Plunkett v. Roundtree et al
Filing
64
ORDER granting 18 , 22 , 24 , 25 , 30 and 46 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Order granting 46 Motion for Joinder and denying as moot 48 Motion for Emergency Hearing. Plaintiff's 51 Motion to Object is denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to change the name of Judge M. Roundtree to Judge George M. Rountree upon the docket and record of this case. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 3/31/2015. (csr)
3 the 1initeb statto 33totrict court
for the boutbern flitrict of deorgta
38runibid Oibioton
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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JUDGE GEORGE M. ROUNTREE; CASA
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RICHARD JAMES; DEPARTMENT OF
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FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES;
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Investigator KRISTEN KEENE; Investigator
WALTER LEE; McCLARY BAKER; MARY *
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MACY; BRIThEY MERRIMAN;
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CHANSENETTE AMISON; SAAG JIM
CHAMBERLAIN; Director KRISTAL JONES; *
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Case Worker LARHONDA HARRIS; ANDY
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PRUITT; and LYNETTE GALLAGHER,
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Defendants.
LEE P. PLUNKETT,
CIVIL ACTION NO.:CV214-015
ORDER
This action arises out of child deprivation proceedings in
state juvenile court. The gravamen of Plaintiff's pro se
Complaint appears to be that her constitutional rights, as well
as state law, were violated in connection with the removal of
her two sons from her custody, the litigation in state court,
and the placement of her children in foster care. The many
named Defendants played some role in one or more of those
events: the Department of Family and Children Services ("DFCS");
Kristen Keene, a DFCS investigator; Walter Lee, another DFCS
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investigator; Andy Pruitt, a DFCS supervisor; Chansenette
Axnison, another DFCS supervisor; Larhonda Harris, a DFCS
caseworker; Kristal Jones, a DFCS director; Lynette Gallagher, a
City of Brunswick police officer; Mary Macy, another City of
Brunswick police officer;' Britney Merriman, a Glynn County
dispatcher; The Honorable George M. Rountree, a Glynn County
Juvenile Court Judge ;2 Jim Chamberlain, a Special Assistant
Attorney General ("SAAG"); Richard James, a Court Appointed
Special Advocate ("CASA"); and McClary Baker, a foster parent.
Dkt. No. 1, pp. 3 - 4; see also Dkt. No. 18, p. 2 & n.l; Dkt. No.
22, Ex. A, pp. 1-2; Dkt. No. 23, p. 1; Dkt. No. 44, p. 1.
Presently before the Court are Motions to Dismiss filed by
several Defendants, dkt. nos. 18, 22, 24-25, 30, 46, as well as
a Motion for Emergency Hearing filed by Plaintiff, dkt. no. 48.
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims against
those Defendants. Because it appears that Plaintiff cannot
proceed on her claims against the nonmoving Defendants, the
Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly,
While Plaintiff's Complaint contains a list of Defendants that does not
include Macy, the factual allegations repeatedly refer to a police officer
that appears to be Macy. See Dkt. No. 1, pp. 3-6, 11-12. Accordingly, the
Clerk of Court listed Many as a Defendant on the docket, and Plaintiff's
subsequent pleadings confirm her intention to name Macy as a Defendant to
this action. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 29, p. 1.
2
Plaintiff's Complaint correctly names "George M. Rountree," dkt. no. 1,
p. 4, yet this Defendant was docketed as "Judge George M. Roundtree." The
Clerk of Court is directed to change the name of said Defendant to "Judge
George M. Rountree" upon the docket and record of this case.
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Plaintiff's pending Motion for Emergency Hearing is DENIED as
moot.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
I. Proceedings in Juvenile Court
Scattered throughout Plaintiff's Complaint and responses to
the pending Motions to Dismiss are copies of various filings,
transcripts, and orders from the deprivation proceedings in the
Glynn County Juvenile Court ("Juvenile Court"). See, e.g., Dkt.
No. 1, pp. 40-51. Attempting to construe Plaintiff's pro se
pleadings liberally, the Court has pieced together the following
events occurring in the Juvenile court that give rise to the
instant dispute.
On March 28, 2013, DFCS filed a complaint against Plaintiff
in the Juvenile Court. Dkt. No. 37, pp. 8-9. The complaint
alleged that on March 26, 2013, Plaintiff neglected her two
children, S.F. and C.F., and that DFCS took custody of the
children. Id. at p. 8. The complaint explained that Plaintiff
had "a history of mental health issues, violent tendencies which
have led to police involvement, jail sentencing, and probation"
and refused to cooperate with DFCS's request for her medical
records. Id. at p. 9. As a result, DFCS determined that
While this Order dismisses Plaintiff's claims on grounds of lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, immunity, and other bars to suit below, the
Court nonetheless provides the following in-depth recitation of facts to make
clear that it has construed Plaintiff's pleadings liberally and combed
through her various submissions for any viable claims.
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Plaintiff was "unable to provide adequate supervision and
maintenance" for S.F. and C.F. and that the children "would not
be safe in her care." Id. Kristen Keene ("Keene") signed the
complaint as the investigating officer on behalf of DFCS. Id.
Upon DFCS's filing of the complaint, the Juvenile Court
held a detention hearing that same day before Judge George N.
Rountree ("Judge Rountree") . Dkt. No. 34, p. 5. Plaintiff
attended the detention hearing, along with her counsel at that
time and the putative father of the children, who are not
parties to the instant action. Id. Also present were Keene,
DFCS supervisor Andy Pruitt ("Pruitt"), and SAAG Jim Chamberlain
("Chamberlain") representing DFCS. Id. According to the
hearing transcript, the purpose of the detention hearing was to
determine whether there was probable cause to find that the
children were deprived. Id. Plaintiff stipulated that probable
cause existed, and Judge Rountree ordered that the children
remain in the custody of DFCS. Id.
At some point, a deprivation petition was filed, the date
and author of which are omitted from the record in this case.
Dkt. No. 1, p. 36. The petition set forth the same allegations
as the DFCS complaint and further recommended that "it is in the
best interest of the children and the public that this
proceeding be brought." Id.
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On April 11, 2013, Judge Rountree conducted an adjudicatory
hearing. Id. at p. 40. The participants again included
Plaintiff, her attorney, the putative father, Keene, and
Chamberlain, along with an additional DFCS employee not named in
the current action. Id. After hearing testimony from Keene,
the putative father, and Plaintiff, Rountree concluded, 'By
clear and convincing evidence I find[ ] these children deprived
and remain in the custody of the department." Id. at p. 50.
Rountree further ordered Plaintiff to have a psychiatric
evaluation and not to contact Keene or the children's foster
parents. Id. at pp. 50-51.
Plaintiff filed a "motion of reunification" on July 8,
2013. Id. at p. 53. Plaintiff moved the Juvenile Court to
return custody, expressing dissatisfaction with the removal of
her children, the petition, and the DFCS case plan that the
Juvenile Court approved for the children. Id. Plaintiff
emphasized her progress—not only in the case plan but also with
regard to church and her studies—and stated that she had learned
from the experience. Id.
