Peters v. ZWS/ABS Joint Venture
Filing
47
ORDER granting Defendant's 26 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and, denying as moot Defendant's 34 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 02/16/2016. (jah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION
*
ARVY PETERS,
*
Plaintiff,
*
*
v.
CV 214-083
*
ZWS/ABS JOINT VENTURE d/b/a
*
ZERO WASTE SOLUTIONS,
*
Defendant,
ORDER
Currently before the Court are two motions:
Defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 26) and Defendant's
motion to strike (doc. 34).
For the reasons discussed below,
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED, and
Defendant's motion to strike is DENIED.
I.
This
case
stems
Background
from Plaintiff Arvy Peters's
with Defendant ZWS/ABS Joint Venture
("ZWS").
employment
ZWS holds a
government contract, under which it provides janitorial services
to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick,
Georgia.
(Doc. 29, Ex. E ("Singh Dep.") at 7-8.)
ZWS hired
Peters in 2011 as an environmental coordinator, a position that
required him to perform janitorial inspections and, important to
this case,
work certain Saturdays to pressure wash buildings.
(Doc. 29, Ex. A ("Peters Dep.")
2011,
at 19,
34.)
Peters approached his supervisor,
At some point in
James McClinton,
concerns he had regarding his Saturday work.
about
(Id. at 54-55.)
Although the exact details of the conversation are not clear
from the record,
Peters
claims that he
spoke with McClinton
about receiving overtime pay for that work.
Peters subsequently voiced similar concerns.
At a meeting
held in April 2013, McClinton informed Peters and others that
they would need to report to work on Saturdays to perform
pressure-washing duties, at which time Peters informed McClinton
that working Saturdays would be difficult for him because his
wife now worked many weekends.
(Id^ at 55-56.)
Then, in either
May or June 2013, Peters claims that McClinton changed his
schedule to require Peters to work every Saturday and gave him
every Tuesday off.
(Id^ at 63.)
Although the record is not
clear on this, it was apparently McClinton's normal procedure to
give his employees a day off during the week when he required
them to work on a Saturday.
Dep.") at 108.)
(See Doc. 29, Ex. D ("McClinton
Peters complained about overtime pay again in
August 2013.
Also relevant to the issues now before the Court, at a
meeting in July 2013, McClinton used a racial epithet in front
of Peters and other employees.
(Peters Dep. at 96-97.)
Peters
subsequently reported McClinton's racial comment to Jai Sharma,
a ZWS corporate manager.
(Doc. 28, Ex. M.)
In either September or October 2013, ZWS terminated Peters.
Shavila Singh, the president of ZWS, testified that ZWS had to
reduce its
services under the contract because of a government
sequestration.
(Singh Dep. at 11-12.)
According to Singh, ZWS
addressed the sequestration by, in part, terminating positions,
including
Peters's,
supervisors.
Peters's
and
(Id^ at
termination,
it
17-18,
ZWS
distributed
28.)
hired
his
duties
Additionally,
Jon
Hardwick
as
among
prior to
a
"zone
manager." (McClinton Dep. at 106.)
Also subsequent to his termination, Peters claims that he
applied for two positions with ZWS: a marketing position and a
supervisor position.
(Peters Dep. at 163.)
According to
Peters, ZWS never contacted him about either position.
2014,
Peters,
In June
after exhausting his administrative remedies,
initiated this action and alleges that ZWS violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to pay
him overtime, retaliated against him in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215, and retaliated against him
in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
now moves
for summary judgment on the
retaliation claims.
(Doc. 1.)
ZWS
FLSA and Title VII
ZWS also moves to strike certain documents
Peters attached to his response in opposition to ZWS's motion
for partial summary judgment.
II.
Summary
genuine
judgment
dispute
as
56(a).
the
is
to
entitled to judgment
Legal Standard
appropriate
any material
only
fact
if
"there
as a matter of law."
no
the movant
and
is
is
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of
suit
under
Liberty Lobby,
the
Inc.,
governing
477 U.S.
substantive
242,
248
law.
(1986).
Anderson
v.
The Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences
in [its] favor."
941
F.2d
1428,
United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop.,
1437
(11th
Cir.
1991)
(en
banc)
(internal
punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the
Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the
motion.
Celotex Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477 U.S.
317,
323
(1986).
How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of
proof at trial.
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,
1115 (11th Cir. 1993) .
When the non-movant has the burden of
proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one
of two ways-by negating an essential element of the non-movant's
case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact
necessary to the non-movant's case.
See Clark v. Coats & Clark,
Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining Adickes
v.
