Robinson et al v. The State of Georgia et al

Filing 140

ORDER granting Plaintiff's 100 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lyde from the case; granting Attorney General's 111 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution; granting Atwood's 136 Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 5/20/2015. (ca)

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SCELIA ROBINSON and ZACK LYDE,
Plaintiffs,
CV 213-66

V.

THE STATE OF GEORGIA; AMITY
HOUSE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Scelia Robinson's
motion to drop Plaintiff Zack Lyde from the case (Dkt. no. 100),
Defendants Peggy Sorrells, Norris Smith, Frank Bonati, Clyde
Reese, Frank Berry, Chuck Pittman, Amanda Chapman, Vicki
Riggins, LaSharn Hughes, Bobby Cagle, Mary Skelton, Mike Beatty,
and David Cook's motion to dismiss (Dkt. no. 111), and Defendant
J. Alexander Atwood's motion to dismiss (Dkt. no. 136). For the
reasons stated below, all three motions are GRANTED.
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A full summary of this pro se action can be found in the
Court's previous Order of February 18, 2014, granting the
initial motions to dismiss made by several Defendants. Dkt. no.

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107. As detailed therein, Plaintiffs Scelia Robinson and Zack
Lyde filed their Complaint on May 6, 2013, and elected to amend
it the next month. Dkt. nos. 1, 6. In what the Eleventh Circuit
calls "shotgun fashion" the Complaint and its amendment touch on
more than 40 separate claims lodged against some 110 Defendants.
At the request of many Defendants and following the
directions the Eleventh Circuit has given to courts faced with
such shotgun pleadings, the Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiffs
to provide a more definite statement of their claims. Dkt. no.
74. Plaintiffs were given 20 days from August 20, 2013, to
identify which Defendants allegedly violated which rights. Id.
Instead of complying with the Magistrate Judge's Order, the
Plaintiffs asked for a grand jury investigation of the
Magistrate Judge. Dkt. no. 75.
Thereafter, several Defendants moved to dismiss the
Complaint. The Court granted one round of motions to dismiss on
February 18, 2014 (Dkt. no. 107), another on March 18, 2015
(Dkt. no. 135), and yet another on April 28, 2015 (Dkt.
no. 138). The Court considered the present motions in that most
recent Order (Dkt. no. 138). At that time, the Court noted that
the Plaintiffs had not responded to the Defendants' motions to
dismiss, nor had Plaintiff Lyde responded to Plaintiff
Robinson's motion to have him dropped from the case. Because the
Plaintiffs are before the Court pro se, this Court admonished
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them to respond to the motions and extended the deadline for
responses by three weeks. See Dkt. no. 138,

pp. 12-13. Despite

the Court's willingness to provide Plaintiffs ample time and
opportunity to respond to these motions, they have not done so.
This failure alone is enough to grant Defendants' motions to
dismiss and Plaintiff Robinson's motion to drop Plaintiff Lyde
from the case, but those motions are also due to be granted on
their merits.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff Robinson's "Second Request for a Motion to amend
and Have Co-Plaintiff Zack Lyde Removed from Case CV 213066"

Plaintiff Robinson's November 12, 2013 motion requests that
the Court appoint counsel and remove Plaintiff Lyde from the
case. Dkt. no. 100. Plaintiff's request for appointed counsel
was denied in the Court's April 28 Order, but the Court afforded
Plaintiff Lyde the opportunity to respond to Plaintiff
Robinson's request to have him dropped from the case. Dkt.
no. 138, p. 5-6. Plaintiff Lyde has not opposed that request.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21,

"[o]n motion or

on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or
drop a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. As discussed in the April 28
Order, Plaintiff Robinson appears to argue that Plaintiff Lyde
should be dropped from the case because he has no real interest
in the case and thus is present only by misjoinder. See Dkt.
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no. 100, PP. 2-4. Indeed, this Court has previously noted that
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege any specific harm to
Plaintiff Lyde. Dkt. no. 107, p. 3. By Plaintiff Robinson's
account, she named Lyde as a Plaintiff because he told her it
was necessary for him to be a named co-plaintiff if he were to
successfully represent her in this suit. Dkt. no. 100, p. 7.
However, Lyde is not an attorney.
Plaintiff Lyde has no interest in this case. The Complaint
does not allege that he suffered any harm, and he cannot legally
represent Plaintiff Robinson in this matter. Furthermore, he has
not opposed Plaintiff's request. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 21,
this Court finds that Plaintiff Lyde should be dropped from the
case and GRANTS Plaintiff Robinson's motion in that regard.
II. The Motions to Dismiss

Peggy Sorrells and the other Defendants represented by the
Georgia Attorney General (the "AG Defendants") have filed a
motion to dismiss for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute pursuant
to Rule 41(b). Dkt. no. 111. Defendant Atwood brings his motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6). Dkt. no. 136.
a. The AG Defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss

As has been repeatedly noted by this Court and several of
the 110 Defendants Plaintiff named in her Complaint, the
Complaint is a quintessential "shotgun" pleading. The Complaint
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only connects a handful of Defendants to just a few of the 40
alleged claims, and even those connections are conclusory, at
best. The AG Defendants in particular argue that they are having
a hard time making heads or tails of the Complaint, which they
say 'is wholly unintelligible and fails to link any of the
claimed causes of action to any particular Defendant, making the
filing of a responsive pleading virtually impossible." Dkt.
no. 111-1, p. 2. For this reason, Defendants filed Motions for a
More Definite Statement on July 10 and 15, 2013 (Dkt. nos. 17,
36). As discussed above, the Magistrate Judge entered an Order
granting the Defendants' motions, directing that Plaintiff file
a more definite statement of her claims within 20 days of that
Order. Dkt. no. 74. Instead of complying with the Magistrate
Judge's Order (which Plaintiff acknowledged in her response),
Plaintiff asked for a grand jury investigation of the Magistrate
Judge. Dkt. no. 75. Plaintiff has yet to file a more definite
statement as directed by the Magistrate Judge.
If a plaintiff fails to prosecute a case or to comply with
a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any
claim against it pursuant to Rule 41(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Unless the court states otherwise, a Rule 41(b) dismissal
operates as an adjudication on the merits. Under this Court's
Local Rules, a case may be dismissed for want of prosecution for
"(b) Willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court;
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or

(C)

Any other failure to prosecute a civil action with

reasonable promptness." LR 41.1.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld Rule 41(b)
dismissals where the plaintiff failed to comply with an order to
amend his complaint to comport with Rule S's pleading
requirements. See Popham v. Cobb Cnty., 392 F. App'x 677, 680-81
(11th Cir. 2010) . Here, the Court plainly told Plaintiff what
she needed to do to bring her Complaint into compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. no. 74. Instead of
attempting to state which Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights
and which rights they violated, as she was instructed to do in
the Magistrate Judge's Order, Plaintiff simply demanded a grand
jury investigation. See Dkt. no. 75. Plaintiff was ordered to
provide a more definite statement, and she knowingly rejected
that Order. Without a more definite statement of her claims,
Defendants are not able to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. As
such, it is appropriate for the Court, under Rule 41(b) and
Local Rule 41.1, to GRANT the AG Defendant's motion to dismiss
the claims against them (Dkt. no. 111)
1,. Defendant Atwood's Motion to Dismiss

Defendant Atwood brings his motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6). Dkt. no. 136. When
ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6),
a district court must accept as true the facts as set forth in
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the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th
Cir. 2010). Although a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material
"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). At a minimum, a
complaint should "contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec.
Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
As previously noted, Plaintiff's Complaint is a
quintessential example of a shotgun pleading, which the Eleventh
Circuit has admonished for well over two decades. See Maqluta v.
Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th dr. 2001) (per curiam).
Plaintiff claims that "[a] suit is needed against the State of
Georgia[,] the case workers, family court judges, and district
lawyers, state and federal agencies, DHS and its providers,
hired attorneys, counselors, and medical personnel" for
"Judicial and Government accountability." Dkt. no. 1,

p. 8. As

this Court has observed in other Defendants' motions to dismiss,
the only specific allegations in the Complaint are against Glynn
County Juvenile Court, the State of Georgia, an unidentified
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DFCS worker, and Judge Rountree. See Dkt. no. 135,

P. 3 (citing

Compl., Dkt. no. 1; First Am. Compl., Dkt. no. 6). Beyond
conclusory assertions of legal violations, Plaintiff proffers no
averments showing a plausible claim for relief, under any of her
40-plus theories of liability. The Complaint gives no indication
of what, if anything, Defendant Atwood has done wrong. Even
under the liberal standard under which pro se complaints are
interpreted, the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are
conclusory, speculative, unspecific, and fall short of the
standard for alleging a plausible claim for relief. These fatal
flaws persist even after Plaintiff was under Court order to give
a more definite statement, and Plaintiff has twice declined
opportunities to respond to Defendant Atwood's motion. Defendant
Atwood's motion to dismiss (Dkt. no. 130) is GRANTED, and all of
Plaintiff's claims against him are dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION

The AG Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. no. 111) is
GRANTED; Defendant Atwood's motion to dismiss (Dkt. no. 136) is
GRANTED; and Plaintiff Robinson's motion to drop Plaintiff Lyde

from the case (Dkt. no. 100) is GRANTED.

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SO ORDERED,

this 20TH day of May, 2015.

LISA GODBEY W OD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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