Taylor v. Equifax Information Services, LLC
Filing
41
ORDER granting Defendant Georgia Power Company's 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/18/2016. (ca)
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States! IBtsitrtct Conrt
for tfie ^ontliem Biotnct of(f^eorgta
Pntitsdoirk Btbtoton
CYNTHIA W. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
V.
CV^215-06
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Defendant.
ORDER
Pending
before
the
Court
is
Defendant
Georgia
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 33).
Power
The motion
has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
For the
reasons stated below, Georgia Power Company's Motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from a dispute over Plaintiff Cynthia W.
Taylor's
electric
bill
for
Georgia.
Dkt. No. 33 p. 2.
her
home
in Brunswick,
Plaintiff was billed a monthly fee
for power services to her home.
moved out by July 2010.
previous
Id.
Plaintiff and her son
Dkt. No. 35 p. 2.
However, she failed
to notify Defendant Georgia Power Company
C'GPC") of her move
and did not cancel her account.
D72A
ev. 8/82)
Dkt. No. 33-2 at 83:4-6.
Plaintiff paid GPC with a $600 check, which she believed to
be payment in full.
of funds.
This check ultimately bounced for lack
Dkt. No. 33-2 at 49:5-6.
Plaintiff received a bill from GPC.
6.
Dkt. No. 33-2 at 83:4-
Plaintiff provided her explanation as to why she did not owe
the full bill to one of GPCs employees at its Brunswick office.
Id.
Plaintiff claims the excess bill was due to some confusion
regarding her business account versus her personal account, and
to embezzlement issues caused by her now-deceased accountant.^
Dkt.
No.
33
p.
2.
September 29, 2010.
After
reported
several
her
GPC
disconnected
Plaintiff's
efforts
account
multiple
Plaintiff
as
collections
from
on
Dkt. No. 33 p. 3.
to
collect
delinquent
Plaintiff's
to
Equifax,
reporting agency CCRA"), on February 28, 2011.
sent
power
November
letters
2010
to
to
March
various
2011.
bill,
a
GPC
credit
p. 4.
addresses
p.
GPC
of
3-4.
Plaintiff ultimately discovered the delinquent accoxmt on her
credit report.
owe
anything
She contacted Equifax to report that she did not
under
the
account.
notified GPC of the dispute.
p.
5.
Equifax
then
Id.
^ The Court notes that identity theft and fraud are not at issue in this case.
The
record does not reflect that Plaintiff ever conveyed to GPC that her
identity had been stolen or that her accountant was fraudulently using her
accoxints to pay the GPC bill at issue.
GPC tasked
with
its
revenue
investigating
recovery specialist,
Plaintiff's
investigation entailed
dispute.
Sandy Evers,
Id.
Evers'
verifying Plaintiff's name, birth date,
social security number, and amount owed on the account.
Dkt.
No.
that
33-3
H
14.
On
November
15,
2013,
Plaintiff owed $1,275.87 on her account.
Evers
reported
Plaintiff asserts that
this balance is incorrect and that she does not owe anything
more than the $600 that she originally attempted to pay.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
initially filed
County Magistrate Court.
suit
against Equifax
Dkt. No. 1.
timely Notice of Removal on January 7,
in
Glynn
Equifax then filed a
2015.
]^.
Shortly
thereafter. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Add a Party
Defendant, which the Court granted on June 22, 2015.
9, 10.
Dkt. Nos.
Plaintiff proceeded to add GPC as a party and file an
Amended Complaint on June 26, 2015.
Dkt. No. 11.
On July 30,
2015, GPC filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 13), which the
parties fully briefed.
Dkt. Nos. 15, 17.
Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Dismiss Equifax (Dkt. No. 21) on December 10, 2015,
which this Court granted on December 11, 2015.
GPC filed a Motion to Dismiss in July 2015.
Dkt. No. 23.
The Court dismissed
Plaintiff's claims against GPC as a CRA, but allowed Plaintiff's
other claims to go forward.
GPC is the only remaining defendant
in this matter.
GPC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on
these remaining claims on August 17, 2016.
LEGAL STANDARD
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of
demonstrating
fact.
the
absence
of
a
genuine
issue
of
material
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
To
satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325.
If
the
moving
party
discharges
this
burden,
the
burden
shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present
affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does
exist.
(1986).
