Medlin v. Burns
Filing
37
ORDER granting the United States' 36 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's case is DIMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED the enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/29/2016. (ca)
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ALBERT V. MEDLIN,
Plaintiff,
No. 2:15-CV-78
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is
Motion
dkt.
to
no.
Dismiss for
36.
The
Defendant United
Lack
Motion
of Subject
will
be
States of America's
Matter
GRANTED
Jurisdiction,
for
the
reasons
herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Medlin Is Disciplined By His Supervisors
Plaintiff
instructor
in
Enforcement
FLETC
is
an
Albert
the
V.
Medlin
worked
Firearms
Division
Training
Center
C'FLETC").
agency
within
as
the
of
United
a
senior
the
Dkt.
State
firearms
Federal
No.
1-1
Law
SI
2.
Department
of
Homeland Security and ^'is actually a town unto itself with its
own zip code . . . known as Glynco, GA."
GA,
D72A
ev. 8/82)
Fed.
Law
Enforcement
Id.; About Glynco,
Training
Ctrs.,
https://www.fletc.gov/about-glynco-ga
(accessed
Nov.
11,
2016).
The original defendant in this case,
Medlin's branch chief.
Dkt. No. 1-1 5 4.
Walter Burns, was
Burns recommended
Medlin's termination from federal employment on June 6, 2014.
Id. S[ 7.
falsely
He did so because Medlin allegedly let his wife
indicate
authority
take
the
two
animals
of
Id. at
employee.
Id.
Burns'
and
someone
law-enforcement
property for the benefit of Medlin's grandchildren.
be
of
had
private
Burns deemed this to
off
them
else's
17.
to
that
conduct
Medlin's
unbecoming
division
a federal
chief,
Scott
Donovan (whom Medlin sued in a parallel proceeding ultimately
consolidated
with
this
one.
No.
2:15-CV-123
(S.D.
Ga.)),
agreed and terminated Medlin from federal employment on August
29, 2014.
SI 8.
FLETC
canceled
Burns'
decision on February 26, 2015.
recommendation
Id. SISI 12-13.
and
Donovan's
Medlin claims
that it did so because they were based on false allegations.
Id. SISI 14-15.
On March 25, 2015, Burns proposed suspending Medlin for
fourteen
days
without
pay.
Id.
SI
17.
Donovan
suspended
Medlin without pay for eighteen days on April 17, 2015.
18.
on
Id. SI
FLETC modified this suspension to fourteen calendar days
April
27,
2015,
^^because
it
unlawfully
exceeded
the
disciplinary penalty proposed by Burns' Suspension Proposal."
Id. SISI 19-20.
Medlin
Sues
His
Supervisors
and
the
United
States
Is
Substituted
Medlin
sued
Burns
for
libel,
intentional
infliction
of
emotional distress, and statutory violations relating to the
disciplinary recommendations on May 27, 2015.
id.
The case
Dkt. No. 1.
was
The
removed to this Court on
See generally
June 26, 2015.
United States moved to substitute itself for
Burns on June 26, 2015.
Dkt. No. 4.
While the parties were briefing that motion, the United
States moved to dismiss the case for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
that
all
decision.
of
Dkt. No. 10.
his
claims
Dkt. No. 23.
Medlin responded by acknowledging
hinged
on
the
Court's
substitution
He asked the Court to deny the motion
as premature, given the ongoing substitution dispute.
Id. at
4.
waived
He
then
sovereign
conceded
immunity
that
as
^'the
to
United
libel
States
claims,
has
and
not
that,
if
[substitution] is granted, he cannot pursue his libel claim."
Id.
He likewise granted that in the event of substitution,
^'his emotional distress claim [would] also [be] barred" under
binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.
Id. at 4-5 (arguing ''that
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation . . . is plainly wrong"
so as
preserve the issue for appellate review").
he withdrew his statutory violation claim.
Finally,
Id. at 6-7.
Medlin's parallel case against Donovan, No. 2:15-CV-123
{S.D.
Ga.),
2016.
was consolidated
with
this
one
on
February 19,
Following a hearing on the substitution and dismissal
motions, dkt. no. 29, the Court granted substitution on March
31, 2016.
Dkt. No. 35.
It denied the motion to dismiss with
permission to refile in light of substitution.
Id. at 13.
The United States refiled its motion to dismiss the next day.
Dkt. No. 36.
To date, Medlin has not responded.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
court's
plaintiff
subject
bears
matter
the
burden
jurisdiction.
of
establishing
Ishler
v.
the
Internal
Revenue, 237 F. App'x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Medlin's
claims
for
distress.
libel
The
and
United
intentional
States
is
infliction
immune
from
unequivocally waives its sovereign immunity.
Nordic
Vill.,
Inc.,
503
U.S.
30,
33
of
suit
emotional
unless
it
United States v.
(1992).