S.H.
Kress
&
477
U.S.
Catrett,
Co.,
398
317
U.S.
144
(1986)).
(1970)
Before
and Celotex
the
Court
Corp.
can
v.
evaluate
the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider
whether
the
movant
has
met
its
initial
burden
there are no genuine issues of material
120 F.3d 248,
254
(11th Cir.
showing
that
fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Columbus,
of
Jones
1997)
v.
City of
(per curiam).
A
mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the
burden at trial is insufficient.
Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
If-and only if-the movant carries its initial burden, the
non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing]
that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes
summary judgment."
Id^ When the non-movant bears the burden of
proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the
method by which the movant carried its initial burden.
If the
movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact,
the
non-movant
"must
respond
with
evidence
sufficient
to
withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material
fact sought to be negated."
Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116.
If
the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the
non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence
that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward
with additional
evidence
verdict
at
motion
trial
sufficient to withstand a directed
based
on
the
alleged
evidentiary
deficiency."
Id.
at 1117.
The non-movant
cannot
carry its
burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory
allegations contained in the complaint.
See Morris v. Ross, 663
F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981).
In this action, the Clerk of the Court gave Peters notice
of the motion
for
summary judgment and
informed him of the
summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other
materials in opposition, and the consequences of default.
27.)
Therefore,
the
notice
requirements
of
(Doc.
Griffith
y_;_
Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are
satisfied.
The time for filing materials in opposition has
expired, and the motion is now ripe for consideration.
III.
The
Court
will
Discussion
first
address
the
FLSA
and
Title
VII
retaliation claims, followed by ZWS's motion to strike.
A.
FSLA Retaliation
The
FLSA
retaliating
against
employees who assert their rights under the statute.
See 29
U.S.C.
prohibits
§ 215(a)(3).
circumstantial
evidence,
employers
In
a
courts
from
retaliation
claim
based
apply the McDonnell
on
Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting framework.
See Henderson v. City of Grantville, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1282
(N.D. Ga. 2014).
Thus, an employee must first establish a prima
facie case by showing that: "(1)
[the employee] engaged in
activity
protected
under
[the]
act;
(2)
[the
employee]
subsequently suffered adverse action by the employer; and (3) a
causal
the
connection
adverse
1343-44
existed
action."
(11th
Wolf
Cir.
(citation omitted)
between
2000)
v.
the
employee's
Coca-Cola
(second
Co.,
alteration
activity
200
F.3d
in
and
1337,
original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
If the
employee successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to proffer legitimate,
reasons for its actions.
Id^ at 1343.
the employee must then show pretext.
non-retaliatory
If the employer does so,
Id.
In this case, Peters points to his complaints to McClinton
about overtime pay as his statutorily protected activity.
ZWS
argues that Peters did not engage in protected activity because
his
complaints were
to McClinton,
termination decisions.
The Court,
who did not make
however,
final
is satisfied that
Peters meets this element of the prima facie case.
Informal
complaints are often considered protected activity as long as
the employer has sufficient notice of the complaint.
E.E.O.C.
v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1989);
Traweek v. Glob. Sols. & Logistics, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00308-LSC,
2015 WL 4545634,
at *6
(N.D.
Ala.
July 28,
2015).
And an
employee need only reasonably believe that he is engaging in
protected activity.
See Traweek, 2015 WL 4545634, at *6.
Here,
Peters's complaints were to his direct supervisor, and although
McClinton did not have plenary power to terminate employees, the
record
reflects
termination.
that
he
could
(McClinton Dep.
at
recommend
56.)
employees
Peters,
for
therefore,
has
satisfied the first prong of the prima facie case.
Peters
points
to three different
amount to adverse employment actions:
actions
(1)
that required him to work every Saturday;
hire
him to
fill
the openings
each of these actions in turn.
from
all
retaliation,
injury or harm."
but
from
his schedule change
(2) ZWS's failure to
he applied
termination of his employment with ZWS.
that he claims
for;
and
(3)
the
The Court will address
Employees are protected
retaliation
that
"not
produces
an
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 67 (2006)
(discussing adverse employment actions under
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII).
The retaliation
must be such that "it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a [complaint]."
(citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks
Id.
at 68
omitted).
The
employer's actions must be "materially adverse."
Carroll,
529 F.3d 961,
974
(11th Cir.
2008)
Crawford v.
(finding a poor
performance review that affected an employee's eligibility for a
raise to be an adverse employment action) .
An action that is a
mere "inconvenience or alteration of responsibilities" will not
satisfy this requirement.
