SPRIGGS v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Filing 51

ORDER granting in part as to Plaintiff's post-employment retaliation claim and as to those allegations in Counts II and IV that Mercedes Benz retaliated against Plaintiff because of her comments in the written survey, and that Mercedes Benz reta liated against her by making false statement to prospective employers and denying in part as to Counts I and II of Plaintiff's claims, and for Counts II and IV, but only for the allegations in those Counts that Mercedes Benz fired Plaintiff because she made verbal complaints about racial discrimination to her supervisors re 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 9/26/2014. (ca)

1n the thtiteb State Jitritt Court
for the boutbern flitritt of georgia
jorunowt, th 3wbtoton
LATANYA SPRIGGS,
Plaintiff,
CV 213-051

VS.

MERCEDES BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant.

ORDER

After working for Defendant Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, for ten
years in Belcamp, Maryland, Plaintiff Latanya Spriggs applied
for, was offered, and accepted a transfer to Mercedes Benz's
Vehicle Processing Center in Brunswick, Georgia. She was fired
less than a year later. At issue in this case is whether
Plaintiff's managers were motivated to fire her because she is
black and whether they retaliated against her for complaints she
made about racial discrimination at the workplace. Presently
before the Court is Defendant Mercedes Benz's Motion for Summary
Judgment for all four of Plaintiff's claims. See Dkt. no. 30.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether her
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managers fired her with discriminatory intent, Mercedes Benz's
motion is DENIED as to Counts I and III. Defendant's Motion is
also DENIED as to Counts II and IV, but only as to the
allegations within those Counts that Mercedes Benz fired
Plaintiff in retaliation for her verbal complaints about
workplace discrimination to her managers. Summary judgment is
GRANTED as to those allegations in Counts II and IV that

Mercedes Benz retaliated against Plaintiff because of her
written complaints, and that Mercedes Benz retaliated against
Plaintiff by making false statements about her to prospective
employers.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working at Mercedes Benz's Vehicle
Processing Center ("VPC") in Belcamp, Maryland on October 29,
1999. Dkt. no. 40, ¶ 1. During her time in Belcamp, Plaintiff
worked as a Mechanical Helper, and her work earned her at least
one raise and two promotions. See id.; Dkt. no. 34-3 ("Spriggs
Dep."), 57:1-3, 57:24-58:7. In 2009, Plaintiff applied for a
transfer to the VPC in Brunswick, Georgia to work as a Parts
Person. Dkt. no. 40, ¶I 3, 4. Richard Whitmore—manager of VPC
Brunswick—interviewed Plaintiff and hired her over other
applicants. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff began working at VPC Brunswick
on January 4, 2010. Id. at 91 9.

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As a VPC Parts Person, Plaintiff was responsible for
receiving and ordering vehicle parts. Id. at 91 12. This job
required her to communicate and work with various staff members
at VPC Brunswick. Id. She reported directly to her supervisor,
Charles Taylor, the Repair Shop Foreman. Id. at 91 13. Taylor
reported to VPC Supervisor Richard Gerhart, who in turn reported
to VPC Manager Whitmore. Id. at 9191 16, 17.
a. Alleged Discriminatory Treatment

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after she began working at
VPC Brunswick, her managers began to treat her in a
discriminatory manner compared to how they treated white
employees. Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 15. In her complaint, Plaintiff tells
of various workplace altercations and interactions where she
felt discriminated against. This alleged mistreatment includes
the management's refusal to listen to her ideas during
management meetings, her supervisors' failure to respond to
emails or to otherwise communicate with her regarding issues
pertinent to her job function, and racially-charged comments and
insults about Plaintiff's work attire, her husband (who also
works at VPC Brunswick), and her interactions with other VPC
Brunswick employees. Plaintiff concludes that her race was a
factor in her termination "because the way that [she] had been
treated for most of [her] employment there in Brunswick and how
[she] was being treated by management, how they [were) singling
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[her] out as opposed to the white employees." Spriggs Dep. 151:
1-5.
i. Treatment at Staff Meetings

Plaintiff alleges that "[alt management meetings,
management refused to listen to any of her ideas and suggestions
for improving the parts process." Dkt. no. 40, 91 124. Plaintiff
testified that these meetings were "hard to sit in" because some
individuals would act aggressively towards her and cut her off
when she spoke. Spriggs Dep. 89:5-8. Others in the meeting
allegedly treated Plaintiff as if her "suggestions weren't good
enough," and Plaintiff says even Gerhart would respond to her
suggestions with an "inappropriate" stare suggesting
disappointment. Id. at 89:8-18. In addition to Gerhart,
Plaintiff identified warehouse foreman Steve Sanfilippo and
Matthew Menendez as two other individuals who mistreated her
during these meetings. Id. at 89:19-22. Plaintiff believes this
treatment during the meetings amounts to racial discrimination
because "[she] was the only African-American in the meeting, and
whenever [she] spoke, it was always very aggressive toward [her]
as opposed to whenever someone else spoke who was white, they
were always just very pleasant." Id. at 92:16-20.
ii. Lack of Communication

Plaintiff also alleges that managers at VPC Brunswick "set
[her] up to fail" at her job because management did not respond
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to her emails or provide her with feedback crucial to her job
performance, as they did with white employees. Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 17.
Specifically, warehouse foreman Sanfilippo allegedly would not
communicate with Plaintiff when she approached him about
ordering various parts she needed to perform her job. Spriggs
Dep. 71:14-72:22. While Sanfilippo did not supervise Plaintiff,
she claims his failure to communicate with her negatively
affected her job performance. Id. at 127:14-15; 128:15-129:1.
Plaintiff further alleges, in contrast to how management failed
to communicate with her, that other white employees were given
adequate feedback to perform their jobs. Id. at 146:16-22. These
employees—including Matthew Menendez, Joan McIntyre, and Estes
Smith—did not perform the same job as Plaintiff (in fact,
Plaintiff is unable to give any description of what these people
do). Id. at 147:1-18. They were, however, along with Plaintiff,
all part of "Band B," a classification of VPC employees based on
their level of responsibility and salary. Id. at 147:3-4;
Gerhart Dep. 20:10-11.
iii. Singling Out and False Accusations