On July 10, 2013, Judge Rountree held a hearing on several
matters, including a petition for custody filed by Pamela Capece
("Capece"), the children's grandmother ; 4 a motion to return
custody and an objection to case plan filed by Plaintiff; a
Plaintiff has not named Capece as a defendant in this action.
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motion to withdraw as attorney of record filed by Plaintiff's
counsel, dkt. no. 34, pp. 7, 16; and a sua sponte judicial
review of the case plan, dkt. no. 29, Ex. A, p. 4. In addition
to the regular participants, this hearing was attended by DFCS
caseworker Larhonda Harris ("Harris") as well as various other
attendees not named as defendants here: counsel for the putative
father, Capece and her counsel, Plaintiff's psychiatrist, and
the deacon of Plaintiff's church. Dkt. No. 34, p. 7.
At the hearing, Capece withdrew her petition for custody in
return for an agreement with DFCS allowing her visitation with
the children. Id. at p. 8. Judge Rountree heard testimony from
Plaintiff, her psychiatrist, and the deacon of her church and
denied Plaintiff's motion to return custody on the basis that
the case was not sufficiently developed for such a
determination. Id. at pp. 18-25. Judge Rountree also sustained
in part and overruled in part Plaintiff's objections to the case
plan, modifying the "cause of removal" to include only "mental
health and inadequate housing" and not "[s]ubstance abuse
treatment." Id. at pp. 12-16. In addition, Judge Rountree
granted Plaintiff's attorney's motion to withdraw, based on
their disagreements concerning litigation strategy and
communication. Id. at pp. 26, 28.
Judge Rountree's judicial review of the case plan based on
the July 10, 2013, hearing was formalized in an order filed on
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July 30, 2013. Dkt. No. 29, Ex. A,
p. 9. In that order, Judge
Rountree noted that the permanency plan included
"[r]euinification with the mother no later than: March 26,
2014." Id. at Ex. A, p. 6. Nevertheless, Judge Rountree found
that Plaintiff had not yet completed the goals of the case plan
and that the children needed to remain in the custody of DFCS.
Id. at Ex. A, pp. 6, 8.
Around that time, Plaintiff filed a petition to have
allegedly false statements—concerning her mental evaluation and
housing status—removed from the case plan. Dkt. No. 1,
p. 14.
Plaintiff also filed a "petition for deprivation," again
requesting the return of her children. Id. at p. 18. The
petition for deprivation detailed the removal of S.F. and C.F.
from her custody on March 26, 2013, and alleged that the
children had since been subjected to "physical abuse[,]
abandonment, excessive use of dangerous medications, [and]
mental and verbal abuse" in state care. Id.
In orders entered on October 17, 2013, Judge Rountree
disposed of Plaintiff's petitions. Dkt. No. 37,
pp. 14-15.
Judge Rountree dismissed Plaintiff's petition for the removal of
false statements, explaining that Plaintiff "fail[ed] to state a
claim upon which relief c[ould] be granted." Id. at p. 14.
Additionally, Judge Rountree denied Plaintiff's petition for
deprivation on the basis that the petition was "not in
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[ I the
best interest of the public and the . . . children." Id. at
P. 15.
On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff, represented by new counsel,
filed a motion for return of custody based on Plaintiff's
'completion, or substantial completion, of the goals" in the
case plan. Id. at p. 17. Judge Rountree denied this motion at
a November 21, 2013, after hearing testimony from Plaintiff, the
putative father, their psychiatrist, and a witness who provided
transportation and supervision for the family's visitation with
S.F. and C.F. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 46-65. Judge Rountree also
conducted a judicial review of the children's placement and
granted the putative father's motion for visitation and petition
for legitimation. Id. at p. 65.
Plaintiff then filed a motion to transfer the case to
McIntosh County on November 26, 2013. See id. at p. 29.
Plaintiff also filed a motion on December 31, 2013, seeking a
medical evaluation of the children, who appeared unhealthy and
overmedicated. Dkt. No. 1, p. 77. Plaintiff's motion also
accused SAAG Chamberlain, DFCS, and Harris of "unhanded stunts"
and "lies" at the November hearing and of breaking the
restraining order and court-ordered visitation. Id. Around
that time, DFCS filed a petition for dependency. See Dkt.
No. 34, p. 29.
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On February 28, 2014, the Juvenile Court entered an order
of recusal stating that Plaintiff had recently filed the instant
action in this Court against Judge Rountree. Dkt. No. 38, p. 5.
The order explained that it would be inappropriate for Judge
Rountree to continue to preside over the "currently pending"
dependency proceedings against Plaintiff in the Juvenile Court.
Id. The order requested that the Council of Juvenile Court
Judges of Georgia assign a substitute judicial officer to
Plaintiff's cases. Id. at p. 6.
On March 24, 2014, the Juvenile Court held a hearing on
Plaintiff's motions to transfer case and for a medical
evaluation as well as DFCS's petition for dependency. Dkt.
No. 34, p. 29. Judge Marlo A. Ross ("Judge Ross"), who is not a
Defendant in this action, presided over the hearing and heard
testimony from Plaintiff, her psychiatrist, Capece, and Keene.
Id. at pp. 29-45; see also Dkt. No. 62, Ex. A, p. 24. As the
transcript shows, Plaintiff withdrew her motion to transfer, and
the Court admitted into evidence a medical evaluation of the
children. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 29-30. Finding the children to be
dependent, Judge Ross extended custody in favor of DFCS. Id. at
p. 45.
On June 5, 2014, Judge Ross conducted an initial judicial
review hearing. See Dkt. No. 62, Ex. A,
p. 1. On June 19,
2014, before Judge Ross had filed any order on the judicial
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review, the guardian ad litem for S.F. and C.F. filed a motion
to modify placement based on foster care problems arising after
the judicial review hearing. Id. at Ex. A,
p. 25.
Specifically, since the hearing, the children had moved to their
eighth foster home, the foster parent had then asked DFCS to
remove the children, and DFCS was able to find only temporary,
and no long-term, placement for the children. Id. at Ex. A,
pp. 25-26. The guardian ad litem noted Plaintiff's substantial
completion of the case plan, her stable living condition, and
the success of recent unsupervised visitation, and recommended
placement of the children with Plaintiff, with DFCS retaining
legal custody. Id. at Ex. A, pp. 26-28. Judge Ross conducted a
hearing on the guardian ad litem's Motion on July 1, 2014. Id.
at Ex. A, p. 29.
On July 30, 2014, the Juvenile Court filed Judge Ross's
orders on both the initial judicial review, id. at Ex. A,
p. 3,
and the guardian ad litem's motion to modify placement, Id. at
Ex. A, pp. 23-24, 29. The order on initial judicial review,
dated July 28, 2014, showed that the permanency plans were,
concurrently, "[r]eunification with parent(s)" and "adoption"
but reported that DFCS did not intend to petition for the
termination of Plaintiff's parental rights. Id. at Ex. A,
pp. 4, 17, 22. The order also remarked that Plaintiff, while
demonstrating progress appropriate for reunification, had not
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yet completed the counseling goals; therefore, Judge Ross
directed that the children remain in the custody of DFCS. Id.
at Ex. A, pp. 6-8, 15, 19.