Bryant v. U.S. Steel Corp., 428 F.
App'x 895, 898 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
i.
Schedule Change
Peters asserts that,
2013
to
adverse
require
him
employment
when McClinton changed his schedule in
to
work
action.
every
To
Saturday,
support
this
he
suffered
argument,
an
Peters
points only to the fact he told McClinton that Saturdays were no
longer convenient for him.
schedule
change
was
The Court is not persuaded that the
materially
adverse.
First,
undisputed
evidence shows that Peters was accustomed to working Saturdays-
he had previously worked Saturdays as far back as 2011.
Dep. at 36.)
(Peters
Although the record is not clear about whether he
had previously been required to work every Saturday, the period
of indefinite Saturday work in 2013 lasted,
until October.
at most,
from May
McClinton also announced in the meeting that
Saturday work would be needed for pressure washing-the same
reason employees
Saturday.
had previously been required to
(See idj
report
on
Peters has not put forth any evidence
showing materiality or harm, and his briefs assert materiality
only in conclusory language.
The Court, therefore, finds that
Peters has failed to establish that his schedule change was an
adverse employment action.
ii.
Next,
Failure to Rehire
Peters
claims
that
ZWS's
amounts to an adverse employment action.
failure
to
rehire
him
Peters claims to have
applied for two positions with ZWS following his termination.
One position was an "experienced supervisor" position,
and
Peters
28-1
refers
to
failure
adverse
to
other
Resp.
("Peters's
the
Br.
recall
or
as
the
Opp'n")
rehire
position after termination."
case,
4,
15.)
employee
is
"An
(Doc.
employer's
undoubtedly
an
the employee reapplied for the
Jones v.
App'x 780, 785 (11th Cir. 2008)
quotation marks
at
an
employment action where
(internal
"marketing" position.
Ala.
Power Co.,
(per curiam)
omitted).
In
282 F.
(citation omitted)
any
failure-to-hire
an employee must establish that he is qualified for the
position and that the position either remains open or was filled
by someone else.
See E.E.O.C. v. Comcast of Ga.,
Inc., 560 F.
Supp. 2d 1300, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Peters's
failure-to-hire
claim
fails.
First,
he
demonstrated that he was qualified for either position.
has
not
Peters
applied for the marketing position via the Georgia Department of
Labor's website.
In response,
he received an e-mail from the
Department of Labor explaining that he appeared qualified for
the
position
application.
and
encouraging
(Doc. 28, Ex. K. )
him
to
formally
submit
This, Peters argues, clearly
shows that he was qualified for the position.
And this is the
only evidence Peters cites to establish his qualifications.
Court is not persuaded.
The
This e-mail merely shows what it says:
that Peters appeared qualified for the position.
supervisor position,
an
in his briefs,
Regarding the
Peters does not cite any
portion of the record to support his qualifications and merely
asserts in conclusory language that he was qualified.
10
Peters
has
also
failed
to
address
the
required
qualifications
for
either position.
Moreover,
Peters has failed to allege that either position
remains open or was filled by another applicant.
In fact,
asserts that it never filled the marketing position
at 56.),
which
ZWS
(Singh Dep.
is a legitimate reason for not hiring Peters.
See Duffy v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1144
(M.D. Ga 2006).
to
rehire
Accordingly, the Court finds that ZWS's failure
Peters
does
not
amount
to
an
adverse
employment
action.
iii.
Peters
constitutes
satisfied
Termination
also
an
that
asserts
adverse
his
employment
Peters's
employment action.
that
action.
termination
Accordingly,
termination
A causal
temporal
proximity.
connection
Henderson,
The
amounts
to
Court
an
is
adverse
is
Wolf,
200 F.3d at
established when
37
F.
Supp.
3d
there
at
Generally, "the temporal proximity must be very close."
(citation omitted)
ZWS
to establish a prima facie
case, the causation element must be met.
1343-44.
from
(internal quotation marks omitted).
is
1283.
Id.
Here,
ZWS argues that too much time elapsed between Peters's complaint
and his termination.
Specifically, ZWS asserts that a two-year
period passed because Peters first complained in 2011.
But it
is undisputed that Peters complained as recently as August 2013,
so only two to three months had passed since his last complaint.
11
Although it is a close call, the Court is satisfied that Peters
has
established the
See
Farley
(11th
v.
Cir.
causation element
Nationwide
1999)
Mut.
(finding
Ins.
a
of
the
Co.,
prima
197
seven-week
F.3d
lapse
facie
case.
1322,
1337
sufficiently
proximate).