As
Medlin
concedes, the United States retains its sovereign immunity as
to ^MaJny claim arising out of . . . libel."
28 U.S.C. §
2680(h); Dkt. No. 23 at 4; see also Pl.'s Resp. United States'
Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. No. 9 at 3, Medlin v. Donovan, No. 2:15-CV-
123 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (^'Donovan Resp,") -
The Court
thus lacks jurisdiction over Medlin's libel claims.
Medlin
emotional
also
concedes
distress
claim
that
his
intentional
regarding
Burns
is
infliction
barred
Eleventh Circuit's read of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
by
of
the
Dkt. No. 23
at 4-5; Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1535 & n.9 (11th
Cir.
1986)
(barring
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress claim because it was based on alleged libel); Dkt.
No. 1-1 SI5 42-47 (basing claim on alleged libel).
The Court
lacks jurisdiction over this claim.
Medlin
does
not
surrender
his
intentional
emotional distress claim regarding Donovan.
3-4.
it
infliction
of
Donovan Resp. at
He alleges that his claim is not based on libel because
^'is
knowing
not
and
dependent
on
deliberate
falsity,"
decision
to
but
rather,
find
him
''Donovan's
guilty
of
uncharged conduct, because Donovan could find no evidence to
support
the
charged
misconduct."
Id.
at
3.
This
mischaracterizes Medlin's complaint:
Donovan intentionally making the knowingly false factual
findings of misconduct contained in his Removal Decision
was extreme and outrageous conduct because [] Donovan
terminated Medlin's employment for conduct of which
knew Medlin was not guilty; . . . .
he
Donovan intentionally making the false factual findings
of misconduct contained in his Suspension Decision was
extreme
and
outrageous
conduct
because
[]
Donovan
punished Medlin for conduct of which he knew Medlin was
not guilty; . . . .
Donovan's knowingly false factual findings of misconduct
contained in his Removal Decision and his Suspension
Decision intentionally caused Medlin to experience severe
mental
suffering,
wounded
feelings,
humiliation,
embarrassment and fear.
Medlin's experiencing severe mental suffering, wounded
feelings, humiliation, embarrassment and fear was the
natural
result of
Donovan's
Removal
and
Suspension
Decisions intentionally containing factual findings of
misconduct
which
both
Donovan
and
Medlin
knew
to
be
untrue, and which jeopardized Medlin's employment.
Despite FLETC modifying his unlawful penalty, Donovan did
not change the knowingly false factual findings contained
in
his
Suspension
Decision,
thereby
intentionally
continuing Medlin's severe mental suffering, wounded
feelings, humiliation, embarrassment and fear.
Compl., Dkt. No. 1-1 SISI 51-55, Medlin v. Donovan, No. 2:15-CV-
123 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2015); see also id. fSI 49-50, 72-75,
77-80.
The
complaint
only
alleges
additional
wrongdoing
{usually, right alongside falsity) to argue that Donovan acted
outside the scope of his employment—a threshold consideration
relating
to
intentional
Id.
15
sovereign
infliction
63-64
misconduct,
immunity
of
(alleging
made
that
emotional
that
knowingly
not
distress
Donovan
false
is
part
claim
^'considered
findings
of
of
the
itself.
uncharged
misconduct
on
both charged and uncharged misconduct, and considered a prior
offense"), 66
consider
(same;
Medlin's
also
alleging
reply),
68
that
Donovan
(alleging
that
failed
to
Donovan
"considered aggravating factors that he knew to be false and
knowingly refused to give any weight to mitigating factors."),
71 {alleging that Donovan failed to consider evidence).
alleged
falsity
libelous
alleged
of
Donovan's
character—is
the
statements—that
meat
of
Medlin's
wrongdoing is a light garnish.
claim.
is,
The
their
claim.
Other
Metz thus bars the
788 F.2d at 1535 & n.9.
Even
if
establish
it
did
intentional
not,
Medlin
infliction
would
of
be
left
emotional
trying
distress
to
based
on Donovan's considering improper factors and failing to fully
review evidence.
Such a claim would be dismissed sua sponte
for failure to state
Corp.,
953
F.2d
a
claim.
1275,
1276
(affirming
dismissal
'Mischarge
for
an
improper
kind
of
conduct
egregious
for
See
Beck
(11th
failure
Cir.
to
reason
on
v.
1992)
state
does
which
a
Interstate
a
not
claim
Brands
(per
curiam)
claim
because
constitute
of
the
intentional
infliction of emotional distress can be based.").
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Medlin's claims.
The
present motion must be granted.
CONCLUSION
For
Dismiss,
the
dkt.
DISMISSED.
MOOT.
reasons
no.
above,
36,
is
the
United
GRANTED.
States'
Plaintiffs'
Motion
to
case
is
All pending motions in this case are DISMISSED AS
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal.
7
so ORDERED, this 29th day of November, 2016.
LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN
3 72A
ev. 8/82)
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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