SPRIGGS v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Filing 88

ORDER granting in part as unopposed and otherwise granted Defendant's 64 Motion in Limine. Any party seeking to object to any portion of this Order must file written Objections NO LATER THAN FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER THE ENTERY OF THIS ORDER UPON THE DOCKET AND ORDER OF THIS CASE. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 8/21/2015. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

LATANYA SPRIGGS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13-cv-51

v.
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mercedes Benz USA, LLC’s (“Defendant”)
Motion in Limine. (Doc. 64.) Plaintiff filed a Response. (Doc. 75.) Defendant filed a Reply, as
supplemented.

(Docs. 79, 85.)

For the reasons which follow, Defendant’s Motion is

GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Latanya Spriggs (“Plaintiff”) began working at Defendant’s Vehicle Processing
Center (“VPC”) in Belcamp, Maryland, in October 1999. Plaintiff applied for a transfer to the
VPC in Brunswick, Georgia, as a Parts Person. Plaintiff was hired for this position over other
applicants, and began working at the Brunswick VPC on January 4, 2010. (Doc. 51, p. 2.)
Plaintiff, who is black, asserts that her managers began treating her in a discriminatory manner
vis-à-vis the white employees shortly after she began working at the VPC in Brunswick.
(Doc. 1, p. 3.)

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts management refused to listen to her ideas or

suggestions at management meetings, where she was the only black employee present. Plaintiff
contends her supervisors did not respond to her emails and refused to communicate with her

regarding the performance of her job. (Id.) Plaintiff avers her supervisors made comments about
her work attire being inappropriate, made false accusations against her regarding her interactions
with her co-workers, and made “snide” comments about her husband, who also worked at the
VPC in Brunswick. According to Plaintiff, these actions were taken because of her race.
Plaintiff alleges she verbally complained about the treatment she received to her supervisor,
Charles Taylor, yet the treatment continued. (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff states Defendant fired her on
November 23, 2010, without cause and replaced her with a white male. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff
filed a charge of discrimination, as amended, with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) based on her contentions Defendant discriminated against her because of
her race and had retaliated against her for her complaints about her treatment.
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.,
(“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and alleged in her four (4) count Complaint that Defendant:
treated her differently than similarly situated white employees (Count I); retaliated against her by
terminating her because she objected to and complained about racial discrimination and by
providing false or misleading information to prospective employers (Counts II and IV); and
intentionally discriminated against her due to her race (Count III). 1 (Doc. 1.)
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 34), to which Plaintiff filed a
Response, (doc. 39.) Chief Judge Lisa Godbey Wood granted Defendant’s Motion in part and
denied it in part. (Doc. 51.) Chief Judge Wood denied Defendant’s Motion on Counts I and III
and the portions of Counts II and IV in which Plaintiff stated Defendant retaliated against her
based on her verbal complaints about workplace discrimination. Chief Judge Wood granted
Defendant’s Motion on Counts II and IV as to those portions in which Plaintiff alleged
1

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and this
cause of action was transferred to this Court after Defendant’s motion to transfer venue was granted by
the New Jersey court. (Docs. 7, 12.)

2

Defendant retaliated against her based on her written complaints and by making false statements
about her to prospective employers. (Id. at p. 2.)
Chief Judge Wood specifically found that, although Plaintiff did not present evidence of
similarly situated white employees (or comparators) who were treated differently than she was,
Plaintiff did present circumstantial evidence which would allow the trier of fact to determine
whether Defendant discriminated against her based on her race. (Id. at p. 31.) Chief Judge
Wood determined Plaintiff’s allegation that she was terminated as a retaliatory measure based on
her written survey failed because management did not receive the results of this survey “until the
first quarter of the following year after Plaintiff’s termination.” (Id. at p. 37.) Chief Judge Wood
also determined Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her claim that Defendant retaliated
against her by making false accusations against her to prospective employers. (Id. at p. 39.)
However, Chief Judge Wood found Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims that she was retaliated against by being fired based on her verbal complaints of
racial discrimination. (Id. at p. 38.) Thus, Plaintiff’s contentions that Defendant discriminated
against her based on her race and that Defendant retaliated against her after she made verbal
complaints about alleged racial discrimination by terminating her are the claims remaining
before the Court.
With its Motion in Limine, Defendant seeks to exclude from the trial of this case
evidence and argument related to any written comments Plaintiff made in the November 2010
survey, alleged retaliation relating to post-termination conversations Defendant may have had
with potential future employers, and comparators. (Doc. 64, p. 1.) The Court’s ruling on each of
these matters follows.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Argument and Evidence Relating to Alleged Retaliation Based on Plaintiff’s Written
Comments in the November 2010 Survey
Defendant asserts the Court has dismissed the portion of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim

based on her written comments, and accordingly, this Court should exclude evidence or
argument relating to Plaintiff’s allegation Defendant terminated her employment for the
comments she made in the November 2010 written survey. Defendant maintains any evidence or
argument as to this claim is not relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claims and would confuse or
mislead the jury. Defendants states the Court should exclude these specific categories of trial,
affidavit, or deposition testimony and documentary evidence which relate to Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim based on this survey: 1) Plaintiff’s complaints of racial discrimination found in
her responses to the November 2010 survey; 2) who administered the survey and how it was
administered; 3) whether Plaintiff’s written survey complaints mirrored or were similar to other
complaints she made to management; 4) any complaints Plaintiff made that management was
using Performance Management Plans (“PMPs”) against employees, as Plaintiff testified the
only complaints she ever made about the PMPs were in the written survey; 5) any complaints of
race discrimination or the need for diversity training by any employees on this survey; 6) the
proximity in time between the administration of this survey and Defendant’s decision to
terminate Plaintiff; and 7) whether Plaintiff’s handwriting is “distinct and recognizable”. (Id. at
p. 3.)
Plaintiff responds that Defendant “seeks the exclusion of an extraordinarily broad range
of evidence,” which disregards uses of this testimony regarding the survey in other ways. 2

2

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s Motion “to the extent that testimony is excluded based upon the
Court’s” Order on Defendant’s summary judgment motion that Plaintiff’s termination was not causally
linked to this survey. (Doc. 75, p. 2.)

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(Doc. 75, p. 2.) Plaintiff asserts this evidence is relevant to a claim of discriminatory hostile
work environment, which must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Plaintiff
avers the statements she made in the written survey show her then-existing state of mind that she
was working in a discriminatory environment. Plaintiff asserts she can testify as to what is in the
survey which is reflective of her state of mind, but she does not seek the admission of the
completed survey into evidence.

Plaintiff states she can provide testimony regarding her

perception of the workplace at the time she completed this survey and her attempts to raise issues
of discrimination and remedies in this survey, which would be relevant, admissible testimony.
As a general rule, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Nevertheless, relevant evidence may be excluded
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Here, any evidence pertaining to the written survey conducted in November 2010 is not
relevant to the issues remaining for the jury’s determination. As noted above, Chief Judge
Wood’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment effectively prevents the
presentation of evidence relating to this survey. Plaintiff cited to her written responses to this
November 2010 survey as a reason underlying her claim that Defendant’s decision to terminate
her was retaliatory in nature. However, Chief Judge Wood considered this assertion and found:
“Plaintiff’s allegation that she was terminated for complaining of unlawful employment practices
in the written survey fails because she cannot satisfy the causation requirement if her prima facie

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case as it relates to that allegation.” (Doc. 51, p. 37.) Thus, this evidence has been rejected
previously and is not relevant to the remaining issues before the Court.
Even if this evidence were relevant, it nonetheless would be inadmissible because any
presentation of evidence relating to this written survey has the potential to confuse the issues
before the jury. While Plaintiff’s claim that she was terminated as retaliation for engaging in
protected speech remains a viable claim for the jury’s consideration, the sole basis for this claim
is that Plaintiff made verbal complaints about racial discrimination, not that she made written
comments.
This portion of Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff is precluded from
presenting any evidence pertaining to the November 2010 written survey. 3
II.

