Rangel v. Anderson
Filing
76
ORDER granting Defendant's 56 Motion in Limine; sustaining in part and overruling in part Defendant's 57 OBJECTION TO TRIAL EXHIBITS OF PLAINTIFF. Any party seeking to object to these rulings must file specific objections prior to the close of business on 11/11/16. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 11/7/2016. (ca)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION
TAMMY RANGEL,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:15-cv-81
v.
PAUL ANDERSON,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Trial Exhibits, (doc. 52),
Defendant’s Motion in Limine, (doc. 56), and Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Trial
Exhibits, (doc. 57). The Court held a hearing on these pleadings, as well as other pretrial
evidentiary matters, on August 10, 2016. At that hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit
a joint filing regarding their remaining motions and objections, which the parties submitted on
August 31, 2016. (Doc. 70.) Plaintiff has WITHDRAWN her Objections to Defendant’s Trial
Exhibits, (doc. 52). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion in
Limine, (doc. 56). Additionally, the Court OVERRULES IN PART and SUSTAINS IN
PART Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits, (doc. 57).
I.
Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Trial Exhibits (Doc. 52).
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Plaintiff WITHDRAWS her Objections to
Defendant’s Trial Exhibits, (doc. 52).1
As agreed in the parties’ Joint Statement, (doc. 70), Plaintiff’s medical records must be accompanied by
a valid certificate of authenticity and the parties shall redact any irrelevant, prejudicial, or otherwise
inadmissible information contained within those records.
1
Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 56).
II.
A.
Defendant’s Objections One (1) and Two (2)
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Plaintiff does not oppose these portions of
Defendant’s Motion in Limine, (doc. 70, p. 7). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS these portions
of Defendant’s Motion in Limine as unopposed.
B.
Defendants’ Objection Three (3)
Defendant argues that the Court should exclude testimony concerning conversations
between Plaintiff and her medical care providers and treating physicians. (Doc. 56, p. 2.)
Specifically, Defendant argues that the Court should prohibit Plaintiff from testifying about
statements made by her medical care providers and treating physicians to Plaintiff, as that
testimony would constitute hearsay. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this testimony falls within an
exception to the rule against hearsay and is, therefore, admissible. (Doc. 70, p. 7.) Plaintiff
further argues that the Court should permit her to present evidence of Plaintiff’s health care
providers’ statements in order to explain Plaintiff’s subsequent conduct. (Id.)
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement that: (1) the declarant makes outside of court; and (2) a party
offers into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid.
801(c). Hearsay is not admissible during a trial unless specifically excepted by statute or rule.
See Fed. R. Evid. 802. However, “[a] statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind
(such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental
feeling, pain, or bodily health)” is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3).
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides that a statement that: “(A) is made
for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical
2
history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause” is
admissible as an exclusion to the rule against hearsay.
Here, Plaintiff seeks to testify about statements made by her health care providers.
Though Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Evidence 8032 in her argument that the Court should
overrule Defendant’s objection, the applicable exceptions within that rule apply only to
statements made by a patient to his or her physician or to other parties—not to statements made
by a physician to his or her patient. Stull v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1271, 1273–74 (8th
Cir. 1990) (“The medical records exception to the hearsay rule assumes that a person making a
statement for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment will likely tell the truth to
a medical person and that the statement is therefore inherently reliable. Hence, to fall within the
exception, the statement must be obtained from the person seeking treatment, or in some
instances from someone with a special relationship to the person seeking treatment, such as a
parent.”); see also Sweeney v. State of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 94 F. Supp.
2d 1241, 1263 (M.D. Ala.), opinion vacated and superseded on reconsideration sub nom.
Sweeney v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2000)
(finding that plaintiff’s statements that her physician diagnosed her with fatigue syndrome were
not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule (citing Bombard v. Fort Wayne
Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 & 564 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that deposition testimony
detailing physician’s statement to patient was hearsay and did not fall within Rule 803(4)’s
exception to the hearsay rule: Rule 803(4) “excepts statements made by a person seeking
medical attention to the person providing that attention. Rule 803(4) does not purport to except,
nor can it reasonably be interpreted as excepting, statements by the person providing the
The Court construes Plaintiff’s citation of Federal Rule of Evidence “803(e)” as Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(3) and 803(4), as those provisions are most pertinent to Plaintiff’s argument.