In addition to the inadequate communication and
mistreatment at staff meetings, Plaintiff alleges that she was
singled out in other ways based on her race. These "singling
out" incidents consist mainly of various corrective and
disciplinary measures and some managers' off-hand remarks,
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including comments about the appropriateness of her work attire
and what Plaintiff believes to be a derogatory comment Whitmore
made during a staff meeting about her and her husband. These
instances of "singling out" are motivated, plaintiff alleges, by
her supervisors' racial bias against her, which she testified
Taylor confirmed to her in a private conversation.
The work-attire incident involved Whitmore's and Taylor's
conversations with Plaintiff about her reputedly revealing
attire. Plaintiff says she first learned of her supervisors'
opinions about her fashion when Taylor told her that Whitmore
and Gerhart were "making comments about what [Plaintiff was]
wearing, but [were] not saying [anything] to Ashley [Adams]," a
white employee. Id. at 111:3-6, 113:3-8. Taylor then told her
"[d]on't worry about it. They're only saying something because
you're black." Id. at 111:8-9. For his part, Whitmore testified
that he did in fact have a conversation about appropriate work
attire with Plaintiff, but that he also had a similar
conversation with Ashley Adams about her attire as well.'
Whitmore Dep. 55:3-56:22.
Plaintiff also claims she was singled out by a comment
Whitmore made at a staff meeting. In the meeting, Whitmore
stated "I know you had to be away from your families for so long
unless you work here with your spouse, and that's too close for
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Plaintiff testified that she did not know whether Adams was ever spoken to
about her attire. Spriggs Dep. 113:18-23.
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my comfort." Spriggs Dep. 133:7-10. Plaintiff felt like this
comment was directed towards here because her husband also works
at VPC Brunswick. Id. at 134:4-6. However, Plaintiff called it a
"snide comment," and did not state in her deposition that she
thought the comment was based on her race. Id. at 134:7-10.
Plaintiff's husband also testified that he did not think the
comment was racially hostile. John Spriggs Dep. 12:1-3. Whitmore
testified that he did not mean anything derogatory by this
comment, but that he was referring to both Plaintiff and her
husband along with another unmarried couple who cohabited as
parents. Whitmore Dep. 60:19-61:9.
The false accusations charge in Plaintiff's EEOC complaint
revolves around a dispute Plaintiff had with one of her nonmanagement colleagues. In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleges
that she was "falsely accused" regarding interactions with her
co-workers, and that this false accusation amounted to racial
discrimination. Dkt. no. 34-27, p. 3. At her deposition,
Plaintiff testified that the only "false accusation" this charge
refers to is one made by Joan McIntyre, the Repair Shop
Scheduler. Spriggs Dep. 108:9-13. One day after Plaintiff had
suggested in a staff meeting that McIntyre be assigned as
Plaintiff's backup Parts Person, Plaintiff alleges McIntyre took
issue with that suggestion and came into Plaintiff's office and
"snapped" at her about the suggestion. Id. at 105:12-106:14.
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Plaintiff says they were both brought to Gerhart's office, where
McIntyre falsely accused Plaintiff of instigating the quarrel.
Id. McIntyre was not Plaintiff's manager and had no authority to
terminate her or change any conditions of her employment. Id. at
105:2-4, 109:2-4.
iv. Reporting Concerns to Management

Plaintiff claims that despite reporting this mistreatment
to Taylor, the discriminatory treatment continued. Dkt. no. 1,
I 19. Plaintiff specifically expressed to Taylor her belief that
her race was the reason she was being treated differently than
white employees. Spriggs Dep. 170:5-8. While Plaintiff did not
report her concerns to human resources, she complained to Taylor
"on many, many occasions." Id. at 91:13-21; 92:9-11. Plaintiff
also complained to Gerhart that she believed her treatment
during management meetings was based on her race. Id. at 87:2490:2.
In her complaint, Plaintiff claims Taylor responded to
these reports by telling her that Whitmore did not like her
because she is black. Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 20. It is unclear from the
record whether this alleged statement is the same statement
regarding Plaintiff's attire discussed in Part I.a.iii above or
if it is an independent statement regarding Whitmore's attitude
towards Plaintiff in general. At one point in her deposition,
Plaintiff testified that the comment regarding Whitmore's
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attitude towards Plaintiff's attire was the only comment Taylor
made where Taylor said Whitmore did not like her because she was
black. Spriggs Dep. 138:23-139:6. Later in her deposition,
though, Plaintiff testifies that there was another occasion
where Taylor told Plaintiff that some of her non-management
coworkers did not like her because they were in the KKK, and
also that Whitmore and Gerhart simply did not like her because
she was black. Id. at 140:11-16. Apparently, the comment about
some employees being in the KKK did not pertain to Whitmore and
Gerhart, who allegedly just did not like Plaintiff in general
because she was black. Id. at 141:21-142:2. Taylor denies ever
telling Plaintiff that anyone in management did not like her
because she was black or that a group of non-management
employees was in the KKK and did not like her. Taylor
Dep. 124:17-126:3.
Plaintiff never reported the alleged racial discrimination
or purported racist attitudes of her managers to anyone except
Taylor. Spriggs Dep. 141:8-21. While Plaintiff acknowledges that
she could have gone to human resources with these issues, she
instead brought them to Taylor. Spriggs Dep. at 94:19-95:4.
The Mercedes Benz Employee Handbook "strongly urge[s]"
employees to report incidents of harassment to one's supervisor,
manager, a human resources Business Partner, or General Manager
of human resources. Id. at p. 11. Additionally, Plaintiff signed
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an "Acknowledgement of Workplace Harassment Awareness Training"
which states: "I have the responsibility . . . to report any
instance of harassment to either my manager or to Human
Resources." Dkt. no. 34-11, p. 2. Thus, while reporting
harassment to human resources is an option, it is not
necessarily required.
b. Plaintiff's Termination

