Young v. Smith et al

Filing 41

ORDER ADOPTING the Magistrate Judge's 39 Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff's Objections, dkt no. 40, are OVERRULED. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint and DENIES Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 3/29/2016. (csr)

3 ot aniteb btatto flitritt Court
for the 6outbern flttritt of georgia
3runtuitk Aibioion
JOE T. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
V.

ANTHONY SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:14-cv-109

ORDER
The Court has conducted an independent and de novo review
of the record and analyzed the Magistrate Judge's February 2,
2016 Report and Recommendation, dkt. no. 39, to which objections
have been filed. With one clarification regarding Plaintiff's
claims against Defendant Smith, the Court concurs with the
Report and Recommendation.
The entirety of Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants
reads as follows:
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deprivation of 4th and
5th Amendment constitutional rights against the above
named defendants related to an incident on April 4th,
2014 on or about 2 o'clock, p.m.
While the plaintiff was walking on Homer L.
Wilson Way, Anthony Smith, a Brunswick police officer
pulled up behind the Plaintiff in his car and told
plaintiff to stop and was very hostile. Brunswick
police officers Lawson and English arrived about that

time and the plaintiff was handcuffed and threatened
with jail and forced to answer questions while Anthony
Smith wrote them on a card. Plaintiff was falsely
arrested and imprisoned and had the right to liberty
taken away for about 45 minutes. This was a great
indignity and a violation of the Plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
This plaintiff has had three incidents before
this when liberty was taken by the Brunswick police
but not handcuffed. Therefore it is believed the
Brunswick police department has a policy of violating
basic civil liberties and the policy must be changed
to observe these rights.
For the distress and suffering, that lasted for
days, due to the false arrest and imprisonment,
Plaintiff requests a trial by jury and unspecified
damages, and that the City of Brunswick be required to
obey the law.
Dkt. No.

i, 111

1-4.

Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Smith is properly
characterized by the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation as a Fourth Amendment violation claim for
Defendant Smith's alleged "seiz[ing of Plaintiff] . . . during
the field interview conducted on April 4, 2014." Dkt. No. 39,
p. 3. During discovery, Plaintiff testified that an officer
other than Defendant Smith placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and
that Defendant Smith never touched him. Dkt. No. 25, p. 18:1117. After the close of discovery, see dict. no. 15, in his
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. nos.
32 and 32-3, Plaintiff avers for the first time that he "was
handcuffed by Officer Lawson at Defendant Smiths [sic]

2

Idirection" and that "Defendant Smith was in charge." Dkt. No.
32-3, ¶ 15 (emphasis added); see also Dkt. No. 32 at 4
("Defendant Smith was in charge and had Lawson handcuff
IPlaintiff"). In other words, Plaintiff now appears to assert
that Defendant Smith violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights by virtue of his supervisory authority over Officer
Lawson who handcuffed him.
Plaintiff's attempt to assert a new theory of liability at
this late stage must fail because Plaintiff did not plead a
supervisory liability claim in the Complaint as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8(a) (2) requires only
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."

FED. R.

Civ. P. 8. Specific

facts.are not necessary; the statement need only " 'give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.' " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)) . "To comply with fair notice, a complaint should at
least allege in general terms the acts, customs, practices,
policies of the defendant in a manner sufficient to allow an
informed response." Desai v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 944 F. Supp.
876, 879 (M.D. Fla. 1996)
Even liberally construing the Complaint, as the Court is
required to do, see Erickson

V.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),

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Iplaintift's Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 with regard to
Ia supervisory liability claim. "To state a claim against a
Isupervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the

I supervisor's

personal involvement in the violation of his

Iconstitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy
Ithat resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's
Iconstitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that
Ithe supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed
Ito prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the
Isupervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then
Ifailed to correct." Patterson v. Walden, No. CIV. A. 13-0109IWS-B,

2013 WL 3153761, at *5 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2013).

IPlaintiff did not make any such allegations in the Complaint.
"It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory
officials are not liable under §1983 for the unconstitutional
acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior
or vicarious liability." Cottone

V.

Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360

(11th Cir. 2003). "Nor can a supervisor be held liable under §
11983 for mere negligence in the training or supervision of his
Isubordinates." Patterson, 2013 WL 3153761, at *5 (citing
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1990)).
"Indeed, the law is clear that a supervisor may not be held
liable under § 1983 unless 'the supervisor personally
participates in the alleged constitutional violation or

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there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising
10ff icial and the alleged constitutional violation.'" Id.
(quoting Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)).
"The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his]
individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is

I extremely

rigorous." Id. (quoting Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc.,

588 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Complaint's allegations against Defendant Smith
lare general at best, and the Complaint is devoid of facts to
allege a supervisor liability claim and put Defendants on notice
of such a claim. First and foremost, there is no allegation
that Defendant Smith is a supervisor or holds any supervisory
lauthority over the other officers such that he could be held
Iliable under a theory of supervisor liability. The Complaint
likewise lacks factual allegations that Defendant Smith directed
Officer Lawson to place Plaintiff in handcuffs or that he
knowingly failed to prevent Officer Lawson from doing so. See
Patterson, 2013 WL 3153761, at *5

Furthermore, the Complaint

does not provide any facts that identify a custom or policy of
Defendant Smith that resulted in deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff's constitutional rights or facts that suggest the
existence of a widespread pattern of excessive force or
substantive due process violations by Brunswick police officers
to which Defendant Smith turned a blind eye. See id.; see also

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Jones v. Edmond, No. 1:14-cv-31, 2014 WL 5801536, at *6 (M.D.
Ga. 2014)

(noting that, even taking as true plaintiff's

allegation that officer Brinson was in charge at the roadblock,
plaintiff's supervisory liability theory failed because
plaintiff did not allege that officer Brinson personally
participated in the strip search, nor did plaintiff allege a
causal connection, such as a custom or policy, notice of a
history of abuse by officer Edmonds—the officer who performed
the strip search—sufficient to put Brinson on notice, or that
Brinson instructed Edmonds to conduct the search).
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to put forth a
theory of supervisory liability for a Fourth Amendment violation
in his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, his
effort is barred for failure to plead the claim as required by
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Conley,

355

IILS. at 47. Plaintiff did not provide fair notice to Defendants

of a supervisory liability claim. Desai, 944 F. Supp. at 879.
I Instead, the record makes clear that Plaintiff's assertion of

Isupervisory liability on the part of Defendant Smith is an
Ieleventh-hour theory of liability which Plaintiff did not
Iproperiy plead.'
' Because the Court rules that Plaintiff did not properly plead a
supervisor liability claim, the Court need not determine whether
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence 'indicating that Officer
N. Lawson was subject to the authority of Defendant Smith" to survive
summary judgment on the claim. See Dkt. 39, p. 9 n.8.

Accordingly, with the above clarification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED as the
opinion of the Court and Plaintiff's Objections, dkt no. 40, are
OVERRULED. 2 The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint and DENIES
Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and
to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED, this

Z.\

,/;y

2016.

LISA GODB,E'( WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED $'ATES DISTRICT COURT
2

In his Objections, Plain if f rgues that Magistrate Judge Baker "has
not specified where his lice e comes from to issue an order and
recommendation in this matter." Dkt. No. 40, P. 1. Plaintiff is
advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A) - (C):
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and
determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,
except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the
pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an
indictment or information made by the defendant, to
suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to
permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the
court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this
subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the
magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary
to law.
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to
conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to
submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact
and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the
court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A)[.)
(C) the magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings
and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court
and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA