Tyre et al v. Carter et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting in part Defendants' Sheriff Carter and Deputy Brantley's 13 Partial Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 5/15/2017. (ca)

Sn

?IKmteti States! Siisctrict Court

for ti^e ^outl^em Btotrttt of(deorsta
iimnotoick Btbtoton

FILED
Scott L. Poff, Clerk
United States District Court

By casbell at 3:26 pm, May 15, 2017

GARY TYRE, individually;
SAMANTHA JACOBS, as
Administrator of the Estate of

JERROD WEBSTER TYRE; and YVONNE

GILDER, individually;
Plaintiffs,

CV 216-110

V.

SHERIFF JOHN CARTER, in his
individual capacity; ROBERT
BRANTLEY, JR., in his
individual capacity; and JOHN
DOES 1-3, in their individual
capacities;
Defendants.

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants Sheriff John Carter
(^'Sheriff

Carter")

and

Robert

Brantley")

(^^Defendants'')

Partial

13).

For

the

reasons

stated

Brantley,

Motion
below.

to

Jr.'s

Dismiss

Defendants'

^'Deputy

(Dkt.
motion

No.
is

GRANTED in Part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken solely from Plaintiffs Gary
Tyre,

A0 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Yvonne

Gilder

and

Samantha

Jacobs'

('^Plaintiffs")

Complaint.

On July 21, 2015, deputies with the Wayne County

Sheriff's Department reported to a domestic dispute at the home
of Jerrod Webster Tyre {^Verrod") in Jesup, Georgia.
12

SI

8.

At

the

time.

Plaintiffs

allege

Jerrod

Dkt. No.
was

target

shooting in his backyard with a .22-caliber Ruger pistol.
9.

When deputies arrived, they instructed

from shooting.

SISI 10-11.

Jerrod to refrain

Jerrod refused and said he would

put down his weapon only if police left his property.
11-12.

JA. SI

JA. SISI

The confrontation between Jerrod and the deputies lasted

for forty minutes.

JA. SI 15.

killed by Deputy Brantley.

subsequent

coroner's

unjustified.
{^^Section

1983")

JA. SI 16.

inquiry

JA. SI 17.
and

Ultimately, Jerrod was shot and

revealed

Plaintiffs allege that a

that

the

killing

was

Plaintiffs now bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983
wrongful

death

claims,

and

claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees.

associated

See generally

id.
LEGAL STANDARD

When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), a district court must accept as true the facts as set
forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff's favor.
Cir.

2010).

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th

Although

a

complaint

need

not

contain

detailed

factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual material
^'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."

Bell

Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

a

complaint

should

''contain

either

direct

At a minimum,

or

inferential

allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to

sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."

Fin. Sec.

Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 {11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
DISCUSSION

Defendants move

to partially dismiss

Plaintiffs'

Section

1983 and state law claims on the basis of qualified and official
immunity.
I.

The Court addresses each claim in turn.
Qualified Immunity

Defendants

argue

qualified immunity.
offer

"complete

that

Sheriff

Carter

is

entitled

to

The qualified immunity defense exists to

protection

for

government

officials

sued

in

their individual capacities if their conduct 'does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.'"

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311

F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

protects
knowingly

"all

but

violating

When properly applied, the doctrine

the

plainly

incompetent

or

the

federal

law."

(quoting

lA.

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).

one

who

is

Lee

v.

To determine if

qualified immunity applies, the Court considers (1) whether the

plaintiff alleged facts to establish that the officers violated
a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly
established.

Pearson

v.

Callahan,

555

U.S.

223,

232

(2009).

Sheriff Carter was not at the scene the night Jerrod was killed

and therefore did not personally violate Jerrod's constitutional
rights.

Further,

it

is

well

established

that

Section

1983

claims may not be brought against supervisory officials on the
basis of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.
City

of

Foley,

30

F.3d

1390,

1396

(11th

Cir.

Belcher v.

1994)

(citing

Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 849 (11th Cir. 1992)).

However,

Sheriff

as

Carter

circumstances.

a

supervisory official

may

still

be

held

over

Deputy

liable

under

Brantley,

limited

Specifically, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege a

^^causal connection between actions of the supervising official
and the alleged constitutional deprivation."
906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

established

responsible

when

a

history

supervisor

on

of

notice

A causal connection can be

widespread

of

the

must

continued duration."

be

"obvious,

JA.

abuse

need

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.
deprivations

Brown v. Crawford,

flagrant,

to

JA.

puts

correct

the

However, these

rampant

and

of

Here, Plaintiffs appear to base their

allegations of liability on a "failure to train" theory.
No. 12 p. 5.

the

Dkt.

A failure

to train

must amount to

deliberate

indifference

to the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come into
contact

and

the

failure

has

to

which the plaintiff complains.

actually

cause

the

injury of

Popham v. City of Talladega, 908

F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1990); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d

829, 837 n.l5 (11th Cir. 1990); cf_. City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388, 390 (1989) (addressing municipal liability
under Section 1983).

''deliberate

Only when the failure to train amounts to

indifference" can

it

properly

the "policy" or "custom" that is
liability to attach.

be

characterized

necessary for

Harris, 489 U.S. at 389.

can amount to deliberate indifference

different training is obvious.

Section

as

1983

Failure to train

when the need for more or

at 390.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts which would indicate
Sheriff Carter's deliberate indifference to the use of excessive

force.

Plaintiffs

have

not

alleged

that

other

instances

of

excessive force have occurred, nor do they allege that Sheriff
Carter

was

on

notice

of

any

such

instances.

Furthermore,

Plaintiffs fail to point to any improper policies, practices, or
customs Sheriff Carter enacted which resulted in the deprivation

of constitutional rights.

As such.

plead

pursue

sufficient

Sheriff

Carter

facts

and

all

to

claims

capacity are hereby dismissed.

a

Plaintiffs have failed to
cause

against

him

of

action

in

his

against

individual

II.

Official Capacity

Defendants also move for dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law

claims.

Dkt. No. 13 p. 12.

against Sheriff Carter.
appear

to

agree

that

These claims must be dismissed as

The Court notes that while the parties
Plaintiffs'

state

law

claims

against

Sheriff Carter should be dismissed, see dkt. no. 17 pp. 6-8, the

parties

are

not

as

clear

regarding

Officer

Brantley.

The

parties are directed to clarify on the record within 10 days
whether

Plaintiffs

are

pursuing

state

law

claims

against

Defendant Brantley.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above. Defendants' Sheriff Carter

and Deputy Brantley's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) is
GRANTED in Part.

SO ORDERED, this 15th day of May, 2017.

LISfTGODBEY WOQP, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA