Jones v. United States Of America

Filing 10

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS Jones' Section 1 2255 Motion as untimely. Alternatively, to the extent that the Court reaches the merits of Jones' arguments, it should DENY his Motion. It is a lso RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Jones a Certificate of Appealibility and in forma pauperis status on appeal and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to Close this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. Any party seeking to object to this Re port and Recommendation is ordered to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 2/26/2018). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 2/12/2018. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

ANTWAN JONES,
Movant,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:16-cv-97

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

(Case No. 2:12-cr-9)

Respondent.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
More than four years ago, this Court sentenced Antwan Jones (“Jones”) to 137 months’
imprisonment following his conviction for possession with intent to distribute controlled
substances. Jones, who is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution-Low in
Yazoo City, Mississippi, has now filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 83.) 1 Jones contends that the Court must resentence him
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. at
___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (June 26, 2015). (Id.) Johnson invalidated the Armed Career Criminal
Act’s (“ACCA”) residual clause. This Court did not rely upon the ACCA, much less the Act’s
residual clause, in any way during Jones’ sentencing proceedings. However, Jones points out

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The pertinent record documents in this case are filed on the docket of Jones’ criminal case, United
States v. Jones, 2:12-cr-9 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2012), and many are not included in Jones’ civil docket.
Thus, for ease of reference and consistency, the Court cites to Jones’ criminal docket in this Order and
Report and Recommendation. Jones previously filed a Section 2255 motion, (doc. 71), and a motion to
dismiss that motion, (doc. 78). While the Court ruled on those motions on March 14, 2016, (doc. 81), the
Clerk of Court failed to terminate these motions on Jones’ criminal docket. The Court DIRECTS the
Clerk of Court to correct this mistake and terminate docket numbers 71 and 78 in Jones’ criminal docket,
in accordance with this Court’s prior Order.

that his advisory Sentencing Guidelines’ range turned on his classification as a career offender
under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. Section 4B1.2(a)(2) contains
language similar to the ACCA’s residual clause. Nonetheless, following Jones’ instant Section
2255 Motion, the Supreme Court held that Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines and has
specifically held that the decision does not invalidate Section 4B1.2(a)(2)’s definition of a “crime
of violence.” Beckles v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Mar. 6, 2017).
Because Jones does not raise a valid Johnson claim, he filed his Motion well outside of
the one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Thus, I RECOMMEND that the
Court DISMISS Jones’ Section 2255 Motion, (doc. 83), as untimely. Alternatively, to the extent
that the Court reaches the merits of Jones’ arguments, it should DENY his Motion. Further, I
RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Jones a Certificate of Appealability and in forma
pauperis status on appeal and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the
appropriate judgment of dismissal.
BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2012, a grand jury for this District charged Jones with: possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count One); possession with intent to
distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count
Two); and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Three). (Doc. 1.) The Government’s Penalty Certification stated
that Jones faced not more than ten years’ imprisonment as to each of Counts One and Three and
not more than twenty years’ imprisonment as to Count Two. (Doc. 2.)
However, Jones and his trial counsel were able to negotiate a plea agreement with the
Government whereby Jones agreed to plead guilty to Count Two of the Indictment in exchange

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for the Government moving to dismiss the remaining counts. (Doc. 46.) On November 9, 2012,
Jones appeared before the Honorable Lisa Godbey Wood for a change of plea, or Rule 11,
hearing. (Doc. 44.) Before accepting Jones’ guilty plea, Judge Wood engaged in an extensive
plea colloquy with Jones to ensure that Jones fully understood his rights and the charges against
him, as well as the maximum penalties associated with those charges, and that Jones made his
decision to plead guilty knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally. (Doc. 65.)
Prior to Jones’ sentencing hearing, United States Probation Officer Brian Mills prepared
a Pre-Sentence Investigation report (“PSI”). Probation Officer Mills detailed Jones’ offense
conduct and criminal history and calculated Jones’ statutory penalties, as well as his advisory
Guidelines’ range. Officer Mills concluded that Jones was a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1 because: (1) Jones was at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the offenses
in this case; (2) the offense Jones pleaded guilty to was a controlled substance offense; and
(3) Jones had three prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses. (PSI, ¶¶ 29, 39,
40, 41.) Jones’ offense level of 29 under Section 4B1.1, combined with a criminal history
category of VI, resulted in a recommended Guidelines’ sentencing range of 151 to 188 months.
(Id. at ¶ 74.)
Jones’ counsel levied objections to the PSI. (PSI Addendum.) Specifically, he argued
that Jones should not receive a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for
possession of a firearm in connection with the offense conduct. (Id.) Additionally, counsel filed
a motion for downward departure, adjustment for time served in state custody, and/or request
that sentence be imposed concurrent with remainder of state sentence. (Doc. 52.)
On July 29, 2013, Jones appeared before Judge Wood for a sentencing hearing.
(Doc. 55.)

Judge Wood overruled Jones’ counsel’s objection to the Section 2D1.1(b)(1)

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enhancement. (Doc. 66, pp. 25–27.) Judge Wood concurred with and adopted the factual
statements and conclusions in the PSI and found a Guidelines’ range of 151 to188 months’
imprisonment. (Id.) However, based on Jones’ counsel’s motion for downward departure, his
arguments at sentencing, and the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553, Judge Wood varied
downward from the Guidelines’ range and sentenced Jones to 137 months’ imprisonment. (Id. at
pp. 42–44.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Judge Wood dismissed the remaining counts of the
Indictment against Jones. (Doc. 56.)
On March 27, 2014, Jones filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. 59.) On December 17, 2014,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal as untimely. (Doc. 69.) On
February 26, 2015, Jones filed his first motion to vacate under Section 2255. (Doc. 71.) The
Government responded that Jones’ motion was untimely and meritless. (Doc. 76.) Jones then
moved to dismiss his first Section 2255 motion without prejudice, and the Court granted that
request. (Docs. 78, 81.)
In his instant Section 2255 Motion, Jones argues that his counsel was ineffective and that
the Court must revisit his sentence. (Doc. 83.) He argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Johnson should apply to Section 4B1.2 and invalidate his career offender designation. (Doc. 83.)
The Government responded to Jones’ Motion and argues that the Eleventh Circuit had held that
Johnson does not apply at all in the context of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and
specifically, does not apply to the career offender Guideline. (Doc. 85, pp. 2–4.) Further, the
Government asserts that, even if Johnson invalidated the Guidelines’ definition of “crime of
violence,” Jones’ career offender designation was not based on that definition. Rather, he was
designated a career offender due to his convictions for “controlled substance offenses.” (Id.)
The Government further argues that Jones’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

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untimely, just as they were when Jones raised them in his first Section 2255 motion. (Id. at p. 4.)
Jones filed a Reply to the Government’s Response and points out that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Beckles to decide whether Johnson applied to Section 4B1.2. (Doc. 86.)
DISCUSSION
I.

Whether Jones Timely Filed his Petition
To determine whether Jones timely filed his Motion, the Court must look to the

applicable statute of limitations period. Motions made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are subject
to a one-year statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). This limitations period runs
from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id.
Jones was sentenced on July 29, 2013, and the Court entered final judgment on August 2,
2013. (Doc. 56.). Jones had fourteen (14) days, or until August 16, 2013, to file a notice of
appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a); Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d
1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that, when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or
sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review

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expires). Because Jones did not file a timely appeal, he had until August 18, 2014, 2 to file a
timely Section 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Jones did not execute his instant Section
2255 Motion until June 22, 2016, which was a year and ten months after the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations period. (Doc. 83, p. 13.) Consequently, Jones’ Motion is
untimely under Section 2255(f)(1). While Jones filed an untimely appeal, that does not toll
Section 2255(f)’s statute of limitations. Montas v. United States, No. 14-20433-CR, 2016 WL
269891, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2016) (“[A]n untimely notice of appeal does not toll the one
year limitation contained in § 2255.”) (quoting Philentrope v. United States, No. 11-2177, 2011
WL 4913569, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2011)). Further, even if Jones’ appeal did somehow toll
the limitations period, he filed this Section 2255 Motion more than a year after the Eleventh
Circuit dismissed the appeal.
Jones argues that he timely filed his Motion under Section 2255(f)(3) because Johnson is
a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review. (Doc. 83, p. 12.)
Indeed, in Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Apr. 18, 2016), the Supreme
Court held that Johnson is a substantive decision which applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. Thus, if Jones actually asserted a right newly recognized by the Supreme
Court in Johnson, Section 2255(f)(3) could allow Jones to bring his Section 2255 Motion.
However, as discussed in Section II below, Jones does not bring a cognizable Johnson claim.
Because Jones does not bring a valid Johnson claim, he cannot rely upon Johnson to excuse the
untimeliness of his Section 2255 Motion.
Moreover, even if Jones made timely claims under Johnson, he could not use those
claims to open the door to other non-Johnson claims. Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 922–26
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August 16, 2014, was a Saturday. Thus, Jones had until the following Monday to file his Section 2255
Motion. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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(11th Cir. 2013) (habeas limitations periods apply on a claim-by-claim basis). Thus, regardless
of the timeliness of Jones’ Johnson claims, the Court must dismiss his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel as being filed well outside the statute of limitations period.
For all of these reasons, the Court should DISMISS Jones’ Motion as untimely.
II.

Whether Johnson Applies to Jones’ Guidelines’ Career Offender Sentence
Enhancement
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that “imposing an increased sentence under the

residual clause of the ACCA violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process[.]” ___ U.S. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The ACCA provides enhanced penalties for defendants who are
(1) convicted of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and
(2) have “three prior convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added). The residual clause of the ACCA defines “violent
felony” as, inter alia, a felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson, the Supreme Court
found the “residual clause” so vague as to violate due process. See ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
2557.
The “crime of violence” definition formerly contained within the Sentencing Guidelines’
career offender enhancement provision is identical to the residual clause language found
unconstitutional in Johnson.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2004).

Despite this similarity, the

Supreme Court held in Beckles that the Johnson holding does not apply to the residual clause of
the Sentencing Guidelines. In Beckles, the petitioner was arrested for being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). “Due to multiple prior felonies, Beckles[’]
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) subjected him to the enhanced penalty provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1)[,] and the district court found him to be an armed career criminal pursuant to that

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statute.” United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 841 (11th Cir. 2009). “This finding, in turn,
qualified Beckles for a sentence enhancement under [Section 4B1.4 of the Sentencing
Guidelines].” Id. Section 4B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines “instructs that the appropriate
offense level is . . . [inter alia] the offense level described in § 4B1.1, if applicable.” Id. at 841–
42. “Section 4B1.1, in turn, applies if”:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and
(3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.
Id. at p. 842 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis supplied)). The term “crime of violence”
previously included “any offense under . . . state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2004). “At [Beckles’] sentencing, the district court
found that § 4B1.1 was applicable . . . reasoning that two of Beckles[’] prior felony convictions
were for qualified controlled substances offenses, and the current 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) conviction
[for being a felon in possession of a firearm] was for a ‘crime of violence.’” Id.
In Beckles’ subsequent Section 2255 motion, he “claimed that he was improperly
sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, [arguing that] his conviction for
possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a ‘crime of violence.’” Beckles v. United States, 579
F. App’x 833, 833 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, Beckles, ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 886. The
Eleventh Circuit denied Beckles’ Section 2255 motion, finding Johnson inapplicable to the
Sentencing Guidelines. Beckles subsequently filed a petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, again contending that the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause is void for
vagueness under Johnson. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the