However, the order on the guardian ad litem's motion was
dated later, on July 29, 2014, and granted the request for
placement with Plaintiff. Id. at Ex. A,
pp. 23-24, 29.
Specifically, the order mandated that "legal custody of the
children be placed with the natural mother" and that DFCS's
temporary legal custody be terminated. Id. at Ex. A,
p. 23.
With the return of custody were certain safeguards: DFCS was to
provide "intensive aftercare services" for the children; DFCS
and the guardian ad litem were "authorized to make unannounced
home visits" and request random drug and alcohol screens of
Plaintiff; Plaintiff had to continue counseling and take all
prescribed medications; and Plaintiff could not allow
unsupervised visitation with Capece until further order. Id. at
Ex. A, pp. 23-24.
II. Facts Alleged by Plaintiff
The gist of the factual allegations in Plaintiff's eightynine-page Complaint is that the fourteen Defendants treated
Plaintiff or her children unfairly at various times during the
deprivation process outlined above. See generally Dkt. No. 1.
To begin, Plaintiff alleges that when her children were removed
from her custody on March 26, 2013, Keene and fellow DFCS
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investigator Walter Lee ("Lee")—along with two police officers,
one of whom Plaintiff believes to be Britney Merriman
("Merriman")—never presented an "ER report from the medical
condition that [was the] cause of detaining them." Id. at
p. 17.
In addition, Plaintiff contends that these Defendants
instructed Plaintiff to pack a bag and not return to her home,
without showing any warrant, order, or eviction notice. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that under the care of DFCS, her
children were "shocked scared and abused for a year on no legal
grounds." Id. at p. 6. For example, Plaintiff states that
while the children lived at the foster home of McClary Baker
("Baker"), the "bruises and sadness set in." Id. Plaintiff
further states that Baker took any toys, clothes, and toiletries
that Plaintiff sent and failed to provide the children with
pillows and blankets. Id.
In support of these allegations, Plaintiff includes in her
Complaint a copy of a police report filed against Baker on
August 5, 2013. Id. at pp. 37-38. The report contains
statements of S.F. including various allegations of neglect by
Baker. Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint refers only to two "county cops." Dkt. No. 1, p. 17.
However, the Complaint identifies Merriman as a Defendant and a "[c]ounty
police (o)fficer." Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff has confirmed, in a later
pleading, that she intended to refer to Merriman when discussing the two
"county cops." Dkt. No. 29, pp. 2-3. While Merriman has clarified that she
is a dispatcher, rather than a police officer, dkt. no. 18, p. 2 n.l, the
Court, for the purposes of this Order, accepts as true Plaintiff's
allegations regarding Merriman's involvement in the removal of the children.
See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Plaintiff contends that she repeatedly reported the alleged
abuse in the Baker home, but CASA Richard James ("James") kept
writing that the children were happy. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff
maintains that she similarly informed Harris, who assured that
she would find safe placement but nevertheless reported that the
children were fine. Id.
According to Plaintiff, the children were moved from the
Baker home to another foster home, where the alleged neglect
persisted. Id. Plaintiff further states that, at the time of
filing the instant Complaint, the children were in yet another
foster home, with a "family that ha[d] over [the] state law
limit of babies and kids." Id. She claims that S.F. seemed
angry and that both children had "marks." Id. 6
Plaintiff further alleges that her children received
inadequate medical care while in the care of DFCS. See Id. at
p. 8. For example, she contends that when S.F. injured his
wrist in September 2013, Harris indicated that she would take
him to the emergency room but "never showed up." Id. Plaintiff
avers that she called Harris and her supervisor—presumably,
Pruitt—and threatened to call the police, prompting Harris to
take S.F. to the emergency room. Id. A few days later, Harris
notified Plaintiff that S.F. was rushed to the doctor for an
emergency procedure on his wrist. Id. Plaintiff also attaches
6
Plaintiff has not named the foster parents in these other foster homes as
defendants in this action.
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to her Complaint photographs of the children, which appear to
show a skin rash, though the photographs are mostly unclear.
Id.
p. 34.
In addition, Plaintiff complains that her children were
overmedicated while in the custody of DFCS: "They have drugged
my son so bad he's out of his mind." Id. at p. 7. In
particular, Plaintiff reports that Keene, upon removing the
children from Plaintiff's custody and leaving the children with
Capece, gave Capece some pills for S.F.; however, S.F. had not
been taking medication and had not seen a doctor. Id. at p. 17.
Plaintiff also includes her e-mails to Harris, in which
Plaintiff expressed concern that S.F. was receiving too much
medication for his diagnoses of ADD, ADHD, anxiety, and
depression. Id. at pp. 15, 17. As stated in one e-mail, dated
January 15, 2014, "[I] requested the medicine be stopped due to
racing heart and aggression along with a long list of dangerous
effects on a growing child." Id. at p. 17.
Plaintiff's Complaint contains various filings from the
state-court proceedings, discussed supra, in which Plaintiff
contested the overmedication of the children. See id. at p. 18
(petition for deprivation); Id. at p. 53 (motion of
reunification); id. at p. 77 (motion requesting a medical
evaluation). Plaintiff also attached a letter from a second
doctor concurring with the prescribed medications, which
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Plaintiff believes is evidence that DFCS did not follow a court
order to have S.F. seen by another doctor. Id. at p. 19. In
further support, Plaintiff points to an article addressing the
"mass overmedication" of foster children, a copy of which
Plaintiff includes in the Complaint. Id. at p. 73.
Plaintiff also suggests that DFCS has not been forthright
in implementing the case plan. See id. at p. 7. Specifically,
Plaintiff states that in Juvenile Court on July 10, 2013, DFCS
denied having received a report from Plaintiff's doctor
regarding her counseling goals, which Plaintiff maintains that
DFCS had possessed for a month. Id. Plaintiff asserts that
DFCS also represented that it could not reach the case plan
documents at that time, because the DFCS office was closed for
black mold. Id. Plaintiff goes on to make general allegations
regarding mold at the DFCS office and claims that DFCS was
engaged in the improper destruction of documents. Id. In
support of these contentions, Plaintiff's Complaint includes an
article on mold at the DFCS office and an article on an
investigation into DFCS falsifying reports for grant funding.
Id. at pp. 22, 28-30.
Plaintiff further complains that DFCS failed to follow
through with the court-ordered visitation. See Id. at pp. 7885. To this end, Plaintiff attaches an e-mail thread from
December 2013, which included Judge Rountree, Harris, and DFCS
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director Kristal Jones ("Jones"), among others. Id. In
essence, the e-mails reflect either a lack of communication or a
miscommunication between Plaintiff and DFCS regarding a
perceived cancellation of her regularly scheduled visitation.
Id. at p. 79. Ultimately, however, Jones apologized for the
confusion and assured that the visitation would continue as
scheduled. Id. at p. 83.
Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the police officers
failed to respond appropriately to her complaints regarding
DFCS. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff points to a police report, dated
April 13, 2013, showing that Macy and Lynette Gallagher
("Gallagher") were called to DFCS when Plaintiff confronted DFCS
with allegations of abuse, neglect, and "filth" in the DFCS
visitation room. See Id. at pp. 11-12. The report documents
Plaintiff's allegations and shows that Macy and Gallagher met
with various DFCS employees, including Pruitt. Id. at p. 12.
According to Plaintiff, the facts in the report are incorrect,
and the officers not only left the children in the poor
conditions at the DFCS office but also delayed in filing the
report. Id. In addition, Plaintiff states, "While being called
bipolar and threaten[ed] with prison time by [O]fficer gauliger
[sic] [I] was told again not to return to my home." Id. at p.
17.
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Plaintiff also expresses dissatisfaction with Judge
Rountree's handling of the deprivation proceedings in Juvenile
Court. See id. at pp. 31, 84. In the Complaint, Plaintiff
includes an August 31, 2013, e-mail to Governor Nathan Deal
stating that Plaintiff was "reporting [J]udge [Rountree] as well
for letting such a case as wrong as mine" and for laughing at
Plaintiff in court. Id. at p. 31. In another e-mail directed
to Jones, Plaintiff asserted that the cases in Juvenile Court
were not backed by facts and that Plaintiff wished to have the
state remove Judge Rountree from the bench. Id. at p. 84.
Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint a copy of the transcript for
the April 11, 2013, adjudicatory hearing before Judge Rountree.
Id. at pp. 40-51.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that many of the Defendants
lied over the course of the state-court proceedings. See, e.g.,
id. at p. 7. For example, Plaintiff avers that DFCS and
Chamberlain lied to Judge Rountree, stating that Plaintiff
threatened to throw a brick through the window of DFCS. Id.;
see also p. 84. According to Plaintiff, DFCS also lied to Judge
Rountree regarding a police report—stating that the police
report involved Plaintiff and Capece, when the report actually
documented S.F.'s allegations of abuse. Id. at p. 6. In
addition, Plaintiff states that Harris's testimony did not match
the facts. Id. at p. 84. Plaintiff also contends that CASA
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James "kept writing lies then got scared and let go of all his
cases but [in the] last few reports . . . said [to] give [the]
kids back." Id. at p. 7; see also Id. at p. 31.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court on February 5,
2014. Dkt. No. 1, p. 1. Contemporaneously with the Complaint,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File In Forma Pauperis.
Dkt. No. 2, p. 1. On February 7, 2014, the Court granted
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File In Forma Pauperis and,
accordingly, directed the United States Marshal Service to serve
Defendants with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. Dkt. No. 5,
P. 1.
Plaintiff's Complaint does not offer any basis for the
Court's jurisdiction. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Presumably,
Notably, Plaintiff's factual allegations make no mention of DFCS Director
Chansenette Amison ("Amison"). Additionally, many allegations relate to
agency oversight of DFCS and Plaintiff's complaints to Governor Nathan Deal
and the Department of Human Services regarding the lack of oversight in this
instance. Dkt. No. 1, p. 8; see also Id. at pp. 31, 54. Those allegations
involve only individuals not named as Defendants in this action and,
therefore, are irrelevant here. Finally, Plaintiff's responses in opposition
to the pending Motions to Dismiss introduce additional factual allegations
not mentioned in the Complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 29. However, the Court
need not address those additional allegations, because factual allegations
must appear on the face of the complaint to survive dismissal. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Erb v. Advantage Sales & Mktg.,
LLC, No. 6:11-cv-2629, 2012 WL 3260446, *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2012) ("Motions
to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) test the sufficiency of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint, and 'a party may not rely on
new facts in submissions in response to a motion to dismiss to defeat the
motion.'" (quoting Cherry v. City of Phila., No. 04-1393, 2004 WL 2600684, *3
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2004))); accord Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss." (alteration in original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984))).
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Plaintiff seeks to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the basis
that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated
Plaintiff's federal rights during the child deprivation process.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014).8 Indeed, Plaintiff's complaint
lists the name and official title of each Defendant, see dkt.
no. 1, pp. 3-4, suggesting that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims
against these Defendants as state actors. Plaintiff's
"Statement of Claim" in her Complaint states that Defendants
acted in "[v]iolation of policies and[ ] procedures" and
discriminated against her. Id. at p. 3. Elsewhere in the
Complaint, Plaintiff avers that she was denied "due process" in
the Juvenile Court. Id. at p. 7. Construing these claims
favorably to Plaintiff, it appears that Plaintiff alleges
violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
equal protection.
It also appears that Plaintiff raises supplemental claims
under Georgia law. Plaintiff's "Statement of Claim" accuses
Defendants of "all forms of negligence" and "deflamation [sic]
of [c]haracter." Id. at p. 3. In addition, Plaintiff's
A failure to plead a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of
the complaint can lead to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h) (3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) ("If the court determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action."); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1) ("A pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court's jurisdiction."). Nevertheless, for the purposes of
this Order, and given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will proceed as if
Plaintiff had identified 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the jurisdictional basis for
this action.
8
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Complaint repeatedly emphasizes that Defendants lied in their
reports, communications, and representations to the Juvenile
Court. See, e.g., id. at pp. 6-7. Plaintiff's allegations
arguably constitute claims of negligence, defamation, and fraud
actionable under The Georgia Tort Claims Act. O.C.G.A. §§ 5021-20 to 50-21-37 (2014).'
Based on these claims, Plaintiff requests an Order from
this Court requiring that Defendants return her children, stay
away from her family, and clear her file at DFCS. Dkt. No. 1,
p. 5. Plaintiff also seeks money damages in the amount of
$8,000,000.
Id.
On March 25, 2014, Rountree, Macy, Merriman, and Gallagher
jointly moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 18. Individual Motions to
Dismiss then were filed by CASA James on March 31, 2014, dkt.
no. 22, and Chamberlain on April 2, 2014, dkt. no. 24. On
April 10, 2014, DFCS, Amison, Harris, Jones, and Pruitt filed a
collective Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 25. On May 29, 2014,
Keene filed a Motion to Dismiss incorporating the collective
Because Plaintiff's allegations of negligence, defamation, and fraud, dkt.
no. 1, PP. 3, 7, do not implicate any federally guaranteed right, these
claims could not support a Section 1983 claim. See Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 336 (1986) (holding that a state official's negligence is not
actionable under § 1983); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 694 (1976) (holding
that simple defamation by a state official does not give rise to a § 1983
claim); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2002)
(demonstrating that in a § 1983 action, allegations of fraud give rise to
separate claims under Georgia law) . In addition, Plaintiff raises numerous
legal theories in her responses to the pending Motions to Dismiss. See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 29. The Court declines to consider each of those theories
here, because those theories were not raised in the Complaint, see discussion
supra note 6, and, in any event, would fail for the same reasons as the
claims discussed herein.
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Motion of DFCS and its employees. Dkt. No.
46.10 The several
Motions to Dismiss largely set forth the same grounds for
dismissing Plaintiff's claims: lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the
Younger abstention doctrine, immunities under federal and state
law, and failure to state a claim for relief. See generally
Dkt. Nos. 18, 22, 24-25, 26.
Many of the Defendants also filed Motions to Stay Discovery
until the Court could rule on their Motions to Dismiss. Dkt.
Nos. 26, 28. Over Plaintiff's objection, dkt. nos. 37-38, the
Court granted the Motions to Stay Discovery on May 6, 2014.
Dkt. No. 43, p. 1.
The nonmoving Defendants include Baker, who filed an Answer
on April 11, 2014, specifically responding to each of
Plaintiff's allegations without raising any defenses. Dkt.
No. 27. In addition, Lee has not filed a motion, or even a
responsive pleading, as it appears that Lee has not been served
a copy of the Complaint. The docket shows that on February 12,
2014, a U.S. Marshal sent Lee a Waiver of Service via certified
mail to the DFCS address listed in Plaintiff's Complaint. Dkt.
No. 63, p. 1; see also Dkt. No. 1, p. 3. On February 18, 2014,
the Waiver of Service was returned uriexecuted, because Lee
To the extent that Keene's Motion is docketed as a Motion to Dismiss and a
separate Motion for Joinder, dkt. no. 46, Keene's Motion for Joinder is
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) ("A motion under this rule may be joined
GRANTED.
with any other motion allowed by this rule.")
10
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apparently was no longer employed at DFCS. Dkt. No. 63,
p. 1.
The U.S. Marshal then mailed the Waiver of Service via certified
mail to a different address on May 9, 2014, which Lee signed for
on May 10, 2014, but never returned. Id. Having not received a
waiver from Lee, the U.S. Marshall attempted to serve Lee with
process but was unable to locate Lee as of November 7, 2014.
Id.
In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Emergency Hearing
on June 2, 2014. Dkt. No. 48. Plaintiff's Motion explains that
the foster parent at that time did not allow the children to
attend visitation, causing Plaintiff to fear that the children
were "missing or worse." Id. at p. 2.11
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
plaintiff's complaint contain both "a short and plain statement
of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2). A party may
move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), based on a "lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction" or a "failure to state a claim upon which relief
' The docket also reflects that Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Object" to the
Motion to Dismiss filed by DFCS, Axnison, Harris, Jones, Pruitt, and Keene,
dkt. nos. 25, 46. Dkt. No. 51. It appears that the Motion to Object should
have been docketed as a Response; however, to the extent that the Court must
rule on a docketed Motion, Plaintiff's Motion to Object, dkt. no. 51, is
DENIED for the reasons discussed infra.
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can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1), (6) ("Rule 12(b) (1)"
and "Rule 12(b) (6)"). In addition, a court, on its own, may
raise issues concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) (a court must dismiss an action "[if the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction" (emphasis added)); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v.
MClmetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1297
n.17 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)
("If the parties
do not raise the question of lack of jurisdiction, it is the
duty of the federal court to determine the matter sua sponte."
(emphasis omitted)). Moreover, where a plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis, the Court must assess issues regarding the
legal sufficiency of a complaint even when a defendant has not
moved to dismiss.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) (2014)
(mandating that a court "dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that" the action "fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted" (emphasis added)).
A court applies the same standards of review in evaluating
dismissal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
based on a failure to state a claim. See Carmichael v. Kellogg,
Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.
2009) •12 A court must accept as true the facts as set forth in
12
On this point, the Court refers to facial challenges to subject-matter
jurisdiction. That is, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (1) "can be
asserted on either facial or factual grounds." Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279.
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the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Randall, 610 F.3d at 705. While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, it "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Igbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2)). To be plausible
on its face, a complaint must set forth enough facts to
"allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In addition, a court must afford a pro se party, such as
Plaintiff, leniency in applying procedural rules. see GJR
Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.
1998), overruled on other grounds by, Swann v. S. Health
Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 2004). Even so, a court
cannot "serve as de facto counsel for a party" or "rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
A "facial" challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction is based "solely on the
allegations in the complaint. When considering such challenges, the court
must, as with a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, take the complaint's allegations as
true." Id. By contrast, a "factual" challenge to jurisdiction relies on
facts and circumstances existing outside of the complaint; in those
circumstances, a court "may consider extrinsic evidence such as deposition
testimony and affidavits." Id. Because the Defendants attack subject-matter
jurisdiction based on the events in Juvenile Court, and those events appear
on the face of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants' jurisdictional challenge is
facial. Indeed, to evaluate subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, the
Court need not look beyond the Complaint—which, as discussed supra, includes
the attachments thereto. Thus, for the purposes of this Order, the standards
for reviewing the jurisdictional basis and the legal sufficiency of the
Complaint are the same.
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Ordinarily, a court's review on a motion to dismiss is
limited to the factual allegations on the face of the complaint.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a court is presented with
matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the motion
to dismiss is converted into one for summary judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d).
However, there are certain instances in which a court may
consider matters outside the pleadings without transforming a
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. See Daisy.
Self, 547 F. App'x 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2013) . For example, a
court may consider copies of documents that a plaintiff has
attached to the complaint. See Brooks._ Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Fla., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (a court
may examine "the face of the complaint and attachments
thereto") . In addition, a court may look to documents that are
central to, or referenced in, the complaint. See Davis, 547 F.
App'x at 929 (a court may reference "other sources courts
ordinarily examine when ruling on . . . dismissal, in
particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference" (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007))). Finally, a court may also
consider facts that are subject to judicial notice. See Fed. R.
Evid. 201(a)-(d); Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322; see also Fed.
R. Evid. 201(b) (2) ("The court may judicially notice a fact that
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is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned."); Boateng v. InterAmerican
Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (a court "may treat
documents from prior state court adjudications as public
records" subject to judicial notice).
DISCUSSION
Defendants' Motions as well as this Court's obligations to
review its jurisdiction and the sufficiency of claims brought in
forma pauperis require the Court to apply the above-described
standards to all of Plaintiff's claims. 13
I.
Section 1983 Claims
Construing Plaintiff's allegations in her favor, she seeks
relief pursuant to Section 1983 for alleged violations of her
rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Dkt. No. 1, pp. 3, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff
asks the Court to order Defendants to return her children, stay
away from her family, clear her file at DFCS, and pay $8,000,000
in damages. Id. at p. 5.
13
Given the Court's obligation to dismiss Plaintiff's claims at any time
upon determining that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h) (3), or that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii), the Court will consider
Plaintiff's claims against Lee and Baker along with those against the
Defendants moving to dismiss.
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a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In their Motions to Dismiss, Defendants argue that under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to consider any claims attacking the outcome of the
deprivation proceedings in Juvenile Court. See Dkt. No. 18,
pp. 6-7; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. A, pp. 5-7; Dkt. No. 23, pp. 5-6; Dkt.
No. 25, Ex. A, pp. 11-12.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction "to review final judgments of
a state court in judicial proceedings." D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 485 (1983) (holding that only the U.S.
Supreme Court has authority to review such judgments). In
effect, the doctrine "prevent[s] lower federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state-court
losers' challenging 'state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced.'" Bates v. Harvey, 518
F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546
U.S. 459, 460 (2006)).
