Youngblood v. Williams
Filing
30
ORDER granting Defendant Jeff Williams' 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/25/2017. (csr)
in tl^e
States! Btsctritt Cotttt
for tfie ^ontfieni Btotrtct of 4^eorsta
iSntttofotcft Btbtoton
ANTONIO RAYSHAWN YOUNGBLOOD,
Plaintiff,
No:
V.
2:16-CV-118
INVESTIGATOR JEFF WILLIAMS,
GLYNN COUNTY POLICE OFFICER,
Defendant.
ORDER
Pending
before
the
Court
is
Defendant
(^'Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment
Jeff
Williams'
(Dkt. No. 21) .
The
motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision.
For
the reasons stated below,
21)
the Defendant's Motion
(Dkt.
No.
i s GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from the alleged excessive force used by
Defendant in apprehending Plaintiff.
theft of a Sony PlayStation 4
(^'PlayStation")
the Glynn County Police Department.
During their
Investigators
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
investigation of
identified
On January 1,
the
Plaintiff
2016,
the
was reported to
Dkt. No. 21-4 p. 25:21-24.
theft,
as
Glynn County
having
put
that
Police
same
PlayStation up for
sale on Facebook.
sent
Plaintiff
a
message
to
PlayStation 4.
Id.
to
The investigators
arrange
On January 2,
for
2016,
purchase
of
the
Plaintiff agreed to
meet Defendant and other investigators at a nearby gas station.
Dkt. No. 21-5 p. 24:18-20.
Defendant and another investigator
waited at the gas station for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff
arrived
with
the
PlayStation.
PlayStation was verified as
stolen—easily
cover.
identified by
After a few minutes.
the
25:2-4.
one that
the
had been reported
custom artwork
on
its
outer
Dkt. No. 21-4 p. 26:12-22.
Defendant
officer
and
receiving
identified
informed
stolen
himself
Plaintiff
property.
as
that
1^.
p.
a
he
Glynn
was
running.
attempt
Dkt. No. 21—5 p.
to
evade
enforcement officers.
Defendant
arrest
O.C.G.A.
chased after
No. 21-4 p. 33:6-12.
25:7—10.
under
arrest
As
a
for
third
Plaintiff took off
obstruction
§ 16-10-24;
Dkt.
No.
ordering him to
of
law
21-2 p.
stop.
6.
Dkt.
Plaintiff did not stop; instead, he raced
to a nearby alleyway, with Defendant in pursuit.
Defendant
Police
Defendant shows that the
constituted
Plaintiff,
County
33:6-12.
investigator arrived at the parking lot.
15.
The
yelled
^'taser"
and
fired
a
p. 34:10handheld
tasing
device, striking Plaintiff with two electrified barbs: the first
in the back,
the other in the head.
Id.
p.
35:4-15.
Plaintiff
collapsed to the ground, injuring his face on the pavement. Dkt.
No.
21
p.
3.
SISI 17-18.
Plaintiff was immediately arrested and
given medical treatment.
Id. p. 3 1 21.
Plaintiff brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (^^Section 1983") claim
for
excessive
claims
for
force
against
aggravated
Defendant,
assault
and
as
well
as
battery.
state-law
Dkt.
No.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all claims.
No.
1.
Dkt.
21.
LEGAL STANDARD
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating the basis for its motion for summary judgment
and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions,
answers
it believes
to
interrogatories,
Taylor
v.
(citation
which
absence
demonstrate
and admissions
genuine
of
Espy,
of
816
omitted).
any
F.
If
Supp.
it
issue
1553,
shows
1556
that
material
(N.D.
there
is
fact.
Ga.
1993)
insufficient
evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, the moving party
has
satisfied
317,
its
325
burden
Celotex
Corp.
v.
then
shifts
to
the
nonmovant
genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Lobby,
this
Inc.,
burden
evidence,
which
Catrett,
477
U.S.
(1986).
The
burden.
was
477 U.S.
by
242,
showing
sufficient
to
^overlooked
257
that
(1986).
the
withstand
or
ignored'
demonstrate
a
Anderson v. Liberty
The nonmovant may meet
record
a
to
contains
directed
by
the
"supporting
verdict
motion,
moving
party."
Fitzpatrick
1993)
v.
City
(quoting
dissenting) ) .
with
evidence
at
at
to
carry
F.3d
U.S.
the
this
to
on
But
1116
(11th
Cir.
