Moreland v. Wood et al

Filing 59

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 30 Motion to Dismiss; 31 Motion to Dismiss; 33 Motion to Dismiss; and 36 Motion to Amend/Correct. Denying 37 Motion for Entry of Default; 40 Motion to Dismiss; 43 Motion to Dismiss; and 55 Motion for Hearing. Granting 38 Motion to Dismiss; 42 Motion to Withdraw; and 47 Motion to Dismiss. Moreland is granted leave to amend his complaint within 14 days of this order. Defendants shall have 21 days to respond to the amended complaint once filed. The clerk is directed to terminate Chief Judge Wood, Judge Graham, and Clerk Tunstall as parties to this action. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 4/16/15. (cmr)

IN THE

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

COURT

FOR THE

GEORGIA

BRUNSWICK DIVISION

DAVID L.

MORELAND,

*

Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

CHIEF JUDGE LISA GODBEY WOOD,

*'

et al.f

CV 214-143

*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

This

case

presents

the

Court

with

allegations

elaborate conspiracy accusing Defendants of treason,

law,

corruption, and racism.

of

an

trespass of

In response to what he perceives

to be an orchestrated and deliberate scheme to sabotage his 2008

employment discrimination lawsuit,
("Moreland")

filed

the

judges in his case,
Appeals,
workers.

opposing

instant

100-page

complaint

Moreland

against

the

a clerk at the Eleventh Circuit Court of

counsel,

Now before

Plaintiff David L.

the

and

Court

his
are

former employer and
several motions

to

co

dismiss

(docs. 30, 31, 33, & 47), supplemental motions to dismiss (docs.
40 & 43) , a motion to amend the complaint and

transfer venue

(doc. 36), a motion for entry of default (doc. 37), a motion to
dismiss Defendant Calvin Lawson without prejudice

(doc. 38),

a

motion to withdraw the motion to dismiss Defendant Calvin Lawson

(doc.

42),

and

a

motion

for

oral

argument

which were filed over just two months'

I.

Moreland

has

sued

Moreland named Chief

James E. Graham,
of

Appeals

and

Brown,

Lois

three

groups

Tunstall

of

individuals.

First,

Magistrate

Judge

(collectively

"the

Judicial

In the second category, Moreland names the law

of

that

Bumgartner,
firm

Defendants"),

discrimination

lawsuit.

co-workers,

Cater,

Terry
who

Inc.

Michael

Strickland

Readdick

were

Finally,

employer Glynn Iron & Metal,
of

of

time.

Lisa Godbey Wood,

("the Attorney

number

all

BACKGROUND

Judge

Readdick,

attorneys

55),

and deputy clerk of the Eleventh Circuit Court

Defendants'') .x
firm

(doc.

and

opposing

Moreland

and his

Fairman,

& Watkins

Garret
counsel

names

his

former boss

Tony

Corbett,

Meader
in

the

former

and a
Eddie

Corbett, Beth Spain, Shaun Conway, William Lewis, Calvin Lawson,

and Norberto Vazquez ("the Glynn Iron Defendants").2

1

As will

be discussed in greater detail below,

Moreland also moves to

amend his complaint to specifically name all judges on the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In his complaint as it now stands, he simply names "United
States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit Judges Unknown.''

2
Throughout his complaint, Moreland apparently misspells (1) Clerk
Tunstall's last name; (2) Terry Readdick's first name; (3) Tony Corbett's and
Eddie Corbett's last names; (4) Beth Spain's last name; (5) Shaun Conway's
first name; and (6) Norberto Vazquez's first name.
Throughout this Order,
the Court uses the spelling advanced by the various Defendants.

A.

The Underlying Discrimination Lawsuit

On

August

Fairman

2008,

Glynn

and

13,

Moreland

Iron

&

Metal,

discrimination based on race.
Inc.

et al. , No.

2:08-cv-104,

(Id. ,

him

an

Docs.

dismiss

attorney,

4-5.)

his

Doc.

(Id., Docs.

7-8.)

10.)

The

late

Before

Judge

2009.

68.)

2010

which

1

(S.D.

was

Ga.

denied

Moreland

without

Judge

Anthony

Alaimo's

passing,

(Id. , Docs.

and

Judge

heard

employment

Aug.

by

13,

2008).)

Judge

moved

prejudice,

to

which

Alaimo

presided

both parties

Graham.

voluntarily

was

granted.
(Id., Doc.

over

the

case.

filed motions

44,

48,

63.)

(Id., Doc.

Both motions

64.)

for

Wood

held

argument

a

on

status

a

for summary

Following Judge Alaimo's

Chief Judge Wood was reassigned the case.

Chief

Michael

on which Judge Alaimo heard argument December

judgment were denied.
passing,

alleging

Moreland later reopened his case.

summary judgment,
21,

Inc.

against

Moreland requested that the court

Thereafter,

complaint

suit

(Moreland v. Glynn Iron & Metal,

In addition to his complaint,
appoint

filed

conference

pending

reconsider the summary judgment ruling.

(Id., Doc.
on March

defense

(Id., Doc.

motion
79.)

22,

to

Chief

Judge Wood later granted the motion for reconsideration in part,

dismissing

Michael

denied the motion as
84.)

Fairman
to

in

his

individual

Glynn Iron & Metal,

capacity,

Inc.

but

(Id. , Doc.

From

this

100-page,

point

212-paragraph

understanding of
nature

forward,

of

the

Court

handwritten

complaint,

to

complaint

the alleged conspiracy.

Moreland's

refers

the

Moreland's

for

its

Given the disjointed
Court

summarizes

the

allegations in bullet format:
•

During
in

discovery,

bad

faith

the

Attorney

interference

Defendants
in

a

"acted
[sic]

investigation" and withheld information to which
Moreland was entitled because of his race and pro

se status.

(Compl., Doc. 1, fU 26, 200.)

•

The hearing on the motion for reconsideration was
simply "an opportunity to find a way to get the
case thrown out of court."
(Id. f 32.)

•

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham "were having ex
parte
communication
behind
[Moreland's]
back
plotting
against
him
and
the
United
States

Government."3

(Id. f 35.)

•

The Attorney Defendants fabricated the truth in
the hearing on the motion for reconsideration by
forcing
Luther
Stephenson,
Johnny Reese,
and
Reggie Nixon to sign affidavits against their
will.
(Id. f 212)

•

The
Attorney Defendants
would not work with
Moreland on meeting to discuss pretrial issues.
(Id. t 215.)

•

At the pretrial conference, Chief Judge Wood gave
Moreland until 5:00 p.m.
to properly tag and
initial

all

exhibits

and

to

submit

certain

exhibits not brought to the conference, while the
defendant was given until that Friday.
(Id.
K1f 38, 216.)

3
Moreland additionally alleges that Judge Graham and Defendant Readdick
have been friends for more than 30 years. (Id. 1 36.)

•

Defendant Meader acted in bad faith during the
pretrial conference "to further the conspiracy ex

parted

[sic]

between

the

conspirators

of

the

conspiracies" and that the Attorney Defendants
filed "three objection [sic] to Plaintiff tr[ia]l
exhibits to misrepresentate
[sic], and mislead
the
jury
hiding
and
concealing
the
truth

violating Plaintiff [sic] right
Constitution."
(IcL Iff 37, 39.)
•

[sic]

under

the

On September
14,
2010,
Judge
Graham held a
settlement conference during which he "tried to
intimidate
the
plaintiff
into
settling
for
3,000.00 dollars" and "acted as an attorney for
the

defendant

Michael

Fairman,

and

his

attorneys."
(Id. f 40.)
When Moreland told
Judge Graham that he would accept 1.5 million to
settle his claims, he alleges that Judge Graham
responded "oh no we will never pay you that. You
can take your chances with a jury, but no jury
every [sic]
found a white man guilty of race
discrimination in this Court."

