SPRIGGS v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Filing 135

ORDER denying Defendant's 118 Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law in its entirety. This case will proceed to retrial as scheduled. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 4/26/2016. (ca)

N the Enttieb Stateoflittitt court
for the boutbiern flittict of georgia
runtuttk flibtIon
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LATANYA SPRIGGS,

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Plaintiff,

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V.

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MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant.

CV 213-51

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ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC's ("Defendant") Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law. Dkt. No. 118. Defendant filed this Motion after a jury
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict in the trial of this
case, resulting in a mistrial on November 5, 2015. Dkt. No.
112. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion (dkt. no.
118) is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Latanya Spriggs ("Plaintiff"), a Black female and
former employee of Defendant, filed this employment
discrimination action against Defendant on October 15, 2012.
Dkt. No. 1. In counts one and three of the Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant discriminated against her in violation of

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"),
respectively, by treating her differently than White employees
and terminating her employment based on her race. Id. at If 3135, 41-47. Plaintiff's counts two and four claim that Defendant
unlawfully retaliated against her under Title VII and Section
1981, respectively, because it terminated her after she objected
to and complained about race discrimination in the workplace.
Id. at ¶91 36-40, 48-56. Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses.

Id. at 191 (a)-(e).

In an Order dated September 26, 2014, the Court granted in
part and denied in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
on all counts. Dkt. No. 51. The Court denied summary judgment
on Plaintiff's counts one and three, finding that Plaintiff—
though having failed to present evidence of similarly situated
White employees who were treated differently than her—had put
forth "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" that
created a triable jury issue as to whether Defendant fired her
with discriminatory intent. Id. at pp. 1-2, 23-34 (quoting Sims
v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013)). As to
counts two and four, the Court granted summary judgment in
Defendant's favor only to the extent that Plaintiff's
retaliation claims were based on allegations that she made
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written complaints of race discrimination and that Defendant
gave false statements about her to prospective employers
following her termination. Id. at p. 2. The Court denied
summary judgment on the retaliation claims insofar as they
allege that Defendant fired Plaintiff for her verbal complaints
about workplace discrimination to her managers. Id.
The Court later granted in part and denied in part a Motion
in Limine in which Defendant sought to exclude at trial, among
other things, evidence relating to allegations of differential
and discriminatory treatment. See Dkt. Nos. 88, 98. Relevant
here is that the Court denied the portion of Defendant's Motion
pertaining to evidence of the following: "1) [m]anagement's
alleged refusal to listen to Plaintiff's ideas during management
meetings; and 2) [m}anagement's alleged failure to respond to
emails or to otherwise communicate with Plaintiff regarding
issues pertinent to her job function." Dkt. No. 98, p. 6. The
Court reasoned that this alleged mistreatment was the subject of
Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination to her supervisor, and
that the jury would need to hear the substance of those
complaints to determine whether Defendant retaliated against her
for engaging in protected speech. Id. at p. 11. The Court also
determined that this evidence, when combined with other evidence
in this case—in particular, evidence that Plaintiff's supervisor
made a comment that management did not like her because she is
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Black—could add to the "convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence" from which the jury could infer that Defendant's
managers were motivated by racial bias in firing her. Id. at
pp. 16-18.
This case proceeded to trial on November 2, 2015. See Dkt.
No. 103. During trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter
of law, and the Court reserved ruling on its Motion at that
time. See Dkt. No. 104. The jury ultimately was unable to
reach a unanimous verdict, and the Court declared a mistrial on
November 5, 2015. See Dkt. No. 112. On December 2, 2015,
Defendant filed the instant Motion renewing its request for
judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 118. Plaintiff has since
responded in opposition to Defendant's Motion, dkt. no. 119, and
the Court has scheduled a new trial of this case to begin on May
10, 2016, dkt. no. 128.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The core evidence at trial included the following:
• In 1998, Plaintiff began working at Defendant's vehicle
processing center ("VPC") in Maryland. Dkt. Nos. 114-17
("Trial Tr."), 84-86. Roughly ten years later, Plaintiff's
colleague in Maryland, Charles Taylor ("Taylor"), informed
her that he was taking a position as Shop Foreman of a new
VPC in Brunswick, Georgia. See id. at 92:9-14, 100:5-8,
166:2-24. Taylor told Plaintiff that there would be an
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opening for a Parts Person to work under his supervision at
the Brunswick VPC, and that he wanted Plaintiff to apply
for that position. See id. at 91:2-93:11, 166:2-18.
• Plaintiff soon applied for the Parts Person job at the
Brunswick VPC. Id. at 93:9-11. She testified at trial
that she never had an in-person interview for the Parts
Person position—though she could not recall whether she
ever interviewed over the telephone—but that she was
offered the position in mid-December 2009. Id. at 100:5-8,
101:1-10. Richard Whitmore ("Whitmore"), the Manager of
the Brunswick VPC, testified that he, in fact, interviewed
Plaintiff and hired her for the position, and that he was
aware of her race at that time. Id. at 243:15-17, 410:19411:8, 411:17-19. Plaintiff moved from Maryland to Georgia
and began working at the Brunswick VPC in January 2010.
Id. at 100:19-21, 109:1-2.
• As the Parts Person, Plaintiff was primarily responsible
for maintaining the inventory of parts that the VPC
personnel needed to repair vehicles. Id. at 106:23-107:2.
An explicit and essential requirement of this job was to
"[c]ommunicate with supervisors and management when
problems ar[o]se." Id. at 107:25-108:2. Plaintiff's
supervisor was Taylor, the Shop Foreman. Id. at 109:3-16.
While Plaintiff reported directly to Taylor, she frequently
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needed to interact with Steve Sanfilippo ("Sanfilippo"),
the Warehouse Foreman, regarding contact information and
parts orders. Id. Taylor and Sanfilippo reported to
Richard Gerhardt ("Gerhardt"), the Supervisor of
Operations. Id. at 109:17-21. The only management
position above Gerhardt was Whitmore. Id. at 110:5-15,
243:15-17.
. Whitmore later hired Plaintiff's husband, John Spriggs, Jr.
("Mr. Spriggs"), to work at the Brunswick VPC, and he
continues to work at the facility to this day. Id. at
412:3-21.
I. Defendant's Employee Handbook

