King v. Humphrey

Filing 88

ORDER denying 85 Motion to Alter Judgment; denying 85 Motion for Certificate of Appealability. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 06/22/2020. (MG)

In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
Brunswick Division
WARREN KING,
Petitioner,
v.

CV 2:12-119

WARDEN,
Georgia Diagnostic Prison,
Respondent.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Warren King’s
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and a Request for an Expansion of the
Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). Dkt. No. 85. His motion
specifically challenges the Order entered by this Court in January
2020 denying King’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but
granting King a COA on certain issues (the “Habeas Order”). See
Dkt. No. 83. The Court will assume the parties’ familiarity with
the facts and procedural history of this case, which is laid out
in detail in the Habeas Order. For the reasons set forth below,
King’s motion will be DENIED.
The only grounds for granting a motion to amend or alter
judgment

under

Rule

59(e)

are

“newly-discovered

evidence

or

manifest errors of law or fact.” United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d

1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335,
1343 (11th Cir. 2007)). Such a motion is not a means to “relitigate
old matters, or to raise arguments or to present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). Instead, the
movant must “demonstrate why the court should reconsider its
decision and ‘set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing
nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.’” United
States v. Battle, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(quoting Cover v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 294, 294 (M.D.
Fla. 1993)).
Here, King identifies three issues that he argues merit
alterations or amendments to the Habeas Order. First, he contends
that this Court erred in failing to address the merits of certain
arguments

related

to

his

alleged

intellectual

disability.

Specifically, King argues that even though he raised several
grounds for relief in Claim II of his amended habeas petition to
this Court (the “Habeas Petition”), the Court only addressed one
of those grounds in the Habeas Order, namely, that the ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ standard of proof the state applied to his
intellectual disability claim at trial violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth

Amendments

to

the

United

“Standard of Proof Claim”).

2

States

Constitution

(the

In the Habeas Order, the Court found that King’s argument
concerning the Standard of Proof Claim had been rejected by the
Eleventh Circuit and that the Court was therefore bound by that
holding. Dkt. No. 83 at 68-69. The Court further rejected the
remaining arguments in Claim II of the Habeas Petition because
“they were not briefed, and thus King [could not] satisfy his
burden.” Id. at 69. King argues that briefing on the merits of the
Habeas Petition was not necessary to obligate a court to consider
them. 1 In support, he cites to an Eleventh Circuit holding that
the habeas rules do not require a court to allow briefing before
it rules on the merits of a petition. Dkt. No. 85 at 5-6 (citing
McNabb v Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr. 727 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir.
2013)).
However, the McNabb decision was not about whether courts may
disregard arguments that petitioners fail to raise in briefing;
rather, McNabb simply addressed whether the Court may rule on
arguments raised in the petition before they are briefed. King has
not

cited

any

authority

for

the

proposition

that

courts

are

required to consider arguments abandoned in briefing. 2 Moreover,

1

King argues, in the alternative, that “the merits briefing before this Court
provided significant additional pertinent information demonstrating [his]
intellectual disability.” Dkt. No. 85 at 6. However, merely because there may
have been facts in his briefing that he might have relied upon to formulate
certain arguments does not mean those arguments were raised.
2 King also cites to Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal for the proposition that
petitioners are “entitled to an adjudication of all of the claims presented” in
an application for habeas relief. 523 U.S. 637, 643 (1998). However, this
holding was meant to address whether a district court was required to consider

3

at

least

one

circuit

court

has

held

that

“[e]ven

a

capital

defendant can waive an argument by inadequately briefing an issue.”
Fairchild v. Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 724 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Grant

v.

Trammell,

727

F.3d

1006,

1025

(10th

Cir.

2013)).