Plaintiff worked at VPC Brunswick until she was terminated
on November 23, 2010. Gerhart informed Plaintiff that she was
being terminated for her behavior. Spriggs Dep. 181:14-17.
Managers at VPC Brunswick gave various behavior-related
reasons for Plaintiff's termination, including insubordination,
disrespect, and ineffective communication. Gerhart Dep. 142:2225, 143:23-144:1; Taylor Dep. 152:11-14; Caruso Dep. 100:7-25.
Gerhart also testified that Plaintiff's termination was based in
part on past behavior at VPC Belcamp—specifically that her
previous supervisor described her behavior as "questionable."
Gerhart Dep. 84:17-85:3. Additionally, Carol Caruso, a Human
Resources Business Partner at the time of Plaintiff's
termination, testified that although Plaintiff was terminated
because of her behavior and insubordination, these reasons were
subsumed within a "performance" category for purposes of
documenting the termination. Caruso Dep. 100:7-22; 105:21106: 13.
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Mercedes Benz has documented several examples of
Plaintiff's behavior that it used to justify Plaintiff's
termination. Gerhart testified that Plaintiff routinely
misconstrued simple requests and correction from management as
"singling out" or attacking Plaintiff. Examples include
Plaintiff's aversion to and repeated complaints about an
accident report form Gerhart filled out after Plaintiff cut her
hand while opening a box, 2 Plaintiff's tendency to interpret
simple requests as attacks on her work, 3 and her refusal to
consider constructive criticism. 4 Gerhart also noted several acts
of insubordination. For example, Gerhart testified that he would
often have to repeat simple requests several times before
overcoming Plaintiff's objections to the instructions. Gerhart
2

Plaintiff had cut her hand using a multi-tool to open a box, and Gerhart
issued an "Accident/Illness Report," in which he noted that the cause of the
injury was that Plaintiff had misused the multi-tool. Dkt. no. 34-14,
pp. 2-3; Dkt. no. 34-15, p. 1. Plaintiff objected to filling out the report,
even though filling out the form is required whenever there is an injury.
Taylor Dep. 71:3-13; 71:21-72:1. Gerhart discussed the incident without using
names the next day at a staff meeting, and Plaintiff allegedly threw up her
hands in the air and said "oh no." Dkt. no. 34-15, p. 1. Long after the
incident, Plaintiff would continually revive the issue with Gerhart, claiming
that the form was filled out incorrectly or that she was "singled out," and
no other employees ever had similar incidents documented. Gerhart Dep. 90:14; 71:19-21. Gerhart would repeatedly tell Plaintiff that she was not the
only employee to have such injuries documented. Id. at 71:21-25. Plaintiff
continued to dwell on the incident for more than two months. Id. at 96:12-23.
On June 14, 2010, Gerhart says he emailed Plaintiff and asked her to "keep
an eye out" outside after landscapers informed him that some labels were
found all around the area. Gerhart Dep. 90:25-91.2. In response to this
request, Plaintiff allegedly got very defensive and accused Gerhart of
attacking her work and accusing her of not keeping her area clean. Id. at
91:10-16.
Gerhart recalled that on November 3, 2010, he advised Plaintiff that
employees may take offense to her being distant towards them by "walking with
her head down and not communicating with them." Dkt. 34-15 p. 4. Gerhart says
that Plaintiff responded by trying to point out the faults of other employees
and generally not listening to his advice. Gerhart Dep. 94:21-23.
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Dep. at 119:24-120:3; 117:1-3. Additionally, Gerhart testified
that Plaintiff would not communicate with management and her
coworkers, especially regarding high-priority information. 5
Finally, Mercedes Benz notes Plaintiff's inability to get
along with and hostility towards her coworkers as a reason for
her termination. Taylor testified that Plaintiff did not get
along "with mostly everyone in the facility." Taylor Dep. 83:36. On November 18, 2010, Sanfilippo sent Taylor an email stating
that two members of his team told him that Plaintiff talked down
to them and that "they would rather not have to deal with her
anymore." Dkt. no. 34-19, P. 2; Gerhart Dep. at 115:19-20. Many
of Plaintiff's coworkers reported feeling "very uncomfortable
working with [Plaintiff] closely," Gerhart Dep. 111:17-19, and
Taylor says he "had an entire shop that did not want to go into
the parts room [where Plaintiff worked]," Taylor Dep. 103:17-19.
These behavioral reasons the managers at VPC Brunswick give
for terminating Plaintiff are mentioned in a set of notes
compiled by Gerhart, see Dkt. no. 34-15, but are not listed in
Plaintiff's 2009 or mid-cycle performance evaluations. Gerhart
testified that "so many things happened" around November that
management decided to terminate Plaintiff rather than complete

Particularly, on one occasion, Plaintiff failed to notify anyone at the VPC
that a part for a "Priority" customer's vehicle had arrived when vpc
Brunswick had been waiting over one month for that item, causing a delay in
shipping the vehicle to the customer. Dkt. no. 34-15, pp.3-4; Taylor Dep.
91:10-21, 92:11-13.
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the final performance evaluation. Gerhart Dep. 123:9-14; 124:36. Additionally, Human Resources employee Caruso sent an email
to Gerhart on November 23, 2010, expressing some concern over
this lack of documentation, but ultimately agreeing that
termination was appropriate:
Although I am somewhat concerned with the fact that
2009 mid-cycle year-end and this year's mid-cycle
[performance review] documents do not reflect any of
the behavioral or attitude issues whether in the
ratings or in the comments, we do have documentation
in the 2009 [performance review] in the form of
behavioral ratings (no written comments) along with
your recent memo to Latanya addressing the issue of
working with Joan (McIntyre) and the management team
notes from this year recording the numerous
conversations you had with her.
Caruso Dep. 78:8-22. Caruso further testified that human
resources recommends extensive documentation regarding concerns
like those Plaintiff's supervisors had in regards to her
behavior. Id. at 79:1-9. However, Caruso did not feel the need
to investigate the reasons for Plaintiff's termination further
because whether those reasons were legitimate "had already been
determined." Id. at 79:16-21.
c. The Annual Survey

Plaintiff alleges in her retaliation claim that she was
fired, in part, for comments she made in an annual survey taken
by VPC Brunswick employees the week before she was fired. Dkt.
no. 1, ¶[ 38, 51.