"The doctrine extends not only to constitutional claims
presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims
that are 'inextricably intertwined' with a state court
judgment." Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163,
1172 (11th Cir. 2000)). A federal claim is "inextricably
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intertwined" with a state-court judgment if the claim would
"effectively nullify" the state-court judgment or if the claim
"succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
decided the issues before it." Id. at 1332-33 (quoting Siegel,
234 F.3d at 1172) . However, even if a claim is inextricably
intertwined with the judgment in state court, "the doctrine does
not apply if the plaintiff had no 'reasonable opportunity to
raise his federal claim in state proceedings.'" Id. (quoting
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th dr. 1996)).
The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies in this case.
First, Judge Rountree's decision that S.F. and C.F. were
deprived at the adjudicatory hearing, dkt. no. 1,
p. 50, was a
final judgment on the merits concerning the temporary custody of
S.F. and C.F. See In re S.J., 607 S.E.2d 225, 232-33 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004) (distinguishing between proceedings to determine
whether a child is deprived and those to decide custody and
stating that "[aln order within a deprivation proceeding
deciding temporary custody of the child is a 'final order' .
from which a direct appeal lies") . That decision occurred on
April 11, 2013, dkt. no. 1, p. 40, before Plaintiff commenced
this action on February 5, 2014, id. at p. 1.
Second, while Plaintiff did not present any due process or
equal protection claim in the Juvenile Court, those claims are
"inextricably intertwined" with Judge Rountree's judgment.
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Plaintiff's allegations relate to actions taken by each of the
Defendants in connection with either the removal of her
children, the litigation in Juvenile Court, or the treatment of
her children in foster care. See generally id. Thus,
Plaintiff's constitutional claims concern the events leading up
to, or resulting from, the loss of temporary custody over her
children. For Plaintiff to succeed on these claims, this Court
would have to conclude that Judge Rountree wrongly decided that
the children were deprived and that the children should remain
in foster care under temporary custody of the state. See
Goodman ex rel. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334 (finding that RookerFeldman barred jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' due process
claims against state officials, because the success of those
claims would require finding that the state court wrongly
decided to terminate the plaintiffs' parental rights and wrongly
denied their petition for return of custody).
Finally, Plaintiff could have raised her due process and
equal protection claims in the state-court proceedings.
"Georgia law permits constitutional challenges to a juvenile
court's orders to be brought in the juvenile court, and those
challenges are subject to review by the Georgia Supreme Court,
and ultimately by the United States Supreme Court." Id. As the
record shows, the Juvenile Court conducted at least seven
hearings after the adjudicatory hearing, three of which took
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place after the filing of this case. See Dkt. No. 34,
pp. 7,
29, 46; Dkt. No. 62, Ex. A, pp. 1, 29. Plaintiff should have
raised, at that time, any constitutional issues concerning the
decisions on deprivation and temporary legal custody.
Because the Rooker-Feldman criteria are met, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's constitutional claims.
As a result, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants
are due to be dismissed.
b. Younger abstention Doctrine
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Juvenile Court and Defendants
from taking further action affecting the custody of her
children. Defendants contend that the Younger abstention
doctrine requires the Court to dismiss these constitutional
claims for injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 18, p. 7 n.3; Dkt. No.
22, Ex. A, p. 6; Dkt. No. 23, p. 8; Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A,
pp. 9-11.
The Younger abstention doctrine reflects "a strong federal
policy against federal[ ] court interference with pending state
judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances."
Middlesex Cntv. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 431 (1982) . Where "vital state interests" are involved, a
federal court should abstain from hearing a case "unless state
law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claim."
Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
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415, 426 (1979)). To determine whether Younger requires
abstention in a given case, a federal court must ask three
questions: "first, do the proceedings constitute an ongoing
state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate
important state interests; and third, is there an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges." 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274
(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S.
at 432). If the answer to all three questions is "yes," then a
federal court must abstain from hearing a case in order to avoid
interfering with the ongoing state-court proceedings.
Abstention is undeniably the appropriate course here. As
to the first Middlesex factor, Plaintiff does not dispute that
the deprivation proceedings in the Juvenile Court were ongoing
at the time of filing this action on February 5, 2014. See Dkt.
No. 1, pp. 1, 6-8; id. at Ex. A, p. 1. Plaintiff's submissions
in this case of the Juvenile Court record further underscore the
ongoing nature of those proceedings: the transcript of a motions
hearing on March 24, 2014, at which time Judge Ross continued
DFCS's temporary legal custody of the children, dkt. no. 34,
pp. 29, 45; the guardian ad litem's motion to modify placement,
dated June 19, 2014, dkt. no. 62, Ex. A, p. 25; and Judge Ross's
orders on that motion and on his judicial review, both filed on
July 30, 2014, id. at Ex. A, pp. 3, 23-24, 29. Because the
AO 72A
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Juvenile Court continued to oversee DFCS's temporary legal
custody of the children and had not yet rendered a final
decision as to Plaintiff's parental rights, it is clear that
there were ongoing judicial proceedings in the Juvenile Court at
the time Plaintiff filed this action.
Put succinctly, the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks—an
Order granting Plaintiff unbridled custody over the children,
restraining Defendants from having contact with the family, and
directing DFCS to clear Plaintiff's file—would directly
interfere with the ongoing proceedings in the Juvenile Court.
See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279-80 (explaining that the
dangers of a federal court issuing an order in this context
include that the order could conflict with those issued by the
state court or could require an amendment to the case plan that
the state court would not have approved).
The second Middlesex factor also is present here. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally
stated that "[t]here is no doubt that matters involving domestic
relations and child custody implicate important state
interests." Davis, 547 F. App'x at 930 (citing Moore, 442 U.S.
at 435). Thus, the child deprivation proceedings certainly
implicate interests important to the State of Georgia.
With regard to the final factor of Middlesex, Plaintiff
does not allege that she was unable to raise her constitutional
AO 72A
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claims in the deprivation proceedings. Plaintiff has "the
burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide
an adequate remedy for [her] federal claims." 31 Foster
Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. "Minimal respect for the state
processes . . . precludes any presumption that the state courts
will not safeguard federal constitutional rights. A federal
court should assume that state procedures will afford an
adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the
contrary." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431. Thus, "what
matters is whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented from
raising his constitutional claims in the state courts," not
whether those claims would likely be successful on the merits in
that forum. Davis, 547 F. App'x at 931 (quoting Pompey v.
Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996)). Nothing
suggests that the Juvenile Court procedure prevented Plaintiff
from raising her due process and equal protection claims and
seeking review in the state appellate court.
Because all three Middlesex factors are present, and
Plaintiff does not allege any "extraordinary circumstances"
suggesting otherwise, Younger requires that the Court abstain
from hearing Plaintiff's constitutional claims for injunctive
relief. Accordingly, the Younger abstention doctrine provides
A0 72A
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33
an additional basis for dismissing Plaintiff's Section 1983
claims requesting this form of relief.
c. Immunity
Defendants assert that Plaintiff also cannot sustain her
damages claims under Section 1983, because some Defendants are
shielded by respective doctrines of immunity. Dkt. No. 18,
pp. 7-9; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. A, pp. 9-11; Dkt. No. 23,
pp. 6-7;
Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 8-9.
