in Butler,
Plaintiff was barred from filing suit until he exhausted
available administrative remedies. Any suit filed prior to
administrative exhaustion on May 7, 2010, would have been
dismissed for failure to comply with the PLRA's exhaustion
requirements. Thus, the reasoning of the court in Butler
suggests that Plaintiff is entitled to tolling.
This result is also consistent with the high court's broad
holding in Private Truck Council. Under the reasoning of the
court in that case, a plaintiff who is unaware that he is
included in the putative class receives the benefit of equitable
tolling. If equitable tolling is warranted where a plaintiff is
The Court notes that this result would likely differ if Plaintiff had not
begun the administrative review process prior to the running of the statute
of limitations.
24
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
unaware that others are pursing possible remedies, equitable
tolling is more warranted here—where Plaintiff receives the
benefit of equitable tolling only because he complied with
federal law and pursued his available administrative remedies.
Similar to the reasoning of the court in Antinoro, tolling
the statute here gives effect to the PLRA's purpose, which is to
resolve as many disputes as possible without resort to
traditional litigation. See Antinoro, 478 S.E.2d at 395.
Defendants advance three (3) arguments against tolling.
First, Defendants assert that the present case is not the type
of case envisioned by the courts as warranting equitable tolling
because Plaintiff had seventeen (17) months after his release
from prison to file suit. See Dkt. No. 37, at 4-5. Following
Defendants' argument to its logical conclusion, equitable
tolling is only appropriate if a prisoner's administrative
remedies are unsatisfactorily exhausted shortly before or after
the limitations period expires. Georgia courts have not limited
equitable tolling in this way. They have not required a caseby-case inquiry into the amount of time that a plaintiff had to
file suit after the alternative dispute resolution or
administrative hearing concluded. Without some suggestion by
25
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
the Georgia courts that such an inquiry is required, this Court
will not undertake one.
Second, Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff was not a
prisoner at the that time he filed his Complaint, the PLRA and
its exhaustion requirements do not apply. See Id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff correctly states the law. However, the fact that
Plaintiff is no longer subject to the PLRA does not mean that he
was not subject to it at one time. It is for that time that the
Court finds that the limitations period for Plaintiff's claims
was equitably tolled. This Court sees no reason why a plaintiff
in prison should receive the benefit of equitable tolling while
a plaintiff who is released from prison after exhausting his
administrative remedies should not.
Third, Defendants assert that incarceration does not toll
Georgia statutes of limitation. See Id. at 3-4 (citing Lawson
v. Glover 957 F.2d 801, 804 (11th Cir. 1987)). This is true.
However, as discussed above, tolling in the present case is not
a result of Plaintiff's incarceration. Instead, the limitations
period tolled because the PLRA barred Plaintiff's suit until he
exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the statute
of limitations was tolled until the final denial of Plaintiff's
26
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
administrative appeal. Thus, the limitations period began to
run prior to his release from prison.
d. Conclusion
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued as to Defendant Haynes
on December 1, 2009; as to Defendant Holt on December 21, 2009;
and as to Defendants Truman and Watts on May 7, 2010. See supra
Part III.A.3.b. However, the limitations period was equitably
tolled while Plaintiff pursued possible administrative remedies
pursuant to the PLRA. See supra Part III.A.3.c. Plaintiff
exhausted the PLRA's mandatory administrative review process on
May 7, 2010. Therefore, Plaintiff had until May 7, 2012, to
file suit against Defendants.
Plaintiff filed this action on March 5, 2012. Dkt. No. 1.
Therefore, his claims against all Defendants are timely. 10
Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims as
untimely is DENIED.
'° This Court notes that, even if the limitations period was not equitably
tolled, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Truman and Watts were timely.
27
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
B. Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff is a Rastafarian. He alleges violation of his
First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants discriminated
against him by refusing his request to receive foods that were
uncontaminated by the flesh of animals. See Dkt. No. 1, at 5.
Further, Plaintiff alleges violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied him meals consistent
with his religious beliefs while simultaneously providing meals
consistent with the religious beliefs of Jews and Muslims. See
id. at 5-9.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified
immunity on both of these claims. For the reasons stated below,
the Court agrees. Consequently, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) is GRANTED.
1. Legal Standard
a. General
Federal officials may be sued in their individual
capacities for violations of an individual's constitutional
W
.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) . Qualified immunity is a
defense that protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from such suits where their conduct did
not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Gonzalez
v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). The purpose of qualified
immunity is to allow government officials to perform their
discretionary duties without fear of personal liability or
harassing litigation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638 (1987) . As such, "all but the plainly incompetent" and
those who "knowingly violat[e] the federal law" are protected.
