In Re: Cameron Ippolito and Lou Valoze

Filing 6

ORDER denying 5 Motion to Vacate and Dismiss. The Order of January 30, 2015 shall remain in full force and effect. The Clerk of this Court shall file this Order in each of his respective divisional offices for Augusta, Brunswick, and Savannah. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 4/11/2018. (pts)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
AUGUSTA uiV.
THE

2O10 APRI I

AH 9: 1^2

CLERK
MISC. NO. 215-002

IN RE: CAMERON IPPOLITO

ORDER

Before

the

Court

is

former

Assistant

United

States

Attorney Cameron Ippolito's "Motion to Vacate and Dismiss" an
Order entered by the Court in this miscellaneous case on

January 30, 2015 (hereinafter, the "January 2015 Order").
(Doc. No. 5.)

At the outset, it should be noted that the

subject Order was subscribed by each of the then serving
active and senior judges of this Court.

(See Doc. No. 1.)

This Order is subscribed by the four remaining judges, thereby
endorsing each of its particulars.

Also noteworthy at the outset is the fallacy of the
assumption that premises the third full paragraph of the
instant motion, which begins: "Subsequently, as the Court is
aware . . ,

(Doc. No. 5, at 2.)

Any reliance upon this

assumption is mistaken; it cannot be assumed that each of the

signatory judges is or was otherwise aware of the specifics
contained therein prior to reading the motion. Moreover, with
regard to Ms. Ippolito and her standing as a practitioner
before this Court, the findings of the Department of Justice's

Office of Inspector General and those of the Virginia State

Bar

may

be

matters

of

interest,

but

they

are

neither

determinative nor persuasive.

In the retrospective view of the motion and the summary
supplied for the actions taken by the Virginia State Bar, the

Court detects an implication that the then United States
Attorney, Edward J. Tarver, in his timing and methods, acted
precipitously,

ultra

vires,

or

arbitrarily.

Any

such

suggestion is specifically and absolutely rejected by this
Court.

While it is true that the Court instructed Mr. Tarver

to refrain from submitting matters in pending or recent cases

using the format of a letter to the Court, his decision to
disclose in detail the information upon which the January 2015

Order was based was appropriate, necessary, even unavoidable.
It

was

the

only

responsible

thing

to

do

under

extant

circumstances.

The chronological context of the January 2015 Order
cannot be ignored.

The seven-page letter from Mr. Tarver was

dated January 22, 2015.

The judges of the district had less

than one week to review the matter, consider it, and confer

prior to the entry of the Order.

Movant is correct in the

assessment that the ''effect [of the January 2015 Order] was to

freeze the status quo and to avoid any further potential taint
of then-pending criminal proceedings."
1.)

(Mot. to Vacate, at

With full benefit of the record of investigations by the

Office of the Inspector General and the Virginia State Bar,
the proceedings of which this Court was not apprised, Movant
now

dismissively

asserts:

"The

Virginia

State

Bar

has

publicly reprimanded Ms. Ippolito for a technical violation of
the Rule regarding Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor."

(Id.

at

2

(emphasis

added).)

Further,

Movant

asserts:

"Neither the Office of Inspector General nor the United States
Attorney . . . accepted any charges in reference to the
allegations made by former United States Attorney Tarver."

(Id.)

Whether Ms. Ippolito has been the subject of criminal

investigation

or

prosecution is,

in

the

context

standing before the Bar of this Court, immaterial.
Movant's

characterization

of

Ms.

Ippolito's

of

her

Likewise,

defalcation

regarding the special responsibilities of a prosecutor as a
"technical violation" is far from apposite.^

To "avoid any further potential taint of then-pending
criminal proceedings" is not the single reason prompting this
Court's Order that Ms. Ippolito should not "appear before the

Court in an official, professional capacity in any proceeding
until further Order."

This Court's permit that an individual

may plead, appear, and practice, whether as an Assistant
1 "The United States Attorney is the representative not
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

United States Attorney or as a private attorney at law,
includes by way of implication the Court's endorsement of the
individual attorney as a member of its Bar in good standing.
Through Mr. Tarver's ample letter of January 22, each judge of
the Court was made aware of the numerous transgressions of Ms.

Ippolito and Special Agent Valoze, generally involving:
A)

Failure to disclose Gialio information to numerous
defendants in criminal cases;

B)

Misleading testimony elicited from S.A. Valoze, by
AUSA Ippolito;

C)

Actions taken by S.A. Valoze at the direction or
with the knowledge of AUSA Ipplito; and

D)

S.A. Valoze's procurement of an "S" visa for an
informant

based

upon

disingenuous

and

false

information, known to be such by AUSA Ippolito.
The nature of Mr. Tarver's letter cannot be ignored.

The

United States Government's disclosure of exculpatory material

and

impeachment

evidence

guarantee to a fair trial.

is

part

of

the

constitutional

See Bradv v. Marvland. 373 U.S.

83, 87 (1963); Gialio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150, 154

(1972).

To that end, the Department of Justice has developed

policies for federal prosecutors regarding the disclosure of
Brady/Gialio evidence.
5.001,

''Policy

See. e.a.. U.S. Attorney's Manual, 9-

Regarding

Disclosure

of

Exculpatory

and

Impeachment Information." Further, the Department of Justice

has implemented a policy regarding disclosure by investigative
agencies to federal prosecutors of Gialio information.

See

U.S.

the

Attorney's

Manual,

9-5.100,

"Policy

Regarding

Disclosure to Prosectors of Potential Impeachment Information

Concerning

Law

Enforcement

Agency

Witnesses

(^Giglio

Policy')."

Here, Ms. Ippolitio had first-hand knowledge of

potential Gicrlio material, indeed, creating it by her own
conduct.

The failure of an Assistant United States Attorney

to disclose potential Gialio material where that failure is
attributable to the author of the problem is alone sufficient

to justify the action taken by this Court.

In issuing its January 2015 Order, this Court acted in

protection of the rights of criminal defendants, in protection
of the public, to uphold the dignity of the judicial process
as a whole, and to stem further incursions or insult to its

processes. During the period from the receipt of Mr. Tarver's

letter until the entry of the January 2015 Order, the judges
of the Court, beyond whatever personal disappointment the
letter may have caused, apprehended the potential for a sharp
and significant workload increase due to a perception of need
to unravel the complications in their respective caseloads

precipitated by the conduct of Ms. Ippolito and S.A. Valoze.
In short, to allow the continued appearance before the Court
by both or either of Ms. Ippolito or S.A. Valoze was an
untenable prospect given the confusion between their personal

intimacies and their official duties.

The Court perceived a

diminution of credibility which was unacceptable to the judges
and which would, if known, erode the confidence of the public.

Nevertheless,

while

these

underlying

facts

remain

unchanged, Movant requests that the January 2015 Order be
vacated.^

To vacate a prior order is essentially to annul or

render the order void of any effect.
order operates ah initio.

Generally, vacating an

Because the Order of January 2015,

entered under virtual emergency circumstances, reflected the
clear intent of this Court and each of its judges toward the

salutary purpose of avoiding the taint of Ms. Ippolito's
improprieties

upon

other

cases,

to

prevent

the

further

potential erosion of public confidence, and to minimize the

potential for the abridgement of rights guaranteed to criminal
defendants in this district under federal and constitutional

law, this Court will not consider vacating the Order.

The

January 2015 Order shall remain of full force, effect, and a
part of the record in this proceeding.
Finally and pragmatically, it must be noted that any
attorney presented to this district court as a vetted and
sworn Assistant United States Attorney is initially afforded
admission to its Bar and

accorded a level of

respect, and presumptive ability.

^

privilege,

Thus, an Assistant United

According to Black's Law Dictionary, ''vacate" means

"to annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind."

States

Attorney may

plead and

practice

before

the

Court

whether or not that individual otherwise meets the standards

of admission to its Bar.

Ms. Cameron Heaps Ippolito is not

listed as a member of the State Bar of Georgia.
is a member of the State Bar of Virginia.

Rather, she

Her admission to

the Bar of this District was ex officio, accomplished only

through her hire in the United States Attorney's Office around
December 1999. According to the motion, Ms. Ippolito is no

longer an Assistant United States Attorney, therefore she is
no longer entitled to "streamlined admission" of her foanner
position.

Upon the foregoing and for the reasons stated herein, the
"Motion to Vacate and Dismiss" filed on behalf of Ms. Cameron

Ippolito {doc. no. 5) is DENIED.

The Order of January 30,

2015, shall remain of full force and effect.

IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall file this Order in

each

of

his

respective

divisional

offices

for

Brunswick, and Savannah.

SO ORDERED, this

day of April, 2018.

HONOR^LET J. RANDAL HALL
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

Augusta,

honourable LlSA^GODBE^^OOD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

HONORABLE DUD^ H. BOWEN, JR.
SENIOR UNITEC/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

HONORABLE WILLIAM T. M0DRE, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA