SPRIGGS v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Filing 98

ORDER sustaining 94 Plaintiff's Objections to the 88 Magistrate Judge's Order. Plaintiff's Objection are SUSTAINED to the extent she intends to offer evidence of the Enumerated Allegations to prove her claims of discrimination. The remainder of the Magistrate Judge's Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine shall remain the order of the Court. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/6/2015. (csr)

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LATANYA SPRIGGS,
Plaintiff,
V.

MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV213-051

ORDER

In this employment discrimination action, the Magistrate
Judge issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion in Limine to
exclude certain evidence at trial. Dkt. No. 88. Plaintiff has
now filed limited Objections to that Order, dkt. no. 94, and
Defendant has filed a Response, dkt. no. 95. In these
pleadings, the parties raise evidentiary arguments not
specifically raised by Defendant's Motion in Limine, and,
therefore, not addressed in the Magistrate Judge's Order.
However, these arguments pertain to the same evidence addressed
by the Magistrate Judge's Order. Furthermore, it is in the
interest of judicial efficiency to resolve the parties' disputes
now rather than in the midst of trial. Therefore, the Court
addresses the parties' arguments, and for the reasons set forth

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below, SUSTAINS Plaintiff's Objections. The Magistrate Judge's
Order is amended as follows.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Latanya Spriggs ("Plaintiff") began working at
Defendant's Vehicle Processing Center ("VPC") in Belcamp,
Maryland, in October 1999. Plaintiff applied for a transfer to
the VPC in Brunswick, Georgia, as a Parts Person. Plaintiff was
hired for this position over other applicants and began working
at the Brunswick VPC on January 4, 2010. Dkt. No. 51, p. 2.
Plaintiff, who is black, asserted in her Complaint that her
managers began treating her in a discriminatory manner as
compared to the white employees shortly after she began working
at the VPC in Brunswick. Dkt. No. 1, p. 3. Specifically,
Plaintiff asserted management refused to listen to her ideas or
suggestions at management meetings, where she was the only black
employee present. Plaintiff contended her supervisors did not
respond to her emails and refused to communicate with her
regarding the performance of her job. Id. Plaintiff averred
her supervisors made comments about her work attire being
inappropriate, made false accusations against her regarding her
interactions with her co-workers, and made "snide" comments

about her husband, who also worked at the VPC in Brunswick.
According to Plaintiff, these actions were taken because of
her race. Plaintiff alleged she verbally complained about the
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treatment she received to her supervisor, Charles Taylor, yet
the treatment continued. Id. at

p. 4. Plaintiff stated

Defendant fired her on November 23, 2010, without cause and
replaced her with a white male. Id. at P. 5. Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination, as amended, with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based on her contentions that
Defendant discriminated against her because of her race and had
retaliated against her for her complaints about her allegedly
discriminatory treatment.
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against Defendant
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.,

