Nichols v. Murray Ford of Kingsland, Inc. et al
Filing
22
ORDER denying Defendant Murray Ford of Kingsland's 16 Motion to Dismiss; granting Defendant's alternative 16 Motion to Stay pending resolution through arbitration. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 1/13/2017. (ca)
Ifn tl^e ?IIIntteb States!I9it(trtct Court
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SANDRA NICHOLS,
Plaintiff,
CV 216-69
V.
MURRAY FORD OF KINGSLAND
INC., and S.E. GA FORD, INC
d/b/a
LILLISTON FORD OF KINGSLAND,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the
Court is Defendant Murray
Ford of Kingsland's
("Murray Ford") Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration (Dkt. No. 16).
For
the reasons stated below. Defendant's motion to Stay Proceedings
and Compel Arbitration (Dkt. No. 16) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The
Sandra
facts
Nichols'
stated
herein
("Plaintiff")
are
taken
solely
Complaint and
true pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
are
from
Plaintiff
assumed
to
be
In February 2015, Nichols was
hired to work as a full-time Sales Representative by Defendant
Lilliston Ford of Kingsland ("Lilliston Ford").
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
Dkt. No. 1 SI
14.
Plaintiff alleges that Lilliston Ford employee Mike Hanley
C^Hanley")
made
several
sexually
during a business trip.
charged
SISI 18-20.
comments
toward
her
She alleges that this
eventually escalated to forcible kissing and groping.
months
afterwards.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
she
For
endured
groping and sexually explicit comments from Hanley.
more
JA. SISI 29-
30.
Plaintiff alleges that she reported the February incident
to her manager, Stephen Ardman (""Ardman"), on May 9, 2015.
SI
32.
The
reiterated
her
with her.
a
written
harassment
allegedly
continued.
concerns to Ardman,
SI 36.
complaint
who allegedly
that
Ms.
became
later
upset
Plaintiff claims that she ultimately gave
to
the
owner
of
Lilliston
Tanner-Lilliston (''Ms. Tanner-Lilliston").
alleges
Plaintiff
Id.
Tanner-Lilliston
Ford,
SI 37.
assured
Jedon
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
that
she
would fix the problem, but again, the harassment continued.
Id.
Plaintiff
and
alleges
that
Ardman
subsequently turned
began retaliating against her with Hanley.
On
September
Murray Ford.
1,
JA. SI 45.
2015,
Lilliston
on
her
Id.
Ford
was
purchased
by
On September 4, 2015, Plaintiff alleges
that she notified the owners of Murray Ford about the harassment
and retaliation she was suffering.
2015, Plaintiff was terminated.
JA. SI 46.
JA. SI 47.
On September 14,
She further alleges
she was not paid commission for three vehicles sold when working
for Murray Ford.
JA. SI 48.
Plaintiff asserts her termination
and unpaid commission was in retaliation for reporting Hanley's
harassment.
She subsequently filed a Complaint with this Court
on May 13, 2016.
Murray
Ford
now
moves
to
dismiss
on
the
basis
that
Plaintiff is required to arbitrate this matter before the Court
can exercise jurisdiction in this case.
Dkt. No. 16.
LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), a district court must accept as true the facts as set
forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor.
Cir.
2010).
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th
Although
a
complaint
need
not
contain
detailed
factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material
^^to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
a
complaint
allegations
should
respecting
^'contain
all the
either
direct
Bell
At a minimum,
or
material elements
inferential
necessary to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."
Fin. Sec.
Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (quoting
Roe
v. Aware
Woman Ctr. for
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
DISCUSSION
Murray Ford seeks to enforce arbitration and dismiss this
action.
""'The Federal Arbitration Act (^FAA') generally governs
the validity of an arbitration agreement."
Windshield
Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d
Walthour v. Chipio
1326, 1329 (llth
cert. den'd, 134 S. Ct. 2886 (2014).
Cir. 2014),
''The FAA was 'enacted in
1925 as a response to judicial hostility to arbitration.'"
Id.
(quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. —, —, 132 S.
Ct. 665, 668 (2012)).
"The FAA thus 'embodies a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements' and seeks 'to relieve
congestion
in
the
courts
and
to
provide
parties
with
an
alternative method for dispute resolution that is speedier and
less costly than litigation.'"
Aerospace
Corp.,
428
F.3d
Id. (quoting Caley v. Gulfstream
1359,
Consistent with the text of the
1367
(llth
Cir.
2005)).
FAA, "courts must 'rigorously
enforce' arbitration agreements according to their terms."
Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., — U.S. —, —, 133 S. Ct.
2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
The
FAA's
primary
substantive
provision
provides
that
a
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy arising out of that
contract
upon
"shall
such
be
grounds
valid,
as
irrevocable,
exist
at
law
and
or
in
enforceable,
equity
save
for
the
revocation of any contract."
9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Penderqast
V.
F.3d
Sprint
Nextel Corp., 691
1224, 1231 (llth
Cir.
2012)
(explaining that
with
arbitration
other contracts").
agreements are on
^^equal footing
court can decline to enforce an
arbitration agreement under the FAA only if the plaintiff[] can
point to a generally applicable principle of contract law under
which the agreement could be revoked."
State
law,
here,
Georgia
law,
Caley, 428 F.3d at 1371.
generally
governs
whether
an
enforceable contract exists; however, the FAA preempts state law
to the extent that it treats arbitration agreements differently
than other contracts.
JA. at 1367.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Murray Ford relies on
the following arbitration agreement, signed by Plaintiff, which
subjects all actions against Murray Ford to alternative dispute
resolution:
I agree that any dispute of a legal nature arising under
federal,
state, or local law
between
me
and the
Company,
including
any such
claim regarding
Company property,
discrimination, harassment, or any other legal dispute
relating to my employment or arising from any labor,
employment, or civil rights law, will be subject to final
and binding arbitration in accordance with the Company's
Dispute
Resolution
Policy.
I
understand
that
the
Arbitrator has the same authority, to award damages and
other relief, as does a court of law.
I also understand
that while the Employee Handbook is otherwise subject to
change at the Company's discretion, this Agreement to
Arbitrate and the Company's Dispute Resolution policy will
be binding and irrevocable for the Company and me as
written.
Dkt. No. 16-3 p. 2.
As
Circuit
an
has
initial
held
matter,
the
Court
that ''statutory
notes
claims,
that
the
including
Eleventh
Title
VII
claims, can be subject to mandatory arbitration."
Consumer
Fin.
Corp.,
211
2000)(citation omitted).
Title
VII
claim
it
1217,
1222
{11th
Cir.
Therefore, while this case involves a
may
arbitration agreement.
F.3d
Brown v. ITT
nonetheless
be
subject
to
a
valid
Therefore, the Court must look to the
actual language of the agreement itself to determine whether the
arbitration clause applies.
that
She
the
arbitration
points
to
Plaintiff urges the Court to find
clause
language
does
in
the
not
mandate
Murray
Ford
arbitration
employee
here.
handbook
indicating that arbitration is not mandatory, but instead, an
'"option."^
Further, Plaintiff points to another provision in the
employee handbook that arbitration ^^can," rather than '"shall,"
apply to "any actionable issue." Dkt. No. 17 p. 3.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff signed the arbitration
agreement
Murray
within
Ford.
the
notice
Instead,
of
acknowledgement
Plaintiff
argues
that
form
the
cited
by
arbitration
clause is unenforceable given that the mandatory language in the
notice
of
acknowledgement
employee handbook.
that the
contradicts
Dkt. No. 17 p. 5.
arbitration
agreement is
the
language
in
the
Further, Plaintiff argues
unenforceable
because it is
^ "in the event you are still not satisfied with the decision presented, you
have
the
option
of
requesting
binding
arbitration
between
you
and
the
company.
Arbitration can apply to any actionable issue, including claims
regarding wrongful discharge, employment discrimination, harassment, or any
other dispute relating to your employment or arising
employment, or civil rights law." Dkt. No. 16-2 p. 3.
under
any
labor,
missing
key terms.
Id.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
The
Court
finds
that
Id.
there
is
nothing
innately
contradictory about the arbitration agreement and the employee
handbook's language about the '^option" to arbitrate.
Plaintiff
urges the Court to read the employee handbook to indicate that
she and she alone had the power to arbitrate this matter.
such language exists in the employee
handbook.
No
The handbook
simply provides notice that the option to arbitrate any dispute
can
be
exercised
by
Plaintiff,
not
exercise its right to arbitrate.
its
intent
agreement,
to
which
that
arbitrate
any
dispute
indicates
that
^'any
^'missing
terms"
arbitration
the
Court
agreement
is
could be more detailed.
621
F.
App'x
"incompleteness"
arbitration
court's
569,
an
clause).
opinion
in
l:13-CV-2353,
2016
arguing
1)
that
rejects
invalidate
the
cannot
in
the
arbitration
dispute . . . will
be
Dkt. No. 16-3 p. 1.
Plaintiff's
arbitration
unenforceable
argument
that
clause.
simply
The
because
it
Matthews v. Ultimate Sports Bar, LLC,
572-73
(11th
insufficient
Plaintiff
Matthews
WL
the
not
Ford
Indeed, Murray Ford indicated
subject to final and binding arbitration."
Furthermore,
Murray
v.
Cir.
basis
relies
Ultimate
4035655
(N.D.
agreement
is
Ga.
2015)
to
invalidate
heavily
Sports
July
(holding
on
Bar,
28,
a
sister
LLC,
2016),
"incomprehensible"
an
and
No.
in
2)
incomplete terms should invalidate the agreement.
However, the
agreement in this case is distinguishable from the agreement in
Matthews.
The agreement in that case contained broken English
resulting
in
^^nonsensical language" that
even understand.
lA. at *2.
In
court did
addition, the
the
court
could
not
This is plainly not the case here.
not
hold that missing
terms
were the reason that the agreement was invalid.
alone
Instead,
the Matthews court found that the agreement, taken as a whole,
was entirely meaningless.
case
here.
Again, this is simply not the
Therefore, the
Court finds that the
agreement is
valid.
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff s argument that the
arbitration
clause
is
unconscionable.
Under
Georgia
law,
an
unconscionable contract is ^^such an agreement as no sane man not
acting under a delusion would make and that no honest man would
take advantage of."
(Ga.
Ct.
factors
App.
in
1986).
Georgia
determining
intelligence,
their
Hall v. Fruehauf Corp., 346 S.E.2d 582, 583
business
relative
look
unconscionability:
acumen
bargaining
courts
and
power,
the
''age,
experience
the
to
of
following
education,
the
parties,
conspicuousness
of
and
comprehensibility of the contract language, the oppressiveness
of the terms, and the presence or absence of meaningful choice."
NEC
Techs.,
Inc.
Plaintiff
v.
Nelson,
attempts
to
478
S.E.2d
frame
8
her
769,
771
lack
(Ga.
of
1996).
business
sophistication
as
unconscionable.
lack
of
a
reason
why the
Dkt. No. 17 p. 6.
sophistication
unconscionable.
is
arbitration
agreement
The Court disagrees.
insufficient
to
find
an
is
A mere
agreement
Saturna v. Bickley Constr. Co., 555 S.E.2d 825,
827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
She also claims that she did not have
time to read the agreement sufficiently before she signed it.
This
argument
also
has
no
merit.
Under
Georgia
law, ''one
signing a document has a duty to read it and is bound by the
terms
of
a
document [s]he
does
not
read."
Gill
Plumbing
v.
Jimenez, 714 S.E.2d 342, 350 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that she
lacked the bargaining power to renegotiate the agreement or ask
for
more
fails.
time
to
consider
the
agreement,
this
"[0]ne may not void a contract on
argument
also
grounds of duress
merely because she entered into it with reluctance, the contract
is
very
parties
disadvantageous to
was
unequal
or
her,
there
the
was
bargaining
some
negotiations preceding the agreements."
534
S.E.2d
Plaintiff's
agreement
arbitration
such, the
446,
450
(Ga.
2000).
unconscionability
will
be
provision
Court
enforced.
of the
Thus,
2008
unfairness
of the
in
the
Kramer v. Kroqer Co.,
Thus,
argument
power
the
and
the
Agreement
Court
the
Court
rejects
arbitration
finds
the
enforceable.
As
will stay this matter pending the
resolution
through arbitration.
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971
F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered that
Defendant Murray Ford of Kingsland's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No.
16) is DENIED.
(Dkt.
No.
However, Defendant's alternative Motion to Stay
16) is
GRANTED
and
the
Court
orders
this
action
STAYED pending resolution through arbitration.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of January, 2017.
LISA GODBEY WODD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
10
be
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