Kittles v. Health Care Staffing, Inc. et al
Filing
52
ORDER granting in part Shearer's 49 BILL OF COSTS. The Court awards Shearer two-thirds of her requested costs as Kittles' financial circumstances warrant a reduction the amount taxed. Accordingly, the Clerk is AURTHORIZED and DIRECTED to tax costs in the amount of $786.65 for Shearer's costs of litigation. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/6/2015. Modified on 11/6/2015 (ca).
n the uniteb 'tate flitritt Court
for the boutbern aitrict of georgia
jorunowick flibiIou
ERICA D. KITTLES,
Plaintiff,
V
CV 213-138
.
HEALTH CARE STAFFING, INC.,
VANESSA SHEARER, BONITA MIKEL,
and CINDY ACKERMAN,
Defendants.
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant Vanessa Shearer's
("Shearer") Bill of Costs. Dkt. No. 49. Upon due
consideration, Shearer's Bill of Costs is GRANTED in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2013, Plaintiff Erica Kitties ("Kitties")
filed a Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) against Defendants Shearer,
Health Care Staffing, Inc. ("HCS"), Bonita Mikel ("Mikel") and
Cindy Ackerman ("Ackerman"). Kitties alleged that Shearer—along
with HCS, Mikel, and Ackerman—deprived her of her rights and
privileges while conspiring against her, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). Shearer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. No. 29) on August 18, 2014. Following extensive briefing
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from the parties, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 47) on March 18, 2015.
Shortly thereafter, on April 17, 2015, Shearer filed a Bill
of Costs, requesting that Kitties pay certain Fees as the nonprevailing party in the lawsuit, namely:
Fees for service of summons and
(1)
or
Fees
for
printed
(2)
subpoena;
transcripts
recorded
electronically
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing; and
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs
of making copies of any materials where the
copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case.
Dkt. No. 49, p. 1. Counsel for Kitties objected to Shearer's
request, arguing that Kitties is indigent. Dkt. No. 50,
p. 3.
Counsel for Kitties avers that she did not have the money to pay
the initial filing fees in this case and that she does not
currently have the money to pay Shearer's requested costs. Id.
Now pending before the Court is Shearer's Bill of Costs (Dkt.
No. 49), which the Court GRANTS in part for the reasons set
forth below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that a court
should award costs to a prevailing party ''(u)nless a federal
statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (1). Rule (54)(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure thus creates a presumption of an award of costs
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to a prevailing party. Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,
1039 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) . The non-prevailing party,
however, bears the burden of demonstrating that a challenged
cost is not taxable. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp v. Tag Co., No.
06-81105, 2009 WL 3208649, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2009)
(citing E.E.O.C. v. W & 0, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 621 (11th Cir.
2000))
"[A] non-prevailing party's financial status is a factor
that a district court may, but need not, consider in its award
of costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039.
Although a court may consider the non-prevailing party's
financial circumstances, "a court may not decline to award any
costs at all." Id. Thus, to properly raise the issue of a
litigant's financial circumstances before the court, counsel
must provide the court with "substantial documentation of a true
inability to pay." Id. Conversely, to defeat the presumption
and deny costs on the basis of the litigant's inability to pay,
a district court "must give a reason for its denial of costs."
See Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 354 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis in original)); Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186
F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999). Notwithstanding the above, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that a court should only consider the
financial circumstances of a non-prevailing party in "rare
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circumstances" because a "foundation of the legal system [is]
that justice is administered to all equally, regardless of
wealth or status." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039 (internal
quotations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Shearer asks the Court to assess $1,171.58 in costs against
Kitties. This Court notes however, that Kitties is a litigant
who proceeded in forma pauperis ("IFP") during the course of
this litigation. See Dkt. No. 6. The Eleventh Circuit has held
that it is proper for a court to assess costs against an IFP
litigant. See Harris v. Forsyth, 742 F.2d 1277, 1277-78 (11th
Cir. 1984) (holding that appellate costs may be awarded under
Fed. R. App. P. 39 against an unsuccessful IFP litigant); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f) (1) ("Judgment may be rendered for costs
at the conclusion of the suit or action as in other
proceedings."). Notably, courts in this Circuit have provided
some relief for IFP litigants upon consideration of their
financial circumstances. See, e.g., Moreland v. Miller, No. 132-579, 2014 WL 2795473, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 29, 2014) (reducing
the costs for IFP litigants from $1,274.45 to $318.61 in
accordance with the court's prior reduction of their filing fee
by one fourth, from $400 to $100.); Daughtry v. Army Fleet
Support, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-153, 2014 WL 466109, at *3_4 (M.D.
Ala. Feb. 5, 2014) (awarding a reduction in costs from $20,000
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to $3,000 where the litigant submitted an affidavit explaining
that he is unemployed, that he faces homelessness due to the
initiation of foreclosure proceedings against him, and that he
is unable to purchase necessary medication because he lacks
health insurance); but see Washington v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc.,
No. 3:11-cv-29, 2012 WL 2192171, at *1 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2012)
(declining to tax costs against an IFP litigant where the court
waived the cost of the filing fee).
In determining whether Kitties has the ability to pay the
requested costs, this Court evaluates Kitties' financial
circumstances. See Dkt. No. 4. Kittles is currently employed
and she works at least forty hours per week, in addition to her
part-time employment. Dkt. No. 50, pp. 1-2; see also Dkt. No.
29-3, 33:6-35:7. A review of her IFP application reveals that
Kitties has a balance of approximately $1,180 after covering her
basic living expenses. Dkt. No. 4. This Court further notes
that Kittles supports herself and three children, two of whom
have reached the age of majority. This Court, in an Order dated
September 24, 2013, waived Kittles' court fees or costs due to
her financial status. Dkt. No. 6. While this Court empathizes
with Kittles' financial circumstances, it is clear that she is
not unable to pay a fraction of Shearer's requested costs.
Accordingly, an assessment of costs in the amount of $786.65
would serve the dual purpose of "provid[ing] deterrence both to
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[Plaintiffs] specifically and litigants generally regarding the
pursuit of non-meritorious cases," Daughtry, 2014 WL 466109, at
*4, and of awarding costs, as this Court must, in an amount
commensurate with her ability to pay.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Shearer's Bill of Costs
(Dkt. No. 49) is GRANTED in part.
The Court awards Shearer two-
thirds of her requested costs as Kitties' financial
circumstances warrant a reduction in the amount taxed.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is thus AUTHORIZED and DIRECTED
to tax costs in the amount of $786.65 for Shearer's costs of
litigation.
SO ORDERED, this 6TH day of November, 2015.
L..-
>0.
LISA GODBEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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