(Brennan,
332
nonmovant
based
1117.
1112,
at
sufficient
trial
deficiency."
2
477
Alternatively,
motion
attempt
Atlanta,
Celotex,
additional
verdict
of
J.,
''may
come
withstand
the
forward
a
alleged
directed
evidentiary
should the nonmovant
burden
with
nothing
instead
more
"than
a
repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for
the defendants
Ross,
[is]
not only proper but required."
663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34
At
the
summary
responsibility
"not
(11th Cir.
judgment
to
weigh
1981).
stage,
the
Morris v.
it
is
evidence
the
and
Court's
determine
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
issue for trial." Tolan v.
(quoting Anderson v.
Cotton,
134 S.
Liberty Lobby,
Ct.
Inc.,
(1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
parties
have
filed
cross-motions
for
1861,
477
applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected.
Reinsurance
(11th
Cir.
favorable
Mercantil
2012).
Corp.
2001).
to
the
of
Am.
v.
"[T]he
non-moving
Commercebank,
Gallagher,
facts
are
viewed
party on
N.A.,
701
267
242,
249
the
judgment,
the
See Gerlinq Glob.
F.3d
in
1228,
the
each motion."
F.3d
(2014)
as here,
When,
summary
genuine
1866
U.S.
the
896,
899
1233-34
light
most
Chavez
(11th
v.
Cir.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
asserts
both
that
he
is
entitled
to
qualified
immunity and that the amount of force used to subdue Plaintiff
was reasonable given the circumstances.
Dkt. No. 21.
The Court
addresses each assertion in turn.
A. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Do Not Succeed
The qualified immunity defense offers ''complete protection
for government officials sued in their individual capacities if
their conduct
'does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional
known.'"
2002)
rights
Vinyard
of which
v.
Wilson^
(quoting Harlow v.
When
properly
plainly
federal law."
(11th Cir.
lA.
reasonable
311
F.3d
Fitzgerald,
applied,
incompetent
a
doctrine
one
who
is
(quoting Lee v.
1340,
457 U.S.
the
or
person would have
1346
800,
protects
818
"all
Cir.
(1982)).
but
the
violating
the
284 F.3d 1188,
1194
knowingly
Ferraro,
(11th
2002)).
To qualify for protection via qualified immunity,
a public
official must prove that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary
occurred.
2012).
authority
Terrell
In
arguing
"discretionary
v.
at
the
Smith,
that
a
authority,"
time
668
F.3d
public
that
the
alleged
1244,
official
official
wrongful
1250
acts
must
show
(11th
within
acts
Cir.
his
"objective
circumstances that would compel the conclusion that his actions
were
undertaken pursuant
to
the
performance
of his
duties
and
within the scope of his authority."
1558, 1564
Dollar,
841 F.2d
(quoting Barker v. Norman,
(11th Cir. 1988)
Rich v.
651 F.2d
1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Effectuating an arrest is a discretionary act. McClish v.
Nugent,
483
F.Sd 1231,
1237
(11th Cir.
2007)
(noting that an
officer acts within his discretionary authority at the time of
an
arrest).
Therefore,
Defendant
was
acting
discretionary authority by effectuating an
ambit
of
his
plaintiff
Terrell,
To
to
employment.
show
that
The
burden
qualified
within
his
arrest within the
thus
shifts
immunity
does
immunity
applies,
to
not
the
apply.
668 F.3d at 1250.
determine
whether
qualified
engages in a two-step inquiry,
facts
establish
right
and
(2)
that
the
the
assessing whether both
officers
right was
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
violated
a
court
(1)
the
constitutional
clearly established.
(2009).^
a
Pearson v.
A constitutional right is
clearly established if ^'a reasonable official would understand
that
what
Creiqhton,
Fort
law,
he
is
483
U.S.
Lauderdale,
in
factual
doing
7
635,
F.3d
terms,
violates
that
640
(1987);
1552,
1557
has
not
right."
see also
(11th
Cir.
staked
out
Anderson
Post v.
1993)
a
v.
City of
(^'If
bright
case
line,
qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.").
We
^ Federal courts have discretion in deciding which prong to address first.
See Pearson,
555 U.S.
at 236.
therefore
begin
by
analyzing
whether
Defendants
violated
Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
First, the Court notes that Plaintiff appears to make the
argument that his arrest was made without probable cause.
No. 24-1 p.
3-5.
Dkt.
Probable cause to arrest exists where the
facts and circumstances '^^within the collective knowledge of law
enforcement
officials,
information,
are
caution
to
derived
sufficient
believe
that
to
an
from
reasonably
cause
trustworthy
person
reasonable
a
offense
has
of
been
or
is
being
committed." Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.Sd 724, 734
{11th
Cir.
2010).
When
determining
whether
an
official
is
entitled to qualified immunity, however, the issue is not actual
probable cause, but rather arguable probable cause. Montoute v.
Carr,
114
F.3d 181,
184
(11th Cir.
1997).
Arguable probable
cause to arrest exists if objectively reasonable officers in the
same
circumstances
officer
and
effectuating
possessing
the
probable cause existed.
(11th Cir.
Here,
stolen
[a]
Case v.
same
could
Eslinqer,
knowledge
have
as
believed
the
that
555 F.3d 1317,
1327
2009).
Defendant initially arrested Plaintiff for receipt of
property
person
property
arrest
the
under
commits
when
he
O.C.G.A.
the
§
offense
receives,
of
16-8-7.
theft
disposes
of,
Under
by
or
that
statute,
receiving
retains
stolen
stolen
property
which
O.C.G.A.
§
he
knows
or
should
know
was
stolen
.
.
."
16-8-7(a).
The undisputed facts set forth in the record indicate that
Defendant had arguable probable cause to believe that Plaintiff
had
committed
this
offense.
First,
the
PlayStation
in
Plaintiff's possession was outfitted with the same ^^skin" as the
one reported stolen.
Dkt. No. 26:16-25.
Defendant noted that
this particular skin was ^'very identifiable."^
Defendant
discovered
reported stolen.
the
PlayStation
one
day
And second.
after
it
was
Defendant was faced with a situation where a
similar PlayStation was discovered for sale close to the place
of the burglary and close to the date of the burglary.
with these facts.
an
arrest.
Defendant had arguable probable cause to make
Having
determined
that
probable cause to effectuate arrest,
Plaintiff
did
Armed
not
suffer
a
Defendant
had
arguable
the Court determines that
violation
of
his
constitutional
rights in relation to this claim. The Court turns to Plaintiff's
second
contention:
that
Defendant
used
excessive
force
by
employing a taser.
Plaintiff
next
argues, that
Defendant
in effectuating his arrest by using a
p.
4.
used excessive
taser gun.
Dkt.
No.
force
24-1
The Fourth Amendment's freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures encompasses
the
right
to be
free
from the use of
^ For reference, a PlayStation "skin" is a type of silicon or plastic covering
which comes in a wide range of colors and thousands of unique designs.
excessive
force
in
the
course
of
an
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).
that
"[d]etermining,
whether
particular seizure is
the
arrest.
Graham
v.
The Supreme Court has held
force
^reasonable'
See
used
to
effect
a
under the Fourth Amendment
requires a careful balancing of ^the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake."
490 U.S.
(1985)
at 396
(quoting Tennessee v.
(internal
quotations
Garner,
omitted) ) .
Graham,
471 U.S.
Moreover,
1,
8
''Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
thereof to effect it."
U.S. 1, 22-27
The
evaluate
"including
at 396
(citing Terry v.
Ohio,
392
(1968)).
Supreme
a
Id.
Court
has
of
factors
number
the
severity
of
established
the
to
that
determine
crime
at
a
court
excessive
issue,
must
force,
whether
the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or
others,
and
whether
he
is
actively
attempting to evade arrest by flight."
The
crimes
obstruction
misdemeanors.
of
at
law
issue
are
enforcement
arrest
or
Id.
selling
stolen
officers.
O.C.G.A § 16-10-24(a).
that the force used was a
resisting
property
Here,
both
and
are
The record is undisputed
two-prong taser fired at Plaintiff's
back.
It is also undisputed that
Plaintiff attempted to evade
arrest by running away after Defendant notified him that he was
under a r r e s t .
The
Eleventh
appropriate
violation.
In
even
Circuit
when
has
the
initial
Draper v. Reynolds,
Draper,
the
plaintiff
violation.
The
held
that
stop
tasing^
is
369 F.3d 1270
was
stopped
plaintiff
made
for
a
a
minor
repeated
be
traffic
{11th Cir.
for
refused to cooperate with the officer.
may
2004).
traffic
outbursts
and
The defendant officer
then used a taser a single time to subdue the plaintiff.
Id.
