Dufel v. Stirewalt et al
Filing
11
ORDER denying 9 Motion to Remand this case to the State Court of Glynn County, Georgia. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 3/16/2015. (csr)
3Itt the Uniteb btateo 30hitritt Court
for the boutbern Jitritt of Oeorgta
runMuitk aibiion
FREDERICK DUFEL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KATHERINE STIRE WALT, and CITY OF
BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA,
Defendants.
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CV 214-73
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
this case to the State Court of Glynn County, Georgia. Dkt. No.
9. Upon due consideration, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Frederick Dufel brought this suit against
Katherine Stirewalt and the City of Brunswick ("Defendants")
based on his arrest by Stirewalt on April 6, 2012. Plaintiff
asserts that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that
the arrest was based on false charges. Among other allegations,'
Plaintiff maintains that
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Plaintiff contends that the City is liable for Stirewalt's actions because
it caused Plaintiff's arrest and incarceration and because it has a policy
authorizing the use of illegal arrests without cause or has failed to adopt a
policy prohibiting incarceration except under appropriate circumstances.
Dkt. No. 1-1, 191 6, 11. Plaintiff further alleges that Stirewalt's actions
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[t]he wrongful arrest and untrue charges were done
under color of law and authority, and said wrongful
acts were done intentionally, negligently, and with a
complete and deliberate indifference for the
Plaintiff's rights, and all of said wrongful conduct
has caused the Plaintiff to be deprived of his
constitutional rights, including but not limited to
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, as well as being a
violation of the Plaintiff's rights conferred by the
Georgia Constitution.
Dkt. No. 1-1, ¶ 9. Plaintiff claims to have suffered physical
and mental damages as a result of his mistreatment and
incarceration, and he requests actual and punitive damages as
well as attorney's fees and costs. Dkt. No. 1-1, 9191 8, 10.
Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Glynn
County, Georgia. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and § 1446,
Defendants removed the case to this Court. Dkt. No. 1.
Defendants assert that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Plaintiff asserted claims
arising under federal law when he alleged that Defendants
violated his rights under the United States Constitution. Dkt.
No. 1, 9191 2, 3. Defendants further contend that the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Dkt. 1, 91
4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367)
Plaintiff moved to remand the case because, he contends, he
did not allege a federal claim, and the Court thus lacks
were malicious and motivated by a desire to cause Plaintiff harm and
distress. Dkt. No. 1-1, ¶ 12.
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Jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 9, p. 1. Later in the filing, Plaintiff
characterizes this contention slightly differently, stating,
"The Complaint does not state that the predominant claims arise
under federal law." Dkt. No. 9, p. 3.
II. ANALYSIS
Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over "all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. According to 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a),
any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
Id. In other words, a claim initially filed in state court may
be removed to federal court if the case could have been filed in
federal court originally. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc., 381
F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) . If a federal district court
has original jurisdiction of an action, it also has supplemental
jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Still, however, "[fJederal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against the exercise of
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federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal
jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand." Russell
Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095
(11th Cir. 1994)). Additionally, the party seeking removal
bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction
exists. Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243
F.3d 1277, 1281 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001)).
In order to assess whether a claim arises under federal
law, courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, "which
provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint." Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310
(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 392 (1987)). Federal question jurisdiction will be found
to exist where the "well-pleaded complaint standing alone
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action
or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Baltin v.
Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)).
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A plaintiff is the master of his claim and may avoid
federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. However a plaintiff may not
defeat removal by engaging in "artful pleading," or omitting to
plead necessary federal questions. Rivet v. Regions Bank of
La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998).
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court finds
that Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a federal question such that
federal question jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Complaint does not clearly delineate Plaintiff's causes of
action or specify what law those causes are grounded in, except
where it says,
[t]he wrongful arrest and untrue charges were done
under color of law and authority, and said wrongful
acts were done intentionally, negligently, and with a
complete and deliberate indifference for the
Plaintiff's rights, and all of said wrongful conduct
has caused the Plaintiff to be deprived of his
constitutional rights, including but not limited to
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, as well as being a
violation of the Plaintiff's rights conferred by the
Georgia Constitution.