2
3
medical attention to the patient.”)); See also Weatherly v. Alabama State Univ., No.
2:10CV192-WHA, 2012 WL 274754, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2012) (“Plaintiffs state that the
exhibit is a statement for diagnosis or treatment. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The rule, however,
applies to statements made to the physician for medical diagnosis and treatment.”).3
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this portion of Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
However, to the extent that Plaintiff intends to testify about a health care provider’s
statement to her to explain her conduct following that statement, she would not be offering the
statement for the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement would not be hearsay.
However, at this stage, it is not clear how Plaintiff would need to explain her conduct, much less
whether the probative value of such an explanation would outweigh any undue prejudice.
Should the need arise at trial, Plaintiff’s counsel may address the Court and seek permission to
offer the health care provider’s statement to explain Plaintiff’s subsequent conduct. Plaintiff’s
counsel must seek such permission before eliciting evidence of such a statement.
C.
Defendant’s Objections Four (4) through Seven (7)
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Plaintiff does not oppose these portions of
Defendant’s Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS these portions of Defendant’s
Motion in Limine as unopposed.
D.
Defendant’s Objection Number Eight
Defendant argues that the Court should exclude any evidence that he received a traffic
citation in connection with the automobile accident in question, the disposition of that traffic
Furthemore, even if Plaintiff’s physician’s statements were admissible under Plaintiff’s interpretation of
Rule 803(4), this Court previously granted Defendant’s Motion in Limine to exclude Plaintiff’s treating
physician’s expert opinions. Plaintiff may not now present those opinions under Rule 803(4). See
Johnson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 12-00534, 2013 WL 4607548, at *5 n.12 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 29,
2013) (“[S]ince this court has established . . . that the treating physicians are not allowed to testify as
experts, any statements in the medical records unrelated to the treatment of plaintiff, including any
statements as to the causation of plaintiff’s injuries, is not admissible under Rule 803(4).”)
3
4
citation, and any documentary or testimonial evidence of that citation.
(Doc. 56, p. 4.)
Defendant contends that, absent evidence that he entered a guilty plea as to the traffic charge,
this evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible. (Id. at pp. 4–5.) In the alternative, Defendant
argues that evidence that he received a traffic citation is cumulative in light of the stipulation of
liability in this case. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff argues that “it is important in her case to establish
that even though [Defendant] admits he caused the collision, that he also violated Georgia’s
Rules of the Road.” (Doc. 70, p. 8.) Plaintiff further argues that “[w]ithout the citation and
evidence of the guilty plea in evidence, the jury may be inclined to believe he did not violate the
law and should not be held responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id.)
“Evidence of traffic citations is only admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding if the
defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered a plea of guilty.” Movromatis v. Murphy, No. 143469, 2016 WL 3012051, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2016) (citing Rhodes v. Curtis, No. 04-cv476, 2006 WL 1047021, at *2 (D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2006). See also Bergeron v. Great W. Cas.
Co., No. 14-cv-13, 2015 WL 3505091, at *4 (E.D. La. June 3, 2015) (federal courts “agree that
evidence of a traffic citation is only admissible if the defendant pleaded guilty to the citation”);
Dawson v. Carbollosa, No. 14-cv-0057, 2014 WL 7272768, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2014)
(“While a plea of guilty to a traffic citation is admissible in a civil case, the mere fact that a party
was charged with a traffic violation is not.”) (internal citation omitted); Cunningham v. Wash.
Gas Light Co., No. 86-cv-2392, 1988 WL 90400, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 1988) (“[T]he mere
issuance or failure to issue a traffic citation is not admissible in a civil trial.”).
Here, though Plaintiff provides copies of Defendant’s traffic citation and the disposition
of that citation, neither document reveals whether Defendant entered a guilty plea in connection
with that citation. Even assuming Defendant pled guilty to the traffic offense, this evidence
5
would be irrelevant to any issue that the jury must determine, cumulative, and unfairly
prejudicial, as Defendant admits liability in this case. See Fed. Rs. Evid. 402, 403. Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS this portion of Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
E.