The court found that this was a reasonably proportionate amount
of force given the circumstances.
The facts
this
case.
JA. at 1278.
of this case are. similar to those in Draper.
Plaintiff
offense—though
an
was
also
offense
violation in Draper.
detained
more
serious
with
regard
than
the
An identical amount of force
In
to
an
traffic
was used in
both cases—Plaintiff was struck with a taser a single time.
And
while
did
the
Plaintiff did
plaintiff
in
not
repeatedly
Draper,
he
being informed of his arrest.
officers
to
U.S.
But an attempt
1.
use
excessive
also
clash with
took
officers
action;
he
as
fled
after
Attempting to flee does not allow
force,
to flee
carte
arrest
blanche.
is
Garner,
471
action that enhances
^ The Court notes the difference between a taser and a "stun gun".
A taser
utilizes more force than a stun gun because it deploys two small prongs which
puncture the skin.
A stun gun does not deploy such prongs.
The defendant in
Draper,
as is the case here,
used a taser.
10
the amount of
Graham,
force
490 U.S.
Defendant
an officer may use
to
subdue a
plaintiff.
at 396.
had
few,
if
any,
reasonable
alternatives
to
safely stop Plaintiff—and the situation was escalating quickly.
Plaintiff
turned
to
run
placed under arrest.
years
Plaintiff's
condition.
flee
Dkt.
next
to
a
as
soon
senior
No.
and
21-4
p.
is
major highway,
Dkt. No. 21-2 p.
calculus
of
that
judgments—in
officers
are
he
was
Defendant is 30
exceptional
And
being
physical
Plaintiff began to
officers
and after
had had an
committing
a
6. The situation was tense; the
The
Court
is
mindful
embody allowance
often
circumstances
in
weapons,
reasonableness must
police
learned
before the
second offense.
split-second.
not
34:1-8.
check him for
was
he
Dkt. No. 21-5 p. 25:7-10.
opportunity to
decision
as
forced
that
are
to
that
for
make
tense,
"[t]he
the
fact
split-second
uncertain,
and
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in
a particular situation." Graham,
490 U.S.
at 396-97.
Given the
undisputed facts of this case, tasing a fleeing suspect a single
time
under
violate
the
circumstances
Plaintiff's
excessive
of
this
Fourth Amendment
case
rights
does
not
against
clearly
the use of
force.
Plaintiff relies on two cases to support his arguments that
the
amount
and Powell.
and
nature
Fils v.
of
force
used
City of Aventura,
11
was
647
unconstitutional:
F.3d 1272,
1289
Fils
(11th
Cir.
2011);
Powell
v.
Haddock,
2010) . Neither argument,
First,
Plaintiff
366
however,
notes
Fed.
Appx.
29
(11th
Cir.
carries the day.
that
in
Fils,
the
court
explained
that ^""resisting arrest without force does not connote a level of
dangerousness that would justify a greater use of force.
647. F.Sd
at
1288.
As
such.
Plaintiff
argues,
his
Fils,
misdemeanor
obstruction of resisting arrest without the use of force did not
justify greater use of force.
But Plaintiff here is differently
situated from the plaintiff in Fils. There,
the Court proceeded
to
^'was
note
that
the
plaintiff
in
that
case
not
resisting
arrest or attempting to escape," nor did that Plaintiff ^^present
a
threat" to the safety of the officers or the public around
him.
Id.
at
resisted
arrest
officers'
factors.
1289.
But because
and
had
not
greater use of
Graham,
Second,
490 U.S.
Plaintiff
the
Plaintiff
been
force
is
checked
in
this
for
case
both
weapons,
the
justified under the Graham
at 396.
notes
that
in
Powell,
the
Court
noted
that a taser could not ''constitutionally be used against a nonthreatening suspect when the alleged crime is a minor offense."
Powell,
366 Fed.
Appx.
immediately thereafter,
311 F.3d 1340,
violates
individual
the
1347
at 29.
But that citation is incomplete;
the Court cited to Vineyard v.
(11th Cir.
Fourth
suspected
2002),
Amendment
of
to
resisting
12
Wilson,
for its holding "that it
use
an
pepper
officer
spray
when
on
an
that
individual
31
was not posing a
{emphasis
added).
threat,)
Here,
Powell,
Plaintiff
366
from
fled
Fed.