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On November 18, 2010, Mercedes Benz administered a
voluntary, annual survey to obtain employee feedback in a number
of areas, including management. Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 20. Employees were
not asked to identify themselves in the survey. Id. Mercedes
Benz would provide VPC Brunswick management with survey results
in a typed summary during the first quarter of the next year.
Caruso Dep. 40:14-17.
Plaintiff used the survey as an opportunity to express her
belief that management was racist and discriminated against her.
Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 22. Although Plaintiff testified that she does not
know whether anyone at VPC Brunswick saw her handwritten
responses, she testified that her managers expressed ideas in
their notes and testimonies that they could only have known from
reading her responses. Spriggs Dep. 178:17-19, 216:8-217:11;
Spriggs Aff. ¶ 20. Gerhart, Taylor, and Whitmore testified that
local management does not see handwritten comments. Gerhart Dep.
134:11-14; Taylor Dep. 43:11-13, 44:10-11, 45:14-16; Whitmore
Dep. 68:22-24. Furthermore, Mercedes Benz stated in an
interrogatory response:
The survey results were at all times kept anonymous as
local management did not see any of the individual
surveys or any individual employees' handwriting. A
third party (the Beacon Group) was responsible for
providing survey debriefs to local General Managers
and their management teams.
Dkt. no. 34-24, p. 4.

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d. Prospective Employer Allegations

Plaintiff also alleges that Mercedes Benz retaliated
against her for complaining about management's discriminatory
practices by thwarting her attempts to seek new employment after
she was fired. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that someone
from Mercedes Benz told prospective employers that Plaintiff was
terminated for "misconduct and/or other false reasons." Dkt. no.
].

¶ 26. Plaintiff later clarified that this allegation pertains

only to one potential employer—Georgia-Pacific—and that she does
not know whether anyone at Mercedes Benz actually spoke with
potential employers. Spriggs Dep. 160:19-21, 159:4-6. Plaintiff
claims that her panel of interviewers at Georgia-Pacific found
her "more than qualified," but that she did not hear back from
Georgia-Pacific after the interview. Id. at 159:17-160:21.
Plaintiff speculates that she lost the Georgia-Pacific position
because one of her interviewers told her the company was going
to ask Mercedes Benz Human Resources why Plaintiff no longer
worked there. Id. at 160:1-7.
Taylor testified that he received one phone inquiry about
Plaintiff after her termination. Taylor Dep. 155:1-10. He stated
that he merely told the caller Plaintiff's name and position
when asked if there was anything else he would like to say. Id.
Taylor does not remember the identity of the caller. Id. at

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158:1-2. Upon hanging up, he immediately notified Human
Resources of the call. Id. at 155:8-10.
e. EEOC Charges

Plaintiff filed an initial Charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 26, 2011, where she
alleges that she was subjected to harassment and racial insults.
Dkt. no. 34-27. The Charge alleges that the harassment included,
but was not limited to, comments about her work attire and false
accusations. Id. Furthermore, the Charge notes Plaintiff's
belief that VPC Brunswick management discriminated against her
because she was African American. Id. On April 26, 2011,
Plaintiff amended her Charge to include a claim of retaliation,
alleging that Mercedes Benz retaliated against her by "informing
other companies of their accusations," which left Plaintiff
unable to find another job in her field. Id. On October 15,
2012, Plaintiff filed the instant action in Federal Court. Dkt.
no. 1.
II. Discussion
a. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

FED.

R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law." FindWhat Investor Grp. v.
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FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A
dispute over such a fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Id. In making this determination, the court is to view
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d
501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000)
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To
satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325. If the moving party discharges this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and
present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
fact does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. In employment
discrimination cases, "the plaintiff will always survive summary
judgment if [she] presents circumstantial evidence that creates
a triable issue concerning the employer's discriminatory
intent." Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir.
2013)

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b. EEOC Charge Filing Requirement for Title VII Claims

Counts I and II of Plaintiff's four claims against Mercedes
Benz are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In reviewing these two Title VII claims, the Court is
limited to considering only those allegations that have "been
made the subject of a timely-filed EEOC charge." Thomas v. Miami
Dade Pub. Health Trust, 369 Fed. Appx. 19, 22 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting A.M. Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303,
1332 (11th Cir. 2000)). Furthermore,
EEOC regulations provide that charges should contain,
among other things, a clear and concise statement of
the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the
alleged unlawful employment practices. A plaintiff's
judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow
out of the charge of discrimination.
Id. (quotations and alterations omitted) . After a plaintiff has
pursued her EEOC claims, a court may consider subsequent
judicial claims if they "amplify, clarify, or more clearly
focus" the allegations in the EEOC complaint. Wu v. Thomas, 863
F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989). However, a court may not
consider "allegations of new acts of discrimination." Id.
Ultimately, a court must determine if the allegations in the
judicial complaint are within the scope of an EEOC investigation
"which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination." Id.

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Thus, the Court must compare Plaintiff's Title VII
allegations in her complaint against the allegations in her EEOC
charge. 6 In Count I of her complaint, Plaintiff accuses Mercedes
Benz of intentionally discriminating against her because of her
race by "treating her differently in hiring, compensation,
demotion and discharge than similarly situated white employees"
of Mercedes Benz. Dkt. no. 1, 91 34. In Count II of her
complaint, Plaintiff claims she made two types of complaints to
her supervisors about discrimination protected by Title VII
while at Mercedes Benz: first, she complained verbally to her
supervisors about unlawful discrimination (Id. at 91 37); second,
she complained about unlawful discrimination in a written,
internal survey conducted by Mercedes Benz management (Id. at
¶ 38) . Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges in Count II that she
endured two different forms of retaliation for making these
complaints: Mercedes Benz terminated her because of the
complaints, and, after her termination, Mercedes Benz
communicated "false and/or misleading information about her to
prospective employers." Id. at 91 39.
Plaintiff filed her first EEOC Charge on January 26, 2011.
The charge states:

6

Section 1981 claims are not subject to the administrative exhaustion
requirement. E.g., Mathis v. Leggett & Platt, 263 Fed. Appx. 9, 12 (11th Cir.
2008). Thus, The Court need not consider whether Plaintiff has exhausted any
administrative remedies as to Counts III and IV of her judicial complaint.
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I began my employment on March 29, 1999, as a
Mechanical helper. I was later promoted to the
position of Parts Person. During my employment, I was
subjected to harassment and racial insults. Such
harassment includes, but is not limited to comments
about my work attire being inappropriate and false
accusations regarding my interaction(s) with coworkers. On November 23, 2010, I was informed by Mr.
Gerhart, Supervisor of Operations, and Charles Taylor,
III, Shop Foreperson, that I was discharged from my
employment, and that I would need to contact Carol
Caruso in Human Resources, to get further information
regarding my discharge.
Dkt. no. 34-27, p. 2. Plaintiff concludes her initial charge by
stating that she believes she was discriminated against for
being African American. Id. Plaintiff later amended her charge,
on April 26, 2011, to include the statement: "Since my
discharge, [Mercedes Benz] has retaliated against me by
informing other companies of their accusations. Because of this,
I have been unable to obtain a job in this field, and have had
to seek employment in another field." Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff
also included in her amendment her belief that she was
discriminated against for opposing unlawful employment
practices.
Mercedes Benz claims Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to both of her Title VII claims.
First, Mercedes Benz argues that Plaintiff's race-based
discharge claim (Count I) was not properly raised in her EEOC
charge because she did not allege Mercedes Benz terminated her
because of her race. Dkt. no. 30, pp. 16-17. Second, Mercedes
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Benz argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim (Count II) also
was not properly raised in her EEOC charge because Plaintiff
never claims in the charge that she was terminated for
complaining about discrimination or harassment. Id.
Mercedes Benz's first argument as to administrative
exhaustion fails because it holds the Plaintiff to too high of a
pleading standard in her EEOC charge. In the EEOC charge,
Plaintiff alleged (1) that she was discriminated against because
of her race while working at Mercedes Benz, and (2) that she was
eventually fired. Dkt. no. 30-27,

p. 3. Plaintiff never

explicitly argues a causal connection between these two
allegations in her EEOC charge, but a claim that her termination
itself was discriminatory could "reasonably be expected to grow
out of the charge of discrimination" as she alleges in the EEOC
charge. See Thomas, 369 Fed. Appx. at 22. Additionally, while
Mercedes Benz suggests that Plaintiff concedes in her deposition
that she was not terminated because of her race (Dkt. no. 30,
citing Dkt. no. 30-3, 151:6-15), the Court's job at this stage
of the analysis is to determine whether Plaintiff's judicial
claims properly arise from an EEOC charge. The Court will
consider the merits of evidentiary arguments later in its
summary judgment analysis, but at this stage the Court finds
that Plaintiff has properly exhausted her administrative

AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)

I

21

remedies as to her Title VII discriminatory termination claim
(Count I).
Additionally, Mercedes Benz's argument that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her Title
VII retaliatory termination claim (Count II) also fail. In her
amended EEOC charge, Plaintiff states that since her discharge,
Mercedes Benz "has retaliated against me by informing other
companies of their accusations." Dkt. no. 34-27, p.3. She later
concludes she was discriminated against "in retaliation for
opposing unlawful employment practices." Id. These statements
are enough to put Mercedes Benz on notice that Plaintiff was
accusing it of retaliating against her for opposing unlawful
employment practices when it allegedly thwarted her attempts to
get a new job. Furthermore, while this allegation in the EEOC
Charge lacks the details Plaintiff includes in her judicial
complaint, there are enough details in the EEOC Charge from
which the EEOC could base an investigation into Plaintiff's
retaliation complaint. The details Plaintiff includes in her
judicial complaint "serve to amplify, clarify, [and] more
clearly focus the earlier EEO complaints," and are thus
sufficient to make her judicial claim appropriate. See Wu, 863
F.3d at 1547.

AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)

-

22

Thus, The Court finds that Plaintiff has exhausted her
administrative remedies as to both of her Title vii claims, and
those claims will be considered alongside her § 1981 claims.
c. Racial Discrimination under Title VII and § 1981

Counts I and III of Plaintiff's complaint are racial
discrimination claims brought under Title VII and § 1981,
respectively. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against a person based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that all persons in the
United States "shall have the same right - . . to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens," and
this provision has been interpreted to prohibit employment
discrimination. Addison v. Ingles Mkts., Inc., 515 Fed. Appx.
840, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2013) . The Court will address Plaintiff's
Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims together as both
types of claim "have the same requirements of proof and the same
analytical framework." Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161
F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
"A plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional
discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence,
or statistical proof." Alvarez v. Royal Ati. Developers, Inc.,
610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rioux v. City of
Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff
alleges facts which could potentially be direct evidence, but
AO 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

23

her argument frames these facts as circumstantial evidence. When
a plaintiff bases her prima facie case of discrimination on
direct evidence of intent to discriminate on account of race, a
defendant can only rebut that evidence by showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same
employment decision absent the discriminatory motive. Wall v.
Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 1991). However,
when the prima fade case is based on circumstantial evidence,
the defendant merely needs to articulate a legitimate business
reason to have terminated the plaintiff, and the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that this stated reason is a
pretext for racial discrimination. Id. Because employment
discrimination defendants are required to rebut direct evidence
by a higher burden of proof, the Court must first determine
whether Plaintiff has established her prima facie case under
direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both.
Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence "which
reflects 'a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating
to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the
employee." Wilson v. 3/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,
196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999)). "Only the most blatant
remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to
discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor
24
AO 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

constitute direct evidence of discrimination. .