1. Judicial Immunity
Judge Rountree maintains that the doctrine of judicial
immunity provides him with complete immunity from all claims
against him, not just from the eventual assessment of damages.
Dkt. No. 18, p. 7.
Judges are afforded "absolute judicial immunity from
damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their
judicial capacity unless they acted in the 'clear absence of all
jurisdiction.'" Davis, 547 F. App'x at 932 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2000)). Judicial immunity "applies even when the judge's
acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her
jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239)
To determine whether a judge was acting in his or her
judicial capacity, courts consider whether: "(1) the act
complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the
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events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3)
the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and
(4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the
judge in his judicial capacity." Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d
1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d
1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983)).
The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint clearly indicate
that Judge Rountree acted in his judicial capacity. For
example, Judge Rountree appears in Plaintiff's Complaint only in
the following instances: in the list of Defendants, dkt. no. 1,
p. 3; in the transcript of the adjudicatory hearing on April 11,
2013, Id. at pp. 40-51; in Plaintiff's e-mail to Governor Nathan
Deal stating that Plaintiff was "reporting [J]udge [Rountree] as
well for letting such a case as wrong as mine" and for laughing
at Plaintiff in court, Id. at p. 31; and in Plaintiff's e-mail
to Jones asserting that the Juvenile Court cases were not backed
by facts and that Plaintiff wished to have Judge Rountree
removed from the bench, id. at p. 84. Notably, these factual
allegations concern only Judge Rountree's actions while
presiding over the deprivation hearings—a normal judicial
function, in open court, involving a case pending before him.
Thus, Judge Rountree was acting in his judicial capacity.
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that Judge Rountree
was acting in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." See
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Davis, 547 F. App'x at 932 (quoting Bolin, 225 F. 3d at 1239).
Indeed, Georgia law grants Juvenile Courts jurisdiction to
preside over deprivation proceedings. See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-10.
As a Judge in the Juvenile Court, Judge Rountree's actions taken
in his judicial capacity were within the scope of his
jurisdiction.
On this basis, Judge Rountree is absolutely immune from
Plaintiff's constitutional claims for money damages.
Plaintiff's allegations of error do not change this result. See
Davis, 547 F. App'x at 932 (quoting Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239)
2. Prosecutorial Immunity
Chamberlain cites the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity as
protecting him against any claim based on his actions taken as a
SAAG in the deprivation proceedings. Dkt. No. 23, pp. 6-7.
A prosecutor is entitled to "absolute immunity from
allegations stemming from the prosecutor's function as
advocate." Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Thus, a prosecutor's absolute immunity encompasses "acts
undertaken in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his
role as an advocate for the State." Id. (quoting Jones, 174
F.3d at 1281). These actions are afforded absolute immunity
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"even if undertaken with malicious intent." Davis, 547 F. App'x
at 933 (citing Hart, 587 F.3d at 1295)
While prosecutorial immunity traditionally arises in the
context of criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court
has held that, in civil proceedings, executive branch officials
"performing certain functions analogous to those of a
prosecutor" are similarly entitled to absolute immunity from
damages claims under Section 1983. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 515 (1978); see, e.g., Davis, 547 F. App'x at 933 (finding
that district attorneys, empowered under Alabama law "to
represent the state in enforcing child support orders by
initiating civil or criminal actions," were entitled to absolute
immunity).
Plaintiff's allegations against Chamberlain relate to his
actions pursuant to that statute. Plaintiff attaches to her
Complaint a transcript of the April 11, 2013, adjudicatory
hearing showing that "Chamberlain, SAAG" was present, acted as
the attorney for DFCS, and examined the witnesses. Dkt. No. 1,
pp. 40-51. Plaintiff also accuses Chamberlain of "unhanded
stunts" and "lies" at another hearing. Id. at P. 77.
All of Plaintiff's allegations pertain to Chamberlain's
role as a SAAG in initiating deprivation proceedings and
advocating on behalf of DFCS. Because this role is
prosecutorial in nature, Chamberlain is afforded absolute
AO 72A
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immunity in the performance of his duties. Furthermore,
Plaintiff does not allege that Chamberlain acted outside the
scope of his duties as a SAAG at any time. While Plaintiff
contends that Chamberlain engaged in "unhanded stunts" at a
hearing, id., this contention, without more, still relates to
Chamberlain's actions while advocating on behalf of DFCS. See
Davis, 547 F. App'x at 933 (stating that absolute immunity even
protects actions taken with malicious intent).
3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Defendants further maintain that the Eleventh Amendment
and principles of sovereign immunity bar Plaintiff's claims
against DFCS and against the remaining state-actor Defendants in
their official capacities. Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A,
pp. 4-6.
States are immune from private suits pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment and traditional principles of state
sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999)
Furthermore, Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established
immunities of a state from suit without its consent. Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a
lawsuit against a state agency or a state officer in his
official capacity is "no different from a suit against the
[s]tate itself," these defendants are immune from suit under
§ 1983. Id. at 71.
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Plaintiff sets forth numerous allegations against DFCS and
various state officials. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Because the
State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit
against DFCS and against the state Defendants in their official
capacities, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes these actors from
suit. See Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.
1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity, Plaintiff cannot
sustain any constitutional claims for money damages against
these Defendants in their official capacities.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further allege that the doctrine of qualified
immunity protects any Defendants who are government officials
from claims seeking money damages from them in their individual
capacities. Dkt. No. 18, pp. 8-9; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. A, p.
Dkt. No. 23, p. 7 n.2; Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A, pp. 8-9.
Qualified immunity "protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from suits in their
individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486
F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
14
CASA James argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 22,
Ex. A, p. 11. If there is any issue as to whether a CASA is considered to be
a state official, the Court need not resolve it here. To the extent that
James is a state actor, qualified immunity bars the claims against him in his
individual capacity. To the extent that he is not a state actor, James is
not subject to suit under Section 1983 as a private actor.
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omitted) (quoting Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th
Cir. 2003)). A government official who raises qualified
immunity as an affirmative defense "must initially establish
that he was acting within his discretionary authority." Skop v.
City of Atl., 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). If it is
shown that the official was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity."
Id. at 1136-37.
For the plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity, she must
show that "(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right,
and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370
F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Davis, 547 F. App'x
at 933 ("Meanwhile, as the Supreme Court recently reiterated,
"[q]ualified immunity . . . protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." (quoting
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012))).
According to Defendants, "[t]he complaint indicates that,
at all times relevant to Plaintiff's allegations, the State
Defendants were acting within their duties as state officers or
employees, and thus they were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority." Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A,
p. 9; see also
Dkt. No. 18, pp. 8-9; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. A, p. 11; Dkt. No. 23,
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p. 7 n.2. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated
her due process and equal protection rights in connection
actions taken while the Defendants were performing job-related
duties. See Hollornan ex rel. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265 ("We
ask whether the government employee was (a) performing a
legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related
goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize);
see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1, p. 12 (alleging that Macy and Gallagher
misconstrued facts and delayed filing in completing a police
report). Thus, Defendants have established that they were
acting within their discretionary authority.