Anderson
The
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
257
nonmovant may satisfy this burden in two ways;
First, the nonmovant ^^may show that the record in fact contains
supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion, which was
^overlooked or ignored' by the moving party,
who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an
absence of evidence."
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
332 (Brennan, J., dissenting))
.
forward
directed
with
additional
verdict
evidence
motion
evidentiary deficiency."
Second, the nonmovant ''may come
at
sufficient
trial
Id. at 1117.
based
to
on
withstand
the
a
alleged
Where the nonmovant instead attempts to carry this burden
with
nothing
more
^^than
a
repetition
of
his
conclusional
allegations, summary judgment for the defendants [is] not only
proper but required."
Morris v. Ross, 663 F,2d 1032, 1033-34
(11th Cir. 1981).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
brings
claims
under
the
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. C'FCRA").
11.)
The FCRA applies to three
Fair
Credit Reporting
(See generally Dkt. No.
types of
entities:
consumer
reporting agencies, users of consumer reports, and furnishers of
information to consumer reporting agencies.
Chipka v. Bank of
Amer., 355 F. App'x 380, 382 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§§
1681b,
1681m,
1681S-2).
It
is
undisputed
that GPC is a
''furnisher of information" and therefore must only comply with
the
duties
previously
Dkt. No.
imposed
on
dismissed
26.
Thus,
furnishers
Plaintiff's
the
by
the
FCRA.
non-furnisher
Court analyzes
The
FCRA
Court
claims.
the FCRA only as it
applies to furnishers.
The FCRA imposes two duties on GPC.
provide accurate information to CRAs.
Second,
furnishers
must
investigate
First, furnishers must
15 U.S.C. § 1681S-2(a).
all
disputed
after receiving notice of a dispute from a CRA.
1681s-2(b).
information
15 U.S.C. §
The FCRA does not provide a private right of action
when a furnisher submits false information to a CRA in violation
of Section 1681s-2(a).
641, 642 n.4
Green v. RBS Nat^l Bank, 288 F. App'x
{11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
By contrast, a
private right of action exists when a furnisher violates Section
1681s-2(b), ^^but only if the furnisher received notice of the
consumer's dispute from a consumer reporting agency."
at
642 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681S-2(b)(1)).
As the Court has already held. Plaintiff cannot state a
claim
since
under Section 1681s-2(a).
it
is
Plaintiff's
undisputed
dispute.
that
Section
Dkt. No. 26 p. 8.
GPC
did
1681s-2(b)
receive
still
However,
notice
applies.
of
To
prevail under Section 1681s-2(b), the plaintiff must:
allege and establish that [s]he notified a
consumer
reporting
agency
that
[s]he
disputed the completeness or accuracy of
information in [her] credit report that was
furnished by defendant, the credit reporting
agency gave notice of plaintiff's dispute to
defendant as a furnisher, and defendant did
any
one
conduct
of
a
the
following:
reasonable
(1)
failed
investigation
of
to
the
identified dispute(s); (2) failed to review
all
relevant
information
provided
by
the
credit reporting agency; (3) failed to
report the results of its investigation to
the credit reporting agency; or (4) if an
item
of
information
was found to be
it
could
not
disputed
by
plaintiff
inaccurate, incomplete, or
be
verified
after
any
reinvestigation, failed to modify, delete,
or permanently block the reporting of that
item of information.
Ware v. Bank of Amer. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1338 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (citing Howard v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., No. CV 109-156, 2012
WL 1850922, at *4 (S.D. Ga. May 21, 2012) {citing 15 U.S.C. §
1681S-2(b))).
Plaintiff
assertion
appears
that
to
GPC
base
failed
her
to
claim
entirely
conduct
a
on
the
'"reasonable"
investigation under Section 1681s-2(b).
Dkt. No. 35 pp. 7-12.
Indeed,
investigation
the
"reasonableness"
of
GPCs
is
the
standard by which the Court determines whether a violation of
the
FCRA
occurred.
Hinkle
v.
Midland
Credit
Mgmt.,
F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Inc.,
827
Plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that GPCs investigation was
unreasonable.
Chiang v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37
(1st Cir. 2010); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d
1147, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2009).
The
Eleventh
Circuit
has
found
that
a
reasonable
investigation is one that "verif[ies] the disputed information,
and
report[s]
to
the
CRAs
that
the
information
has
been
verified." "When a furnisher reports that disputed information
has been verified, the question of whether the furnisher behaved
reasonably
will
turn
sufficient
evidence
information
was
to
true."
on
whether
support
the
the
This
furnisher
conclusion
question,
acquired
that
the
however, "is
a
factual question, and it will normally be reserved for trial."
Id.
Nonetheless, a furnisher "need not do more than verify that
the reported information is consistent with the information in
its records" for an investigation to be reasonable.
Howard v.
Pinnacle Credit Servs., LLC, No. 4:09-CV-85, 2010 WL 2600753^ at
*3 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2010).
Indeed,
the
Court
looks
only
to
whether
or
not
the
furnisher reviewed all the necessary information it had in its
possession at the time of the investigation.
Knight v. Navient,
T.T.C, No. 5;14-CV-424, 2016 WL 915192, at *6 (M.D. Ga. March 4,
2016).
The scope of the furnisher's investigation may be narrow
if the plaintiff provides only ^'scant information" regarding the
nature of the dispute.
Howard, 2010 WL 2600753, at *3.
The Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to
whether
the
GPC
conducted
Section 1681s-2(b).
a
reasonable
investigation
under
The undisputed facts show that GPC reviewed
all of the information it had in its possession and verified
Plaintiff's name, birth date, social security number, and amount
owed on the account.
Plaintiff
has
Dkt. No. 33-3 t 14.
failed
to
provide
any
evidence
that
the
investigation was unreasonable beyond stating that she told a
GPC employee that she did not owe on the account.^
p. 9.
Dkt. No. 35
She failed to provide any additional information to GPC
which it could have included in its investigation.
^
The
Court
notes
that
this
assertion
appears
to
have
been
incorrect.
Plaintiff in fact does owe on this account, though the amount owed appears to
be in dispute. Dkt. No. 33-2 49:5-6.
8
Defendant
reviewed
all
of
regarding Plaintiff's dispute.
information
GPC
received
the
information
it
received
Further, considering the scant
regarding
the
nature
of
Plaintiff s
dispute, the scope of its review was reasonable.
Plaintiff largely relies on the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Hinkle
Circuit
to support
found
that
her argument.
the
In Hinkle,
defendant
CRA's
the Eleventh
investigation
was
unreasonable because the CRA did not verify the information it
received from the original creditor.
However,
Hinkle
is
distinguishable
Hinkle, 827 F.3d at 1302.
from
this
action
because
Hinkle involved a CRA rather than an original creditor.
Id.
That case turned on the fact that the CRA did not ''seek out and
verify" its inforroation from the original creditor.
This
is plainly not an issue in this case, as GPC is the original
creditor.
Further,
information
GPC
Plaintiff
should
has
have
failed
verified
to
or
point
any
to
any
additional
information it should have obtained.
Instead, Plaintiff relies on the fact that she informed GPC
that
she
"did
not
absolutely no money."
open
or
use"
a
GPC
Dkt. No. 35 p. 5-7.
account
and
"owed
However, Plaintiff
also contradictorily asserts that she paid $600 "for the entire
balance owed" on the account.
at 2.
In fact it appears
that Plaintiff acknowledges that she owed money on the account
but mistakenly believed she has already paid what she believed
9
to be the entire balance.
The record is undisputed that
Plaintiff paid nothing on this account because the $600 check
that
she
Therefore,
wrote
the
ultimately
Court
gives
bounced.
no
Dkt.
weight
33-2
the
fact
to
49:3-16.
that
she
incorrectly notified GPC that she ^'owed absolutely no money.
This is fatal to Plaintiff's claim as Plaintiff provides little
other evidence in support of her claim.
GPC verified that the
the
information
it
had
account
and
that
was indeed
a
debt
owed
Plaintiff's
on
the
with
account.
Plaintiff points to nothing, more that GPC could have done to
conduct a more reasonable investigation.
Therefore, the Court
finds that GPCs investigation was reasonable.
Accordingly, the
Court will grant summary judgment in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
stated
above.
Defendant
Georgia
Power
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 33) is hereby
GRANTED.
The
Clerk
of
Court
is
DIRECTED
to
enter
the
appropriate judgment and to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this 18th day of November, 2016^
LISA GOteJBEY'WOOD, fHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
^ The Court recognizes that there very well may be a dispute as to the actual
amount owed here.
Nonetheless this is beyond the scope this claim. The Court
looks only to whether GPCs investigation was reasonable with the information
it could have obtained at the time of the investigation.
10
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