. If the

alleged statement suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory
motive, then it is circumstantial evidence." Id. (quotations and
internal citations omitted). The statements must prove
discriminatory motive "without inference or presumption."
Burrell v. Bd. Of Trustees of Ga. Mu. College, 125 F. 3d 1390,
1393 (11th Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Taylor told her that the
reason Whitmore treated her differently than other employees was
because she was black. Dkt. no. 1, ¶ 20; Spriggs Dep. 139:19-24.
At first glance, this evidence appears to fit within the narrow
bounds the Eleventh Circuit has established for direct evidence
because it clearly suggests a decisionmaker's "intent to
discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor." See
Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086. However, this evidence has factual and
procedural shortcomings that preclude its use as direct evidence
in the Court's summary judgment analysis.
First, the factual circumstances of Plaintiff's submitted
direct evidence differ from those of this Circuit's precedents,
in that Plaintiff learned of Whitmore's statements through the
grapevine rather than directly from Whitmore himself. Cf. CabanWheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 842-43 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a decisionmaker's statement directly to the plaintiffemployee that he wanted a black person to have the white
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25

employee's job sufficed as direct evidence of discriminatory
intent); Haynes v. W.C. Caye & Co., Inc., 52 F.3d 928, 930 (11th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a decisionmaker's statement directly to
the plaintiff-employee that he did not think women were "tough
enough" to work in collections constituted direct evidence).
With Taylor acting as an intermediary between the person
offering the evidence (Plaintiff) and the decisionmaker
allegedly holding the racist attitude (Whitmore), this degree of
separation would require the factfinder to infer or presume that
Taylor was telling the truth, that he was not projecting a
racist attitude onto Whitmore, and that he had otherwise
accurately repeated Whitmore's statements to Plaintiff before
finding that Whitmore was racist in fact. See Burrell, 125 F.3d
at 1390.
Additionally, Plaintiff failed to argue in her motion
opposing summary judgment that Taylor's alleged statements about
Whitmore's and Gerhart's attitudes towards Plaintiff amount to
direct evidence. This reason alone is sufficient for the Court
to use the statement in its analysis merely as circumstantial
evidence. See, e.g., Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264 (declining to
consider defendant-employer's alleged statement that "Cubans are
dumb" as direct evidence where plaintiff failed to make that
argument, "even if we assume, as we must for summary judgment
purposes, that he actually said it.").
AO 72A
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26

Having determined that Plaintiff has not presented direct
evidence that supervisors at Mercedes Benz discriminated against
her during her employment, the Court now analyzes her claim
under one of two available "circumstantial evidence" analyses.
The more common rubric enumerated by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), applies when the plaintiff is relying on comparators as
evidence of differential treatment. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087.
"Under this framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates
a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted illegally." Id.
A plaintiff can meet this burden by showing that she is a
qualified member of a protected class who was treated adversely
and differently in her employment than similarly situated
employees outside of the protected class. Id. The similarly
situated employee, known as a "comparator," must be similarly
situated "in all relevant respects," and must be "nearly
identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from secondguessing a reasonable decision by the employer." Id. at 1091.
If the plaintiff meets her burden of establishing her prima

facie case, then there is a presumption that the employer acted
illegally, which the employer may rebut by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the
27
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

employer satisfies this burden of production, then the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show that the defendant's
proffered reasons for its actions are simply a pretext for
discrimination. Id. While the burden of production may shift
back and forth between the plaintiff and defendant, it is the
plaintiff who ultimately bears the burden of showing that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against her. Id. (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
Where the McDonnell Doualas framework is not useful for
lack of comparators, courts rely on a more straightforward
circumstantial evidence analysis—albeit one that requires more
piercing evidence of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit has
held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not the sine qua
non for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment in a

discrimination case. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333
(11th Cir. 2013)
Instead, the plaintiff will always survive summary
judgment if [she] presents circumstantial evidence
that creates a triable issue concerning the employer's
discriminatory intent. A triable issue exists if the
record, viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to
infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
Mercedes Benz does not dispute that Plaintiff, a black
female, belonged to a protected class, was subjected to an

28
AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)

adverse employment action through her termination, and was
qualified for the position. Mercedes Benz does argue, however,
that Plaintiff has failed to establish her prima facie case
because she failed to show that similarly situated white
employees at Mercedes Benz were treated differently than she
was.
Plaintiff argues that she can identify white employees who
were given different treatment than she was, and attempts to do
so by pointing to the record. However, in doing so, she either
misrepresents the record entirely or relies on comparators who
are not similarly situated to her.
In her brief opposing Mercedes Benz's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff states that managers at VPC Brunswick gave
white employees "the opportunity to be aware of and to improve
on a particular performance or behavioral issue by counseling,
reprimanding, warning, or disciplining them by means of a CAR, a
PIP, or other disciplinary measures." Dkt. no. 39,

p. 12. To

support this argument, Plaintiff points to Taylor's deposition,
where he testifies that once or twice he placed an employee on
PIP perhaps two or three years ago, but Taylor could not
remember those employee's names. Taylor Dep. 31:8-21. Without
knowing the names, race, job descriptions, or circumstances
surrounding these employees' discipline, this admission in no
way establishes that there were similarly situated comparators
29
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

to Plaintiff who were outside of her protected class and
received more favorable employment treatment from Taylor.
Additionally, Plaintiff points to McIntyre and Jeff
Schaffer as potential comparators who were not disciplined
despite engaging in "equally serious 'behavioral' issues as
compared to Plaintiff." Dkt. no. 39, p. 13 ri.17. Plaintiff
claims that McIntyre was not disciplined for falsely accusing
Plaintiff as the instigator of their altercation and that port
surveyor Jeff Schaffer was not disciplined for making an
improper sexual joke.
One reason this argument establishes neither McIntyre nor
Shaffer as comparators for purposes of establishing Plaintiff's

prima facie case is that, again, Plaintiff misconstrues the
record in making her argument. Gerhart's deposition—which
Plaintiff cites to as evidence of Gerhart's failure to
discipline Shaffer—shows that he verbally counseled Shaffer
regarding his conduct. Gerhart Dep. 108:24-109:23. Notably, much
of the discriminatory discipline Plaintiff claims she was
subjected to amounts to nothing more than verbal counseling, so
it is unclear to the Court how her supervisors' handling of
Shaffer's conduct is any different than how, for example, her
supervisor verbally advised her to make her attire more
professional. Additionally, Plaintiff's citation to the record
in support of her argument that McIntyre was not properly
AO 72A
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I

