Barnett v. Health Care Staffing, Inc. et al

Filing 65

ORDER granting 60 Motion for Bill of Costs. Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Bill of Costs are OVERRULED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to tax the following costs against Plaintiff: Fees paid for printed transcripts: $720.27; Fees paid for printing: $413.75 and Fees paid for making copies: $ $50.00. Total: $1,184.02. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/23/2015. (csr)

3Iit the Sniteb btatto flitritt Court
for the Soutbern flitrttt of 4eoria
runtuitk flthiion
ANTHONY D. BARNETT,

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Plaintiff,

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V.

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HEALTH CARE STAFFING, INC.;
GATEWAY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SERVICES; KRISTINE WALDRON;
VANESSA SHEARER; and CATHY
THOMPSON,
Defendants.

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CV 213-73

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ORDER

Presently before the Court is a Bill of

Costs filed by

Defendants Gateway Behavioral Health Services ("Gateway")
Vanessa Shearer, and Cathy Thompson (collectively,
"Defendants"). Dkt. No. 60.' Plaintiff Anthony D. Barnett
("Plaintiff") has filed Objections to the Bill of Costs (dkt.
no. 61), along with a supporting Affidavit (dkt. no. 64), and
Defendants have filed a Response thereto (dkt. no. 62). Upon
due consideration, Plaintiff's Objections (dkt. no. 61) are

As Defendants Health Care Staffing, Inc. and Kristine Waldron have
neither joined in the filing of the instant Bill of Costs nor
separately filed any motion to that end, any reference to "Defendants"
in this Order, as well as the ruling of the Court herein, are intended
to apply only to those Defendants presently moving for an award of
costs.

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OVERRULED, and Defendants' Bill of Costs (dkt. no. 60) is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the termination of Plaintiff's
employment at Gateway. Dkt. No. 9, ¶ 34-64. On May 22, 2013,
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in this Court, alleging
discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
in violation of federal and state law. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 9,

¶T 65-278. On March 30, 2015, the Court granted Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 37) on all claims. Dkt.
No. 58. The next day, the Clerk of Court entered final judgment
in favor of Defendants and closed this case. Dkt. No. 59.
On April 17, 2015, Defendants filed a Bill of Costs seeking

to tax $1,184.02 against Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 60. Specifically,
Defendants request reimbursement for the following expenses: (1)
[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts

necessarily obtained for use in the case" in the amount of
$70.27;

(2) "[f]ees and disbursements for printing" in the

amount of $413.75; and (3)

'[f]ees for exemplification and the

costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case" in the amount of
$50.00. Id. at p. 1. Attached to the Bill of Costs, Defendants
submitted an Affidavit of their counsel attesting to the truth
and accuracy of these expenses (dkt. no. 60-1), as well as a
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copy of an invoice from a court reporter for the transcriptionrelated expenses (dkt. no. 60-2).
On May 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed Objections to Defendants'
Bill of Costs. Dkt. No. 61. In his Objections, Plaintiff asks
the Court to consider his indigence in ruling on Defendants'
Bill of Costs. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff contends that while he
did not file this action in forma pauperis, he has since become
indigent due to his inability "to obtain employment [paying]
what he made working for [Gateway]." Id. at ¶ 3. In his
supporting Affidavit, Plaintiff explains that he did, in fact,
obtain other employment after his termination from Gateway, but
that he has since been laid off, denied unemployment benefits,
and not hired for any other nursing positions in the area. Dkt.
No. 64, $T 6, 8, 10, 12. Accordingly, Plaintiff attests that he
"do[es] not have the money to pay the costs requested by
Defendants." Id. at ¶ 15.
In their Response, filed May 7, 2015, Defendants maintain
that Plaintiff cannot be considered indigent, given that he
earned between $52,000 and $55,000 annually prior to his
termination from Gateway and $8 per hour in the position that he
obtained thereafter. Dkt. No. 62, pp. 1-2. Defendants further
emphasize that Plaintiff is a college graduate, former Air Force
officer, and registered nurse. Id. at p. 2. Based on these
circumstances, Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to
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demonstrate a true inability to pay, such that his financial
status should not be considered in awarding costs. Id. at p. 3.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (1) ("Rule 54(d) (1)")
provides that a court should award costs to a prevailing party
u]niess a federal statute, these rules, or a court order
provides otherwise." Rule 54(d) (1) thus "establishes a
presumption that costs are to be awarded to a prevailing party,
but vests the district court with discretion to decide
otherwise." Chapman v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1038 (11th
Cir. 2000)
The costs that are taxable against a nonprevailing party
are defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 ("Section 1920") as follows:
l) [flees of the clerk and marshal; (2) [flees for
printed or electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) [flees
and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4)
[flees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) [dlocket
fees under section 1923 of this title; [and] (6)
[c]ompensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services
under section 1828 of this title.
A court is bound by the limitations set forth in Section 1920
and, accordingly, may not tax costs not listed in that section,
absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to do so.
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445

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(1987). The burden lies with the nonprevailing party to
demonstrate that a requested cost is not taxable. Sensormatic

Elecs. Corp. v. Tag Co. US, No. 06-81105, 2009 WL 3208649, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d
600, 621 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Although a court has discretion not to award full costs to
the prevailing party, this discretion "is not unfettered."