Artiga v. Garcia, 316 F. App'x 847, 848 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (citations omitted) . See also Coffin v. Brandau, 642
F.3d 999, 1017 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("The qualified
immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by
protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.'" (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) ) )
Because qualified immunity is a defense not only from
liability, but also from suit, the court should ascertain the
29
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit
as possible. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227 ("[B]ecause [t]he
entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability, we repeatedly have stressed the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.") (internal citation omitted)); Durruthy v. Pastor,
351 F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003)
b. Eleventh Circuit
The law governing qualified immunity is well-established in
the Eleventh Circuit. To receive qualified immunity, the public
official 'must first prove that he was acting within the scope
of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts
occurred." Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir.
1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . "A
government employee has acted within his or her discretionary
authority if objective circumstances show that the challenged
actions occurred in the performance of the employee's duties and
within the scope of this authority." Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d
1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotations
marks omitted).
30
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Once the government official shows that he was acting
within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to
qualified immunity. See Courson, 939 F.2d at 1487. The Supreme
Court has established a two-part test to determine the
applicability of qualified immunity: the court must determine
(1) whether a plaintiff's allegations establish the violation of
a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly
established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001);
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2004). This second inquiry "must be undertaken in light of
the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 715 (11th Cir. 2010) . The court may
exercise its discretion in determining which of the two Saucier
prongs to evaluate first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009); Randall, 610 F.3d at 715 n.9.
The right in question cannot be a generalized right, like
the right to due process. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639-40 (1987) . It must be clearly established in a
"particularized" sense, such that "the contours of the right"
are clear enough for a reasonable official in the defendant's
31
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
position to know that what the official is doing violates that
right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. A right is "clearly
established" when it is enunciated by a court of controlling
authority in the defendant's jurisdiction in a case sufficiently
similar in its facts "that a reasonable officer could not have
believed that his actions were lawful." Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 616-17 (1999) . General statements of the law give
"fair and clear warning" only if their application to a specific
set of facts is apparent. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 271 (1997)
In the Eleventh Circuit, the law can be "clearly
established" for qualified immunity purposes "only by decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or
the highest court of the state where the case arose." Jenkins
v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826-27 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) . If there is no precedent on point, a
right is clearly established only if the law has "earlier been
developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to
make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the
defendant's place, that 'what he is doing' violates federal
law." Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (citations omitted)
32
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
2. Factual Background
Accepting the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true
and construing all reasonable inferences in his favor, as is
required at this stage of the proceedings, this Court finds that
Plaintiff has alleged the following facts.
Plaintiff is a member of the Rastafarian religion. Dkt.
No. 1, at 5. Part of Plaintiff's Rastafarian belief is that his
diet must "contain nonflesh foods that are uncontaminated and
not contaminated by any flesh foods or vessels or utensil[s]
used to prepare and serve flesh foods." Id.
Plaintiff was imprisoned after his conviction for drugrelated charges. Id. at 3-4. In October 2009, Plaintiff was
transferred to Jesup FCI. Id. at 4. After this transfer,
Plaintiff discovered that Jesup FCI's dietary programs did not
comport with his religious dietary beliefs. Id. Specifically,
although Jesup FCI provided nonflesh food options, those options
were "cooked and served in the same utensils as its flesh foods
and served with the flesh foods in and on the same serving
utensil[s]." Id. at 8. As such, the method of preparation and
serving the nonflesh foods was inconsistent with Plaintiff's
religious beliefs.
33
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Jesup FCI also provided an alternative religious dietary
program. This program was consistent with the beliefs of Jews
and Muslims. Id. at 8-9. However, this dietary program was
inconsistent with Plaintiff's religious beliefs because it
contained meat. Id.
Plaintiff complained to Defendants that the dietary
programs provided at Jesup FCI were inconsistent with his
religious dietary beliefs. Id. at 7-8. Defendants all denied
Plaintiff's request "on the grounds that the [Bureau of
Prison's] religious and/or alternative dietary programs were
sufficient to meet Plaintiff's dietary needs." Id. at 9.
3. Application
a. Discretionary Authority
Defendants must have acted within the scope of their
discretionary authority for qualified immunity to apply. They
did.
Defendants received Plaintiff's request for dietary
accommodation through Jesup FCI's administrative remedy process.
Id. at 11-12. They responded to the request in their official
capacities. Plaintiff alleges that these responses were
wrongful. See Dkt. No. 1.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
It is not disputed that Defendants were authorized to
respond to Plaintiff's request; nor is it disputed that
Defendants were authorized to exercise discretion in whether to
grant the request. Therefore, the allegedly wrongful acts were
within the scope of Defendants' discretionary authority.
b. Clearly Established Right
Because Defendants acted within the scope of their
discretionary authority, this Court must grant them qualified
immunity unless Plaintiff can show "that the facts when viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a
constitutional violation" and "that the illegality of
[Defendants'] actions was 'clearly established' at the time of
the incident." Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted) . As indicated above, this Court can
exercise its sound discretion to decide which prong of the
inquiry to address first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009)
i. First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the First
Amendment by denying his request to receive meals consistent
with his religious belief. See Dkt. No. 1, at 5.