•

Following the settlement conference, Judge Graham
had Chief Judge Wood move the trial date from
October

25,

2010

to

December

conspirators can make
[sic] done correctly."
•

(Id.)

Judge

Graham

Moreland's
and

and

Chief

evidence

based

authentication

6,

2010

"so

the

sure the conspiracies
(Id. f 41.)

issues

Judge
on
—

Wood

hearsay,
which

he

is

removed

Rule
claims

801,
did

not apply — and Chief Judge Wood "tried to
intimidate
[Moreland]
before and during trial,
stating *if Plaintiff tries to use any evidence
at trial, Plaintiff could be held in contempt of

court and get in a lot of trouble."

(Id. %% 42-

45.)
Moreland alleges that the evidence was
actually removed to mislead the jury, force a
different outcome, and discriminate against him

because his race and pro se status.

(Id. KH 42-

44.)

•

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham directed court

personnel
f 229.)

to

engage

in

the

conspiracy.

(Id.

Moreland additionally makes a number of more general allegations

regarding the biases of Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham.

(Id.

HU 225-29, 210-114.)
Following the

(Id.

f 46.)

that

the

jury.

trial,

During

Attorney

this

denied

on

(Moreland v.

Docs.

130,

2011,

the

Moreland

presented

jurisdictional

164

Clerk

grounds
Inc.

(S.D. Ga. Aug.

of

Moreland's
''failed

false

evidence

to

the

file

for
an

Chief

et al.,

No.

13, 2008).)

Eleventh

appeal

by

Circuit

want

of

appellant's

Judge

According to Moreland,

convinced

the

the

Court

dismissing the appeal.

of

which

Wood.

2:08-cv-104,

On November 22,
Court

of

Appeals

prosecution

because

brief

excerpts within the time fixed by the rules[.]"5
168.)

to

followed by a motion for new trial,

Glynn Iron & Metal,

134,

dismissed

Moreland additionally alleges

Moreland then filed a notice of appeal with

the Eleventh Circuit,

was

trial,

Defendants

% 212.)

(Id.

the jury returned a defense verdict.

and

record

(Id., Doc.

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham

Appeals

to

conceal

the

truth

by

(Compl. f 49.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this conspiracy,

"is

he

still

is

being

black

ball

by

the

conspirators"

and

4
Paragraphs 210-211 refer to those on page 95 of Moreland's complaint.
Moreland begins renumbering his complaint at various points.

5
Though signed by John Ley, the clerk of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, Lois Tunstall seems to have been the deputy clerk who prepared the
dismissal order.

"suffering

emotional

reckless malicious[]
B.

and

physically

from

the

conspirators'

(Id. %% 47, 50.)

action."

Procedural History

Moreland filed his present complaint on September 17,

nearly four years after the conclusion of his trial.6
attempting

judges of

to

serve

the

Judicial

Defendants,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of

2014,

After

including

Appeals,

the

United States

Magistrate Judge Brian Epps ordered Moreland to cease and desist
all

efforts

instructed

employees

to

serve

persons

Moreland

of

the

on

not

the

United

listed

in

appropriate

States.

(Doc.

the

complaint

method

and

serving

After

10.)

of

Moreland

attempted to personally serve Judge Graham and Chief Judge Wood,
he

was

shown

deputy

clerk

and

read

offered

Federal

to

January 5 to January 9,
Defendants save one:
16,

2015,

29.)

Moreland

Defendant

issue
2015,

of

moved

for

Civil

another

Procedure

set

of

an

(Docs.

17-28.)

extension

of

Lawson.

given

(Doc.

until

29.)

February

Moreland

23,

6

could

not

find

On October 6,

him.

(Doc.

38.)

the

From

the named

time

to

serve

(Docs.

2015

to

16,

serve

then moved on February

18 to dismiss Defendant Lawson without prejudice,
he

and

On January

which was granted by Judge Epps.
was

4

summons.

Moreland served all of

Calvin Lawson.

Moreland

Defendant Lawson,

Rule

Just

asserting that

five

days

later,

2014, Moreland also filed a "Motion for Recusal,

Removal,

Disqualification or Impeachment" of all district judges in the Eleventh
Circuit, as well as a motion to transfer venue to the District of Columbia.
Both motions were denied.

(Docs.

6,

11,

13.)

Moreland moved to withdraw his motion to dismiss,

stating that

he did not realize Defendant Lawson had been found and served on

February 10, 2 015.

(Doc. 42.)

The Attorney Defendants

on behalf of

filed two motions

to

dismiss,

one

the individually-named attorneys and one on behalf

of the law firm,

each on January 26, 2015.

(Docs.

30, 33.)

The

Glynn Iron Defendants likewise filed a motion to dismiss on that
date.

(Doc.

31.)

The Judicial Defendants have moved to dismiss

Moreland's complaint as well.

On February 6,

2015,

(Doc. 47.)

Moreland moved to amend his complaint

to specifically name all Eleventh Circuit judges and to transfer
the

case

Columbia

Moreland

to

United

Circuit.

moved

defendants.

his

the

complaint,

(Doc.

for

(Doc.

States

entry

37.)

the

36.)

Court
Then,

of

of

Appeals

on

District

February

default

12,

against

all

of

2015,

named

In light of Moreland's motion to amend

Attorney

Defendants

and

the

Glynn

Defendants each filed supplemental motions to dismiss,

Iron

asserting

that the amended complaint Moreland seeks to file supersedes his

original complaint and does not contain any allegations against
them sufficient to state a claim.

II.

As detailed above,

motions,

(Docs. 40,

43.)

DISCUSSION

the Court is presented with many pending

both by Defendants and Moreland.

To summarize,

each

Defendant

has

filed

and Moreland

has

Transfer Venue;
to

Dismiss

motion;

and

a

motion

filed

(3)

a

a

dismiss —

Motion

Lawson

and

grounds,

have

to Amend;

a

Motion

as

well

as

filed

(2)

to

Motion for Oral Argument.

addresses the Judicial Defendants'

immunity

some

a

a Motion for Entry of Default;

Defendant

(5)

(1)

to

Motion to

(4)

a Motion

Withdraw

First,

Court

addresses

Motion to Dismiss on judicial

Moreland's

Defendants'

Finally,
to

and

Moreland's

Glynn

Iron

that

the Court

Motion

to

Amend

complaint to add the individual Eleventh Circuit judges.
the

two —

complaint

Defendants'

and

his

Next,

the

Attorney

to

Dismiss.

Motions

the Court rules on the remaining motions — the Motion

Transfer

Venue,

Motion

Entry

Motion

to

Dismiss

Defendant

Dismiss,

of

Default,

Withdraw

that

Motion

to

Motion

to

and Motion for Oral Argument.

A.

Lawson,

for

Absolute Judicial Immunity

"Judges

damages

are

entitled

to

absolute

judicial

immunity

from

for those acts taken while they are acting in their

judicial capacity unless they acted in the 'clear absence of all

jurisdiction.'"

2000)

Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,

1239 (11th Cir.

(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-57 (1978)).

Indeed,

"[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common

law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for
acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction."

Cashion Nev.

Spendthrift Trust v. Vance,

William B.

552 F. App'x 884,

885

(11th Cir.

(1967)).

2014)

(quoting Pierson v.

Ray,

386 U.S.

547,

553-54

"This immunity applies even when the judge is accused

of acting maliciously and corruptly/7

Pierson,

386 U.S. at 554,

or when "the judge's acts are in error ... or were in excess
of his or her jurisdiction."

The Supreme

Court

Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239

has recognized

this broad grant of immunity:

judicial capacity and

(2)

absence of all jurisdiction.

(1)

just

two

exceptions

to

for actions taken in a non

for actions taken

in the complete

Vance, 552 F. App'x at 886.

Whether a judge's actions were made while acting in
his [or her] judicial capacity depends on whether: (1)
the act complained of constituted a normal judicial
function;

(2)

the

events

occurred

in

the

judge's

chambers
or
in
open court;
(3)
the
controversy
involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the
.confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the
judge in his judicial capacity.

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005).

Second,

determining whether a judge acted in "complete absence of all

jurisdiction"

requires

an inquiry into whether the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
Bush,

220 F.

App'x 974,

975-76

(11th Cir.

Wash. Mut. Bank v.
2007)

(per curiam).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in determining whether a

judge acted in complete absence of jurisdiction or simply acted
in excess of jurisdiction:

[I] f a probate
over wills

persons,
offences,

court,

and the

should

invested only with authority

settlement

proceed

of

estates

to try

parties

jurisdiction over
10

the subject

of

deceased

for
of

public

offences

being entirely wanting in the court, and this being
necessarily known to its judge, his commission would
afford no protection to him in the exercise of the
usurped authority. But if on the other hand a judge of
a
criminal
court,
invested with general
criminal
jurisdiction over offences committed within a certain
district, should hold a particular act to be a public
offence, which is not by the law made an offence, and
proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged
with such act, or should sentence a party convincted
[sic] to a greater punishment than that authorized by
the law upon its proper construction,
no personal
liability to civil action for such acts would attach
to the judge, although those acts would be in excess
of his jurisdiction, or of the jurisdiction of the

court held by him, for these are particulars for his
judicial
consideration,
whenever
his
general
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invoked.
Bradley v. Fisher,

80 U.S.

335, 352

(1871).

Judicial immunity also extends beyond judges.
officials,
their

such as

"official

clerks,

duties

judicial process."
751

(11th

Hyland

v.

Cir.

clerks

arising

from

362858,

at

*2

267

have

acts

Ghee

an

2012)(internal

court order or at
omitted));

have

integral

immunity where

relationship

Caffey v. Ala. Sup. Ct. , 469 F.

Kolhage,

("Court

enjoy quasi-judicial

Non-judicial

F.

absolute

they

are

quotations

App'x

836,

immunity

from actions

(N.D.

United

Ga.

See

Cir.
for

also

2008)
damages

specifically required to do under

a judge's direction[.]"

v.

(11th

the

App'x 748,

omitted).

842

with

States,

Jan.

30,

No.

2013)

(internal quotations

1:10-cv-0381,

("To the

2013

extent

WL

[the

plaintiff] intends to assert claims against the Eleventh Circuit

11

judges

or

clerk

based

on

the

dismissal

of

her

appeal,

those

individuals have absolute judicial immunity.").

i.

Chief Judge Wood and Magistrate Judge Graham

As best the Court can discern,

Moreland makes the following

allegations against Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham:

1.

Chief Judge Wood's

hearing on the motion for

reconsideration was simply "an opportunity to
find a way to get the case thrown out of

court."

(Compl. K 32.)

2.

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham "were having
ex parte
communication behind
[Moreland's]
back plotting against him and the United
States Government."
(Id. f 35.)

3.

Judge Graham and Defendant Readdick have been

friends for more than 30 years.
4.

(Id. K 36.)

At the pretrial conference, Chief Judge Wood
gave Moreland until 5:00 p.m. to properly tag
and initial

all

exhibits and to

submit certain

exhibits not brought to the conference, while
the defendant was given until that Friday.
(Id. UK 38, 216.)

5.

Judge Graham tried to intimidate Moreland into
settling his claims and said "no jury every
[sic]
found
a
white
man
guilty
of
race
discrimination in this Court."
(Id. K 40.)

6.

Judge

Graham

trial

date

had

from

Chief

October

Judge
25,

Wood

2010

move

to

the

December

6, 2010 "so the conspirators can make sure the
conspiracies is [sic] done correctly."
(Id.

11 41.)
7.

Judge

Graham

and

Chief

Judge

Wood

evidence

that did
different

not apply in order to force a
outcome,
mislead
the
jury,
and

discriminate

based on rules

against

race and pro se status.
12

Moreland

of

removed

Moreland's

based

evidence

on

(Id. UK 42-45.)

his

8.

Chief Judge Wood tried to intimidate Moreland
by stating if he attempts to use excluded
evidence,

he

would

be

in

contempt

of

court.

(Id.)

9.

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham directed
court personnel to engage in the conspiracy.
(Id. H 229.)

10. Chief
the

Judge

Wood

Eleventh

conceal the
(Id. 1| 49.)

and Judge

Circuit

truth by

Graham convinced

Court

of

dismissing

Appeals

the

to

appeal.

11. Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham allowed
their biases and prejudices to inform their
decisions,

which

contradicts

their

oath

of

office.

Given

the

substantial

overlap

in

allegations

against

these

Judges, the Court addresses the applicability of immunity as to
both of them concurrently.

First,

Graham

the

were,

capacities.

Court

at

all

finds that Chief Judge

times,

acting

within

Wood

their

and

Judge

judicial

All of the above-mentioned allegations refer to

various stages in litigation, ranging from pre-trial proceedings
to appeal.

Indeed,

the crux of Moreland's complaint is that

during the course of the litigation, Chief Judge Wood and Judge
Graham allowed

their

own personal

biases

to influence

their

decisions and that they engaged in a conspiracy with the other
Defendants to further those biases.

Moreland never alleges that

he dealt with the Judges on an informal or personal basis, but

13

rather his entire claim centers on proceedings in his employment
discrimination case.

As to this factor,
the

act

and

resolves

not

the

intention

question

Patterson v.
Any

the

the law is clear:

Aiken,

perceived

of

628

whether

F.

motivation

for

nature

of

evidentiary

ruling

on

nature.

the

rulings,

It

holding

motions,

and

with

applicability of
6:12-cv-442,
(finding

immunity

relationship
of

with

the

plain

at

any

Cuyler v.

U.S.

Dist.

*2

Fla.

Nov.

to

this

are

1985) .

would

the act,

and

all

be

and not

Court

that

hearings,

judicial

*4

the

No.

2011)

has

not

.hinder

See Sheikh v.
(M.D.

Fla.

based

counsel).

immunity

Ct.,

14,

which

act."

Ga.

rulings

would

claim

Sibley factors,

judicial

(N.D.

conferences

counsel

1166236,

opposing

to

done

in

claim that Judge Graham had a personal

barred

exception

(M.D.

is

was

*judicial'

1074

management

opposing

WL

a

intention of

judicial immunity.

2012

it

Judges'

status

case

Even Moreland's

relationship

context

act.

was

1068,

the

the

which

it

Supp.

appropriately categorized as
the

with

"[I]t is the nature of

Court

not

Apr.

been

9,

the

viewed

finds

6: ll-cv-1225,

Foxman,

upon

Thus,

the

that

met.

No.

2012)

judge's

in

the

the
first

See

also

2011 WL 5525935,

(applying judicial

at

immunity when

federal judges were alleged to have willfully and intentionally
dismissed

valid

claims,

ignored

14

rules

and

laws,

directed

the

clerk

to

close

cases,

refused

hearings,

and

threatened

the

plaintiff with sanctions).
Turning

to

clear

that

Chief

clear

absence

invoked

the

Brunswick

second

Judge

of

all

exception,

Wood

and

in

the

filing

the

Judge

jurisdiction.

jurisdiction of

Division

lawsuit.

ability

the

record

Graham

Indeed,

is

did

not

act

Moreland

Southern District

his

similarly

employment

of

in

himself
Georgia,

discrimination

It appears to the Court that Moreland has confused the

to

act

in

excess

of

jurisdiction with

acting

in

the

absence of jurisdiction in the first place.

Here,
most

the

Supreme

beneficial.

probate
consider

judges,
wills

Court's

illustration

If

Chief

Judge

Wood

then

they

would

have

and

trusts.

If

they

and

in

Bradley

Judge

Graham

jurisdiction

were

to

proves

make

were

only

to

rulings

on

Moreland's discrimination suit, they would be acting in complete

absence

of

jurisdiction.

jurisdiction to

decide

Federal

discrimination

judges,

cases.

however,

Thus,

have

if

the

judges were to make up their own set of discrimination laws and

apply them to impose liability on an individual, they would not
be acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction but rather
would be exceeding the scope of their jurisdiction.

The same

logic applies to the instant case.

Here, Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham clearly had subject

matter and personal jurisdiction over the case.
15

Moreland raised

claims

under

Title

VII,

a

federal

law,

and

jurisdiction of the federal court in Brunswick,
the

facts

Court

that

alleged

must

do

Chief

on

Judge

in Moreland's
a

motion

Wood

to

and

complaint

dismiss

Judge

—

as

at

Graham

invoked

Georgia.

true —

best

Taking

which this

Moreland

exceeded

the

the

states

scope

of

their jurisdiction by engaging in improper behavior in managing
the

case.

In

jurisdiction

no

way

in the

does

first

that,

place.

however,

them

of

Moreland appears

Indeed,

divest

to

recognize as much when he states that Chief Judge Wood and Judge
Graham acted outside their job description and contrary to their
Oath of Office.

Such an allegation would not alter the court's

subject matter jurisdiction.
ii.

Clerk Tunstall

Moreland
Tunstall:
conceal

"FOR

that

the

THE

DISMISSED

makes

one

allegation

she dismissed Moreland's

lower

COURT

for

just

-

court's

BY

want

actions.

DIRECTION"

of

against

appeal

That

stated

in an attempt

Order,

"this

prosecution because

Defendant

which went

appeal

the

is

to
out

hereby

appellant

David

Leon Moreland has failed to file an appellant's brief and record

excerpts within the
The

Eleventh

immunity

time

Circuit

extends

to

has

fixed by

clearly held,

court

clerks

specifically required to do under
direction [. ]"

Tarter v.

the rules[.]"

Hury,
16

however,

for

court

646

F.2d

(Doc.
that

actions

168.)

judicial

"they

are

order or at a judge's
1010,

1013

(5th

Cir.

June 1, 1981).7

It is difficult for this Court to imagine a task

less appropriate for quasi-judicial immunity.

Like Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham,

the two exceptions

to judicial immunity likewise do not apply to Ms. Tunstall.
one,

her

action

dismissing

judicial function.

way did Ms.

appeal

was

the Eleventh Circuit Court

the court.

Tunstall act

As

of Appeals,

to the second exception,

in complete

Moreland was

who first invoked the jurisdiction of each court.

filed his

Appeals,

lawsuit

a

in the Southern District

Notice of Appeal with the

at

in no

absence of jurisdiction.

As with the other two Judicial Defendants,

original

clearly

She entered the dismissal of his appeal in a

pending case before
the direction of

Moreland's

For

the one

He filed his

of Georgia,

and he

Eleventh Circuit Court of

which clearly has jurisdiction over appeals filed in

this district.

Accordingly,

the Court finds that all Judicial Defendants

are protected under the doctrines of judicial and quasi-judicial
immunity.

Therefore,

all

claims

asserted

against

these

Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Hi. Motion to Amend to Add Eleventh Circuit Judges

Moreland additionally seeks leave to amend his complaint

pursuant

to Federal

Rule

of Civil

Procedure

15 in order to

7
see Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981) (holding Fifth Circuit decisions made on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding precedent in Eleventh Circuit).
17

individually name all Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals judges,
active and senior.

Rule 15 allows a party to amend its pleading

once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it or, "if

the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required,
21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b),
earlier."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).

(e) , or

(f), whichever is

For the purposes of Rule 15,

a motion to dismiss does not qualify as a "responsive pleading."
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282,
1291 (11th Cir.

2007) .

Prior to Moreland's motion to amend, no Defendant had filed

an answer.

Under this rule,

then,

Moreland could have simply

filed an amended complaint .as a matter of course,

leaving
Instead,

waiving

this

Court

Moreland

"the

"invit[ing]
amendments."

70

chose

right
the

(11th Cir.

with

to

no

room

to file

amend

District

as

Court

to

review

a motion

the

to amend,

a matter
to

presumably

review

of

pleading.
thereby

course"

[the]

and

proposed

Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869-

2010) .

If this Court were to accept such an

invitation, it very well might find any amendment futile given
the sub-par pleading and doctrine of judicial immunity.
However,

the Eleventh Circuit has held that a district

court may not sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff's complaint based
on the doctrine of judicial immunity, as it is an affirmative
18

defense subject to waiver and does not automatically divest the
court of
159

F.

subject matter jurisdiction.

App'x

although

the

938,

Court

939

(11th

has

Cir.

serious

Mordkofsky v.

2005)

doubts

(per

as

Calabresi,

curiam).

to

the

Thus,

merits

of

Moreland's claims against the Eleventh Circuit judges given the

doctrine of judicial immunity,

it nonetheless reserves for those

judges the opportunity to raise that defense.
The

Court

allegations

is

similarly

contained

in

Eleventh Circuit judges.

afforded pro se litigants,

the

troubled

by

the

scarce

complaint

as

they

relate

factual

to

the

However, and in light of the deference

the Court finds the correct action at

this early stage is to allow Moreland the opportunity to clarify
his claims.

This result is particularly appropriate given.that

the Court is granting Moreland leave to amend his complaint as
to his Civil RICO claims.

that any claims

judges

must

The Court cautions Moreland,

against the Eleventh

similarly

comply

requirements detailed below.

with

Circuit

all

however,

Court of Appeals

amended

pleading

This includes any limitations on

the types of claims that may be raised and the manner in which
they are to be presented.

B.

Moreland's Complaint and the Pending Motions to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not whether

the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits.
19

Scheuer v.

Rhodes,
all

416 U.S.

facts

in the

Hoffman-Pugh
court,

conclusions

v.

Ramsey,

The court must accept as true

complaint and construe all

light most
312

favorable
F.3d

however,

need

not

as

only

its

true,

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

A

236 (1974).

alleged in the

inferences

The

232,

complaint

on its face.'"

544,

"factual

570

content

inference

that

alleged."

1225
the

accept

(11th

complaint's

well-pled

facts.

must

at

"contain

678

sufficient

(citing Bell Atl.

(2007)).
that

Id.

legal

Ashcroft

factual

.the

Corp.

allows

the

defendant

court

is

"The plausibility
but

to

liable

draw

As Moreland

for

standard

it asks

rightfully recognizes,

are

held

v.

the

the

v.

matter,

Twombly,

for more

to

a

less

in

this

stringent

reasonable

misconduct

is not

akin

than

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."

pleadings

2002).