Evidence and Argument Related to any Alleged Retaliation due to Defendant’s PostTermination Conversations with Potential Future Employers
Defendant contends this Court also rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant retaliated

against her by having conversations with prospective employers, which allegedly resulted in
Plaintiff not getting a job with Georgia Pacific. As with the evidence relating to the survey,
Defendant contends evidence relating to its alleged efforts to sabotage Plaintiff’s posttermination employment efforts should be excluded as irrelevant and likely to confuse and
mislead the jury. (Doc. 64, p. 4.) Defendant urges the Court to exclude any trial, affidavit, or
deposition testimony relating to these specific categories of evidence: 1) Defendant’s policies
regarding employment references; 2) how Defendant handled reference requests about
Plaintiff; 3) whether reference requests about Plaintiff were handled consistently with its policy

3

This ruling is in no way intended to prevent Plaintiff from presenting evidence that she was terminated
as retaliation based on her verbal complaints as to her belief that racial discrimination existed at the VPC
in Brunswick.

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or practice; and 4) what managers may have told prospective employers about Plaintiff’s
employment status or performance. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims she is not seeking “to generally admit evidence of post-termination
retaliation.”

(Doc. 75, p. 4.)

Plaintiff also claims she does not object to the limitations

Defendant seeks on the use of statements and evidence of post-termination retaliation, as long as
Defendant does not open the door to such evidence by asking Plaintiff about the specifics of her
Amended EEOC Charge. Plaintiff asserts that, if Defendant uses the Amended EEOC Charge at
trial, she should have the ability to present evidence regarding her good faith belief that
Defendant retaliated against her after she was fired. 4
This portion of Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as unopposed at this time. The Court
notes Defendant’s assertion that it has no intention of opening the door to any evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s post-termination retaliation claim based on the specifics of her Amended EEOC
Charge. In the event Defendant does open the door to this evidence, Plaintiff can then voice any
objection to Defendant’s presentation of this evidence or she can ask questions and present
testimony regarding Defendant’s alleged post-termination retaliation actions against her.
III.

Comparator Evidence and Argument
Defendant alleges that, although the Court found Plaintiff could proceed to trial on her

discrimination claim, it did so on a limited basis. Defendant maintains that the Court rejected
Plaintiff’s use of comparator evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated
white employees and stated Plaintiff “‘either misrepresents the record entirely or relies on
comparators who are not similarly situated to her.’” (Doc. 64, p. 5) (quoting Doc. 51, p. 29.)

4

Plaintiff avers she does not plan to use the Amended EEOC Charge at trial and would agree to
Defendant withdrawing the Charge as a joint exhibit. (Doc. 75, p. 5 n.2.) If the parties wish to withdraw
this Charge as a joint exhibit, they are free to do so but must notify the Court of this withdrawal prior to
the trial of this case.

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Defendant also maintains the Court viewed Plaintiff’s proffered comparator evidence as “‘easily
dismissed as routine disciplinary measures or, at most, common rudeness in the workplace.’”
(Id.) (quoting Doc. 51, p. 33.) Defendant notes the Court determined Defendant failed to
establish a lack of a disputed issue on a material fact as to the “convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence” standard. (Id.) However, Defendant asserts, the only contention this
Court found raised a “‘possible inference of discrimination’” is Plaintiff’s assertion that Charles
Taylor, her supervisor, told Plaintiff Richard Whitmore and Richard Gerhart did not like her
because of her race. (Id. at p. 6) (quoting Doc. 51, p. 32.) Based on this Court’s ruling,
Defendant contends the following allegations of differential and discriminatory treatment should
be excluded: 1) management’s alleged refusal to listen to Plaintiff’s ideas during management
meetings; 2) management’s alleged failure to respond to emails or to otherwise communicate
with Plaintiff regarding issues pertinent to her job function; 3) alleged comments about
Plaintiff’s work attire, her husband working at the VPC in Brunswick, and interactions with other
Brunswick VPC employees; 4) alleged opportunities management gave to white employees to
improve upon performance and behavioral issues which were not afforded to Plaintiff; and 5)
management’s alleged failure to discipline white employees with equally serious “behavioral”
issues as Plaintiff’s. (Id. at p. 5.) Defendant avers this evidence should be excluded as irrelevant
to the issues remaining before the Court and would confuse and mislead the jury.
Plaintiff maintains she is entitled to present evidence of the work environment she was
subjected to in its totality so that the jury can consider whether a discriminatory environment
existed. Plaintiff contends the incidents Defendant seeks to exclude are part of her harassment 5

5

Plaintiff averred she “has not asserted a separate claim for either ‘harassment’ or hostile work
environment based on race under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” (Doc. 39, p. 3, n.3) (citing Compl.,
¶¶ 31–35, 41–47.) Defendant notes Plaintiff failed to set forth any harassment or hostile work
environment claim in her portion of the Pre-Trial Order, (doc. 54, p. 5), and cannot modify the Pre-Trial

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and discrimination evidence which leads to an inference of unlawful discrimination, if the jury
were to believe evidence relating to these incidents. Plaintiff also contends the Court cannot
weigh evidence or pigeonhole it as being related to only one type of claim, which seems to be
Defendant’s goal. Plaintiff asserts the jury can consider evidence relating to the discrimination
claim, such as management’s refusal to listen to her ideas during meetings or its failure to
respond to her emails or otherwise communicate with her regarding job function issues. Plaintiff
maintains this is certainly true in light of Mr. Taylor’s alleged statement that Mr. Whitmore and
Mr. Gerhart did not like her because she is black.
Chief Judge Wood ruled that Plaintiff, in attempting to identify white employees who
were treated differently than she was, “either misrepresents the record entirely or relies on
comparators [i.e., similarly situated employees] who are not similarly situated to her.” (Doc. 51,
p. 29.) Judge Wood specifically rejected Plaintiff’s comparator examples of white employees
being given the opportunity to be aware of and to improve their performance and behavioral
issues and two white employees who were not disciplined for their “equally serious behavioral
issues”. (Id. at pp. 29–31.) Consequently, Plaintiff cannot present evidence to the jury that she
was treated differently than similarly situated white employees, and the allegations enumerated
at Numbers 4 and 5 of this section clearly are excluded by the Court’s Order on Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Plaintiff may not present evidence regarding
comments about spouses working together, Plaintiff’s interactions with other employees, and her
work attire, (allegation enumerated as Number 3), as such evidence is clearly excluded based on
Chief Judge Wood’s Order. (Id. at p. 32) (finding Plaintiff’s “allegations do not give rise to an
inference of discrimination (e.g., there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s contention that

Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e). (Doc. 79, p. 5) (“Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(e) dictates that the pretrial order can only be modified ‘to prevent manifest injustice.’”.)

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Whitmore’s comment about spouses working together was racial in nature, and McIntyre’s
alleged false accusations do not create such an inference of discrimination by a decisionmaker
because she was not a manager over Plaintiff).”); (id. at p. 33) (“[T]he rest of Plaintiff’s
proffered examples of discrimination are easily dismissed as routine disciplinary measures or, at
most, common rudeness in the workplace[.]”.)

This portion of Defendant’s Motion is

GRANTED.
However, the remaining two (2) enumerated allegations Defendant seeks to exclude are
not so easily characterized as inadmissible. While Plaintiff’s assertions that management did not
listen to her ideas during meetings and did not communicate with her about her job functions
may fall under the “common rudeness in the workplace”, (doc. 51, p. 33), umbrella Chief Judge
Wood described, such is not clear based on Chief Judge Wood’s Order. To the extent these
allegations fall under this umbrella, evidence relating to these allegations would be inadmissible
at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 401 & 403. Therefore, Plaintiff would, of course, not be permitted to
present evidence regarding these allegations that management treated white employees
differently than they treated her. 6 This portion of Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion in Limine, (doc. 64), is GRANTED
IN PART AS UNOPPOSED and otherwise GRANTED. Plaintiff shall not present testimony
or evidence related to inadmissible testimony and evidence, as outlined in this Order. Because
this case is set for trial on Tuesday, September 1, 2015, an expedited period for Objections is
required. Therefore, any party seeking to object to any portion of this Order must file written

6

If these allegations do not fall within the “workplace rudeness” category, it can be gleaned that Chief
Judge Wood considered these allegations to evidence concerning Plaintiff’s comparator arguments.
(Doc. 51, pp. 4–5.)

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Objections no later than five (5) days after the entry of this Order upon the docket and
record of this case.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of August, 2015.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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