Sullivan v. SILCO Timber LLC
Filing
29
ORDER granting Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/22/2016. (ca)
N the unitleb Statto 30t0tritt Court
for the boutbern Motrid of georgia
jorunIftick Aibtoion
MACK H. SULLIVAN, SR.,
Plaintiff,
CV 215-52
V.
SILCO TIMBER, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant SILCO
Timber, LLC's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt.
No. 14.
Pro se Plaintiff Mack H. Sullivan, Sr. ("Plaintiff")
alleges that his great-grandfather owned a 400-acre parcel of
land ("the property") located in Camden County, Georgia.
Plaintiff sets forth a claim for the property, requesting either
of the following remedies: (1) that the Court "bound over" the
property to his great-grandfather's estate; or (2) that
Defendant pay him $3,500 to $5,500 per acre. Dkt. No. 1, p. 5.
In response, Defendant produced evidence showing an extensive
title search that reveals that Defendant owns the property in
fee simple and there is no evidence that Plaintiff or his greatgrandfather owned the entirety of the 400-acre plot in question.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)
Dkt. No. 14-4, pp. 1-6. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the great-grandson of Chester M. Sullivan
("Sullivan"),' who allegedly owned some property in the 1800s.
Dkt. No. 16, ¶ 4. According to Plaintiff, the property was
comprised of four-hundred acres, "more or less." Dkt. No. 1, ¶
III. Plaintiff alleges that the property is located within the
boundary of the land owned by Defendant (hereinafter, the "SILCO
Tract"). Dkt. No. 24, p. 6, ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 14-1, ¶ 22.
Plaintiff is unable to precisely define the location of the
property, as "[t]he boundary line [is] unrecorded." Dkt. No. 1,
¶ 111.2
Defendant, in response to Plaintiff's claim, conducted an
extensive title search on both the property and all of the land
located within the SILCO Tract. Dkt. No. 24, p. 4, ¶ 12; Dkt.
No. 14-1, ¶ 9. Grantee deed indexes from April 28, 2014, back
to the formation of the State of Georgia in 1788 in Camden
County, Georgia, were examined as part of the Title Search that
was conducted pursuant to Georgia Title Standards. Dkt. No. 24,
1
Chester Sullivan is also known as Chester Monday ("Mun") Sullivan. Dkt. No.
16, 91 4.
2
Plaintiff alleges that the property is "bound[ed] on the north by SILCO
Timber LLC and land owner, south by Coleburg Tompkins Road and land owner,
west by Highway 110 and land owner, [and) east by land owner and SILCO Timber
LLC." Dkt. No. 1, 91 III.
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p. 3, ¶ 9. While conducting the title search, Kevin Yackel
("Yackel") and Steven Sales ("Sales") searched for any interest
of either Plaintiff or Sullivan in the land located within the
SILCO Tract. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 14-1, P. 4, 91 11.
After conducting their search, Yackel and Sales only found a
single conveyance of land to Mun Sullivan within the SILCO
Tract. The title searchers did not find a deed of record within
the SILCO Tract conveying land to or from Plaintiff, Mack
Sullivan. Dkt. No. 24, p. 6, ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 14-1, 91 24.
The only record evidence shows that whatever acreage the
Sullivans may have had in the SILCO Tract was lost through
foreclosure long ago. On April 5, 1879, Helen Peebles
("Peebles") conveyed interest in a sixty-acre parcel of land
to Nun Sullivan and Usual Dallas ("Dallas"). Dkt.
No. 24, p. 5,
¶ 17; Dkt. No. 14-1, at ¶ 14, p. 17. Sullivan thus received a
interest in the 60-acre property. Dkt. No. 24, p. 5, 91 18; Dkt.
No. 14-1, ¶ 15. Approximately ten-years after this conveyance,
Sullivan obtained a loan from J.A. Foster on February 2, 1889.
See Dkt. No. 14-1, p. 18. Sullivan used his
interest of the
land that was conveyed to him by Peebles as collateral for the
loan. Id. 3 The aforementioned mortgage was foreclosed and sold
through a sheriff's sale. Id. at p. 21. According to
Plaintiff, however, a copy of the deed that was allegedly
The court notes that the loan was not filed until May 2, 1889. Id.
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transferred to Sheriff John Brown was never found, and the deed
"did not stipulate the acres or value that was transferred or
described." Dkt. No. 16, ¶ 7; see generally Dkt. No. 16-1.
Dallas—the other owner of the interest conveyed by
Peebles—through his heirs, conveyed his interest to H.B.
Readdick. See Dkt. No. 14-1, pp. 23-24. In turn, H.B. Readdick
conveyed the parcel, in addition to 3,227.95 acres, to the
Georgia Forest Product Company on December 23, 1937. Id. ¶ 19.
Defendant acquired title to the entirety of the SILCO Tract in
fee simple ownership on December 17, 2002. Id. ¶ 22.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law." FindWhat Inv'r
Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)) . A dispute over such a fact is "genuine" if the
"evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Id. In making this determination,
the court is to view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Johnson v. Booker T.
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Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir.
2000). To discharge this burden, the movant must show the court
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case. Id. at 325. The burden shifts then shifts to the
nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative
evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
Given that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his allegations
are entitled to the benefit of liberal construction. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Although courts may construe
pleadings liberally, "this leniency does not give a court
license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite
an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action."
Boles v. Riva, 565 F. App'x 845, 846 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotes
and cite omitted). "Although we are to give liberal
construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, 'we
nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural
rules.'" Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir.
2002)
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment is warranted on Plaintiff's claim. As
discussed below, the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff's
claim to land within the SILCO Tract is unfounded, even
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crediting Plaintiff's argument that he is an heir to Sullivan's
estate.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff does
not allege, nor does the record support a finding that there is
a deed of record conveying any land within the SILCO Tract to
Plaintiff. Plaintiff thus cannot claim title to any land in the
SILCO Tract in his own name. The Court notes that he brought
suit only in his own name.
Second, as to any Sullivan family land, any claim to that
land was extinguished upon the foreclosure of the mortgage and
its subsequent purchase during a sheriff's sale. Defendant
presented record proof that it owns the land. Plaintiff was
only ever able to allege that his relative had an interest in
it.
Finally, as to the matter of the size of the property, the
Court notes that the record does not support a finding that
Sullivan owned 400-acres "more or less" at any time. Indeed,
Plaintiff is unable to provide the Court with an exact
description of the property, much less provide documentary proof
of a 400-acre parcel of land owned by one of the Sullivans.
Based on the undisputed evidence, the Court cannot credit
Plaintiff's argument that Sullivan, at one time, owned a parcel
of land in Camden County, Georgia, comprised of 400-acres "more
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or less." Dkt. No. 1, ¶ III. For all of these reasons,
Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court
is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this
case.
SO ORDERED, this 22' day of August, 2016.
LISA GODBEY OD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AO 72A
(Rev. 8182)
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