Miller v. Holmes et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 8 Motion to Remand to State Court. Directing Clerk to remand case to the Superior Court of McIntosh County, Georgia, for resolution. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/23/15. (slt)
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JODY MILLER,
Plaintiff,
CV 215-46
V.
TERRANCE HOLMES; DONNIE HOWARD;
and THE CITY OF DARIEN,
Defendants.
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Jody Miller's
(Mil1er") Motion to Remand this case to the Superior Court of
McIntosh County, Georgia. Dkt. No. 8. Upon due consideration,
Miller's Motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Miller's Complaint alleges that he "shot the bird" at
Defendant Terrance Holmes ("Holmes") of the "Darien Police" as
Miller drove by the City of Darien Police Department on July 28,
2013. Dkt. No. 1, P. 7 at ¶j 22, 25.' Miller continued driving
to his intended destination, parked his car, and exited his
vehicle. Id. p. 8 at ¶ 28. Holmes followed Miller in his car
"Jhooting the bird" is a colloquialism for a vulgar symbol, made with one's
hand, in which one raises his middle finger toward another.
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with his beacons flashing, along with another Darien police
officer and a deputy sheriff. Id. at ¶ 29. When Miller
returned to his car, Holmes allegedly exited his cruiser and
motioned for Miller to approach him, Id. at ¶ 30, asked for
Miller's driver's license, Id. at ¶ 32, threatened to arrest
Miller if he did not put his phone away when he tried to record
the events,
id. p. 9 at ¶ 33, and subsequently handcuffed him,
id. at ¶ 41.
While Miller was handcuffed, Holmes emptied Miller's
pockets, Id. p. 10 at ¶ 45, forced him into the backseat of the
cruiser, id. at ¶ 47, and unlocked Miller's car to search it,
id. Holmes and the other two police officers then retrieved
books from the back of the patrol car, allegedly searching for
crimes with which to charge Miller. Id. at ¶ 48. After
approximately ten to fifteen minutes of searching, Holmes drove
Miller to the jail, where he was searched and processed for
violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-125, Method of Giving Hand and Arm
Signals, and Darien City Ordinance 46-19, Disorderly Conduct.
Id. pp. 10-12 at ¶j 50-62.
After spending approximately five hours in jail, Miller was
released upon posting a bond of $627. Id. p. 12 at ¶ 59.
Miller was arraigned on the aforementioned charges, which Police
Chief Donnie Howard ("Howard") allegedly ratified, on December
18, 2013, in the Darien City Court. Id. pp. 15-16 at ¶J 89-90.
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On January 17, 2014, the prosecutor nolle prosequi Miller's
case.
Id.
Miller filed the present action on March 12, 2015, in the
Superior Court of McIntosh County, Georgia. Dkt. No. 1, p. S.
Miller alleges that Holmes acted illegally when he arrested him
with no probable cause. Id. pp. 17-18 at ¶ 101. As a result of
his "physical and mental anguish," id. p. 17 at ¶ 99, Miller
brought suit against Holmes, Howard, and the City of Darien
("Darien") for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and battery.
Id. at p. 5.
Shortly after receiving Miller's Complaint, Defendants
filed a timely Notice of Removal. Id. at pp. 1-2. Defendants
allege that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and 1441(a), given that Miller's Complaint sets forth
claims "arising under" federal law. Dkt. No. 1, p. 1.
Specifically, Defendants point to Miller's allegation that
Holmes arrested him for "shooting the bird"—a constitutionally
protected act with First Amendment implications—as the basis for
a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 11, p. 4.
Following briefing from the parties, the Court held a
Motions Hearing to address whether Miller's claims "arise under"
federal law, on October 5, 2015. Dkt. No. 18. Immediately
following the hearing, counsel for Miller filed a "Prejudicial
Stipulation in Lieu of Dismissal with Prejudice," wherein he
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stated that he would not file a subsequent claim, or seek relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the case were remanded to state
court. Dkt. No. 19. Now pending before the Court is Miller's
Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 8), which the Court GRANTS for the
reasons set forth below.