. Defendant's employee handbook contains a section entitled,
"Open Door Communications," which states, "Associates are
encouraged to openly discuss concerns or problems with
their supervisors so that appropriate action may be taken."
Id. at 122:1-18.
. The handbook also sets forth a "Diversity Philosophy," as
well as an "Associate Relations Philosophy" providing that
"communication is the key underlying factor to ensure these
values are consistent throughout [the] organization." Id.
at 123:2-19.
. In another section relating to investigation, the handbook
reads, "Any reported allegations of harassment,
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discrimination or retaliation will be investigated
promptly, thoroughly and impartially." Id. at 124:8-14.
As to any resulting disciplinary action, the handbook
ensures that misconduct "constituting harassment,
discrimination or retaliation will be dealt with promptly
and appropriately." Id. at 125:2-6.
• The handbook contains a nonretaliation policy, pursuant to
which employees are free to share concerns with their
supervisors without fear that it will adversely affect the
conditions of their employment. Id. at 126:2-12.
II. Early Communication Issues

• Plaintiff testified at trial that after starting work at
the Brunswick VPC in January 2010, she felt that she was
being treated differently in the workplace. Id. at 110:1923. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that she "had issues
almost immediately . . . with communication with
management." Id. at 108:6-7. She explained that the
managers were not giving her the proper information to do
her job. Id. at 111:1-2.
• Plaintiff cited one example of a lack of communication
involving Sanfilippo. Id. at 111:4-24. According to
Plaintiff, Sanfilippo avoided interacting with her and
neglected to respond to numerous E-mails from her. Id. at
111:21-24. Consequently, Plaintiff did not know which
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parts to order for the line. Id. at 111:12-15. Plaintiff
suspected that Sanfilippo treated her in this way because
of her race. Id. at 111:5-7.
• When Plaintiff voiced concern about Sanfilippo's lack of
communication to her supervisor, Taylor, he assured her
that "he would take care of it." Id. at 112:2-9.
Plaintiff testified, however, that "[n]othing happened"
after her conversation with Taylor; she was still unable to
get any communication or information from Sanfilippo. Id.
at 112:13-15. Plaintiff then took the issue to Gerhardt,
whose attempt to remediate the situation resulted in some
interaction from Sanfilippo but only for a brief period of
time. Id. at 112:16-25.
III. Mistreatment at Staff Meetings

• Plaintiff stated at trial that she also was treated
differently and made to feel "inferior" during staff
meetings. Id. at 113:18-21, 116:16-17. Staff meetings,
which occurred monthly from March 2010 up until Plaintiff's
termination, provided a forum for certain support staff and
management team members to discuss issues at the VPC. Id.
at 113:25-114:7, 114:17-24, 115:9-12. of the nine people
who attended these meetings, Plaintiff was the only Black
person. Id. at 114:11-14; 115:4-8.

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. Plaintiff testified that whenever she tried to give an idea
or suggestion at staff meetings, Sanfilippo and another
employee "would start raising their voices at [her]." Id.
at 115:23-116:1. Plaintiff continued, "[I]nstead of
Richard Gerhardt intervening and stopping it, he would just
glare at me like I was stupid or something and that would
go on." Id. at 116:13-15. Plaintiff indicated that on
several occasions when she shared ideas, Gerhardt glared at
her and "never really said anything"—he "just g[a]ve [her]
really dirty looks like whatever [she] said wasn't good
enough." Id. at 116:20-117:6.
. Plaintiff approached Gerhardt at some point and explained
that she "didn't want to attend [staff meetings] because
[she] felt so threatened in the meetings." Id. at 142:1519. While Gerhardt initially responded that Plaintiff no
longer needed to go to the staff meetings, he retracted
this statement about one week later. Id. Gerhardt
informed Plaintiff that she needed to continue attending
the staff meetings, because he "spoke to his colleagues and
they told [him] [that] it's a different dynamic with [her]
in there." Id. at 142:22-25.
. Nevertheless, Plaintiff detailed another instance that took
place at a staff meeting following her conversation with
Gerhardt, in which she expressed dissatisfaction with a
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proposed location for the VPC holiday party, and Sanfilippo
and Taylor "yell[ed] at [her] like [she] was stupid." Id.
at 141:19-25, 142:6-9. Plaintiff recounted, "I remember
just feeling like I was being attacked, just 'you don't
know what you're talking about.'" Id. at 141:25-142:2.
. Plaintiff testified that she feels that the managers
treated her differently at staff meetings because she is
Black. Id. at 142:10-12. When asked whether she ever
observed management treating other employees the same way
at the meetings, Plaintiff replied, "No, just the opposite.
Whenever anybody else would say something, it was like an
attaboy, good job, you know, like a shaking -- nodding
[the] head up and down like it was a great suggestion[,]
and I never got that, ever." Id. at 117:7-13.
IV. Complaints to Management

• Plaintiff described at trial several discussions that she
had with Taylor concerning what she perceived to be race
discrimination at the VPC:
You recall speaking with Mr. Taylor about
0:
discrimination in the workplace?
A.
I did.
And what do you believe, what type of
Q.
discrimination did you talk to him about?
A.
Race discrimination.
Q. And did you do that more than once?
A.
Many times.
And did he say anything in response to you
Q.
that you felt confirmed your understanding?
A.
Oh, he agreed many times.
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And did he say anything in particular other
than agreeing?
He actually told me many times that Richard
A.
Whitmore and Richard Gerhart both didn't like me
because I was [B]lack.
Now, at any time when you spoke with Mr.
Q.
Taylor about those things, did you ever think
about having him do something about this?
I don't know if I ever really -- going to
A.
your supervisor, I guess I just automatically
assume he's going to do something because he is
my supervisor and that's his responsibility as my
supervisor to do something about it.
And, in fact, to your understanding, did Mr.
Q.
Taylor do anything about what you perceived as
discrimination in the workplace?
As far as I know, he did not.
A.
And were you ever interviewed by anyone
Q.
about how you felt about working in the workplace
while you were employed by [Defendant]?
A.
No.
Did Mr. Taylor ever ask you to give him
Q.
specific dates or names of people other than what
you told him?
A.
No.
Did Mr. Whitmore or [H]uman [R]esources come
Q.
to you at [the VPC] to talk to you about what you
told Mr. Taylor about?
No, they did not.
A.
Q.

Id. at 136:15-138:1.'
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At trial, Defendant's counsel questioned Plaintiff about her prior
deposition testimony regarding Taylor's alleged comment that Whitmore
and Gerhardt did not like her because she is Black:
. . . I want to -- okay. "So let me get this
Q.
straight. Mr. Gerhart -- did Mr. Gerhart and Mr. Whitmore
ever directly insult you because of your race?" And your
answer there was "Not directly, no"; correct?
A.
Correct.
Then [counsel] asked you, at Line 16, "So all the
Q.
insults you learned from Mr. -- you learned of from Mr.
Taylor; is that correct?" And you answered "Yes"; correct?
A.
Correct.
And then at Line 19, [counsel] asked "I think one of
Q.
them was already talked about, you already described to
me," and you answered "Yes" at Line 21; correct?
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. Mr. Spriggs testified at trial that he was present when
Taylor told his wife that Whitmore and Gerhardt did not
like her because she is Black. Id. at

192:4-7.

Mr.

Spriggs related that Taylor also told him that both
Whitmore and Gerhardt are racist. Id. at 202:20-22

2

Correct.
A.
And then at Line 22, [counsel] asked, "Are there any
Q.
other, other than that instance," and what was your answer
at Line 23?
"Not that I can recall off the top of my head."
A.
And then at Line 24, [counsel] asked, "So that's the
Q.
only instance that you recall during your employment with
[Defendant] where Mr. Taylor told you something where you
were insulted because of your race," and what is your
answer at Line 3 on Page 132?
"That I can recall, yes."
A.
Trial Tr. 179:6-180:2.
2

Defendant's counsel read the following excerpt from Mr. Spriggs'
deposition into evidence at trial:
[Counsel:] "Were you ever present for any conversations
between Mr. Taylor and your wife where management said they
didn't like your wife because she's [B]lack?"

[Mr. Spriggs:] . . . "I don't remember at this time."
[Counsel:] "You don't recall that happening at this time?"
[Mr. Spriggs:] "Not at this time, no. I will have to think
on that."

[Counsel:] "Did [Taylor] say Rick Whitmore or has [he] ever
told you that he believes Rick Whitmore is a racist?"
[Mr. Spriggs:] "I don't remember at this time."
[Counsel:] "Has he ever told you that Richard Gerhart was
racist?"
[Mr. Spriggs:] "No, I don't think he's told me that."
Id. at 202:1-8, 204:19-23. Defendant's counsel then asked Mr. Spriggs
at trial to reflect on his deposition testimony:
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. Taylor, who also took the stand at trial, denied that
Plaintiff ever complained to him about any mistreatment or
lack of communication, or that he ever stated that Whitmore
and Gerhardt did not like her because she is Black. Id. at
367:11-369:2.
Plaintiff, however, maintained that she reported concerns
about discrimination to Taylor and, in doing so, relied on
the employee handbook policies mandating that allegations
of discrimination be investigated promptly and thoroughly
and not serve as a basis for retaliation. Id. at 124:1517, 126:9-12. She stated that, to her knowledge,
management never conducted any investigation or disciplined
any employee in connection with her complaints. Id. at
124:21-23, 125:16-126:1. Plaintiff also testified that she
believes that the company did not honor its nonretaliation
commitment, based on the fact that she was terminated
sometime after making these complaints. Id. at 126:13-17.

So in 2013 you didn't remember at that time
that Mr. Taylor ever told you that Rick Whitmore was
racist; correct?
A.
Correct.
And in 2013, Mr. Taylor had never told you at that
Q.
point that Richard Gerhart was racist, had he?
A.
No, he hadn't.
Id. at 204:24-205:4.

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. Plaintiff did not contact or talk to anyone from
Defendant's Human Resources department about any
discrimination complaints during her employment. Id. at
174:13-15. Plaintiff, testified that, based on her
understanding of the company policies, she was not required
to go to Human Resources to report discrimination and,
instead, could go to her direct supervisor with such
grievances. Id. at 181:2-6.
. Plaintiff also complained to Gerhardt on one occasion about
a coworker making vulgar sexual jokes at company meetings.
Id. at 138:16-139:3. Plaintiff explained to Gerhardt that
the jokes offended her, and Gerhardt, in Plaintiff's words,
"made light of the situation"—"[h]e made it seem like it
was okay for [the coworker] to make those jokes." Id. at
139:10-13, 140:8-9. According to Plaintiff, Gerhardt gave
no indication that he would take any action to prevent this
type of conduct, and no one interviewed her about her
complaint at any time. Id. at 140:10-15. When Gerhardt
took the stand at trial, however, he testified that he did,
in fact, speak with the coworker and interview other
employees about the matter. Id. at 276:8-277:5.
V. Review Meeting and Subsequent Communication Issues

• On October 1, 2010, Taylor met with Plaintiff to deliver
and discuss her mid-cycle review, a formal evaluation of
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her job performance. Id. at 129:19-21, 130:20, 131:19132:3. Plaintiff testified that Taylor told her during
that meeting that he was glad to have her at the VPC, and
that she had done "a fantastic job in getting the parts
department up and running." Id. at 132:7-11. As to the
portion of the mid-cycle review relating to "core
behaviors," Plaintiff received an "excellent" rating in the
area of "execut[ing] decisions and deliver[ing] results."
Id. at 134:20-21, 135:9-14. According to Plaintiff, Taylor
neither criticized her job performance nor mentioned
anything about her behavior in the workplace during that
meeting. Id. at 132:4-6, 134:9-12. Plaintiff left the
mid-cycle review meeting believing that she was performing
very well in her position. Id. at 132:24-133:2.
• Plaintiff testified, however, that following the mid-cycle
review meeting, Taylor's behavior toward her changed. Id.
at 135:18-22. Whereas Taylor had previously visited her
office daily and been "extremely cordial" to her, Plaintiff
stated that his communications with her decreased
dramatically just after the meeting. Id. at 126:24-25,
127:22-24, 135:24-25. As Plaintiff described it, "[t]he emails got less and less[,] and the verbal communication and
interaction just got less and less until it just completely
stopped." Id. at 135:25-136:3. As a result, Plaintiff
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stated, crucial information that Taylor passed along to all
of his employees, such as the scheduling of a meeting, did
not reach her unless she happened to overhear another
employee discussing it. Id. at 143:8-144:1. It was during
this period of time that Taylor allegedly yelled at
Plaintiff for commenting on the location of the company
holiday party at a staff meeting. Id. at 141:19-21, 142:6-