30

disciplined for her false accusations against Plaintiff simply
shows that Plaintiff thought McIntyre was lying and says nothing
about what punishment she did or did not receive. See Spriggs
Dep. 105:19-106:17. As such, the Court cannot make a comparison
between Plaintiff and McIntyre based on this evidence.
The second reason Plaintiff's argument that McIntyre and
Shaffer are adequate comparators fails is because, even if
Plaintiff's characterization of the record was accurate,
McIntyre's and Shaffer's conduct is not "nearly identical" to
Plaintiff's. Thus, these two employees do not meet the Eleventh
Circuit's standards for comparators in employment discrimination
claims. See, e.g., Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091.
Thus, Plaintiff has not produced a similarly situated
comparator to establish her prima facie case. The Court's
analysis does not end there, however, because, as noted above,
the Eleventh Circuit has held that a lack of comparators will
not necessarily doom a plaintiff's case. Lockheed-Martin, 644
F.3d at 1328. But without a comparator, Plaintiff must put forth
"a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow
a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker." Id.
Plaintiff has successfully presented such evidence.
Plaintiff has enumerated several instances of alleged
discrimination throughout her complaint and deposition. Most of
31
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

these allegations do not give rise to an inference of
discrimination (e.g., there is no evidence to support
Plaintiff's contention that Whitmore's comment about spouses
working together was racial in nature, and McIntyre's alleged
false accusations do not create such an inference of
discrimination by a decisionmaker because she was not a manager
over Plaintiff). However, Plaintiff's allegation that Taylor
told her Whitmore and Gerhart do not like her because she is
black taints the trio's decision to terminate Plaintiff with a
possible inference of discrimination. 7
Mercedes Benz argues that this exception to the general
requirement for a comparator only applies where there are enough
"tiles" in the evidentiary mosaic amounting to "extraordinary"
evidence of discriminatory intent. Dkt. no. 48,

pp. 6-7. While

the "mosaic" analogy may appear to imply that multiple, discreet
bits of evidence are necessary to overcome summary judgment, and
while those cases applying the exception to the McDonnell
Do u glas analysis often involved "extraordinary" evidence, 8 the
Eleventh Circuit has held that, ultimately, summary judgment is
' Mercedes Benz argues that this evidence is inadmissible because it is
hearsay. That argument is wrong. Because Taylor is a Mercedes Benz employee
and his statement was "on a matter within the scope of" his business
relationship with Mercedes Benz, his statement falls under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d) (2) (D) as an opposing party statement and is not hearsay by
definition.
8
See, e.g., Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008) (waiving
comparator requirement where plaintiff showed, through circumstantial
evidence, that employer had maintained a race-based quota for employment
purposes and had tracked plaintiff's demotion in records pertaining to the
quota)

32
AO 72A
(Rev 8/82)

"improper" where "the circumstantial evidence raises a
reasonable inference that the employer discriminated against the
plaintiff." Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff's allegation that Taylor told her
Whitmore and Gerhart were mistreating her and did not like her
because she is black raises a "reasonable inference" that the
employment decisions these men made—including the decision to
fire Plaintiff—were motivated by Plaintiff's race. 9 Even if the
rest of Plaintiff's proffered examples of discrimination are
easily dismissed as routine disciplinary measures or, at most,
common rudeness in the workplace, the suggestion by one manager
that two other managers base their disciplinary decisions on
Plaintiff's race casts doubt on the managers' stated reasons for
terminating Plaintiff. While Taylor adamantly denies that he
ever made such statements to Plaintiff, the truth of the matter
is for a fact finder to determine.
Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has presented
circumstantial evidence sufficient for the McDonnell Douglas
exception discussed in Lockheed-Martin, the Court need not
proceed with the McDonnell Douglas analysis by considering
Mercedes Benz argues that the "same decision maker" inference creates an
inference of no discrimination because Whitmore made both decisions to hire
and fire Plaintiff. However, Whitmore testified that he had little knowledge
of the events culminating in Plaintiff's termination and relied on Gerhart's
judgment on this matter. Whitmore dep. 74:22-25. Because Whitmore was the
only decision maker in hiring Plaintiff, but one of three decision-makers in
terminating Plaintiff, the "same decision maker" inference does not apply
under these circumstances.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)

33

Mercedes Benz's proffered reasons for the termination, or
Plaintiff's argument for whether those reasons are a pretext. It
is enough that Plaintiff has presented circumstantial evidence
raising a reasonable inference of discrimination for the Court
to DENY summary judgment as to Counts I and III.
d. Retaliation Under Title VII and § 1981

Counts II and IV of Plaintiff's complaint both allege that
Mercedes Benz retaliated against Plaintiff because she engaged
in statutorily protected activity. The Court will consider these
two claims under the same framework because the framework for
deciding retaliation claims under Title VII governs retaliation
claims under § 1981. Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol.,
516 F.3d 955, 978 (11th Cir. 2008)
To establish a retaliation claim under Title VII and
§ 1981, Plaintiff must prove that she: (1) engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) suffered a materially
adverse action; and (3) there was a causal relation between the
protected activity and the adverse action. See Butler v. Alabama
Dept. of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,. 513 F.3d 1261, 1277
(11th Cir. 2008)). An action is "materially adverse" if it
"might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination." Chapter 7 Trustee v.
Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
AO 72A
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I