Defendant’s Objections Numbers Nine (9) through Twelve (12)
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Plaintiff does not oppose these portions of
Defendant’s Motion in Limine. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS these portions of Defendant’s
Motion in Limine as unopposed.
F.
Defendant’s Objection Number Thirteen (13)
Defendant argues that the Court should exclude evidence that he is a non-resident of
Georgia. Defendant first maintains that this evidence is irrelevant. Defendant argues in the
alternative that, even if evidence of his residency is relevant, the probative value of that
evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Plaintiff, however, argues that evidence of Defendant’s residency is admissible to demonstrate
Defendant’s lack of familiarity with the area in which the accident occurred. Plaintiff further
argues that she may present evidence of his residency to acquaint the jury with the parties.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that evidence of Defendant’s residency is not so prejudicial as to
outweigh its probative value.
“Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”
Fed. R. Evid. 401. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .unfair
prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Here, Defendant’s out-of-state
residency is arguably probative as to whether he was familiar with the scene of the accident.
6
However, Defendant’s familiarity with the scene of the accident is not a fact of consequence in
determining the action because Defendant admits liability in this case. Therefore, evidence of
Defendant’s out-of-state residency is inadmissible under Rule 401. Further, there is a danger
that a Georgia jury would unfairly hold Plaintiff’s out-of-state residency against him in
determining the matters that are at issue. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS this portion of
Defendant’s Motion in Limine.
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits (Doc. 57).
III.
Defendant filed Objections to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits, (doc. 57), which address several
issues—many of which the parties have resolved. The Court addresses Defendant’s remaining
objections below.
A.
Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2
Defendant again objects that evidence of his traffic citation and the disposition of that
citation is inadmissible, while Plaintiff maintains that this evidence is necessary to establish that
Defendant violated the law and should be held responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries. For the
reasons discussed in Section II D above, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s Objection.
B.
Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3
Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3—listed as “Annuity Mortality Table” arguing
that there is no evidence of future lost wages or the need for future medical care and that,
therefore, the annuity mortality table is irrelevant. Plaintiff argues that, because there is medical
testimony and anticipated testimony from Plaintiff to establish that she has suffered neck and
back pain consistently since the automobile accident, a jury could find that she will continue to
suffer pain. Plaintiff argues that, should the jury make that finding, a mortality table is a
reliable and acceptable tool by which a jury can calculate an award for future pain and suffering.
7
The parties agree that “[t]he issues which th[e] jury must determine are whether this
motor vehicle accident caused [Plaintiff]’s injuries, and if so, the damages to which [Plaintiff] is
entitled.” (Doc. 68, p. 1.) Based upon the evidence presented thus far in the case, a jury could
find that Defendant caused Plaintiff’s injuries, that Plaintiff continues to suffer pain as a result
of those injuries, and that she will suffer pain in the future. Accordingly, the jury could find
that Plaintiff is entitled to damages for future pain and suffering. If the jury does so, the annuity
mortality table would assist the jury in determining an appropriate award. Cf. Jarrard v. Grange
Mut. Cas. Co., No. CV508-031, 2010 WL 11463590, at * 2 (S.D. Ga. June 8, 2010) (finding
that annuity mortality table was inadmissible because that exhibit “relate[d] solely to damage
calculations” which were not at issue in that case). The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s
Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3.
C.
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits Four (4) through Seven (7)
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Defendant has WITHDRAWN his objections as
to Exhibits four (4) through seven (7).
D.
Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11
Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11, listed as “Avis Rental Car agreement,”
arguing that this document is irrelevant and an improper attempt to introduce evidence of a
collateral source and insurance by Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Avis Rental Car
Agreement is relevant to show that Defendant was unfamiliar with the vehicle he was driving
and the area where the collision occurred. For the reasons discussed in II F above, Defendant’s
familiarity with the accident scene is not a fact of consequence in this action, because Defendant
admits liability. Therefore, evidence that Defendant rented the car that collided with Plaintiff’s
car is not relevant to whether the impact caused Plaintiff’s injuries and if so, the damages to
8
which Plaintiff is entitled. Additionally, for the reasons stated by Defendant, this evidence
could unfairly prejudice Defendant. Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s Objection
to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11.