• At some point in time, Gerhardt and Taylor agreed that
Gerhardt would take over Taylor's role as Plaintiff's
direct supervisor. Id. at 377:15-19, 383:11-13. However,
Plaintiff testified that Gerhardt, too, stopped
communicating and interacting as much with her after the
October 2010 review meeting. Id. at 138:5-6. According to
Plaintiff, Gerhardt had visited her area of the facility to
speak with her relatively frequently in the past, but he
completely avoided her area after the review meeting. Id.
at 138:10-12. Plaintiff indicated that whenever she did
encounter Gerhardt in the warehouse after the meeting, he
passed right by her without speaking. Id. at 138:6-8.
When prompted as to the possible reasons for Gerhardt's
alleged lack of communication, Plaintiff opined, "I guess I
complained too much about discrimination." Id. at 138:1315.
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VI. Counseling Sessions

• Gerhardt testified at trial that he met with Plaintiff
multiple times to counsel her regarding her communications
or behavior in the workplace. See Id. at 275:6-301:8. The
first instance occurred after Plaintiff cut her hand while
opening a package on April 29, 2010, and Gerhardt assisted
her in filling out an incident report for risk management.
Id. at 288:15-289:6. According to Gerhardt, Plaintiff
continued to raise issues with the form and its contents
for months after its submission. Id. at 289:18-291:3.
Gerhardt stated that Plaintiff was very upset and claimed
that no one else was required to submit this form, and he
had to assure her that he followed the same procedure with
other individuals. Id. at 289:18-290:5.
• As to his discussions with Plaintiff about Sanfilippo's
lack of communication and her coworker's crude jokes at
staff meetings, Gerhardt admitted that it was not
inappropriate for Plaintiff to raise these concerns to him.
Id. at 309:8-10, 316:25-317:2.
• Gerhardt testified that on June 1, 2010, Plaintiff made a
general complaint that certain unnamed members of
management were unprofessional. Id. at 291:11-18.
Gerhardt advised Plaintiff that he could not act on her
complaint without further information. Id. at 291:19-23.
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Gerhardt testified that "that's kind of how it was talking
with [Plaintiff;] . . . she would make these general
accusations[,] but she wouldn't put any substance behind
[them]." Id. at 291:24-292:1.
• Gerhardt testified that, at some unidentified point in
time, Plaintiff complained to him about a comment by
Whitmore that she found offensive, but she refused to
follow Gerhardt's advice to speak with Whitmore and resolve
the issue. Id. at 277:24-279:11. Gerhardt also described
an instance where two employees complained that they were
uncomfortable working with Plaintiff because she gave them
attitude. Id. at 280:5-12. He testified that he spoke
with Plaintiff upon receiving these complaints and implored
her to "take a look at [her] demeanor and behavior" and
"work[] on that a little bit." Id. at 280:13-281:6.
• Gerhardt also recalled sending an E-mail to Plaintiff on
June 24, 2010, to ask her to look outside of the parts area
for trash or any other uncleanliness, and receiving a
response from her claiming that he was attacking her work.
Id. at 296:15-297:4. Gerhardt stated that Plaintiff made a
simple request unnecessarily dramatic by insisting that he
was singling her out, and that he had to explain his
reasons for the request to her. Id. at 297:4-14, 299:7-11.

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• On August 11, 2010, Gerhardt and Taylor had to sit down
with Plaintiff and another employee with whom she had had a
disagreement. Id. at 297:21-298:13. In a follow-up E-mail
sent to Plaintiff, the other employee, Taylor, and
Whitmore, Gerhardt explained that they had counseled the
two that a failure to improve their business relationship
could result in disciplinary action. Id. at 319:17-320:9.
Finally, Gerhardt testified that in November 2010, Taylor
came to him with performance- and communication-related
concerns about Plaintiff. Id. at 281:11-17.
Specifically, Taylor had implemented a new process that
required Plaintiff to communicate with the mechanics about
the transferring of their parts, and Plaintiff had resisted
the change. Id. at 283:16-21. Gerhardt indicated that he
and Taylor went to Plaintiff's office, where she continued
to dispute Taylor's instruction, and he had to counsel her
regarding the need to follow the direction of her immediate
supervisor. Id. at 283:16-284:18.
• Gerhardt testified that Plaintiff was neither receptive nor
responsive to his counseling on these occasions. See id.

Taylor testified that Plaintiff went to Gerhardt on November 18,
2010, to discuss a problem with parts being left on the shelf for
extended periods of time. Id. at 394:1-3, 394:24-395:2. Taylor
admitted that it was helpful for the parts department that Plaintiff
raised this issue. Id. at 394:4-7.

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at 284:1-6, 295:7-11. He stated that Plaintiff continued
to insist that there was nothing wrong with her behavior,
and that she was being singled out. Id. at 295:12-14,
299:24-300:1.
• Even so, Gerhardt admitted that he never executed any
formal disciplinary document in these instances. Id. at
301:13-16.
VI. Plaintiff's Termination

• In November 2010, Taylor and Gerhardt recommended to
Whitmore that Plaintiff's employment at the VPC be
terminated. Id. at 413:18-20. The three then consulted
with the company's General Manager and a Human Resources
representative regarding the possibility of her
termination. Id. at 302:9-10. While Gerhardt and Whitmore
described the termination decision at trial as a
"collaborative process" and "group decision," the managers
agreed that it was Whitmore who made the final decision to
terminate Plaintiff's employment. Id. at 302:14-18,
413:15-20. Taylor and Gerhardt met with Plaintiff on
November 23, 2010, to inform her of the termination
decision. Id. at 144:2-13. Whitmore, who was out of the
office on a hunting trip, did not participate in that
meeting. Id. at 259:14-21.

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. Gerhardt explained the reasons for Plaintiff's termination
as follows:
In November[,] it was just too many things
that came to a head. The biggest one was the
observation that I had with Charles Taylor where
[Plaintiff] was being incredibly resistant to do
certain tasks to complete her job.
Seeing that firsthand was an eye-opener for
me combined with the fact that I've tried several
times to get her to show some initiative to
correct her behavior and become part of the team.
I didn't see any effort on her part to turn
around, and after seeing how she handled the
conversation with Mr. Taylor, I didn't think that
we were going to have any chance of turning her
behavior around at that point.
Id. at 303:9-20. Gerhardt, Taylor, and Whitmore denied
that Plaintiff's race factored into their decision in any
way.

Id. at 308:6-8, 370:8-10, 413:24-414:1.

• Whitmore testified that at the time of making the
termination decision, he was not aware of any disciplinary
write-up against Plaintiff. Id. at 259:11-13. While
maintaining that counseling or meetings with supervisory
staff generally resolves performance or behavior issues,
Whitmore conceded that a persistent problem needing
heightened personnel action would likely be documented in
an employee's file. Id. at 258:18-259:10. Additionally,
Whitmore identified only one instance in which he had had a
work-related interaction with Plaintiff. Id. at 414:10-15.

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He further stated that he believed that Taylor was
Plaintiff's direct supervisor, and that he would expect to
be notified if Gerhardt ever took over for Taylor in this
capacity. Id. at 417:19-418:10.
According to Plaintiff, no one criticized her job
performance or her behavior in the workplace prior to her
termination. Id. at 144:14-19. Plaintiff recalled, "I
just felt like I was terminated because of my -- because I
was [B)lack and because I complained too much about the
discrimination." Id. at 145:2-4.
. Plaintiff was replaced by a White male. Id. at 272:14-17.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 ("Rule 50"),
a party may move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of
evidence and, if the court does not grant the motion at that
time, may renew its motion after the jury returns a verdict or
fails to return a verdict on a particular issue. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50(a)-(b). "When a court considers a motion for judgment as
a matter of law—even after the jury has rendered a verdict—only
the sufficiency of the evidence matters." Hubbard v.
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 716 (11th Cir. 2012)
(citing Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th
Cir. 2007)). In other words, regardless of whether a court is
evaluating such motion before or after the case is submitted to
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a jury, the question before the court remains the same: "whether
the evidence is 'legally sufficient to find for the [nonmoving]
party on that issue.'" Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(a) (1); then citing Cleveland v. Home Shopping
Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004), and Arthur
Pew Constr. Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.
1992)). The court may grant the motion only if "'there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find' for the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Lipphardt v.
Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
In reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a
court must consider all of the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Hubbard, 688 F.3d at
724 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530U.S.
133, 150 (2000)) . The court is not to assess the credibility of
witnesses or weigh conflicting pieces of evidence at this stage.
Id. (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150); Shannon v. Bellsouth
Telecornms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186). "Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Accordingly, while the
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court must review the entire record, "it must disregard all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not
required to believe." Id. at 151. That is, it must "give
credence to evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, as
well as 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' evidence supporting the
moving party, 'at least to the extent that that evidence comes
from disinterested witnesses.'" Hubbard, 688 F.3d at 724
(quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151). If reasonable jurors could
reach different conclusions about the evidence, the court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Shannon, 292
F.3d at 715 (quoting Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186, and Gupta v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 582 (11th Cir. 2000)).
DISCUSSION

Defendant now moves for judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiff's discrimination claims, arguing that her evidence at
trial was insufficient to create the "convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence" that the Court contemplated in allowing
these claims to survive summary judgment. Dkt. No. 118, pp. 515. Defendant also contends that Whitmore's role as decision
maker in Plaintiff's hiring and firing gives rise to an
inference that her race did not factor into her termination, and
that Plaintiff failed to put forth evidence at trial to rebut
this inference. Id. at pp. 13-14. Additionally, Defendant
seeks judgment in its favor on Plaintiff's retaliation claims,
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based on an alleged absence of evidence supporting the causation
element of her prima facie case. Id. at pp. 15-21. Defendant
further asserts that in the event that the Court denies its
Motion on the foregoing claims, it should nevertheless enter
judgment in its favor on Plaintiff's punitive-damages claims at
this stage. Id. at pp. 21-23.
In her Response, Plaintiff urges the Court to deny
Defendant's Motion in its entirety. Dkt. No. 119. Plaintiff
maintains that she introduced sufficient evidence of
discrimination at trial, including testimony that (1) Taylor
commented that Whitmore and Gerhardt did not like her because
she is Black; (2) management mistreated her at staff meetings;
and (3) management refused to communicate with her. Id. at pp.
7-12. As to her retaliation claims, Plaintiff cites her
complaints about discrimination to Taylor, as well as subsequent
communication issues and unwarranted counseling sessions, as
circumstantial proof that her termination was, at least in part,
retaliatory in nature. Id. at pp. 12-15. Plaintiff further
contends that there is sufficient evidence in the record to
allow her punitive-damages claim to go to a jury. Id. at pp.
15-17.

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I. Plaintiff's Race Discrimination Claims (Counts One and
Three)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
on the basis of color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). Section 1981, which provides that all
persons in the United States "shall have the same right. . . to
make and enforce contracts - . . as is enjoyed by [W]hite
citizens," likewise prohibits discrimination in the workplace.
Addison v. Ingles Mkts., Inc., 515 Fed. App'x. 840, 841-42 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Race discrimination
claims under Title VII and Section 1981 "have the same
requirements of proof and the same analytical framework."
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th
Cir. 1998).
"A plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional
discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence,
or statistical proof." Alvarez v. Royal Ati. Developers, Inc.,
610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rioux v. City of
Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff who
bases her discrimination claim on circumstantial evidence may
satisfy her burden of proof in one of two ways: First, she may
rely on the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing

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that she (1) belongs to a racial minority; (2) was subjected to
an adverse employment action; (3) was treated less favorably
than similarly situated, nonminority employees; and (4) was
qualified for the job. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562
(11th Cir. 1997) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
802; Coutu v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068,
1073 (11th C. 1995); and Turnes v. I½mSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d
1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1994)). The burden shifts then to the
defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant is able to do so, the
plaintiff "must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 804).
Second, and in the alternative, the plaintiff may present
circumstantial evidence other than evidence of comparators "that
creates a triable issue concerning the employer's discriminatory
intent." Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011) (citing Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562, and
Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)).
"A triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light
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most favorable to the plaintiff, presents 'a convincing mosaic
of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decision[]maker." Id.
(footnote omitted) (quoting Silverman, 637 F.3d at 734)
A "convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" may
include, for example, "circumstantial evidence that the
employer's offered justification for an adverse employment
action is pretextual." See, e.g., id. at 1341 (citing
Silverman, 637 F.3d at 734); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147
("'[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination.' . . . . Proof that the defendant's explanation
is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it
may be quite persuasive." (emphasis removed) (citation omitted)
(first quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511
(1993); then citing id. at 517)). The "convincing mosaic" also
may be comprised of proof that the defendant "consciously
injected race considerations into its . . . decision making
without an adequate explanation for doing so." See, e.g.,
Smith, 644 F.3d at 1341. Other evidence lending support to this
showing may include proof that the defendant "was particularly
concerned with race" and "circumstantial evidence connect [ing]
[the] employee's race to the employer's decision[] making." See
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Connor v. Bell Microproducts-Future Tech, Inc., 492 F. App'x
963, 967 n.l (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith, 644 F.3d at 132747•)
Plaintiff in this case has attempted to prove intentional
discrimination not through comparator evidence but rather
through a "convincing mosaic" of other circumstantial evidence.
As Plaintiff has put forth several pieces of circumstantial
evidence that, when taken together, could reasonably permit a
jury to infer discriminatory intent in Defendant's termination
decision, Plaintiff has succeeded in creating a triable jury
issue.
A. Taylor's Comment

The first and most significant component of this
constellation of circumstantial evidence is Taylor's comment
that Whitmore and Gerhardt did not like Plaintiff because she is
Black. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 137:3-4. At trial, Plaintiff
testified that Taylor made this comment to her "many times"
during their conversations about what she perceived to be
discrimination in the workplace. Id. at 136:15-137:4. When Mr.
Spriggs took the stand, he confirmed that he was present on one
occasion when Taylor made this statement to his wife. Id. at
192:4-7. Mr. Spriggs also indicated that Taylor told him that
both Whitmore and Gerhardt are racists. Id. at 202:20-22.

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Defendant seeks to have the Court disregard this evidence,
arguing that both Plaintiff's and her husband's statements at
trial "materially contradicted" their prior deposition
testimony. Dkt. No. 18, pp. 6-8 (citing Johnson v. Fay Portable
Bldgs., Inc., No. 3:02-CV-173, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20905, at
*19_28 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2003) (denying the defendant's motion
for a new trial, in part because "substantial contradictions"
between the deposition and trial testimonies of its key
witnesses supported a finding "that [they had] lied, either to
the plaintiff or to the jury, in order to cover up their
discriminatory actions" (quoting Hall v. Consol. Freightways
Corp., 337 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2003)))). Defendant's
argument is unavailing, as these witnesses' accounts at trial
were not substantially inconsistent with those given earlier in
litigation: Plaintiff represented at her deposition that
Taylor's comment was "the only instance" in which he told her
something insulting about her race "that [she] [could] recall
off the top of [her] head." Trial Tr. 179:6-180:2. Plaintiff's
statement at trial that Taylor made this comment "many times,"
see id. at 137:3-4, was in accord with the basic message of her
deposition testimony (i.e., that Taylor made this comment to
her). Moreover, it is unclear whether the use of the term
"instance" at the deposition was in reference to one "occasion,"
as opposed to one "example," of a race-related comment from
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Taylor—the latter of which would not speak to the number of
occurrences of this statement and thus would not create any
conflict with Plaintiff's trial testimony. See Instance,
Merriam Webster, http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/instance (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
However, even construing Plaintiff's deposition testimony as
referencing only a single "occasion" on which Taylor made this
comment, it was not contradictory for Plaintiff to supplement
her well-expressed limited recollection at the deposition with
details concerning additional instances of this statement at
trial.
Mr. Spriggs indicated at his deposition that he could not
remember whether he was present for any conversation in which
Taylor stated that the managers did not like his wife because
she is Black, or whether Taylor ever told him that Whitmore is
racist. Trial Tr. 202:1-8, 204:19-21. Mr. Spriggs'
representations at trial that he heard Taylor make these
statements, see id. at 192:4-7, 202:20-22, did not necessarily
contradict his prior inability to recall these facts at his
deposition. Insofar as Mr. Spriggs also suggested at his
deposition that Taylor never said that Gerhardt is racist, and
later gave a contrary implication at trial, see id. at 202:2022, 204:19-205:4, the extent to which such possible
inconsistency impacts the credibility of this witness or the
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weight of this evidence is for a jury, not the Court, to decide,
in any event.
Thus, taking into account Plaintiff's and her husband's
testimonies, Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence of
Taylor's comment as circumstantial proof of intentional
discrimination. Significantly, the alleged comment came from
Plaintiff's supervisor—a manager at the VPC—and it specifically
and directly related to Plaintiff and the circumstances of her
employment. See, e.g., Id. at 137:3-4. Moreover, the employees
to whom Taylor allegedly attributed discriminatory animus,
Whitmore and Gerhardt, played key roles in recommending,
evaluating, and rendering a final decision on Plaintiff's
discharge. Id. at 302:9-10, 302:14-18, 413:15-20; cf. Beckles
v. Fed. Express Corp., 489 F. App'x 380, 385 (11th Cir. 2012)
(evidence that other employees had accused management of making
racial remarks in the past did not create an inference of
intentional discrimination, because it was "so vague and
unrelated to [the plaintiff's] termination"). From this
evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that the proffered
justification for Plaintiff's termination (i.e., performance and
behavioral issues) is pretextual, and that Whitmore and Gerhardt
instead were concerned with Plaintiff's race and injected this
consideration into their termination decision.

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B. Refusal to Communicate or Investigate

Second, Plaintiff has offered evidence that management
refused to communicate with her because of her race and failed
to investigate her complaints. Plaintiff demonstrated at trial
that communication is an explicit component of the Parts Person
job description, and that Defendant's employee handbook not only
emphasizes the importance of communication for all employees but
also ensures that reports of discrimination or harassment will
result in a thorough investigation and appropriate disciplinary
action. Trial Tr., 107:25-108:2, 122:1-18, 123:2-19, 124:8-14,
125:2-6. Plaintiff testified that she had communication issues
with management almost immediately upon beginning work at the
Brunswick VPC—in particular, that Sanfilippo treated her
differently than other employees by failing to provide her with
information that she needed to do her job, which she felt was
because of her race. Id. at 108:6-7, 110:19-23, 111:5-7,
111:12-15. Plaintiff indicated that when she told Taylor and
Gerhardt about Sanfilippo's alleged lack of communication, they
either took no remedial action or took remedial action that
ultimately proved futile. Id. at 112:2-25. Additionally,
Plaintiff described another instance in which she reported a
coworker's offensive jokes to Gerhardt, only to receive a
flippant response and never be interviewed or otherwise involved
in any investigation into the matter. Id. at 138:16-139:3,
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139:10-13, 140:8-15. Plaintiff further testified that Taylor
and Gerhardt never gave any indication that she had performance
or behavioral issues sufficiently severe as to threaten her
continued employment, and that they stopped communicating with
her entirely after the October 2010 review meeting. See id. at
135:25-136:3, 138:5-6, 144:14-19.
Defendant urges the Court not to consider this evidence,
because Plaintiff did not sufficiently state or explain how each
employee's alleged failure to act was based on her race and how
it led to her termination. See Dkt. No. 118, pp. 8-10.
Defendant's argument in unavailing, as it is enough, at this
stage, that Plaintiff's testimony permits an inference of
discriminatory conduct. A jury could reasonably find that
management's departure from the company communication and
investigation policies only when dealing with Plaintiff
exhibited racial bias. Evidence that Taylor commented that
certain of these managers disliked Plaintiff because of her
race, see Trial Tr., 137:3-4, would strengthen this inference.
Further, a jury could conclude that management withheld
important information from her and neglected to investigate her
legitimate workplace concerns, so that she would fail in her
position and be terminated. Alternatively, a jury could infer
from management's silence as to severe performance or behavioral
issues that such issues did not, in fact, exist and are merely
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pretext for the managers' decision to summarily fire her based
on her race.
C. Mistreatment at Staff Meetings

Third, Plaintiff has introduced evidence that management
treated her differently than White employees at staff meetings.
Plaintiff testified that Sanfilippo and Taylor yelled at her as
if she was stupid when she gave suggestions at the meetings, and
that Gerhardt did nothing to intervene in these instances. Id.
at 115:23-116:1, 116:13-15, 141:19-25, 142:6-9. Plaintiff also
indicated that Gerhardt glared at her and made her feel inferior
whenever she gave input. Id. at 116:20-117:6. Plaintiff
testified that she believed that the managers treated her in
this manner because of her race, reasoning that she was the only
Black person of the nine employees at these meetings, and that
the managers did not exhibit these behaviors toward the other
employees. Id. at 114:11-14, 115:4-8, 117:7-13, 142:10-12. To
the contrary, Plaintiff described the managers' response to
other employees' suggestions as "an attaboy, good job, you know,
like a shaking -- nodding [the] head up and down like it was a
great suggestion." Id. at 117:7-13.
Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff's testimony in this
regard is speculative and fails to connect the alleged
mistreatment at staff meetings to her race and termination, see
dkt. no. 118, pp. 11-13, fail for the same reasons discussed in
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the previous subsection. See supra Subpart I.B. Defendant
further contends that Plaintiff's testimony is "illogical" and
"isn't credible" based on evidence that Taylor recommended her
for the Parts Person position and openly discussed
discrimination issues with her, as well as evidence that
Gerhardt insisted upon her continued attendance at staff
meetings at the request of her colleagues. Dkt. No. 118,

p. 13.

Whether the evidence cited by Defendant undermines Plaintiff's
credibility, and whether it creates an inference in favor of
Defendant that is strong enough to outweigh any competing
inference in Plaintiff's favor, are questions for a jury, and
not for the Court on a Rule 50 motion.
A jury could reasonably infer from the circumstances to
which Plaintiff testified that management treated or allowed
others to treat her with hostility at staff meetings based on
her race. When coupled with Taylor's comment that Whitmore and
Gerhardt did not like Plaintiff because she is Black, Trial Tr.,
137:3-4, the fact that Plaintiff was the only Black person at
the staff meetings and had no other distinguishing features from
the other staff members could suggest that management's negative
attitude toward only her at these meetings was based on her
race. A jury could find that this evidence offers further
support for the conclusion that management was motivated by

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racial animus, rather than performance- and behavior-based
concerns, in discharging Plaintiff.
D. "Same Decision Maker" Inference

The "same decision maker" inference does not change this
result. See Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1442
(11th Cir. 1998)

("[W]here the facts indicate that the same

individual both hired and fired an employee, an inference may
arise that the employers' stated justification for terminating
the employee is not pretextual." (citing Proud v. Stone, 945
F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991))). As an initial matter, whether
the "same decision maker" inference even applies to Plaintiff's
termination is for a jury to decide. See id. at 1443
(explaining that the inference is permissive, not mandatory, and
that its application in a given case is a decision entrusted to
the jury's discretion).
The Court cannot conclude at this time that a jury would
unequivocally apply the inference in this case. While Whitmore
testified that he hired Plaintiff and made the final decision as
to her termination, Plaintiff has introduced evidence
undermining his role as decision maker on the latter occasion,
including testimony that (1) Taylor and Gerhardt recommended her
termination; (2) Whitmore did not know that Gerhardt had taken
over primary supervision of Plaintiff's work; (3) Whitmore was
not aware of any disciplinary write-ups against Plaintiff and
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had had only one work-related interaction with her; (4) the
managers engaged in a "collaborative process" and made a "group
decision" to terminate her employment; and (5) Taylor and
Gerhardt conducted the meeting to inform her of her termination
while Whitmore was away on a hunting trip. Trial Tr., 144:2-13,
259:11-21, 302:14-18, 413:15-20, 414:10-15, 417:19-418:10.
Thus, for the purposes of this Motion, Defendant cannot rely on
the "same decision maker" inference to overcome Plaintiff's
"convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" of intentional
discrimination. Defendant's Motion for judgment as a matter of
law on Plaintiff's discrimination claims is, therefore,
II.

DENIED.

Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims (Counts Two and Four)