Because
Peters
retaliation,
has
established
the burden shifts
a
prima
to ZWS to proffer
non-retaliatory reasons for his termination.
1343.
ZWS
asserts
that
government sequestration.
eliminated
the
it
facie
case
of
legitimate,
Wolf, 200 F.3d at
terminated Peters
because
of
a
Specifically, ZWS maintains that it
environmental
coordinator
position
and
distributed its duties among other employees, including managers
and supervisors.
For
his
claim
to
survive,
Peters
must
rebut
this
explanation and show that it was merely pretext for retaliation.
Id.
To
amount
to pretext,
the
evidence "must
reveal
such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or
contradictions
in the employer's
proffered
legitimate
reasons
for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them
unworthy of credence."
Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408
F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(internal
quotation marks
omitted).
"[A]
(citation omitted)
mere
scintilla
of
evidence in favor of the non-moving party, or evidence that is
merely colorable or not significantly probative is not enough."
Woodruff v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty. Fla., 304 F. App'x 795,
12
798
(11th Cir.
2008)
quotation marks
(per curiam)
omitted) .
(citation omitted)
(internal
And "a reason is not pretext
for
[retaliation] unless it is shown both that the reason was false,
and that
App'x
[retaliation]
at
898
was
(citation
the
real
omitted)
reason."
Bryant,
(internal
428
quotation
F.
marks
omitted).
Peters
asserts
termination,
that
Hardwick,
who
was
hired prior
to his
took over his duties after he was terminated and
that this shows pretext.
The Court, however,
is not convinced.
Peters's argument simply affirms ZWS's legitimate reason.
does
not
dispute
duties.
Instead,
that
Hardwick
performed
many
of
ZWS
Peters's
ZWS maintains that Hardwick was hired as a
zone manager and that all the environmental coordinator duties
were distributed among the managers and supervisors.
Pointing
to the fact that Hardwick took on Peters's responsibilities does
not
rebut
ZWS's
legitimate,
non-retaliatory
reasons
because
Hardwick held the exact position to which Peters's duties were
distributed.
Peters also points to evidence that he claims shows that he
was the only employee terminated after the sequestration.
their
depositions,
environmental
in
coordinator
In
addition
to
testifying
that
the
position
was
terminated,
Singh
and
McClinton testified that other employees were let go not long
after the sequestration.
at 37.)
(Singh Dep. at 31-32; McClinton Dep.
Peters attached two affidavits to his response to ZWS's
13
motion
for
partial
summary
judgment.
The
affidavits
were
created by Idella Bradley and Shirley Peters, two ZWS employees,
and
Peters
pretext
urges
because
terminated.
that
they
they
show
create
that
a
he
factual
was
the
dispute
only
about
employee
Specifically, Idella Bradley's affidavit states, in
part: "Arvy Peters was the only person who was terminated around
the time of the government shutdown.
About a year later ... I
know two members of the janitorial staff for the night shift who
did not return to work."1
(Doc.
28,
Ex.
G SI
18.)
Shirley
Peters's affidavit similarly maintains that she did not observe
that any other ZWS employee was terminated until a later date.
(Doc. 28, Ex. H 11 8-10.)
fail
to
identify-an
termination.
Both affidavits also reference-but
employee
ZWS
hired
following
Peters's
The Court notes that both of these affidavits are
almost entirely conclusory, and neither provides much factual
basis for the declarations.
Viewing these
last-minute,
conclusory statements
in the
light most favorable to Peters, he has established, at best,
simply that Singh and McClinton incorrectly testified that other
employees were let go at the time they claimed.
But these
affidavits are more notable for what they fail to do: rebut that
the
environmental
coordinator
position
had
been
eliminated.
1 Bradley's affidavit also claims that she heard McClinton say that he
planned to "get rid of" Peters.
(Doc. 28, Ex. G 1 12.)
Her affidavit,
however, fails to provide any context and does not provide the time at which
McClinton allegedly made this statement. The alleged statement, therefore,
provides little support to Peters's claim.
14
That is, nothing in these affidavits indicates that ZWS retained
an
environmental
coordinator
environmental coordinators.
office
decided
to
or
that
it
hired
any
additional
Singh testified that the corporate
eliminate
the
environmental
coordinator
position, which Peters held, and Peters has not pointed to any
evidence that
contradicts
this
reason.
Peters
has,
therefore,
failed to show pretext, and his retaliation claim based on his
termination fails.
Because Peters has failed to show that his schedule change
and ZWS's
failure
to
rehire him constitute
adverse
employment
actions, and because he has failed to show that ZWS's reason for
terminating
his
employment
was
pretextual,
retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
Peters's
FLSA
Accordingly, ZWS's
motion for partial summary judgment on this issue is GRANTED.