E.
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 12, 13
Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, listed as “Diagram of Accident Location,”
and Exhibit 13, listed as “Google Map of Accident Location” on the grounds of foundation,
hearsay, that those documents assume facts not in evidence, and that those documents are not to
scale and have not been authenticated. Plaintiff argues that the Court should allow her to
present both of these documents to provide the context of the accident scene to the jury.
Provided Plaintiff properly authenticates Exhibits 12 and 13, these documents are admissible for
the limited purpose of describing the accident scene. See Cobb Theatres III, LLC v. AMC
Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1329–30 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (denying
plaintiff’s motion to strike a Google Maps printout when the purpose of the printout was to
show the geographic location of theater buildings in surrounding area, even though printout did
not “provide a scale from which the Court could determine the distance in miles between any
two points”). Defendant can point out any issues regarding the credibility of the Exhibit,
including its lack of scale, through cross examination. The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s
Objection.
F.
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 14, 15, 21–23, 25–29
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Defendant has WITHDRAWN his objections as
to Exhibits 14, 15, 21–23, and 25–29.
9
G.
Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 49
Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 49, listed as “Rangel Property Damage
Appraisal” on the grounds that this evidence is irrelevant, due to Plaintiff’s failure to plead a
claim for property damages. Defendant also objects that Plaintiff has improperly attempted to
introduce evidence of a collateral source and insurance and evidence of subsequent remedial
measures on repairs through this document. Plaintiff avers that her property damage appraisal
will assist the jury in determining the force of impact and, as a result, the severity and extent of
her injuries.
While Plaintiff does not assert a claim for property damage to her vehicle in this case,
this evidence makes it more probable that Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the car
accident. See Robinson v. Ryan, No. 3:07CV74, 2008 WL 5111079, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3,
2008) (rejecting argument that amount of property damage was irrelevant in personal injury
action and holding that “[e]vidence of the [car accident] is obviously relevant as to whether or
not an injury occurred” and that “the extent of damage caused by the wreck is relevant to the
extent of [plaintiff’s] injuries”); Bishop v. Dale Jessup, Inc., No. 4:05CV397 JCH, 2006 WL
571979, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2006) (“Even if there is not a perfect correlation between
property damage and personal injury in automobile accidents, it does not mean that property
damage is not relevant. . . . Evidence of property damage is probative of the extent of personal
injury, and it is not even outweighed, let alone substantially outweighed, by any danger of
unfair prejudice.”) Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Objection.
However, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff’s counsel to redact any and all reference to
insurance or other collateral sources in this Exhibit.
For example, Plaintiff must redact
information regarding an insurance deductible or what insurance company the appraisal was
10
prepared for. Plaintiff’s counsel must review those redactions with Defendant’s counsel prior to
trial.
H.
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 50, 51, 53
As stated in the parties’ Joint Statement, Defendant has withdrawn his objections as to
Exhibits 50 and 51. As to Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 53, listed as “Statement of
Paul Anderson,” Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw this Exhibit. (Doc. 70, p. 6.) Therefore, the
Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s Objection as to Exhibit 53 as unopposed.
I.
Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 54
Finally, Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 54, listed as “Tammy Rangel Medical
Bills Summary.” Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to testify as to a summary of her medical
bills to assist the jury in deliberations as to this issue. As discussed previously, the issues which
the jury must determine in this case are the whether Defendant caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and if
so, the damages to which Plaintiff is entitled. Provided Plaintiff properly authenticates the
medical bills at issue, she may present this evidence to the jury to assist the jury in determining
her damages.
11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons and in the manner set forth above the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion in Limine, (doc. 56). The Court OVERRULES IN PART and SUSTAINS IN PART
Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits. Any party seeking to object to these rulings
must file specific objections prior to the close of business on November 11, 2016.
Any
objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the
Objections or responses thereto must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). The filing of objections is not a
proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Furthermore, it is not necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in objections.
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of November, 2016.
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?