34

Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006)). The "causal relation" prong of the plaintiff's prima

facie case requires the plaintiff to show that the statutorily
protected activity was the "but-for" cause of the adverse
employment action. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. V. Nassar, 133
S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). "This requires proof that the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the
alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer." Id. An
adverse action can occur even after the employment relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant has ended. See Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that the term
"employees," as used in § 704(a) of Title VII, includes former
employees).
"After the plaintiff has established the elements of a
claim, the employer has an opportunity to articulate a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employment
action as an affirmative defense to liability." Goldsmith, 513
F.3d at 1277. If the defendant meets this burden of production,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to satisfy her "ultimate
burden of proving retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence
and that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for
prohibited retaliatory conduct." Id.
While Counts II and IV of Plaintiff's complaint are both
retaliation claims, each alleges different forms of protected
AO 72A
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1

35

speech and retaliation. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that she
engaged in protected activity by complaining about unlawful
employment practices both verbally to her supervisors and in a
written survey, and that Mercedes Benz retaliated against her
both by firing her and by communicating false and misleading
information to prospective employers. Dkt. no. 1, 9191 37-39.
Count IV of Plaintiff's claim likewise alleges that Plaintiff
engaged in protected activity when she complained of racial
discrimination to her supervisors both verbally and in the
written survey. Dkt. no. 1, ¶91 50-51. However, the adverse
employment action Plaintiff complains about in Count IV is
simply her termination. Id. at ¶ 52. Because the Counts have
overlapping allegations, the Court will consider the retaliatory
termination complaints of Counts II and IV together while
parsing out Count II's post-employment retaliation claim for its
own analysis
i. Retaliatory Termination

Plaintiff alleges she verbally complained to Gerhart that
she was being mistreated in the management meetings, and
specifically told him that she believed she was being treated
differently because she was black. Spriggs Dep. 87:24-90:2. She
also claims that she complained repeatedly about racial
discrimination to Taylor. Dkt. no. 1, 191 19-20. Taylor denies
that Plaintiff ever spoke to him about racial discrimination at
AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)

36

VPC Brunswick. Taylor Dep. 122:8-12. The written complaints
Plaintiff refers to include the annual employee survey, which
she completed five days before her termination. Dkt. no. 39,
pp. 23-24.
Plaintiff's allegation that she was terminated for
complaining of unlawful employment practices in the written
survey fails because she cannot satisfy the causation
requirement of her prima facie case as it relates to that
allegation. Mercedes Benz presented evidence that management did
not receive the results of the survey until the first quarter of
the following year after Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff
admitted that she did not know whether anyone at VPC Brunswick
ever saw her handwritten responses. Plaintiff's allegation that
managers at Mercedes Benz saw these responses and terminated
Plaintiff because of them amounts to mere speculation, and does
not rise to the level of "proof that the unlawful retaliation
would not have occurred in the absence of" her comments in the
survey. See Nassar, 133 S.Ct at 2533.
Plaintiff has, however, established her prima facie case
for her allegation that she was terminated for making verbal
complaints to Gerhart and Taylor. She testified at her
deposition that she made at least one complaint to Gerhart and
several to Taylor about racial discrimination. Additionally, it
is uncontested that her termination amounts to an adverse
37
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

employment action. Finally, a jury could find that these
complaints were the "but-for" cause of her termination because
of Taylor's alleged statement that two of Plaintiff's manager's
did not like her because of her race. This evidence could
reasonably support a finding that those managers would want to
terminate her if she began to complain about the racial
discrimination she suffered at their hands.
Because Plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the
burden shifts to Mercedes Benz to articulate legitimate reasons
for terminating Plaintiff, which Plaintiff can rebut by showing
that those proffered reasons are merely a pretext for
retaliation.
Mercedes Benz has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff. However,
Taylor's alleged statement about Gerhart's and Whitmore's racial
bias against Plaintiff continues to loom over much of the
evidence in this case, and, if believed by a factfinder, casts
doubt upon the sincerity of Mercedes Benz's proffered reasons.
Thus, summary judgment is DENIED as to Counts II and IV,
but only insofar as those Counts allege that Mercedes Benz
retaliated against Plaintiff by terminating her for the verbal
complaints of discrimination. Plaintiff has not established a
genuine issue of material fact as to her claim that Mercedes

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

I

38

Benz fired her because of the complaints in the written survey,
and summary judgment as to that allegation is GRANTED.
ii. Post-Employment Retaliation

Plaintiff has not established her prima fade case for
Count II's post-employment retaliation claim, in which she
alleges that Mercedes Benz retaliated against her by making
false accusations about her to her prospective employers.
Plaintiff claims that someone at Mercedes Benz communicated
false information to someone from Georgia-Pacific, who was
considering Plaintiff for a possible job offer. Plaintiff's sole
basis for this allegation is that her interviewers at GeorgiaPacific told her they were going to inquire at Mercedes Benz as
to why she no longer worked there, and she subsequently never
heard back from them. While Taylor testified that he received a
call after Plaintiff's termination from someone asking about
Plaintiff's work history, he says he only disclosed Plaintiff's
name and position. He did not know who the caller was.
With this information, Plaintiff's post-employment
retaliation claim is purely speculative. Nothing in the record
shows that Plaintiff has satisfied the third prong of her prima

facie case as to this claim. Taylor's admission and Plaintiff's
speculation together do not establish any causal connection
between her complaints to her supervisors about racial
discrimination and her missed opportunity at Georgia-Pacific.
39
AO7ZA
(Rev. 02)

Thus, summary judgment as to Plaintiff's post-employment
retaliation claim is GRANTED.
III. Conclusion

Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
Counts I and III of Plaintiff's claims, Mercedes Benz's motion
for summary judgment as to those claims is DENIED. Furthermore,
summary judgment is DENIED for Counts II and IV, but only for
the allegations in those Counts that Mercedes Benz fired
Plaintiff because she made verbal complaints about racial
discrimination to her supervisors. Summary judgment is GRANTED
as to those allegations in Counts II and IV that Mercedes Benz
retaliated against Plaintiff because of her comments in the
written survey, and that Mercedes Benz retaliated against her by
making false statements to prospective employers.

SO ORDERED, this

26"

day of September, 2014.

q

~

LISA GODBEY W OD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AO 72A
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40