Plaintiff cannot meet her burden to overcome the
Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants deprived her of her rights to due process and
equal protection by acting in "[vjiolation of policies and[ I
procedures" and discriminating against her. Id. at pp. 3, 7.
As Defendants note, because Plaintiff has not specified how the
individual state Defendants violated her rights, "she has
certainly not alleged facts showing that any of them violated a
clearly established right." Dkt. No. 18,
p. 9.
Indeed, from Plaintiff's Complaint, it is unclear which
policies and procedures Defendants may have violated and how the
Defendants may have discriminated against her. See Chen ex rel.
V.D. v. Lester, 364 F. App'x 531, 534 (11th Cir. 2010) ("While
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Plaintiffs generally assert that these defendants' actions
violated equal protection and due process, they fail to
articulate what specific rights these defendants violated or to
explain how these defendants violated those rights.")
Furthermore, Plaintiff "cites to no clearly established
legal precedent that would have put the state executive-branch
[D]efendants on notice that their actions were unlawful."
Davis, 547 F. App'x at 933. Without more, Plaintiff's
conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish a violation
of a clearly established right. Consequently, the doctrine of
qualified immunity shields Defendants who are government actors
from any Section 1983 claims seeking money damages from them
individually.
5. Private Actors 15
Baker, as a private party, is not subject to suit under
Section 1983. While Baker's Answer does not specifically raise
any defense to Plaintiff's potential Section 1983 claims, see
generally dkt. no. 27, the Court raises this issue sua sponte.
See 28 USC § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) (requiring a court to dismiss an
action in forma pauperis at any time that it determines that it
fails to state a claim for relief)
15
In this subsection, the Court discusses only Baker as a private actor.
However, as discussed supra, if CASA James is also a private actor, then he,
like Baker, is not subject to suit under Section 1983 for the reasons stated
here.
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An essential element of a Section 1983 claim is that the
act allegedly violating the plaintiff's rights must be committed
by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
While the state-actor requirement traditionally precludes suit
against a private party under this section, a private party may
qualify as a state actor for Section 1983 purposes in "rare
circumstances." See Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th
Cir. 1992). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recognizes a private party as a state actor only when one of
three tests is satisfied: "the state compulsion test, the public
function test, or the nexus/joint action test." Davis, 547 F.
App'x at 933-34 (citing Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241
F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001)). Importantly, the Eleventh
Circuit has determined that foster parents are not state actors
for Sectin 1983 purposes. Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn, 241 F.3d
at 1349.
According to Plaintiff's Complaint, Baker is a foster
parent for children in the custody of DFCS. Dkt. No. 1,
p. 3.
Plaintiff's allegations of wrongdoing pertain only to Baker's
actions as a foster parent, Id. at pp. 6, 37-38, and Plaintiff
never suggests that Baker serves the state in any other
position. Even assuming, arguendo, that Baker violated
Plaintiff's due process or equal protection rights while acting
as a foster parent, those violations would not be actionable
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under Section 1983. Because Baker is outside the scope of
Section 1983, Plaintiff fails to state any claim for relief
against Baker on this basis.
d. Conclusion
In sum, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Aside from that doctrine, the Younger abstention
doctrine prevents this Court from hearing Plaintiff's claims for
injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983, and principles of
immunity preclude Plaintiff's damages claims under that section
against government actors. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot assert
claims against private actors under Section 1983.
Because Plaintiff cannot sustain any Section 1983 claims in
this Court against any Defendant, the Court need not determine
whether Plaintiff's allegations of constitutional violations are
sufficient to state a claim for relief under Section 1983. See
Davis, 547 F. App'x at 934 ("Because we find that no defendant
may be held liable for damages under § 1983 and the district
court properly dismissed [the plaintiff's] claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief under Younger, we do not reach [the
plaintiff's] arguments that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights.").
For these reasons, the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal claims. Plaintiff's claims
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44
for relief under Section 1983 against all Defendants are
DISMISSED.
II. State-law Claims
Plaintiff also alleges negligence, defamation, and fraud
under Georgia law. Dkt. No. 1, PP. 3, 6-7. Defendants raise
several grounds for dismissing Plaintiff's state-law claims:
that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to comply with the Georgia Tort
Claims Act; that the Complaint fails to state any claim for
relief under Georgia law; that certain actions of the Defendants
are privileged; and that Defendants are immune from suit. Dkt.
No. 18, pp. 8-11; Dkt. No. 22, Ex. A, pp. 7-10; Dkt. No. 23,
pp. 2-4, 6-7; Dkt. No. 25, Ex. A, p. 12. However, the Court
need not reach these arguments, because it appears that the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's
state-law claims any further.
Pursuant to Rule 12 (h) (3), the Court must dismiss an action
at any time that it determines that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3) . Because Plaintiff
cannot proceed on her asserted federal claims, and all named
Defendants reside in Georgia, Plaintiff has no basis for
invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 133132 (explaining that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases
involving a federal question or diversity). Because the Court
has no jurisdiction to hear these claims standing alone,
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Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims are
GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to
all Defendants.' 6
III. Motion for Emergency Hearing
Plaintiff's Motion for Emergency Hearing requests this
Court to intervene in a dispute with a foster parent regarding
visitation on June 2, 2014. Dkt. No. 48, p. 2. According to a
later pleading, Plaintiff "agreed to drop the motion for an
Emergency Hearing" while in the Juvenile Court on June 6, 2014,
and later regretted that agreement. Dkt. No. 52,
p. 1.
However, because Plaintiff never communicated to this Court that
she intended to withdraw her Motion, the Motion is still pending
on the docket in this case.
Based on pleadings filed after Plaintiff's Motion, it
appears that custody over S.F. and C.F. was returned to
Plaintiff pursuant to an order of the Juvenile Court filed on
July 30, 2014. Dkt. No. 62, Ex. A, pp. 23-24, 29. In any
event, the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against
the named Defendants and has no basis for entertaining the
16
It is worth noting that, given the many jurisdictional bars and immunity
doctrines precluding Plaintiff from asserting her federal and state claims
against these Defendants, Plaintiff could not cure these deficiencies by
amending her Complaint. Cf. Langlois v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 401 F. App'x
425, 426-27 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the lower court should have
allowed a pro se litigant an opportunity to amend deficiencies in his
complaint prior to dismissal, based on evidence that amendment may not have
been futile). Any additional federal or state claim based on these facts
would likewise fail for the reasons herein.
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motion for an emergency hearing. Thus, Plaintiff's pending
Motion for Emergency Hearing is DENIED as moot.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss,
dkt. nos. 18, 22, 24-25, 30, 46, are hereby GRANTED, and
Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED.
Plaintiff's claims against the nonmoving Defendants are also
DISMISSED.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Object, dkt. no.
51, is DENIED, and her Motion for Emergency Hearing, dkt. no.
48, is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close
this case.
SO ORDERED,
this
/C
\ da
LIA 9tJDBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNTD STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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, 2015.
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