The plaintiff is required to plead

"probability requirement,'

se

Cir.

See

"to state a claim to relief that is plausible
Id.

550 U.S.

1222,

the plaintiff.

678-79 (2009).

also

accepted as true,

to

reasonable

to a

a sheer

Id.

Circuit

"[p]ro

standard

than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed."

Tannenbaum v.

(11th Cir. 1998) .

United

States,

148

F.3d

1262,

1263

This liberal construction afforded to pro se

pleadings notwithstanding, "a complaint must provide sufficient
notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that

a "largely groundless claim' does not proceed through discovery
20

and

"take

up

the

Halpin v.

David,

Fla.

June

22,

U.S.

336,

standard

(quoting

No.

347

Leeds

"Additionally,

a

number

pro

people

.

at

.

*4

"Hence,

even

though

complaint

se

is

quite

law

will

not

suffice.'"

F.3d

51,

85

court's

duty

to

53

Broudo,
the

(2d
a

544

pleading

Cir.

construe

.'"

(N.D.

liberal,

of

v.

.

Inc.

Meltz,

the

other

Pharm. ,

conclusions

v.

of

2009 WL 1753759,

(quoting Dura

(2005)).

a

and

of

4:06-cv-457,

2009)

for

assertions

time

"bald
Id.

1996)).

plaintiff's

complaint liberally is not the equivalent of a duty to rewrite
it."

Id.

Moreland's

complaint,

over 200 paragraphs,
(1)

(3)

which

Court

100

malpractice;

§ 1985;

and

(4)

(2)

For

example,

conspiracy.

Moreland's

and

includes

four counts:

violation of Civil RICO;

is entirely without direction as

claims.

pages

only specifically identifies

violation of 42 U.S.C.

legal

spans

From

there,

the

to any other possible

complaint

is

replete

with

headings referring to general areas of law without any factual

support,

but

various

cases

8

H 72);

instead
or

These headings

legal

statutes.8

include:

(1)

Indeed,

11 74-77);

(4)

a

and/or
vast

citation

many

to

of

these

"Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction"

(Compl.

(2) "RICO Jurisdiction" (id^ 1 73);

(3) "tort claim compliance" (id^

"Equitable And Injunctive Jurisdiction Upon Lack Of Adequate

Remedies Of Law" (id^_ 11 78-84);
88);

conclusions

(5) "Immunities And Estoppel" (id^ 11 85-

(6) "breach of qualified immunities"

(id^ 11 89-91);

(7)

"Breaches Of

Judicial Immunities" (id^ 11 92-99); (8) "Common Law Reliance Estoppel" (id^_
11 100-102); (9) "Pro Se Litigants Entitled To Fees" (id. 1 103); (10) "USC
14th Amendment Deprived The Use Of Property" (id^ 1 104); (11) "What
Constitutes Property Protected Under Constitution" (icL 1 105); (12) "On Due
21

"claims"

— if

that

is

what

they are

intended

to

be — include

nothing more than a string cite of cases and/or statutes.
With
mind,

the

liberal

review pro

se pleadings

are

afforded

in

the Court ventures to address each of the four identified

claims

(Legal

Malpractice,

Conspiracy/Section

1985,

and

Civil

RICO) and then the litany of other legal theories presented.
i.

Legal Malpractice

Moreland

Graham,

alleges

that

Terry Readdick,

Chief

Judge

Wood,

Magistrate

and Garret Meader all

Judge

committed legal

malpractice and "should be reported to the proper authorities."

(Compl.

H 67.)

To support this claim,

Moreland contends that

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham are in violation of Judicial
Codes of Conduct,
of

and that Readdick and Meader are in violation

state bar rules

for misrepresentation and presenting false

statements and documentation before a

jury.

(Id.

KH

68-69.)

Plaintiff alleges that this conduct is "gross" and "malicious"
as

well

as

"reckless"

and

negligent.

(Id^

H 70.)

For that

Process Violation 5th And 14th Amendments" (id^ 1 106); (13) "Jurisdiction Of
The Case (Basic Element Of Due Process)" (id^ 1 107); (14) "Sense Of Fair

Play Shocked Is Not Due

Process

(Congress Barred)"

(id.

1 108);

(15)

"Discrimination As Violation Of Due Process 5th Amendment" (id. 1 109) ; (16)
"14th Amendment
Is The Due Process
[]
Right"
(idL
1 110);
(17)

"Jurisdictional" (id^ 11 117-18); (18) "Statute Of Limitation And Tolling"
(id. 1 119); (19) "Dismissal Issue" (id^ 11 120-24); (20) "Rule 60" (id^
11 125-28); (21) "Federal Judges Oath of Office" (id. 11 142-43)' (22)
"Corrupted Judges" (id^_ 11 144-46); (23) "Trespassers of Law" (icL 11 14748); (24) "Treason of Judges" (icL 1 150); (25) "Perjury in a Judicial

Context" (id^_ 1 151); (26) "Obstruction by Intimidation Threats, Persuasion,
or Deception" (icL 1 152); (27) "Witness Tampering" (id^_ 1 153); and (28)
"Obstruction by Destruction of Evidence" (id. 1 154).
22

reason,

Moreland

seeks

compensatory

well as court costs and expenses.
Moreland's

claim for

and

punitive

damages,

as

(Id.)

legal malpractice must

fail.

First/

Chief Judge Wood and Judge Graham, as detailed above, are immune
from suit under the

only

claims

Defendants.

that

doctrine of

are

left

These Defendants,

are

judicial

those

however,

Moreland — they were opposing counsel.

immunity.

against
at

[the Attorney Defendants

suit]

may

However,

give

rise

to

an

time

Attorney

represented

"Mistakes, if any,

in the underlying
action

the

the

As such, Moreland is not

the proper plaintiff to allege such a claim.

by

no

Thus,

for

discrimination

legal

malpractice.

this is a claim that must be brought by [the Attorney

Defendants']

client[.]"

See Baker.v. Eichholz, No. 4:06-cv-021,

2009 WL 62265, at *2 n.2

(S.D. Ga. Jan. 9,

2009).

Indeed, the

first element that a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must

prove is "employment of the defendant attorney," which Moreland
clearly cannot do.

(Ga. Ct. App. 2000).

See Szurovy v. Olderman, 530 S.E.2d 783, 785

Thus, it would be the Attorney Defendants'

client that could bring a claim for legal malpractice.

Moreland

may not do so on his own behalf simply because he believes their
conduct at trial harmed him.9

Accordingly,

Count III is hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.10

9
As a secondary basis for dismissal, Georgia law is clear that "an
attorney's conduct will not support a legal malpractice action solely because
the conduct violates the Bar Rules[.]"
23

Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes &

ii.

Conspiracy and Section 1985

Count

I,

which

is

not

specifically

labeled,

appears

begin at Paragraph 4 7 and alleges violation of 42 U.S.C.

& 1985.

(Compl.

%% 47-54.)

(Id. 1 71.)

allegations

his

discrimination

November

on

lawsuit

2 011

when

The entirety of Moreland's

treatment

during

in

filed

the

§§ 1983

Count IV alleges "Conspiracy" and

again cites to § 1985.
center

to

This

2008.

Eleventh

Circuit

his

case

employment

concluded

Court

of

in

Appeals

dismissed Moreland's appeal for want of prosecution.11
Sections
limitations

personal

and

&

1985

instead

561

(11th Cir.