Dkt. No. 1-1, ¶ 9. Even though, as Plaintiff describes, "the
Complaint does not state that it arises under the Constitution
or laws of the United States" or "does not state that the
predominant claims arise under federal law", the Complaint does
not need to
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state
that it arises under federal law in order for
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the claims it asserts to actually arise under federal law, which
they do in this case. Dkt. No. 9, pp. 3, 6.
Even though Plaintiff does not cite to the federal statute
creating his cause of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he does not cite
to any state statutes either. This is not the type of case in
which state law claims predominate, see McKinney v. City of
Grosse Pointe Park, 72 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(finding court had discretion to remand where majority of claims
were based on state law), or where the Complaint only alleged a
single state common law cause of action. See Mangum v. Child
Abuse Prevention Ass'n, 358 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D.S.C. 2005) . Nor
is it a case in which Plaintiff has been careful to rely on only
state law. See Roman-Vazquez v. Baxter Sales & Distrib., Corp.,
541 F. Supp. 2d 458, 459-60, 463 (D.P.R. 2008) (remanding case
to state court where some claims in complaint referenced both
federal and state law but at least two claims were based solely
on Puerto Rico law) ; 2 Mathews v. Anderson, 826 F. Supp. 479, 482
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Though some of the claims in the Roman-Vazquez complaint could have been
interpreted as both federal and state in nature, the court analyzed the
"substantial federal question" issue in deciding to remand the case. Id. at
462-63 (citing Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004)).
This Court's understanding of the substantial federal question doctrine
differs from that of the Roman-Vazquez court. The doctrine applies in cases
where the cause of action at issue was created by state law, not those
arising directly from federal law. See Donaldson v. City of Walterboro
Police Dep't, 466 F. Supp. 2d 677, 680 n.2 (D.S.C. 2006). The Dixon court
only employed the substantial federal question analysis once it determined
that state law, and not federal law, created the cause of action:
In cases where federal law creates the cause of action, the
courts of the United States unquestionably have federal subject
matter jurisdiction. In this case Dixon's cause of action was
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(M.D. Ga. 1993) ("Plaintiff has drafted her complaint so as to
avoid federal jurisdiction and Defendant cannot remove this
action to federal court simply because Plaintiff could have
alleged a Title VII claim")
Plaintiff cites Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1964), for the proposition that merely showing a violation of a
constitutional right does not confer jurisdiction on a federal
court. Dkt. No. 9, p. 4 (citing Hornsby, 326 F.3d at 610) . The
Hornsby court's concern, however, seems to have been with
ensuring that the person seeking federal jurisdiction had an
available statutory basis for doing so:
Merely showing a violation of a constitutional right
is, however, not sufficient to gain access to the
federal courts; since Mrs. Hornsby has not sought to
invoke jurisdiction under the federal question
provision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, we must determine
whether she has alleged an actionable claim under the
Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. § 1983], within the
jurisdiction of the district court, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1343(3).
Id. Here, unlike the plaintiff in Hornsby, Defendants have
sought to invoke this Court's federal question jurisdiction. Of
created by South Carolina law not federal law . . . [so] we must
determine whether this case is within the small class of cases
where, even though the cause of action is not created by federal
law, the case's resolution depends on resolution of a federal
question sufficiently substantial to arise under federal law[.]
369 F.3d at 816 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also
Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1290-91 (assessing substantial federal question
issue only after determining plaintiff alleged only state law causes of
action).
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding
precedent all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before
October 1, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
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additional note, the Hornsby court went on to find that the
plaintiff did state a claim within the district court's
jurisdiction, because her complaint, like Plaintiff's in this
case, set forth that she was (1) "denied a protected right,
privilege or immunity, and (2) that defendants acted under color
of a state [or] local law." Id. at 611-12.
Plaintiff's claims, as stated in the Complaint, plainly
arise under the United States Constitution and the Georgia
Constitution. The state law causes of action are so related to
the federal causes of action that they form part of the same
case or controversy, and the Court thus has supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's related state law claims. This
case was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See
Donaldson v. City of Walterboro Police Dep't, 466 F. Supp. 2d
677, 680 (D.S.C. 2006).
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 16TH day of March, 2015.
LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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