35
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
The Court begins its analysis with the second Saucier
prong. That is, in May 2010 (at the latest),' 1 would a
reasonable prison administrator, when confronted with
Plaintiff's request for a Rastafarian dietary accommodation,
determine that a clearly established constitutional or statutory
right was being violated? As a matter of law, it is clear that
a reasonable prison official would not.
The inquiry into whether a right was clearly established
"must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition." Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001) . Therefore, it is important to frame the
issue precisely and not confuse the general with the particular.
As a general matter, in May 2010, a reasonable government
official would have known that a prisoner had the right to
freely exercise his religion if that exercise did not compromise
institutional security and was clearly established. See, e.g.,
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) ("Inmates
clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,
including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free
See Part III.A.3.b. for a discussion of when each Defendant acted. May
2010 is the last date of decision from any Defendant.
36
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
exercise of religion." (internal citation omitted)). Moreover,
as a general matter, a reasonable government official would have
known that this right encompassed the right to a diet consistent
with the prisoner's sincere religious beliefs. See, e.g.,
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1975); Swetokos v.
Allen, No. 09-10085-dy, 2010 WL 2721846 (S.D. Fla. June 7,
2010), report and recommendation adopted,
CIVMARTINEZ,
No.
09-10085-
2010 WL 2730768 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2010) ("Courts,
generally, have found that to deny inmates food that satisfies
the dictates of their religion unconstitutionally burdens their
right to free exercise of their faith." (string cite omitted)).
However, the precise question relevant to this Court's inquiry
is: Did the law, in May 2010, clearly establish a Rastafarian
inmate's right to a particular dietary preparation (i.e.,
vegetarian meals prepared with utensils and dishes that had
never come into contact with animal flesh)? It did not.
Based on judicial decisions decided before May 2010, a
reasonable prison official would know that the Eleventh Circuit
had determined that a prison permissibly discharged its
constitutional duty to respect the dietary beliefs of religious
inmates by offering an alternative, meat-free diet. More
broadly, a reasonable prison official would know that the
37
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Eleventh Circuit permitted prison authorities to limit the
dietary options available to prisoners in the interests of
reducing the costs and burdens entailed in accommodating the
smorgasbord of food-related religious beliefs likely to be
encountered in a prison population. See, e.g., Linehan v.
Crosby, 346 F. App'x 471 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding
that prison had compelling governmental interests to support
denial of Kosher meals to Seventh-Day Adventist where vegetarian
meals were provided); Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th
Cir. 1987), abrogation recognized by Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d
499, 503 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying "least restrictive means"
rather than the less stringent "reasonableness" test recognized
by the Supreme Court in O'Lone and concluding that prison could
deny an inmate's request for a full Kosher diet). 12
Other federal courts reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Java v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 417 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (concluding that the administrative burden justified
prison officials' refusal to provide the plaintiff with specific
12
The Eleventh Circuit underscored this conclusion in July 2010. See
Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(finding that a prison's refusal to provide the plaintiff with his requested
diet was consistent with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act).
38
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
foods, on specific days of the week, that were prepared by
members of the plaintiff's faith); Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d
112, 125-26 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that budgetary and security
concerns justified the decision not to provide Kosher meals to a
Jewish inmate); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2003)
(jail officials entitled to qualified immunity where policy of
providing Muslim inmate with pork-free, rather than vegetarian,
diet was objectively reasonable); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47,
53 (3d Cit. 2000)
("[A] prison's interest in an efficient food
system and in avoiding inmate jealousy are legitimate
penological concerns . . . ."); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877
(9th Cir. 1993) (noting that courts must balance impingement on
right of free exercise of religion against cost of accommodation
and whether alternate means by which inmate can practice his
religion are available); Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting that "prisons need not respond to
particularized religious dietary requests" where Muslim inmate's
religious belief prevented her from eating any food cooked or
served in or on utensils which had come into contact with pork
or any pork by-product and where fulfilling inmate's particular
request would require special food and individualized processing
and containers to completely avoid pork contamination); Swetokos
39
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
v. Allen, No. 09-10085---CIV, 2010 WL 2721846 (S.D. Fla. June 7,
2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09-10085CIVMARTINEZ, 2010 WL 2730768 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2010) (The
acknowledged principle that denying inmates food that satisfies
the dictates of their religion unconstitutionally burdens their
right to free exercise of their faith "does not mean that in
making dietary accommodations, governmental interests including
significant administrative concerns and/or monetary costs are
not to be considered." (string cite omitted)); Lewis v. Ryan,
No. 04CV2468JLS(NLS), 2008 WL 1944112, at *31 (S.D. Cal. May 1,
2008) ("[T]o date, the majority of circuit and district courts
that have looked at this specific issue have concluded there is
no such clearly established right to Halal meals, with or
without Halal meat, under the First Amendment's Free Exercise of
Religion Clause, RLUIPA, or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." (string cite omitted)); Abdul-Malik v.