("Title VII") and 42

U.S.C. § 1981 and alleged in her four (4) count Complaint that
Defendant: treated her differently than similarly situated white
employees (Count I); retaliated against her by terminating her
because she objected to and complained about racial
discrimination and by providing false or misleading information
to prospective employers (Counts II and IV); and intentionally
discriminated against her due to her race (Count III). Dkt.
No. 1.
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 34,
to which Plaintiff filed a Response. Dkt. No. 39. The Court
granted Defendant's Motion in part and denied it in part. Dkt.
No. 51. Specifically, the Court denied Defendant's ["lotion on
Counts I and III and the portions of Counts II and IV in which
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Plaintiff stated Defendant retaliated against her based on her
verbal complaints about workplace discrimination. The Court
granted Defendant's Motion on Counts II and IV as to those
portions in which Plaintiff alleged Defendant retaliated against
her based on her written complaints and by making false
statements about her to prospective employers. Id. at p. 2.
In its summary judgment ruling, the Court found that,
although Plaintiff did not present evidence of similarly
situated white employees (or comparators) who were treated
differently than she was, Plaintiff did present circumstantial
evidence which would allow the trier of fact to determine
whether Defendant discriminated against her based on her race.
Id. at p. 31. Specifically, the Court held that evidence that
Plaintiff's direct supervisor, Charles Taylor, told Plaintiff
that two other managers who were involved in her termination did
not like her because she was black, "taints the trio's decision
to terminate Plaintiff with a possible inference of
discrimination." Id. at p. 32. The Court found that
Plaintiff's claims that Defendant fired her in retaliation for
her verbal complaints of racial discrimination survived summary
judgment. Id. at p. 38.
However, the Court determined Plaintiff's allegation that
she was terminated as a retaliatory measure based on her written
survey failed because management did not receive the results of
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this survey "until the first quarter of the following year after
Plaintiff's termination." Id. at p. 37. The Court also
determined Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her
claim that Defendant retaliated against her by making false
accusations against her to prospective employers. Id. at p. 39.
Thus, Plaintiff's claims that Defendant discriminated against
her based on her race and that Defendant retaliated against her
after she made verbal complaints about racial discrimination
remain before the Court.
In light of the Court's ruling on its Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine seeking the
exclusion of various categories of evidence and testimony during
the trial of this case. Dkt. No. 64. Plaintiff filed a
Response to Defendant's Motion, dkt. no. 75, and Defendant filed
a Reply, as supplemented. Dkt. Nos. 79, 85. The Magistrate
Judge issued an Order on August 21, 2015, granting Defendant's
Motion. Dkt. No. 88. Plaintiff filed limited Objections to the
Magistrate Judge's Order. The Court now addresses those
Objections.
DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not object to the
majority of the Magistrate Judge's Order. Specifically,
Plaintiff has not taken any issue with the Magistrate Judge's
exclusion of the following categories of evidence:
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1) Plaintiff's written comments in the November 2010 survey dkt.
no. 88, PP. 4-6; 2) Defendant's post-termination conversations
with potential future employers, id. at pp. 6-7; 3) alleged
comments about Plaintiff's work attire, her husband working at
the VPC in Brunswick, and interactions with other Brunswick VPC
employees, id. at pp. 7-10; 4) alleged opportunities management
gave to white employees to improve upon performance and
behavioral issues which were not afforded to Plaintiff, id.;
and 5) management's alleged failure to discipline white
employees with equally serious "behavioral" issues as
Plaintiff's, id. As Plaintiff has not called those rulings into
question, the Magistrate Judge's rulings on these matters will
remain the Order of the Court, and nothing in this Order should
be construed to disturb the resolution of those issues.
However, Plaintiff does object to the Magistrate Judge's
Order "to the extent it excludes evidence relating to Defendant
concerning: 1) Management's alleged refusal to listen to
Plaintiff's ideas during management meetings; and
2) Management's alleged failure to respond to emails or to
otherwise communicate with Plaintiff regarding issues pertinent
to her job function." Dkt. No. 94, p. 1. Defendant's Motion in
Limine sought to exclude these areas of evidence as "comparator
' In the Objections and Response thereto, the parties refer to these
two categories as the "Enumerated Allegations." The court uses that
same designation herein.
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evidence" based on the Court's summary judgment Order. Dkt.
No. 64, pp. 4-6. As the Magistrate Judge noted, these
Enumerated Allegations "are not so easily characterized as
inadmissible." Dkt. No. 88, P. 10. However, the Magistrate
Judge ultimately ruled that Plaintiff could not use this
evidence to show that she was treated differently than white
employees. Id.
In her Objections, Plaintiff does not seek to introduce
this evidence as comparator evidence. Rather, she maintains the
Enumerated Allegations are relevant to her claims of
discrimination, without reference to how other employees may
have been treated. Plaintiff emphasizes that the Court
"acknowledged that [her] case is based 'on a convincing mosaic
of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.'" Id. (quoting
Dkt. No. 51, P. 31). She contends the Court's summary judgment
Order "indicates the Enumerated Allegations were not considered
as comparator evidence[,]" nor were these Enumerated Allegations
included under the umbrella of common workplace rudeness. Id.
at p. 3(citing Dkt. No. 51, pp. 31-32). In addition, Plaintiff
alleges this evidence is relevant to her retaliation claim
because "these incidents are part of the protected activity
[she] engaged in when she complained to management[.]" Id. at
P. 5.
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In response to Plaintiff's Objections, Defendant argues
that the Enumerated Allegations should be excluded because they
constitute comparator evidence which the Court rejected in its
summary judgment Order. Dkt. No. 95, pp. 2-3. Defendant
contends that "the jury cannot consider the same evidence this
Court rejected and draw a different conclusion than this Court
did in its summary judgment order." Id. at P. 3. Additionally,
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's argument that the
Enumerated Allegations are part of her retaliation claims is
"nonsensical." Id. Lastly, Defendant asks that the Court
clarify that the only evidence Plaintiff is allowed to offer at
trial in support of her discrimination claims is Taylor's
comment that two other managers did not like her because she is
black. Id. at pp. 4-5.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district judge must consider a party's objections to a
magistrate judge's order on a pretrial matter. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b) (1) (A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). However, the district
judge may modify or set aside that order, and reconsider the
pretrial matter, only "where it has been shown that the
magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to
law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)

