Tyre et al v. Carter et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting in part Defendants' Sheriff Carter and Deputy Brantley's 13 Partial Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 5/15/2017. (ca)

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Sn ?IKmteti States! Siisctrict Court for ti^e ^outl^em Btotrttt of(deorsta iimnotoick Btbtoton FILED Scott L. Poff, Clerk United States District Court By casbell at 3:26 pm, May 15, 2017 GARY TYRE, individually; SAMANTHA JACOBS, as Administrator of the Estate of JERROD WEBSTER TYRE; and YVONNE GILDER, individually; Plaintiffs, CV 216-110 V. SHERIFF JOHN CARTER, in his individual capacity; ROBERT BRANTLEY, JR., in his individual capacity; and JOHN DOES 1-3, in their individual capacities; Defendants. ORDER Pending before the Court is Defendants Sheriff John Carter (^'Sheriff Carter") and Robert Brantley") (^^Defendants'') Partial 13). For the reasons stated Brantley, Motion below. to Jr.'s Dismiss Defendants' ^'Deputy (Dkt. motion No. is GRANTED in Part. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are taken solely from Plaintiffs Gary Tyre, A0 72A (Rev. 8/82) Yvonne Gilder and Samantha Jacobs' ('^Plaintiffs") Complaint. On July 21, 2015, deputies with the Wayne County Sheriff's Department reported to a domestic dispute at the home of Jerrod Webster Tyre {^Verrod") in Jesup, Georgia. 12 SI 8. At the time. Plaintiffs allege Jerrod Dkt. No. was target shooting in his backyard with a .22-caliber Ruger pistol. 9. When deputies arrived, they instructed from shooting. SISI 10-11. Jerrod to refrain Jerrod refused and said he would put down his weapon only if police left his property. 11-12. JA. SI JA. SISI The confrontation between Jerrod and the deputies lasted for forty minutes. JA. SI 15. killed by Deputy Brantley. subsequent coroner's unjustified. {^^Section 1983") JA. SI 16. inquiry JA. SI 17. and Ultimately, Jerrod was shot and revealed Plaintiffs allege that a that the killing was Plaintiffs now bring 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 wrongful death claims, and claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees. associated See generally id. LEGAL STANDARD When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must accept as true the facts as set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cir. 2010). Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material ^'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). a complaint should ''contain either direct At a minimum, or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 {11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)). DISCUSSION Defendants move to partially dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 and state law claims on the basis of qualified and official immunity. I. The Court addresses each claim in turn. Qualified Immunity Defendants argue qualified immunity. offer "complete that Sheriff Carter is entitled to The qualified immunity defense exists to protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). protects knowingly "all but violating When properly applied, the doctrine the plainly incompetent or the federal law." (quoting lA. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). one who is Lee v. To determine if qualified immunity applies, the Court considers (1) whether the plaintiff alleged facts to establish that the officers violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Sheriff Carter was not at the scene the night Jerrod was killed and therefore did not personally violate Jerrod's constitutional rights. Further, it is well established that Section 1983 claims may not be brought against supervisory officials on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. Belcher v. 1994) (citing Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 849 (11th Cir. 1992)). However, Sheriff as Carter circumstances. a supervisory official may still be held over Deputy liable under Brantley, limited Specifically, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege a ^^causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation." 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). established responsible when a history supervisor on of notice A causal connection can be widespread of the must continued duration." be "obvious, JA. abuse need alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. deprivations Brown v. Crawford, flagrant, to JA. puts correct the However, these rampant and of Here, Plaintiffs appear to base their allegations of liability on a "failure to train" theory. No. 12 p. 5. the Dkt. A failure to train must amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come into contact and the failure has to which the plaintiff complains. actually cause the injury of Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1990); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 837 n.l5 (11th Cir. 1990); cf_. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 390 (1989) (addressing municipal liability under Section 1983). ''deliberate Only when the failure to train amounts to indifference" can it properly the "policy" or "custom" that is liability to attach. be characterized necessary for Harris, 489 U.S. at 389. can amount to deliberate indifference different training is obvious. Section as 1983 Failure to train when the need for more or at 390. Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts which would indicate Sheriff Carter's deliberate indifference to the use of excessive force. Plaintiffs have not alleged that other instances of excessive force have occurred, nor do they allege that Sheriff Carter was on notice of any such instances. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to point to any improper policies, practices, or customs Sheriff Carter enacted which resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. As such. plead pursue sufficient Sheriff Carter facts and all to claims capacity are hereby dismissed. a Plaintiffs have failed to cause against him of action in his against individual II. Official Capacity Defendants also move for dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law claims. Dkt. No. 13 p. 12. against Sheriff Carter. appear to agree that These claims must be dismissed as The Court notes that while the parties Plaintiffs' state law claims against Sheriff Carter should be dismissed, see dkt. no. 17 pp. 6-8, the parties are not as clear regarding Officer Brantley. The parties are directed to clarify on the record within 10 days whether Plaintiffs are pursuing state law claims against Defendant Brantley. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above. Defendants' Sheriff Carter and Deputy Brantley's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED in Part. SO ORDERED, this 15th day of May, 2017. LISfTGODBEY WOQP, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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