DISCUSSION
A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal
court if the federal court had jurisdiction to hear the case
originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("[A] district court has
subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("[A]y civil action brought in a state
court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."). Given that removal jurisdiction raises significant
federalism concerns, "federal courts are directed to construe
removal statutes strictly. Indeed, all doubts about
jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state
court." City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fidelity Ins. Co., 676
F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999)). The
removing party "bear[s] the burden of demonstrating federal
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jurisdiction."
1284, 1287 n.4
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d
(11th Cir. 1998).
To determine whether a claim arises under federal law,
courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, "which provides
that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint." Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11th Cir.
(quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
2001)
(1987)) .
Federal question jurisdiction will be found where a
"well-pleaded complaint standing alone establishes either that
federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law." Baltin v. Alaron Trading
Corp.,
128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1983))
Here, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating the
existence of federal jurisdiction. Defendants argue that
Miller' s Complaint—which cites Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the bounds of protected speech— sets forth a federal
cause of action and its removal is thus justified. Dkt. No. 11,
pp. 3-4;
see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1, p. 2 at ¶J 7_92
Paragraph 8, in relevant part, states:
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General reference to federal law does not automatically
invoke federal jurisdiction. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986) ("[TIhe mere presence of a
federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
confer federal-question jurisdiction."); see also Hansard v.
Forsyth Cty., 191 F. App'x 844, 846 (11th Cir. 2006) (declining
to find federal jurisdiction where recovery was based on a
Georgia statute, even though the complaint stated that
"Defendant's arbitrary and capricious acts have violated
Plaintiffs' rights under . . . the United States Constitution,
including U.S. Const. Amend. V and amend. XIV, § 1")
The present case is somewhat analogous to Hansard, in that
Miller specifically pleads state law claims while citing Supreme
Court cases to bolster his argument that Defendants knew or
should have known that "shooting the bird" is not illegal. 191
F. App'x at 846; Dkt. No. 1, pp. 2-4 at ¶j 6-21, p. 13 at ¶11 6670. For a case to "arise under" federal law, federal law must
have created the cause of action alleged. Diaz v.
Sheppard,
85
F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Franchise Tax 3d., 463
Even vulgar and offensive language directed at police
officers is protected free speech by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and
cannot be made a crime and cannot be considered
obstruction of an officer. This rule was announced
by the United States Supreme Court long ago in the
case of Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130
[(1974)].
Dkt. No. 1, p. 2 at ¶ 8.
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U.S. at 8 - 10). Neither the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution nor any other federal law creates Miller's three
causes of action. His claims are a creation of Georgia law.
Furthermore, although it is a close call, Miller's case
does not depend on a construction of federal law. Miller solely
seeks relief for claims based upon state law. In the present
case, any reference to federal law exists only to highlight the
extent of Defendants' alleged misconduct. See Diaz, 85 F.3d at
1505 (whether a lawyer charged with legal malpractice misread or
disregarded federal law in such a way to constitute legal
malpractice in Florida is a question of state law); cf. Hill v.
Marston, 13 F.3d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (Federal question
jurisdiction did not arise where elements of a state-law claim
included alleged knowledge of, and failure to comply with,
federal securities laws); Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 426 (9th
n'r. 1994) (holding that a "malicious prosecution action does
not 'arise under' federal law simply because one element
requires proof that the underlying federal action was legally
untenable.
")
The fact that a state court may rely on Defendants'
knowledge of federal law to determine their liability for a
state cause of action does not justify this Court's review,
particularly where the parties are not diverse. See Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214- 1
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194) ("[l]t
does not follow that a suit brought under the state statute
which defines liability to employees who are injured while
engaged in intrastate commerce, and brings within the purview of
the statute a breach of the duty imposed by the federal statute,
should be regarded as a suit arising under the laws of the
United States and cognizable in the federal court in the absence
of diversity of citizenship.") . Given counsel for Miller's most
recent filing, the Court recognizes the absence of a federal
question, and concludes that Miller's state-law claims do not
depend on a construction of federal law.
Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Miller's Motion for a Remand (Dkt. No. 8)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Miller's Motion for a
Remand is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to
REMAND this case to the Superior Court of McIntosh County,
Georgia, for resolution.
SO ORDERED,
this 23 FJD
day of October, 2015.
Z
.Z
LISA GODEEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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