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II. WHETHER THE ENUMERATED ALLEGATIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE ON
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF RETALIATION

Plaintiff argues in her Objections that Management's
refusal to listen to her ideas during management meetings and
failure to respond to emails or to otherwise communicate with
her are "relevant to support the Plaintiff's protected activity,
an element of the Plaintiff's retaliation claims." Dkt. No. 94,
pp. 6-7. Defendant correctly points out that Plaintiff did not
advance this argument in response to its Motion in Limine. Dkt.
No. 95, p. 4. Ordinarily, the Court will not consider arguments
that are raised for the first time in Objections. However, in
fairness to Plaintiff, Defendant's Motion in Lirnine sought the
exclusion of this evidence to the extent it was offered as
"comparator evidence." Dkt. No. 64, pp. 4-7. Therefore,
neither the Plaintiff nor the Magistrate Judge addressed whether
this evidence was admissible as to Plaintiff's retaliation
claim. Additionally, Plaintiff has cited to this evidence as
part of her retaliation claim throughout this case.
Accordingly, the Court will address Plaintiff's arguments that
this evidence is relevant to her relation claims.
In the portion of its Summary Judgment Order discussing
retaliation, the Court noted that Plaintiff had verbally
communicated to management what she believed to be
discriminatory treatment. Dkt. No. 51, p. 8. The Court

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specifically stated that Plaintiff's areas of complaints
included treatment at staff meetings and a lack of
communication. Id. at pp. 4-5. The Court explained,
Plaintiff specifically expressed to Taylor her belief
that her race was the reason she was being treated
differently than white employees. Spriggs Dep. 170:58. While Plaintiff did not report her concerns to
human resources, she complained to Taylor 'on many,
many occasions.' Id. at 91:13-21; 92:9-11. Plaintiff
also complained to [Richard] Gerhart[, the VPC
Supervisor,] that she believed her treatment during
management meetings was based on her race. Id.
at 87:24-90:2.
Id. at p. 8.
Later in its Order, the Court assessed whether Plaintiff
could establish the following basic elements of a Title VII
retaliation claim: (1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a
materially adverse action; and (3) a causal relation between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Id. at p. 34 (citing
Butler v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th
Cir. 2008)). In that assessment, the Court reiterated that
Plaintiff "verbally complained to Gerhart that she was being
mistreated in the management meetings, and specifically told him
that she believed she was being treated differently because she
was black. Spriggs Dep. 87:24-90:2. She also claims that she
complained repeatedly about racial discrimination to Taylor.
Dkt. no. 1, 191:19-20." Id. at p. 36. The Court went on to
conclude that these verbal complaints established a prima facie

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case of retaliation due to protected speech, and that the
"evidence could reasonably support a finding that those managers
would want to terminate her if she began to complain about the
racial discrimination she suffered at their hands." Id. at
pp. 37-38.
As this analysis from the Court's summary judgment Order
bears out, management's alleged refusal to listen to Plaintiff
during management meetings and their alleged failure to
communicate with her are inextricably intertwined with her
retaliation claims. This alleged mistreatment was the substance
of her complaints, and those complaints are the heart of her
claims of retaliation. Put another way, the Court has already
ruled that the jury will determine whether Plaintiff was
terminated for protected speech, and, in order to do so, the
jury must hear the substance of that speech.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's objections are

SUSTAINED to

the extent she intends to offer evidence of the Enumerated
Allegations to prove her claims of retaliation. Plaintiff will
be allowed to introduce evidence that she complained that
members of management refused to listen to her ideas during
management meetings and failed to respond to emails or to
otherwise communicate with her, and that she complained that
such alleged mistreatment was racially motivated.

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III. WHETHER THE ENUMERATED ALLEGATIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE ON
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION.