U.S.C.

§§

have

are

injury statute of

F.3d 556,
under 42

1983

independent

governed

by

limitations.

1996)

1983 []

no

the

statute

forum

Rozar v.

of

state's

Mullis,

85

("As to the claims brought here .

and 1985, []

precedent

is

clear that

these are measured by the personal injury limitations period of
the state.") ; Reynolds v. Murray,

2006)(per

Georgia,

curiam).

Here,

Moreland

where the statute of

Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719, 720

170 F. App'x 49,

filed

his

50

(11th Cir.

complaint

in

limitations on personal injury

(Ga. 1995).

Thus, to the extent Moreland

is claiming that the Attorney Defendants' violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, such claims would fail.
10

The Court dismisses this claim with prejudice because it finds that any

amendment or additional pleading from Moreland would be futile given that he
was at no time a client of the Attorney Defendants.

11

Moreland moved to reopen his employment discrimination case based on

the alleged conspiracy on February 12, 2015.
that action,

No rulings have been made in

aside from reassigning the case from Chief Judge Wood to the

undersigned.
24

claims is two years.
of

limitations

determines

WL 927562,

Ray,

327

is

when

Koldewey v.

O.C.G.A.
borrowed

the

* 1

F.3d

ordinarily begins

Ga.

1182

law,

"[f]ederal

limitations

Pet.

Ctr.,

Apr.

(11th

And while the statute

state

of

Prob.

(S.D.

1181,

from

statute

Bacon Cnty.

at

§ 9-3-33.

4,

Cir.

begins

No.

2008)

run."

5:07-cv-085,

2008

(quoting Lovett v.

2003)).

to run "from the date

to

law

the

The

facts

statute

which would

support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to

a

person

Reynolds,

with

a

reasonably

prudent

regard

for

his

rights."

170 F. App'x at 51.

Seemingly recognizing that it has been more than two years
since

he

the

makes

First,

last

two

he

event

occurred

arguments

argues

that

to
"a

in Moreland's

avoid

conspiracy

the

judgment

statute

of

to

dismiss

because

theory,

limitations.
of

some

trumped up technicality giving excuse to dismiss a non-lawyer

pro se litigant's complaint" would be manifestly unjust.12
35

at

5.)

limitations,

Second,

Moreland

arguing

that

seeks

Defendants

to

toll

all

the

(Doc.

statute

"continuously

of

and

fraudulently concealed their wrongful acts from Plaintiff" and
that Moreland has "been diligent in researching,

the cause of action[.]"

tolling,

"[t]he

burden

(Compl.

is

on

% 119.)

the

and discovering

To invoke equitable

plaintiff

to

show

that

12
The Court - while sympathetic to the daunting task pro se litigants
face in navigating the complexity of statutes of limitation - is aware of no
law allowing for the tolling of the statute of limitations on this basis.
25

equitable

tolling

F.3d 1474,

of

1479

is

warranted."

(11th Cir.

Justice

1993).

v.

United States,

6

And although "[t]he doctrine

fraudulent concealment is read into every federal statute of

limitations,"

it

cannot

be

concealed from Moreland.

said

that

See Hood v.

anything

was

fraudulently

Sweetheart Cup Co.,

816 F.

Supp. 720, 727 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
merely

First,

stating

that

Defendants

"fraudulently

concealed their wrongful acts" and tried "to impede and prevent

the

discovery

insufficient

of

to

this

litigation

support

equitable

or

cause

tolling,

of

as

action"

such

is

statements

are merely conclusory allegations without factual support.

This

is particularly true given that a plaintiff must plead with
particularity
concealment

"facts

before

limitations."
1347,

giving

a

rise

federal

Pedraza v.

court

to

a

will

United Guar.

claim

of

toll

Corp.,

the

114

fraudulent
statute

F.

Supp.

of

2d

1356 (S.D. Ga. 2000).

Even so,

factual

a

complete

allegations

properly

pled,

entirely

on

demonstrate

would

his

review of Moreland's

not

employment

that

stand.

the

complaint

exception,

Moreland's

discrimination

and

even

claims

litigation.

if

focus
He

alleges, inter alia, that the Attorney Defendants would not work
with him pre-trial, that the judges held biases and prejudices

against

him,

that

the

Attorney

Defendants

presented

false

testimony, and that he was improperly prohibited from presenting
26

evidence at trial —

all because of his race and status as a pro

se

every

litigant.

At

stage

of

proceedings, Moreland was present.
conferences

attended

where

the

allegedly

pre-trial

these

purportedly

corrupt

He attended the hearings and

racist

conference

comments

where

were

his

made,

evidence

he

was

excluded, he attended trial where the allegedly false statements

and

documents

were

presented

to

the

jury,

and

service of all documents and orders in the case.

he

received

Here,

Moreland

"simply provides no basis from which the Court could conclude
that [he was]

ignorant of Defendant[s' ] unlawful conduct and, if

[he was], whether that ignorance was reasonable."

As

such,

Moreland

is

not

"entitled

to

extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling."
of

Corr.,

297

Moreland's

§

F.3d

1983

1278,

and

before he filed suit,

§ 1985

1289

(11th

claims

the

rare

See Drew v.

Cir.

arose

Id. at 1357.

2002).

more

and

Dep't

Because

than

two years

the Court finds that they are time-barred

and are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Hi.

The

Civil RICO

majority

of

Moreland's

complaint

appears

to

be

dedicated to allegations that Defendants violated the Racketeer
Influenced and
§§ 1961-68.

Corrupt
Under

violation

have

establish

a

a

civil

Organizations Act

Section

civil

RICO

cause

1964,
of

violation,
27

those
action

("RICO"),
injured
under

Moreland

must

18 U.S.C.
by

a

RICO

Act.

To

satisfy

four

the

elements:

(1)

pattern;

(4)

Assocs.,

conduct;

of

activity."

U.S.C.

Constr.

Co.

v.

2007).

Rule

standard,

9(b),

can be

place,

which is

with

"racketeering
a

pattern

of

482

Ambrosia

F.3d 1309,

imposes

the

1316

Coal

(11th

heightened

&

Cir.

pleading
"(1)

the

or misrepresentations made;

(2)

and person responsible for the statement;

(3)
the

documents,

manner

Plaintiff[];

and

(4)

F.3d 1364,

Mgmt.

The RICO statute

establish

particularity.

which

and

Brooks

a

"essentially a certain breed of

Morales,

content

fraud."

To

Bus.

satisfied when the plaintiff alleges:

precise statements,
the time,

1988).

v.

constitute

§ 1961(1).

pled

Pages

Durham

through

Id. § 1961(5).

A RICO violation,

be

may

(3)

there must be at least two predicate acts

of racketing activity.

must

enterprise;

activity.

what

racketeering activity,

an

1511 (11th Cir.

defines
18

fraud,"

of

racketeering

847 F.2d 1505,

specifically

the

(2)

v.

1380-81

in

which

these

statements

misled

what the defendants gained by the alleged

Blue

Cross

(11th Cir.

&

Blue

Shield of

Fla.,

1997) (per curiam).

Inc.,

116

"[I]n a case

involving multiple defendants . . . the complaint should inform
each defendant of the nature of his alleged participation in the

fraud."

Id. at 1381 (internal quotations omitted).