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039 (citing Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351,
354-55 (11th Cir. 1995)) . Because Rule 54 (d) (1) creates a
presumption in favor of awarding costs, "the denial of costs is
in the nature of a penalty for some defection on [the prevailing

party's] part in the course of the litigation."
in original) (quoting Walters v.

Id. (alteration

Roadway Express, Inc., 557 F.2d

521, 526 (5th Cir. 1977)) . As such, to defeat this presumption
and deny full costs, a court "must have and state a sound basis
for doing so." Id. (citing Head, 62 F.3d at 354)
Relevant here is that "a non-prevailing party's financial
status is a factor that a district court may, but need not,
consider in its award of costs."

Id. Even so, the Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has determined that a court
should take this factor into account only in "rare
circumstances," because a "foundation of the legal system

[is]

that justice is administered to all equally, regardless of

wealth or status." Id. (quoting Cherry v. Champion Intl Corp.,

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186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999)). Thus, before a court may
consider the financial status of a nonprevailing party, "it
should require substantial documentation of true inability to
pay." lid. (requiring that there be "clear proof of the nonprevailing party's dire financial circumstances") . Moreover,
even where a court considers this factor, it nevertheless "may
not decline to award any costs at all." Id.
This case does not present the type of "rare circumstances"
contemplated by the Eleventh Circuit in Chapman. Plaintiff did
not file this case in forma pauperis, and even if he had, this
evidence alone would not establish his inability to pay
Defendants' costs. See Ang v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 417
App'x 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff's
affidavit and in forma pauperis status did not amount to
substantial evidence of an inability to pay). Moreover, the
record reflects that Plaintiff has held gainful employment—
earning up to $55,000 per year—in the recent past; has
qualifications and experiences that lend themselves to future

employment in nursing or another field; and is actively applying
for other nursing positions in the community. See Dkt. Nos. 62,
64. On this evidence, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff
demonstrates such dire financial circumstances so as to warrant
considering his financial status as a factor in awarding costs

to Defendants. Cf. Anderson v. Columbia Cty., No. CV112-031,

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2015 WL 1959083, at *2-3 (S.D. Ga. May 1, 2015) (finding
substantial documentation of the plaintiffs' inability to pay,

based on evidence that one plaintiff was a decedent's estate
with no assets, and the other an elderly woman receiving only
social security benefits going almost entirely to her long-term
care facility); Daughtry v. Army Fleet Support, LLC, No.
1:11CV153-MHT, 2014 WL 466109, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014)
(finding an inability to pay based on the plaintiff's affidavit
that he was unemployed, undergoing foreclosure proceedings,
lacked health insurance, and could not afford necessary
medication).
Turning to Defendants' Bill of Costs, it appears that
Defendants' expenses fall within the ambit of costs reimbursable
under Rule 54(d) (1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (1). Indeed,
Defendants request costs that are explicitly enumerated under
Section 1920: (1) $720.27 for costs relating to "[f]ees for
printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily

obtained for use in the case"; (2) $413.75 for "[f]ees and
disbursements for printing"; and (3) $50.00 for "[f]ees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials

where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case."
Dkt. No. 60, p. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)-(4). Moreover,
Defendants' requested costs appear to be accurate and
reasonable, based on the affidavit of their counsel and the

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invoice submitted therewith. See Dkt. Nos. 60-1 to -2.
Significantly, Plaintiff does not dispute the Bill of Costs on
these grounds. Thus, Defendants' Bill of Costs reflects the
amounts properly taxable to Plaintiff as the nonprevailing party
pursuant to Rule 54 (d) (1).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Objections to

Defendants' Bill of Costs (dkt. no. 61) are OVERRULED.
Defendants' Bill of Costs (dkt. no. 60) is GRANTED, and the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to tax the following costs against
Plaintiff:
Fees paid for printed transcripts:

$720.27

Fees paid for printing:

$413.75

Fees paid for making copies:
Total:

SO ORDERED,

$50.00
$1,184.02

this 23 day of October, 2015.

LISA GODBEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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