An employer may not retaliate against an employee "because
[s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice . . . , or because [s]he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing" regarding such practice. Little v.
United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 956 (11th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1)
she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered
a materially adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link
between these two events. Butler v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 536
F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) . Once a plaintiff makes
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this showing, the burden shifts to the employer-defendant "to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the
adverse employment action. Brown v. Ala. Dep't of Transp, 597
F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Rojas v. Florida, 285
F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)). If the defendant is able to
do so, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to offer
evidence that the defendant's proffered reason "is a pretext for
illegal discrimination." Id. (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace,
Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004)).
In the instant matter, Defendant's Motion does not
challenge Plaintiff's evidence that she engaged in a protected
activity in complaining about discrimination to Taylor, and that
she suffered an adverse employment action when she was
terminated. See Trial Tr., 136:15-138:1, 144:2-13. While
Defendant disputes Plaintiff's evidence of a causal link between
these events, see dkt. no. 118, pp. 16-21, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has come forward with sufficient causation evidence to
support a jury verdict in her favor on her retaliation claims.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit broadly
construes the causal-link element: "a plaintiff merely has to
prove that the protected activity and the negative employment
action are not completely unrelated." Smith v. Metro. Sec.
Servs., Inc., 537 F. App'x 864, 867 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1278 (11th Cir.
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2008)). A plaintiff satisfies this standard by showing "that
the decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the
time of the adverse employment action." Id. (quoting Goldsmith,
513 F.3d at 1278). While awareness of the protected conduct may
be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must put
forth "more evidence than mere curious timing coupled with
speculative theories." Id. at 868 (quoting Raney v. Vinson
Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th Cir. 1997)). In
the absence of additional evidence, temporal proximity between
the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment
action must be "very close" for a plaintiff to meet her burden
of establishing causation. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506
F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).
At trial, Plaintiff put forth evidence from which a jury
could conclude that she was terminated because of her complaints
about discrimination to Taylor. Plaintiff testified that she
went to Taylor several times to report what she viewed as
discriminatory conduct in the workplace, and both she and her
husband described conversations with Taylor relating to such
conduct on the part of Whitmore and Gerhardt in particular.
Trial Tr., 136:15-138:1, 192:4-7, 202:20-22. The evidence at
trial also demonstrated that Taylor, in turn, reported directly
to Gerhardt, and that Whitmore was the only manager superior to
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Gerhardt at the VPC. Id. at 109:17-21, 110:5-15, 243:15-17.
Plaintiff testified that both Taylor and Gerhardt stopped
communicating with her in early October 2010, which negatively
impacted her job performance, and all three managers admitted to
taking part in the decision to terminate her employment. Id. at
135:25-136:3, 138:5-6, 302:9-10. Plaintiff also expressed her
belief that the managers violated Defendant's nonretaliation
policy by firing her after she "complained too much about the
discrimination." Id. at 124:15-17, 126:2-17.
Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff did not offer any
evidence at trial that Whitmore was aware of her alleged
discrimination complaints to Taylor. See Dkt. No. 118, p. 17.
Plaintiff need not make such a showing, as the evidence
demonstrates that at least one manager directly involved in the
termination decision, Taylor, was aware of these complaints, and
even goes so far as to illustrate a chain of command through
which Taylor and Whitmore may have received notice of this
information. See id. at 109:17-21, 110:5-15, 136:15-138:1,
192:4-7, 202:20-22, 243:15-17. Defendant also highlights a lack
of evidence that Whitmore, Gerhardt, Taylor, or the other two
individuals participating in the termination discussions
actually considered these complaints. See Dkt. No. 118, p. 17.
This argument also lacks merit, as Plaintiff need only put forth
evidence that management was aware of her complaints when they
41
41

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had those discussions to make a prima facie showing of
causation.
While Defendant offered testimony at trial that Plaintiff
was discharged based on poor performance and behavior, see id.
at 303:9-20, Plaintiff countered with evidence suggesting that
this justification is pretextual. Specifically, Plaintiff
introduced evidence that Gerhardt used her legitimate reports
about personnel and product-line concerns as opportunities to
"counsel" her in some instances. See id. at 309:8-10, 316:25317:2, 394:1-3, 394:24-395:2 (Plaintiff's complaints regarding.
Sanfilippo's lack of communication, her coworker's offensive
jokes, and issues with parts being left on the shelf were
appropriate and helpful). Plaintiff also showed that none of
the situations resulting in a counseling session was severe
enough to warrant a disciplinary write-up or any other formal
documentation. Id. at 258:18-259:10, 301:13-16. Because the
Court cannot conclude that there is no legally sufficient basis
to find that Defendant's managers retaliated against Plaintiff
based on her discrimination complaints, judgment as a matter of
law is inappropriate. This portion of Defendant's Motion is
DENIED.
III. Plaintiff's Claims for Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are available in employment discrimination
cases only where the employer-defendant has intentionally
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discriminated against the plaintiff "with malice or with
reckless indifference to [her] federally protected rights."
Koistad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). To create a triable jury issue
regarding punitive damages, the plaintiff must put forth
"substantial evidence" that the defendant acted with actual
malice or with reckless indifference to her federally protected
rights. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1280
(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536-37) . "Malice
or reckless indifference is established by a showing that the
employer discriminated in the face of the knowledge that its
actions would violate federal law." Id. (citing Kolstad, 527
U.S. at 536). Examples of conduct egregious enough to satisfy
this standard include "(1) a pattern of discrimination, (2)
spite or malevolence, or (3) a blatant disregard for civil
obligations." Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317,
1322-23 (11th Cir. 1999)
While the record in this case reflects that Defendant has
policies in place to ensure lawful employment practices,
Plaintiff's evidence that such policies are ineffective allows
an inference that Defendant acted with reckless disregard to her
federal rights under Title VII and Section 1981. Compare
Jackson v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., No. 8:10-CV-1483-T26TBM, 2011 WL 3171812, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2011)
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(defendant not liable for punitive damages where it has made
"good-faith efforts" to comply with federal law through written
policies prohibiting discrimination and procedures for reporting
the same (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544)), with Goldsmith, 513
F.3d at 1281-82 (upholding punitive-damages award where
defendant's management failed to follow antidiscrimination
policy and investigate discrimination complaints, demonstrating
ineffectiveness of policy and reckless indifference to
employee's rights). Defendant's handbook contains an
antidiscrimination policy, as well as open-door communications
and nonretaliation policies encouraging the reporting of
discriminatory conduct. Trial Tr., 122:1-18, 123:2-19, 124:814, 125:2-6, 126:2-12. Nevertheless, Plaintiff put up evidence
at trial from which a jury could reasonably infer that Defendant
did not make good-faith efforts to enforce these policies: (1)
Plaintiff made multiple complaints about discrimination in the
workplace to her supervisor; (2) her supervisor allegedly told
her that management did not like her because of her race; (3)
she continued to be subjected to hostile, less favorable
treatment by management, particularly after the October 2010
review meeting; (4) there was no investigation into her
discrimination complaints; and (5) management did not take
disciplinary action or otherwise make any effort to cease the
allegedly discriminatory acts. See, e.g., id. at 135:25-136:3,
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136:15-138:1, 138:5-6. Because reasonable jurors could differ
as to whether Defendant, through its management, engaged in a
pattern of discrimination or blatant disregard at the Brunswick
VPC, Defendant's Motion for judgment in its favor on the
punitive-damages claims is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law (dkt. no. 118) is DENIED in its
entirety. This case will proceed to a retrial as scheduled.

SO ORDERED,

this 26TH day of April, 2016.

LISA GODBEY W OD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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