In its Motion in Limine, Defendant argued that the
Enumerated Allegations could not be offered as "comparator
evidence." Dkt. No. 64, pp. 6-7. Defendant specifically
maintained that "the introduction of any comparator evidence
(i.e.[,] allegedly differential and discriminatory treatment
between Plaintiff and others) is not relevant to Plaintiff's
remaining claims and would confuse and mislead the jury if
introduced." Id. at P. 6. Indeed, in its summary judgment
ruling, the Court rejected Plaintiff's attempt to establish
discrimination by arguing that white employees were given
different treatment than her. Dkt. No. 59, pp. 29-31. Thus,
the Magistrate Judge correctly ruled that Plaintiff would "not
be permitted to present these allegations that management
treated white employees differently than they treated her."
Dkt. No. 88, p. 10.
However, in their pleadings following the Magistrate
Judge's Order, the parties raise a different issue: whether the
Enumerated Allegations can be presented not as comparator
evidence but as to part of the "mosaic of circumstantial
evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decisionmaker." Dkt. No. 51, p. 31
(quoting Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328

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(11th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff argues that "the jury should be
allowed to weigh this evidence against other evidence when
deciding the case, since the Enumerated Allegations are relevant
to Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, without reference to
how other employees may have been treated." Dkt. No. 94, p. 5.
For its part, Defendant contends that the Court's summary
judgment Order precludes Plaintiff from offering the Enumerated
Allegations for this purpose. Defendant argues that, "this
Court held that the Enumerated Allegations 'do not give rise to
an inference of discrimination' as a matter of law." Dkt.
No. 95, p. 3 (quoting Dkt. No. 51, pp. 31-32). Defendant takes
the additional step of asking the Court to "clarify that the
only circumstantial evidence Plaintiff can introduce at trial to
establish a discriminatory motive is Taylor's comment to
Plaintiff that Whitmore and Gerhart did not like her because she
is black. "2 Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff contends that the jury
should hear only evidence as to Taylor's comment because this
comment is the only circumstantial evidence of discrimination
cited by the Court in its summary judgment Order. Id. at p. 45.
Defendant overstates the evidentiary impact of the Court's
Order on summary judgment. In that ruling, the Court noted that
2

Defendant did not specifically request this relief in its Motion in Limine.
However, the Court will address this issue at this stage because this request
is related to the issues raised by the Motion in Limine, and judicial
efficiency warrants resolving this request before trial.
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"Plaintiff has enumerated several instances of alleged
discrimination throughout her complaint and deposition." Dkt.
No. 51, P. 31. After noting that "most of these allegations do
not give rise to an inference of discrimination", the Court
cited two examples of such unavailing allegations. Id. at
pp. 31-32. The Court explained that Plaintiff had failed to
prove that manager Richard Whitmore's comment about spouses
working together was racially motivated. Id. at p. 32.
Additionally, the Court reasoned that accusations levied by coworker Jon McIntyre could not support an inference of
discrimination because McIntyre was not a manager over
Plaintiff. Id.
In contrast, the Court never specifically addressed whether
Plaintiff's managers' alleged refusal to listen to her during
management meetings or their failure to communicate with her
could support an inference of discrimination. Rather, the Court
focused on Taylor's statement that Whitmore and Gerhart were
mistreating Plaintiff and did not like her because she is black.
Id. at P. 33. The Court held that " -[e]ven if the rest of
Plaintiff's proffered examples of discrimination are easily
dismissed as routine disciplinary measures or, at most, common
rudeness in the workplace", Taylor's statement was enough for
Plaintiff to survive summary judgment. Id. (emphasis supplied).
As the phrase "even if" indicates, the Court needed not, and,
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therefore, did not, decide whether the Enumerated Allegations
could add to the mosaic of circumstantial evidence of
discrimination.
Defendant is correct that the Court only specifically cited
to Taylor's statement when finding that Plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. However, that
does not equate to a ruling that the comment "is the only
evidence that Plaintiff should be permitted to present to the
jury to prove her case", as Defendant contends. Dkt. No. 95,
p. 5 (emphasis in original). Defendant's argument to this end
conflates the judge's inquiry at summary judgment with the
jury's role at trial. Plaintiff should not be limited at trial
to only presenting that evidence that the Court cited in denying
summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, the inquiry is merely
whether there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute
as to a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Osborn v. Haley,
549 U.S. 225, 259 (2007) ("if the plaintiff provides sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment, the defendant must win the
case at trial"); Bussenius v. Bank of Am., N.A., 611 F. App'x
674 (11th Cir. 2015) ("the nonmoving party must make a showing
that is sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably find on his
behalf"). At the summary judgment stage, the Court's function
is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
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matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986).