Moreland's

complaint

does

imposed by the Federal Rules.
mostly

conclusory

not

meet

the

high

standard

Instead, his complaint contains

allegations

and
28

citations

to

cases

and

statutes.

late

While

paragraphs

he

of

does

his

present

some

complaint,

he

facts

does

in

the

not

early and

identify

which

facts apply to which claims or which Defendants.
Particularly

Court

finds

in

that

light

leave

of

to

Moreland's

amend

pro

the

se

status,

complaint

would

the

be

appropriate, subject to the following conditions:
1.

Moreland

shall

specifically

only

address

dismissed

by

those

this

claims

Order.13

not

Stated

differently, Moreland shall not raise claims for
legal malpractice or violations of Sections 1983
and
1985,
as
they
have
been
dismissed
with
prejudice.
2.

Moreland

shall

only

name

Defendants

not

specifically
dismissed
by
this
Order.
Stated
differently, all claims against Chief Judge Wood,
Judge
Graham,
and
Clerk
Tunstall
have
been
dismissed as barred by judicial immunity.
Moreland
shall not raise claims against them in his amended

complaint.
add

As noted above,

the

individual

however,

Eleventh

Moreland may

Circuit

Court

of

appeals judges as defendants.
3.

Moreland's

amended

(10)

4.

each

shall

not

exceed TEN

PAGES.

For

complaint

claim

asserted,

Moreland

shall

clearly

identify (1) one source of law and/or one legal
theory upon which he asserts liability; (2) each
defendant against whom he asserts liability on that
theory; and (3) the factual allegations that form
the basis of each claim against each defendant.
5.

Moreland
conditions

is
of

cautioned
this

if

order

he

does

not

obey

the

"within the time the court

13
Moreland, throughout his complaint, refers to a "conspiracy."
It is
unclear to the Court, however, if he intends to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d),
which makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the substantive RICO

provisions.
If Moreland wishes to allege such a violation in his amended
complaint, he is directed to specifically identify such an allegation as a
separate count.
29

sets, the Court may strike the pleading or issue any
other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

6.

Moreland is finally instructed that "an amended
complaint
supersedes and replaces
the
original
complaint unless the amendment specifically refers
to or adopts the earlier pleading."
Schreane v.
Middlebrooks,
522 F. App'x 845,
847
(11th Cir.
2013) (internal quotations omitted) .
Because the

Court

is

granting

leave

to

amend

the

complaint

because of its pleading deficiencies, Moreland MAY
NOT rely upon, or incorporate by reference, the
allegations contained in the original complaint.

Subject

to

these

six

conditions,

leave to amend his complaint.
DAYS

from

the

COMPLAINT

in

date

of

accordance

this

with

alone entry on the docket.
(21)

Moreland

is

hereby

GRANTED

Moreland shall have FOURTEEN (14)
Order

the

to

terms

file

of

this

his

FIRST

Order

as

AMENDED

a

stand

Defendants then shall have TWENTY-ONE

DAYS to renew their motion to dismiss or otherwise respond to

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

As it relates to the Eleventh

Circuit judges, Moreland is reminded that pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(a) (2-3), United States employees are afforded

SIXTY (60) DAYS to respond following proper service.
iv.

As

Other Asserted Legal Theories

to

Moreland's

the

twenty-plus

complaint,

the

legal

Court

is

theories
almost

presented

entirely

direction as to how they apply to his set of facts.

in

without
Instead,

Moreland asserts that a court reviewing a pro se pleading must

"take notice of and incorporate relevant statutes and rules and

precedents even if not pleaded."

30

(Compl.

K 124.)

Moreland

cites

the

Supreme

Court's

decision

in

Haines

support such a high burden on district courts.

stands

for

the

dismissing

the

proposition
pro

se

that

plaintiff s

the

Kerner

Haines,

district

complaint

v.

to

however,

court

erred

because

the

in

Court

could not "say with assurance that under the allegations of the

pro se complaint,

which we hold to less stringent standards than

formal

drafted

pleadings

by

lawyers,

it

that the plaintiff can prove no set of

appears

(quoting Conley v.

Contrary

to

Moreland's

Gibson,

reading

of

255

doubt

facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.'"

(1972)

^beyond

404

U.S.

Haines,

U.S.

41,
it

519,

45-46

does

520-21

(1957)).

not

require

this Court to formulate his claims for him simply by referencing
countless citations to cases from all over the country.
Moreover,

to

the

extent

through every citation of

Moreland

asks

this

Court

to

sift

law and every factual allegation that

spans his 100-page complaint,

the Court declines to do so.

Eleventh

clearly

pleading

Circuit
as

a

has

very

"shotgun

pleading."

that

"incorporate[s]

every

into

each

claim for

subsequent

condemned
A

antecedent
relief

Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm.

Corp.,

Cir.

of

2006).

impossible

In

to

support which

these

types

this

shotgun

pleading

allegation
or

464

one

affirmative

defense."

F.3d 1273,
"it

of

claim(s)

Frantz v.

31

is

of

reference

complaints,

relief."

sort

by

know which allegations
for

The

fact

are

1279

is

(11th

virtually

intended to

Walled,

513 F.

App'x

815,

820

(11th

Cir.

2013)

(per

curiam)

(internal

quotations omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading
contain "a short
the pleader is

Rule

10

and plain statement

entitled to relief,"

requires

that

"each

of the

Fed. R. Civ. P.

separate

claim

presented in a

separate numbered paragraph,

^limited

far

as

as

practicable

circumstances.'"

Hickman v.

(11th Cir.

(per curiam)

2014)

claim showing that

is

required

to

and

be

with each paragraph

to

a

563

Hickman,

8(a)(2),

F.

(quoting Fed.

single

set

App'x

742,

R. Civ.

P.

of

743-44

10(b)).

These rules are "procedural rules" to which pro se litigants are

required to conform.

with

a

shotgun

Id.

at 743.

pleading,

the

However,

court

is

"[w]hen confronted

supposed

to

repleading for a more definite statement of the claim."

order
Id. at

744.

Thus,

while

claims,

Moreland's

the

it

his complaint,
that

the

Court

Court

the

of

claim

identify.

opportunity

all

should he wish to assert some additional
to

him

reconstruct

amend

unable

offer

not

to

was

will

will

His

amended complaint

shall be prepared and filed in accordance with the Court's detailed
requirements contained in Section II.B.iii.
v.

Defendants' Supplemental Motions to Dismiss

Given

that

amended

Moreland

complaint,

the

has

Court

been

granted

DENIES
32

leave

Defendants'

to

file

an

supplemental

motions

to

dismiss.

appropriate,

(Docs.

40

&

43.)

Defendants

may,

if

refile their motions to dismiss upon the filing of

Moreland's First Amended Complaint.
C.

Motion to Transfer

With his
requests

Court

that

of

asserts

Motion to Amend
this

case

Appeals

that

be

District

transfer

is

(doc.

36),

Moreland additionally

transferred

of

to

Columbia

appropriate

the

United

Circuit.14

because

upon

States

Moreland
adding

individual Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals judges,

the

this Court

will no longer hold jurisdiction because "a lower court can[not]

hear [a] case over an (sic)

higher court."

(Doc. 36 at 6.)

To support his request for a transfer,
Court

to

a

proposition

number
that

a

disrupted absent
non

of

however,

that

he

.claims

choice

plaintiff's

extreme

conveniens,

cases

Moreland directs the

of

forum

circumstances.
applies

in

The

cases

support
should

doctrine

where

the

the

not

of

be

forum

defendant

seeks to disrupt a plaintiff's choice of forum.
Moreover,

district

the

court

of

Court

is

the

of

no

jurisdiction in such a

strikingly similar lawsuit,
affirmed

aware

district

the

court's

law

case.

Tenth Circuit

dismissal

of

that

a

divests

Indeed,

a

in a

Court of Appeals
pro

se

litigant's

action against the judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

14

This

is

September 29,

not

Moreland's

2014,

he

first

request

requested a transfer

Circuit," which this Court denied.

for

(Docs. 6 & 13.)
33

a

transfer

to the

of

"District

venue.

On

of Columbia

Switzer v. Coan,

261 F.3d 985,

pro se plaintiff

987

(10th Cir.

filed suit alleging,

2001).

inter alia,

There,

the

violation of

Civil RICO following a number of adverse rulings from the Court
of Appeals.

Id.

The district court dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
additionally

cured

by

held

that

amendment.

specifically address

the

pleading's

Id.

inadequacy

Although

the merits of

a

that

court

transfer,

affirmation of the district court's ruling is

could

not

did

implicit

and
be

not

in its

that the Court of

Appeals found that the district court held jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claims against the circuit judges.

Without any legal authority provided to the contrary,
Court

case,

finds

that

it

retains

jurisdiction

to

handle

the

Moreland's

notwithstanding the fact that he seeks to add the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals judges as named defendants.
D.

Motion for Entry of Default

On February 12, 2015,

Moreland moved for entry of default.

It is not entirely clear to the Court which Defendants Moreland
believes

to

be

in

default.

As

such,

the

Court

reviews

the

motion as it might pertain to all named Defendants.
As to the Judicial Defendants,

on January 5,
8, 2015;

and

2015;
(3)

(2)

(1) Judge Graham was served

Chief Judge Wood was served on January

Clerk Tunstall was served on January 9,

(Docs. 17, 18, 28.)

2015.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34

12(a)(3),

these government employees must serve an answer to

complaint

within

60

days

of

service.

responses were not due until March 6,

March

10,

2015,

respectively.

their response,
47.)

a motion to

Accordingly,

the

2015,

The

finds

March 9,

Judicial

dismiss,

Court

Accordingly,

that

these

their

2015,

Defendants

on March 6,

a

and

filed

2015.

(Doc.

three Defendants

were not in default and entry of such would be inappropriate.
As

to

the

Attorney

Defendants,

Moreland

Meader and Terry Readdick on January 5, 2015.
Pursuant

to

Federal

Defendants

had

indication

that

Defendants'

motions

on January 26,

21

Rule

days

they

of

to

waived

as

there

service.
.(docs.

were timely.

(Docs.

Procedure

respond,

to dismiss

2015,

Civil

As
30

Thus,

served

19 & 20.)

12(a)(1),

appears

such,

& 33),

Garret

these

to

the

be

no

Attorney

which were filed

these Defendants were

similarly not in default.
Finally,

that

Defendants

Corbett,

25-27).
24) .

as to the Glynn Iron Defendants,

Fairman,

Vazquez,

Conway,

the record shows

E.

Corbett,

and Lewis were served on January 5, 2015

Defendant

Spain was

served on January

(docs.

6,

T.

21-23,

2015

(doc.

These Defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss within

21 days of service.
are not

To

(Doc. 31.)

Accordingly,

these defendants

in default.

the

extent

Moreland

believes

Defendants

are

in

default

because they have not yet filed an answer, such an assumption is
35

incorrect.

to

the

motion

Rule 12(a)(4)

contrary,
to

dismiss)

all Defendants

required

the

to

states that,

serving

alters

have

file

the

a

time

filed motions

answers

pending motions.

of

until

unless the Court provides

Rule
to

12

file

motion

an answer.

to dismiss,

after

the

Based on the foregoing,

(such as

a

Because

no Defendants are

Court

rules

on

the

Moreland's Motion for

Entry of Default (doc. 37) is hereby DENIED.
E.

Motion to Dismiss Defendant Lawson and Motion to Withdraw

On February 18,
Calvin

Lawson

2015,

without

Moreland moved to Dismiss Defendant

prejudice.

apparently believed that he

(Doc.

could not

38.)

Moreland

locate Defendant Lawson.

On February 23, 2015, Moreland moved to withdraw that motion to
dismiss,

stating

February 10,
Moreland's
Dismiss.

Moreland's
Dismiss

F.

2015.

Lawson was

on

Motion

served .on

Defendant Lawson responded to

January

26,

2015

with

a

Motion

to

there
to

is

no

Withdraw

objection,
(doc.

42)

the

Court

Moreland's

GRANTS

Motion

to

38).

Motion for a Hearing

Finally,
schedule

oral

on April
argument

3,
"on

2015,

Moreland moved this

merits

The Court finds this motion to be,
of

actually

31.)

that

(doc.

Defendant

(Doc. 42.)

complaint
(Doc.

Given

that

the

Court's

decision

to

and

at best,

allow
36

evidence."

Court to

(Doc.

55.)

premature in light

Moreland

to

amend

hi s

complaint.

Moreover,

the

unnecessary

for

those

Accordingly,

Moreland's

Court

finds

claims
motion

that

dismissed

for

oral

oral
by

argument
this

argument

is

Order.

(doc.

55)

is

DENIED.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The

Judicial

47)

is

Defendants'

GRANTED.

Motion

to

Clerk

is

The

Dismiss

(Doc.

DIRECTED

to

TERMINATE Chief Judge Wood, Judge Graham,
Clerk Tunstall as parties to this action.
2.

The

Court

Attorney
Motions
Court

GRANTS

IN

Defendants'
to

AND

Glynn

(Docs.

Dismiss

DISMISSES

PART

and

30,

WITH

DENIES

Iron
31,

PREJUDICE

and

IN

PART

Defendants'
&

33.)

Counts

I

The

and

IV

(conspiracy and sections 1983 and 1985) as timebarred.

III

The

Court DISMISSES WITH

(legal malpractice)

claim.

The

Court

for

DENIES

PREJUDICE

failure

the

motions

to

Count

state

a

to

dismiss

is

GRANTED

with regard to the Civil RICO claim.
3.

Moreland's

Motion

to

Amend

(doc.

36)

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Moreland is hereby
GRANTED leave to amend his complaint to address
the

deficiencies

desires,
Moreland
date
of

COMPLAINT

Order

as

to

add

stated

the

herein

Eleventh

shall have FOURTEEN (14)
this
Order to file his

in

a

accordance

stand-alone

with

and,

Circuit

if

he

judges.

DAYS from the
FIRST AMENDED

the terms
entry on
the

of

this
docket.

Defendants then shall have TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS15 to
renew their motion to dismiss or otherwise respond

to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The Motion
to Amend, however, is DENIED as to Moreland's
request to transfer venue.

15
Rule 12(a)(3) of the Federal Rules provides United States employees,
such as the Eleventh Circuit judges, sixty days to respond to a complaint.
37

4.

In light of the Court's ruling on the Motion to
Amend, the Glynn Iron Defendants' and Attorney
Defendants'
Supplemental
Motions
to
Dismiss
(Docs. 4 0 & 43) are DENIED with leave to re-file
following Moreland's First Amended Complaint.

5.

Moreland's Motion for Entry of

Default

(doc.

37)

is DENIED.

6.

Moreland's
Motion
to
Withdraw
(doc.
42)
his
Motion to Dismiss Defendant Lawson (doc. 38) is
GRANTED.

7.

Moreland's Motion for Oral Argument

(doc.

55)

is

DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta,
April,

Georgia,

this

/^

day of

2015.

HONORABLE J.

RAKDAL HALL

IITED /STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOtJTH^RN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

38