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Eleventh Circuit, holding that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, including § 4B1.2(a)’s
residual clause, are not subject to a challenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.” Id., ___
U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 896. The Court reasoned that, unlike the ACCA, “[t]he advisory
Guidelines [ ] do not implicate the twin concerns underlying vagueness doctrine—providing
notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement.” 3 Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 894. The
Court further distinguished the Guidelines from the ACCA because the ACCA requires
sentencing courts to increase a defendant’s prison term from a statutory maximum of 10 years to
a minimum of 15 years, whereas the Guidelines are advisory. Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at
892. Therefore, although the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause and the ACCA’s residual
clause are identical, the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge
under Johnson because the Guidelines “merely guide the district courts’ discretion[.]” Id., ___
U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 894.
As laid out above, the Court deemed Jones a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)
due to his prior convictions for controlled substance offenses. (PSI, ¶¶ 39, 40, 41.) Jones
contends that the Court should resentence him without that designation due to the decision in
Johnson. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles entirely forecloses this argument.
Under Beckles, Johnson has no applicability to the Guidelines. Therefore, Jones cannot use
Johnson to challenge the Court’s Guidelines’ calculation.

Indeed, in his Reply, Jones

acknowledged the importance of Beckles to his claims, as he asked the Court to hold his Motion

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Specifically, the Supreme Court found that “even perfectly clear Guidelines could not provide notice to
a person who seeks to regulate his conduct so as to avoid particular penalties within the statutory range.”
Beckles, ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 894. As to arbitrary enforcement, the Guidelines “do not regulate
the public by prohibiting any conduct or by ‘establishing minimum and maximum penalties for [any]
crime.’” Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 895 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396,
(1989)). “Rather, the Guidelines advise sentencing courts how to exercise their discretion within the
bounds established by Congress.” Id.
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in abeyance pending the outcome of Beckles. That case having now been decided adversely to
Jones’ position, Johnson cannot provide him any relief.
Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court had held that Johnson invalidated Section
4B1.2’s definition of “violent felony,” Jones would still be properly designated a career offender.
The Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” does not in any way mirror the
ACCA’s residual clause. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (defining “controlled substance offense” as
“an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled
substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import,
export, distribute, or dispense.”).

Jones was designated as a career offender because he

unquestionably has at least two prior convictions for controlled substance offenses. He fails to
explain how the decision in Johnson could invalidate that designation.
For all of these reasons, the Court should DENY Jones’ claim that Johnson invalidates
his Guidelines’ career offender classification and resulting sentence.
III.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis and Certificate of Appealability
The Court should also deny Jones leave to appeal in forma pauperis and a Certificate of

Appealability. Though Jones has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is proper to
address these issues in the Court’s order of dismissal.

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules

Governing Section 2255 Cases, “the district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it issues a final order adverse to the applicant.” (Emphasis supplied); see also
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party proceeding in forma
pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).

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An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), an appeal cannot be taken from a final order
in a habeas proceeding unless a certificate of appealability is issued.

A certificate of

appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right. The decision to issue a certificate of appealability requires “an overview of
the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must show
“that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Id. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct
to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district
court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Franklin v. Hightower, 215 F.3d 1196,

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1199 (11th Cir. 2000). “This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual
or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336.
Based on the above analysis of the pleadings and applying the Certificate of
Appealability standards set forth above, there are no discernable issues worthy of a certificate of
appeal; therefore, the Court should DENY the issuance of a Certificate of Appealability. If the
Court adopts this recommendation and denies Jones a Certificate of Appealability, Jones is
advised that he “may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.” Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255
Cases in the United States District Courts. Furthermore, as there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should likewise
DENY Jones in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Jones’ Motion, (doc.
83), as untimely.

Alternatively, to the extent that the Court reaches the merits of Jones’

arguments, I RECOMMEND the Court DENY his Motion. I also RECOMMEND the Court
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of
dismissal and DENY Jones a Certificate of Appealability and in forma pauperis status on appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be

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served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 12th day of February,
2018.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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