Consequently, when holding that Plaintiff's

discrimination claims could survive summary judgment, the Court
did not need to describe all of the evidence supporting those
claims. Rather, the Court only cited a sufficient amount of
evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Put
simply, Taylor's comment was enough, and the Court did not need
to go further into the evidence. However, this does not
preclude Plaintiff from going further at trial.
Having concluded that the summary judgment Order did not
determine whether the Enumerated Allegations are admissible to
support Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, the Court now
turns to that question. In making this determination, the Court
is guided by the principle that the general test for the
admissibility of evidence is that relevant evidence is
admissible unless a constitutional, statutory, or other rule
specifically provides otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 402. "Evidence
is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R.
Civ. 401.

Unlike the accusations levied by co-worker Jon McIntyre,
management's alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff at meetings and
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the refusal to communicate with her describe actions taken by
Plaintiff's supervisors that were involved in the decision to
terminate her. Additionally, unlike manager Richard Whitmore's
comment about spouses working together, Plaintiff has some
evidence that the Enumerated Allegations were racially
motivated. As pointed out repeatedly above, Taylor allegedly
told Plaintiff that two of Plaintiff's managers were mistreating
her because she is black. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that
the Enumerated Allegations establish that the same managers who
decided to terminate her "failed to follow Defendant's own open
door communications policy" as to her. Dkt. No. 94, pp. 5-6.
The jury could find that this evidence, when combined with other
evidence in the case, supports Plaintiff's claims that these
managers were racially biased against her, and therefore, that
their decision to terminate her was racially motivated.'

As the Court noted in its summary judgment analysis of Plaintiff's
retaliation claim, Taylor's alleged statement "looms over much of the
evidence in this case." Dkt. No. 51, P. 38. If the jury believes
Plaintiff that management failed to listen to her at meetings and
failed to communicate with her, then the jury would be more likely to
believe that Taylor made this statement to Plaintiff.
To be clear, the Court does not find that a failure to follow a
communication policy, standing alone, is sufficient to create an
inference of discrimination. See Taleyarkhan v. Purdue Univ.,
No. 4:10 CV 39, 2014 WL 4905443, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2014)
("assuming that defendant violated its own policies in all of the ways
plaintiff claims, these facts would constitute the entirety of the
mosaic of circumstantial evidence in plaintiff's favor, and they do
not present a convincing one.") (citing, Guinto v. Exelon Gen. Co.,
LLC, 341 F. App'x 240, 247 (7th Cir. 2009) (failure of employer to
follow its own policies, without more, does not raise inference of
discrimination)); Kohut v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 09 C 4321,
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For these reasons, Plaintiff's objections are SUSTAINED to
the extent she intends to offer evidence of the Enumerated
Allegations to prove her claims of discrimination.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons and in the manner set forth above,
Plaintiff's Objections, dkt. no. 94, are SUSTAINED. To be
clear, Plaintiff will not be allowed to introduce evidence that
her white coworkers were treated differently than her as all
comparator evidence was excluded by the Magistrate Judge's
August 21, 2015, Order, and Plaintiff has not objected to the
exclusion of comparator evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff has
not asserted a separate claim for harassment or hostile work
environment and cannot add any such claim at this stage. 5
However, Plaintiff will be permitted to support her claims that
Defendant terminated her due to her race and in retaliation for
her protected speech with evidence that her managers refused to
listen to her ideas during management meetings and failed to
respond to emails or to otherwise communicate with her. The
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec.16, 2010) (same) . However,
given that the Court has already found that Plaintiff has sufficient
evidence to proceed on her discrimination claims, this evidence of
alleged mistreatment by her supervisors makes her claims of
discriminatory termination more likely.
2010 WL 5288172,

Plaintiff averred she "has not asserted a separate claim for either
'harassment' or hostile work environment based on race under Title VII
or 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Dkt. No. 39, p. 3, n.3 (citing Compi., ¶J 3135, 41-47.)
Additionally, Plaintiff did not set forth any harassment
or hostile work environment claim in her portion of the Pre-Trial
Order. Dkt. No. 54, p. 5.
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remainder of the Magistrate Judge's Order on Dfendant's Motion
in Limine shall remain the Order of the Cou.
SO ORDERED, this

(j'Jzy of Ocber, 2015.

LISA GODBFY-.WOQ-€TIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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