Accordingly, the Court cannot find that King has demonstrated
“manifest errors of law or fact” that would merit an altered
judgment. Marion, 562 F.3d at 1335 (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, even to the extent that King was entitled to
have the Court consider his unbriefed arguments in Claim II of the
Habeas

Petition,

the

Court

finds

that

those

arguments

are

procedurally barred because King did not exhaust them at the state
level. It is well-settled that “before seeking habeas relief under
§ 2254, a petition ‘must exhaust all state court remedies available
for challenging his conviction.’” Preston v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 758 F.3d 449, 457 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lucas v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 2012)). In Claim
II, King alleges that the trial Court erred in finding that he was
not intellectually disabled because the state’s only witnesses to
rebut his expert witnesses’ testimony on this topic “admitted that
his

opinion

was

based

on

flawed

testing

and

no

information

concerning adaptive functioning.” Dkt. No. 29 at 22-23. However,

a prior habeas application rather than arguments that had been abandoned in
briefing. Likewise, Cunningham v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., on which King also
relies, did not address the distinction between claims raised in a petition and
those raised in briefing.

4

in his brief to the state habeas court, King’s only argument with
respect to his intellectual disability was the Standard of Proof
Claim. See Dkt. No. 65 at 319-33. Because his other claims were
not

alleged

before

the

state

habeas

court,

the

Court

cannot

consider them here. 3
Next, King argues that the Court should expand the COA to
include

both

the

Standard

of

Proof

Claim

and

the

remaining

intellectual disability issues raised in Claim II of the Habeas
Petition.

As

it

concerns

the

Standard

of

Proof

Claim,

King

essentially argues that because the Supreme Court in Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)—a decision that postdated his direct
appeal—found that the execution of individuals with disabilities
violated the Eighth Amendment, the state habeas court erred in
concluding that the claim was barred by res judicata. As noted
above, this Court rejected the Standard of Proof Claim in the
Habeas Order, finding that it had been rejected in Raulerson v.
Warden, an Eleventh Circuit decision that specifically addressed
the Atkins decision. Dkt. No. 83 at 68-69 (citing 928 F.3d 987
(11th Cir. 2019)). Thus, King’s argument with respect to Atkins is
nothing more than an effort to relitigate a matter already decided

3

The Court declines to consider King’s additional argument that executing him
would be a “miscarriage of justice” in light of his intellectual disability.
Dkt. No. 85 at 10. Indeed, King does not identify any particular factual or
legal error from the Habeas Order that would justify any sort of finding on his
Rule 59 motion

5

in its prior decision, which this Court declines to do. See Baker,
554 U.S. at 485 n.5.
King argues that the Standard of Proof claim is nonetheless
sufficiently “debatable” to justify a COA, particularly because
the Raulerson decision was pending before the Supreme Court on a
petition for certiorari. Dkt. No. 85 at 14, 14 n. 5. However, on
March 30, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the petition in that case,
effectively solidifying Raulerson’s holding as the law in the
Eleventh Circuit. Raulerson v. Warden, 206 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2020).
As such, this Court cannot find that “jurists of reason could
disagree with [this Court’s] resolution of [King’s] constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v.
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)). The Court also declines to expand the
COA for the remaining issues raised in Claim II because, as
discussed above, those issues were unbriefed in the Habeas Petition
and are otherwise procedural barred.
Finally, King argues that the Court should expand the COA to
include

certain

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

claims.

In

support, King points to several facts and legal contentions that
he argues show his counsel’s performance was deficient. However,
King does not contend that any of these facts are the product of

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“newly-discovered evidence,” nor does he point to any “manifest
errors of law or fact” from the Habeas Order. Marion, 562 F.3d at
1335

(internal

quotation

omitted).

Instead,

his

argument

is

primarily a critique of several alleged errors by the state habeas
court. As noted above, the role of a Rule 59 motion is not to
“relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or to present
evidence

that

could

have

been

raised

prior

to

the

entry

of

judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5. The Court will
not

review

and

reconsider

its

entire

ineffective

assistance

analysis from the Habeas Order merely because King disagrees with
the outcome of that decision. Accordingly, King’s Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment and Request for an Expansion of the COA is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of June, 2020.

_
HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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