Appx.
the
at
officers
before he had been checked for weapons, next to a major highway,
and after committing a
was
reasonable
believe
under
Plaintiff
community.
second offense.
the
posed
Moreover,
Dkt.
circumstances
a
threat
to
No.
for
21-2 p.
It
officers
the
6.
to
"themselves
or
to
the Plaintiff in Powell was not
the Plaintiff here was.
Powell,
366 Fed.
Appx.
the
fleeing;
at 31.
As such.
qualified
immunity
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive.
In
sum.
because
force
Defendant
neither
he
the
used
to
does
arrest
stop
not
he
require
effectuated
Plaintiff
nor
from
the
amount
fleeing
of
violated
Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
In any event,
force
used
was
even if the Court found that the amount of
unreasonable,
qualified
immunity
would
shield
Defendant from liability. A government employee is entitled to a
judgment of qualified immunity '^unless the
employee's
conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of
which
a
Frederick,
551
Defendant's
1270
on
putting
person
would
have
U.S.
use
(2004).
immunity
than
reasonable
393,
429
(2007).
But
of
force
was
wholly
lawful.
known."
Draper
Morse
confirms
Draper,
369
v.
that
F.3d
Defendant would therefore be entitled to qualified
Plaintiff's
Defendant
claims
on
under
notice
13
42
that
U.S.C.
his
§
1983.
actions
Rather
would
be
unconstitutional,
caselaw tends to confirm the reasonableness of
the actions.
The Court now turns to P l a i n t i f f ' s state law claims.
B.
Defendant
Plaintiff s
The
claims
Court
is
Entitled
to
Official
Immunity
on
State Law Claims.
now
against
addresses
Plaintiff s
Defendant.
The
assault
undisputed
and
facts
battery
show
that
Defendant is entitled to official immunity and therefore summary
judgment
will
Constitution,
be
granted.
"state
According
officers
and
to
Georgia
and
employees
the
those
of
its
departments and agencies are subject to suit only when they .
act
with
actual
malice
performance
of
their
Richardson,
452
S.E.2d
art.
I § 2 SI IX(d)).
Merrow v.
Hawkins,
or
intent
^official
476,
483
to
cause
injury
1994)
in
the
Gilbert
functions.'"
(Ga.
.
v.
(citing Ga.
Const,
Actual malice requires intent to do harm.
467 S.E.2d 336,
337
(Ga.
1996).
The intent
necessary for a showing of actual malice "must be the intent to
cause the harm suffered by the plaintiffs."
647 S.E.2d 54,
60
Plaintiff
(Ga.
Murphy v.
Bajjani,
2007).
alleges
that
Defendant
acted
outside
of
his
authority because Defendant attempted to make an arrest without
probable
cause.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff
The
the
also
Court
argues
undisputed
must
that
reject
Defendant
14
facts
show
Plaintiff's
otherwise
otherwise.
argument.
acted
with
malice.
The
record contains no
indicia of malice.
record reflects that Defendant tased Plaintiff a
stop him from evading arrest.
Moreover,
once Plaintiff stopped fleeing,
Plaintiff appears
to
it
Rather,
the
single time to
is undisputed that
no further force was used.
argue that
any time
an officer uses
force to ^^apprehend," rather than uses force in "self-defense,"
an officer acts with malice.
not so.
"poor
Dkt.
No. No.
24-1 p.
11.
This is
Georgia courts recognize that malice is more than mere
judgment,
rude
behavior,
and reckless
disregard for
rights and safety of others on the part of the officers."
V.
Morrison,
665 S.E.2d 401,
Plaintiff must
present
405
evidence
record
reflects
Ct.
of "ill
injure" on the part of Defendant.
The
(Ga.
App.
2008).
will"
the
Selvy
Rather,
and "intent
to
He has failed to do so.
that
Defendant
took
action
that
respected Plaintiff s constitutional rights in making his arrest
and preventing his escape, and that Defendant took no gratuitous
actions indicating malice.
The Court therefore grants Defendant
summary judgment on all state-law and federal claims.
Plaintiff
U.S.C.
§
punitive
1983.
brought
a
However,
damages
could
claim
for
because all
be
punitive
causes
sought
have
of
damages
under
action on which
been
dismissed.
Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages must also be dismissed.
15
42
CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
set
forth
Motion for Summary Judgment
above.
Defendant
(Dkt. No. 21)
Jeff
is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 25*^" day of October, 2017.
HON.
LISA GODBEY WOOD,
UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
16
Williams'
DISTRICT JUDGE
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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