Hiatt et al v. Rebel Auction Company, Inc. et al
Filing
118
ORDER denying 62 Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds that material issues of fact remain in the case and bar summary adjudication. This case will proceed to trial. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/30/2014. (ca)
3n the initeb Otatess Jitritt Court
for the fiboutbern I)ttritt of georgia
JOrunoWick Obt0ion
ROBIN HIATT and CHANDA HIATT,
Plaintiffs,
CV 213-020
VS.
REBEL AUCTION COMPANY, INC. and
LARRY DAVIS,
Defendants.
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendants Rebel Auction Co.
Inc. and Larry Davis's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. no.
62). Upon consideration of the briefs and oral argument heard
December 17, 2014, the Court finds that factual issues remain as
to Defendants' liability for Plaintiffs' injuries. For reasons
stated below, Defendants' Motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs, as non-movants.
Defendants own and operate an auction company specializing
in mobile equipment and vehicles. On December 8, 2011, Plaintiff
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Robin Hiatt attended one of Defendants' auctions. Dkt. no. 70
("Hiatt Dep."), 32:9-14. As Plaintiff was in the business of
buying and selling heavy equipment, he had previously attended
and purchased equipment at Defendants' auctions. Id. at 16:3-13;
29:24-30:3. On December 8, Plaintiff secured the winning bid on
a mini excavator. Id. at 35:4-8.
Plaintiff claims he was then told by one of Defendants'
employees, an auction cashier, to go into the area where
equipment is driven after auction to locate his purchased
equipment. Id. at 35:22-36:1. It was night, but the post-sale
area was lit by commercial outdoor lighting. Dkt. no. 67 ("Davis
Dep."), 10:10-12:1. Plaintiff walked between two rows of heavy
equipment to look for his purchased excavator. Hiatt Dep. 36:610. While searching for his equipment, something hit Plaintiff
and knocked him twenty feet from where he had been standing. Id.
at 36:6-38:2. The blow literally knocked him out of one of his
shoes. Id. Plaintiff claims that someone then came up to him and
said "I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm going to get help." Id.
Plaintiff lay on the ground for several minutes before anyone
came to his aid. Id. Plaintiff says that, at the scene, a large
excavator was partially pulled out of its row and the boom of
the excavator bucket was pointed in his direction. Id. Also, his
shoe was found at the end of the boom. Id. Based on these facts,
Plaintiff believes someone negligently operated the excavator
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when he was walking by and hit him with the boom, causing him
severe injuries.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a) . A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law." FindWhat Investor Grp. v.
FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cit. 2011) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A
dispute over such a fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Id. In making this determination, the court is to view
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
Johnson v. Booker T. Washinqton Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d
501, 507 (11th Cit. 2000)
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) . To
satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325. If the moving party discharges this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and
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present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
fact does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
For premises liability cases in Georgia, "the 'routine'
issues of premises liability, i.e., the negligence of the
defendant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lack of
ordinary care for personal safety are generally not susceptible
of summary adjudication, and [] summary judgment is granted only
when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed." Robinson
v. Kroger Co., 493 S.E.2d 403, 414 (Ga. 1997).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's claims are based on Ga. Code. Ann. § 51-3-1,
which provides,
Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or
implied invitation induces or leads others to come
upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable
in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his
failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the
premises and approaches safe.
Ga. Code. Ann. § 51-3-1. In Georgia, "the basis of an
owner/occupier's liability to an invitee injured on the premises
is the owner/occupier's superior knowledge of the condition that
subjected the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm." Bartlett
v. McDonough Bedding Co., 722 S.E.2d 380, 382 (Ga. Ct. App.
2012). However, "an invitee must exercise ordinary care to avoid
the consequences of any such negligence on the part of an
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owner/occupier, and the failure to do so bars an invitee's
recovery against the owner/occupier." Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff Robin Hiatt failed to
exercise ordinary care when he willingly walked between rows of
heavy equipment at night while the auction was underway, and
that this lack of care caused him to run into or be hit by the
plainly visible boom of the excavator. However, Plaintiff's
failure to exercise ordinary care is hardly "plain, palpable,
and undisputed." Plaintiff testified that he was instructed to
procure and load his purchased equipment, and that someone
apologized to him after he was hit. A jury could conclude that
Plaintiff's injuries were not the result of his failure to
exercise ordinary care, but rather were caused by the
instructions given to him by Defendants' employee, as well as
either the negligent operation of the excavator by one of
Defendants' other employees or a third party whom Defendants'
negligently failed to keep out of the ostensibly restricted
area. Thus, there are material issues of fact as to Defendants'
negligence and as to Plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Additionally, there is a question of fact as to whether
Defendants had superior knowledge of the possibility that
Plaintiff could be injured by the negligent operation of
equipment within the restricted area. Evidence in the record
shows that Defendants had cordoned off the restricted area and
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had instituted unwritten and sporadically enforced rules, such
as a prohibition on loading equipment at night, for "safety
reasons." A jury could find that these measures show that
Defendants had knowledge of the risk that patrons could be
injured by others operating the equipment. Whether that
knowledge was superior to Plaintiff's is a question of fact for
the jury.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that material
issues of fact remain in the case and bar summary adjudication.
As such, Defendants motion for summary judgment is DENIED. This
case will proceed to trial.
SO ORDERED, this 30TH day of December, 2014.
LISA GODBEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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