B.
Title VII Retaliation
Peters also claims that his termination was in violation of
Title VII.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful to retaliate against
an employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice.
U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3.
FLSA,
a Title
establish
42
Similar to a retaliation claim under the
VII
a prima
retaliation
facie
case
claim
by
requires
showing:
"(1)
an
employee
that
[the
employee] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that
[the employee] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)
that there is some causal relation between the two events."
Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir.
15
2007)
(per
omitted).
applies
the
curiam)
The McDonnell
to Title VII
opportunity
reasons
(citation
for its
F.3d 1160, 1181
to
omitted)
(internal
quotation mark
Douglas burden-shifting
framework also
retaliation claims,
articulate
actions.
and
the
legitimate,
Brown v.
(11th Cir. 2010).
Ala.
employer has
non-retaliatory
Dep't.
of Transp.,
If the employer does so, then
the employee must rebut those reasons and show pretext.
To
establish
a
Title
VII
597
retaliation
claim,
Id.
an
employee
must have a reasonable belief that the employer is engaged in an
unlawful employment practice.
536 F.3d
1209,
1213
Butler v. Ala.
(11th Cir.
2008).
An
Dep't of Transp.,
employee
"must
not
only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed
that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices,
but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of
the facts and record presented."
Id.
Techs.,
103 F.3d 956,
Carrier Transicold Div.,
1997)).
(quoting Little v. United
960
(11th Cir.
Peters's claim is based on his reporting McClinton's
use of a racial epithet during a meeting,
and ZWS argues that
Peters has not shown that he engaged in protected activity.
Court agrees.
The
Throughout his briefs on this motion, and in his
complaint, Peters repeatedly references that he was offended by
McClinton's comment.
Not once does he attempt to show how the
comment amounts to an unlawful employment practice.
does
not
even
reference
evidence
that
believed that the comment was unlawful.
16
shows
he
In fact, he
reasonably
Peters's claim is based
solely on the offensiveness of the comment, and "[m]ere offense
does not rise to
the level of reasonable belief that
engaging in an unlawful
employment practice."
Ali
[ZWS]
v.
was
Educ.
Corp. of Am., No. 4:11-CV-2743-KOB, 2012 WL 5379132, at *7 (N.D.
Ala.
Oct.
31,
Even
if the Court
prima
facie
rebutted
action.
2012).
case,
ZWS's
his
were
to find that
claim would fail
legitimate,
Peters
established a
because
non-retaliatory
he
reason
has
not
for
its
The only adverse employment action Peters presents to
support his claim is his termination.
ZWS proffered the same
reason for his termination as it did for his FLSA retaliation
claim-that
it
terminated
government sequestration.
Peters's
position
because
of
the
And Peters attempts to rebut that
reason by referencing evidence that indicates that he was the
only employee terminated.
But, as discussed above, Peter has
not pointed to any evidence that shows that ZWS retained or
subsequently
hired
other
environmental
coordinators.
Accordingly, Peters has failed to show pretext.
Because Peters
cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title
VII and cannot show pretext, his claim fails as a matter of law.
ZWS's motion on this issue is GRANTED.
C.
ZWS's Motion to Strike
In response to ZWS's motion for partial summary judgment,
Peters attached the affidavits of Idella Bradley (doc. 28, ex.
g) and Shirley Peters (doc. 28, ex. h) and his own declaration
17
(doc.
28,
ex.
portions
i) .
ZWS responded by filing a motion to strike
of these
documents
because
they
are
not
based
on
personal knowledge and, therefore, fail to meet the requirements
of
Federal
finds
it
because
Rule
of
Civil
unnecessary
summary
documents.
to
judgment
Procedure
separately
is
Venture's
The
address
proper
even
Court,
however,
these
in
arguments
light
of
the
Accordingly, ZWS's motion is DENIED AS MOOT.2
IV.
For
56.
the
reasons
motion
for
Conclusion
stated
partial
above,
summary
Defendant
judgment
ZWS/ABS
(doc.
Joint
26)
is
GRANTED, and ZWS's motion to strike (doc. 34) is DENIED AS MOOT.
ORDER ENTERED
at Augusta,
Georgia
this
/ br*- day of
February, 2016.
HALL
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CRN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
2 In a one-line request in the conclusion portion of Peters's response
brief on this issue, his attorney asks the Court to award attorneys' fees for
having to respond to ZWS's motion to strike.
denies that request.
18
Upon consideration, the Court
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