Goord, No. 96 CIV. 1021(DLC), 1997 WL 83402, at *7_8 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 27, 1997) (finding that Muslim inmates' rights were not
violated by the prison's failure to provide Halal meat three
times a week where a "Religious Alternative Menu" was
available); Abdullah v. Fard, 974 F. Supp. 1112, 1118-19 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (finding no constitutional violation where a Muslim
40
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
inmate was provided a "nutritionally adequate alternative" for a
meat entrée in lieu of Halal meat); Muslim v. Frame, 854 F.
Supp. 1215, 1224 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
("[I]n prison, religious
practices are subject to reasonable restrictions to preserve
order and safety." (citation omitted)); Benjamin v. Coughlin,
708 F. Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (no constitutional
violation where a prison refused to provide a Rastafarian diet,
even though Jewish and Muslim prisoners were provided special
diets)
In light of this legal precedent, no reasonable prison
official would have concluded that Rastafarian inmates had an
established right to meals uncontaminated by animal flesh,
especially where non-flesh options were provided. Nor would a
reasonable prison official have concluded that prison
administrators lacked broad discretion in providing dietary
alternatives. Consequently, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff's First Amendment claim.
ii. Fifth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment by providing meals
consistent with the religious dietary needs of Jewish and Muslim
41
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
inmates while not providing meals consistent with his religious
dietary beliefs. See Dkt. No. 1, at 8-9.
The Court begins its analysis with the first Saucier prong.
That is, taking the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, has Plaintiff established a constitutional violation?
He has not.
"To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must
demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners
who received more favorable treatment; and that (2) the state
engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race,
religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally
protected basis." Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App'x 892, 899 (11th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation and
editorial marks omitted); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure
Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that
"the equal protection clause prohibits only intentional
discrimination"). Invidious or "purposeful discrimination
requires more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It instead involves a decisionmaker's undertaking
a course of action because of, not merely in spite of, the
action's adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Ashcroft
42
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009) (internal citation and
editorial marks omitted)
Plaintiff alleged only that meals consistent with the
religious dietary needs of Jewish and Muslim inmates were
provided while meals wholly consistent with his Rastafarian
beliefs were not. Dkt. No. 1, at 8-9. That allegation is
relevant only to the first requirement of Plaintiff's equal
protection claim.
Plaintiff presented no facts related to the second
requirement of his equal protection claim. Viewing Plaintiff's
Complaint in the light most favorable to him does not establish
that the decision to serve meals consistent with Judaism and
Islam but not to serve meals consistent with the Rastafarian
faith was the product of intentional discrimination. See Sapp,
388 F. App'x at 899 (finding that, although a prisoner alleged
that a prison served Kosher meals but not Halal meals, qualified
immunity was appropriate because the prisoner did not provide a
factual basis of invidious discrimination); see also Patel v.
U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815-16 (8th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that a prisoner's equal protection claim failed
because he had not shown that the prison's decision to serve
43
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Kosher entrees and not Halal entrees was motivated by
intentional discrimination)
Plaintiff's Complaint states that Defendants "willfully"
violated his Fifth Amendment right. Dkt. No. 1, at 5. However,
this bare assertion is insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (finding pleadings
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff
posited that the defendants "each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" the plaintiff to
harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of policy, solely
on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and
for no legitimate penological interest."); Id. at 676 ("[T]he
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with
discriminatory purpose.") . Plaintiff's assertion is precisely
the type of "[t]hreadbare recital[] of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements" of which the
Supreme Court spoke in Iqbal. Id. at 678. "While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. Plaintiff
did not provide factual allegations to support his legal
conclusion that Defendants acted invidiously.
44
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Because Plaintiff did not allege any facts related to
invidious discrimination, the facts necessary to establish an
equal protection claim are not supported by his Complaint.
Consequently, there was no constitutional violation, and
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's
Fifth Amendment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the statute of limitations tolled
during Plaintiff's pursuit of the prison's administrative
remedies. However, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. Consequently, Defendants' Objections to the Report
and Recommendation are SUSTAINED IN PART.
Dkt. No. 37.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims is
GRANTED.
Dkt. No. 23. The Clerk of Court is instructed to
enter an appropriate judgment and close the case.
SO ORDERED,
this 27th day of March, 2013.
k~
LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
-
45
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