Edenfield v. Gateway Behavioral Health Services

Filing 25

ORDER granting in part and denying in part Gateway's 14 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying Cheryl Edenfield's 15 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 5/15/2017. (ca)

M t|ie ?limteb States: ISisitrict Court
tor t|ie ^onttiem Btotrict ot <(leorsta
FILED
Scott L. Poff, Clerk
United States District Court

iimufiiltittk BtbtOton

By casbell at 4:14 pm, May 15, 2017

CHERYL EDENFIELD, as Mother

and Legal Guardian of QUINCY
EDENFIELD, an incapacitated
adult.
Plaintiff,

2:16-CV-170

V.

GATEWAY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH

SERVICES,
Defendant.

ORDER

Sovereign

immunity

bars

Plaintiff

Cheryl

Edenfield's

(^'Cheryl") (as mother and legal guardian of Quincy Edenfield
(^'Quincy"))

state-law

amend futile.

tort

claims

and

makes

her

motion

to

But her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (^^Section 1983") claim

survives, as does her contract-breach claim.

Thus, Defendant

Gateway Behavioral Services' (""Gateway") Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, dkt. no. 14, will be GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, and Cheryl's Motion to Amend the Complaint,
dkt. no. 15, will be DENIED.

A0 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

BACKGROUND

Quincy Receives Gateway Services
The Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the

complaint.

Quincy

has

"Severe

Autistic

Unspecified Intellectual Disabilities."

Disorder

and

Dkt. No. 1-3 55.

He

receives housing, transportation, and behavioral services from
Gateway.

Id. 5 8.

Gateway home.

Since May 2012, Quincy has lived at a

Id. 55 6, 8a.

Quincy goes to a Gateway day

center between 8:30 A.M. and 2:30 P.M.

Id. 5 8b.

Cheryl is Quincy's mother and has been his guardian and
conservator since March 23, 2015.
weekends with her.

Id. 5 8a.

Id. 5 7.

Quincy spends his

"Prior to February 29, 201$ and

on many occasions," Cheryl would notice wounds and bruises on
Quincy when picking him up from the Gateway center.

Id. 5 11.

"When [she] would return [him] to Gateway and question staff

members concerning Quincy's
investigation,
answer."

that

she

Id. 5 12.

Quincy

was

would

wounds/bruises and/or ask for
never

obtain

a

a

straightforward

In particular, no one ever told Cheryl

being

abused.

investigations did not uncover abuse.

Id.

5

12a.

Early

Id. 5 12b.

Quincy Was Abused by a Gateway Employee
On February 27, 2016, a Gateway staff member told another

employee that she had seen Gateway's Errol Wilkins "hitting

Quincy as well as another individual."

Id. 5 15.

Cheryl did

not learn

of this.

Id.

SI

14.

On

February 29, 2016, she

brought Quincy to a doctor for a medical examination.
13.

Id. SI

When she returned to Gateway, ^^no one . . . would confess

. . . that Quincy was being abused."

Id. SI 14.

However, Gateway launched an investigation that day.
SI 16.

Id.

It substantiated the accusations, with employees saying

they had seen Wilkins ^'hit Quincy . . . with his fist and/or
open hand on several occasions and that this has been going on
for

several

weeks,"

Id.

SI

18

(alteration

in

original).

Employees claimed Wilkins would hit clients "[a]t least 2-3
times a

week, sometimes 2x

per day," ^^for about 3 months,"

sometimes with a broken-off chair handle—and that they feared

him because he was ''a former gang member."

Id. SISI 21(g)-(i),

22(a), 25(a), 26(j)-(k); ^ also id. SI 25(g)-(h) rsveryone
has seen It and I heard Errol had been spoken to about this .

. . . a long time ago." (alteration in original)), SI 26(h) (^'I
and the other staff have warned him that he was going to get
caught." (alteration in original)).

Wilkins was terminated.

Dkt. No. 14-1 at 4; Dkt. No. 17 at 16.

Cheryl Sues Gateway
Cheryl filed this lawsuit against Gateway in Glynn County
State

Court on

November

15, 2016.

Id. at 2.

She

alleged

three state-law tort claims; failure to train and supervise.

negligent retention, and assault and battery.
She also raised Section 1983.

Id. SISI 28-50.

Id. SISI 51-56.

Gateway removed the case on December 22, 2016.
1.

Dkt. No.

It moved for judgment on the pleadings on January 26,

2017.

Dkt. No. 14.

That motion has been fully briefed and is

ripe for disposition.

Dkt. Nos. 17, 21.

While briefing was

ongoing, Cheryl moved to amend her complaint.

Dkt. No. 15.

She seeks to add Wilkins as a defendant, and to add a fourth

state-law tort claim, against Gateway and Wilkins for fraud.
Id.

63, 79-87.

Gateway responded in opposition, and that

motion is also ripe.

Dkt. No. 19.
LEGAL STANDARDS

Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(c) is governed by the same standards as
a

Rule

claim.

12(b)(6)

motion

to

dismiss

for

failure

to

state

a

Flournoy v. CML-GA WB, LLC, No. CV 114-161, 2015 WL

2345594, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 15, 2015).

Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be
a context-specific task," guided by ^'judicial experience and
common sense."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

A complaint must be ^^a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
P.

8(a)(2).

Its

^Mf]actual

allegations

must

Fed. R. Civ.
be

enough

to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level."

Bell

Atl.

also

Corp.

Iqbal,

V.

556

Twombly,

U.S.

at

550

678.

U.S.
It

544,

has

555

to

(2007); see

^'contain

inferential

allegations from which [the court] can identify each of the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some

viable legal theory."

Roe

v. Aware Woman Ctr.. for Choice,

Inc., 253 F.Sd 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001).

The court must assume the truth of a fact alleged in the
complaint, but not ''a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation."

Papasan

v.

Allain,

478

U.S.

265, 286 (1986).

When ''a dispositive issue of law" shows ^'beyond all reasonable
doubt" . that ""the
would

entitle

plaintiffs can

them

to

relief,"

prove no set of facts that
the

defendants judgment on the pleadings.

court

can

grant

the

Executive 100, Inc. v.

Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991).

Motion to Amend Complaint
Given

this

case's

posture,

^'a

party

pleading only with . . . the court's leave.
freely give leave when justice so requires."

15(a)(2).

may

amend

The court should
Fed. R. Civ. P.

''[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend

is within the discretion of the District Court . . . ."

V.

its

Davis, 371

U.S.

178, 182 (1962).

Foman

'MDJenial of leave to

amend is justified by futility when the ^complaint as amended

is still subject to dismissal.'"

Burger King Corp. v. Weaver,

169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION

Sovereign immunity bars Cheryl's state-law tort claims,
but

her

Section

1983 claim

survives,

as

does

her

contract-

breach claim.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS CHERYL'S STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS.

Cheryl's
concedes

state-law

that

sovereign

Gateway

immunity

tort
is

under

a

claims

are

government

Georgia

(conceding Gateway to be "clothed

law.

barred.
body

Dkt.

Cheryl

entitled
No.

17

to

at

13

with immunity"); see also

Ga. Dep't of Nat. Res, v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.,

755 S.E.2d 184, 188 (Ga. 2014) (observing Georgia sovereign

immunity protects "governments at all levels"); Youngblood v.
Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Serv. Bd., 545 S.E.2d 875,

877

(Ga.

2001)

(holding

community-service

boards,

like

Gateway, are "departments or agencies of the State" entitled
to

sovereign

[Georgia's

immunity).

sovereign

Courts

cannot "abrogate

immunity]"—only

the

or

legislature

modify
can.

Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d at 189 (citing

Ga. Const, art. I § 2 ^ IX(e)).
waiver

of sovereign

claiming one.

immunity

has

An
to

applicable
be

shown

legislative

by the

party

Sherin v. Dep't of Human Res., 494 S.E.2d 518,

522 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).

6

Cheryl

relies

sovereign

immunity

employees

while

on

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a),

"for

torts

of

state

within

acting

the

the

scope

of

duties or employment."^

which

waives

officers

their

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a).

and

official

But this

waiver is subject to limits listed in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24.

In

particular, the State is immune as to "losses resulting from
. . . .

[a]ssault[

Cheryl's

state-law

exception's shadow.
to

train

and

]

[or]

tort

battery."

claims

fall

Id.

§

50-21-24(7).

directly

within

this

To recall, those claims are for failure

supervise,

battery, and fraud.

Even

negligent
though

retention,

assault

most of them

are

and

not for

assault or battery, they still result from assault or battery.
See Dkt. No. 1-3 SISI 28-41, 44-50; Dkt. No. 15-1 ft 19-81.

The

Court's "focus is not on which particular state law causes of

action a plaintiff has set forth in her complaint, but rather
on

the

underlying

plaintiff's loss."
(Ga.

Ct.

App.

conduct

that

allegedly

caused

the

Davis v. Standifer, 621 S.E.2d 852, 857

2005).

Cheryl's

state-law

tort

claims

all

"aris[e] out of conduct that would constitute . . . assault or

battery," so they are all barred.^

Id. (barring claims for

^ Gateway does not raise Georgia's retention of sovereign immunity as to
tort claims brought against it in federal court, perhaps because Cheryl
filed this case in state court.

See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b).

^ Wilkins was allegedly a government employee, dkt. no. 15-1 55 64-65, but
even if he had not been. Gateway would still be immune.

Youngblood, 545

S.E.2d at 878 (holding O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) applies "regardless of who
committed the act."); Cowart v. Ga. Dep't of Human Serv., No. A16A1515,

2017 WL 534877, at *2 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017) ("[I]f a plaintiff's

^^negligent . . .
and

discipline

hiring,
of"

instruction,

police

officer

supervision,

who

control,

allegedly

sexually

assaulted plaintiff during traffic stop); see also Pelham v.
Bd, of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 743 S.E.2d 469, 471, 474

(Ga.

Ct.

negligent

App.

2013)

training

{barring

and

claims

supervision

against

of

overseers

football

staff

for

after

coach allegedly had player assault another player).

Cheryl
apply

contends

when

the

that

O.C.G.A.

assault

or

§

50-21-24(7)

battery

^''is

the

does

not

negligent

implementation of a policy or negligent act not authorized by
policy."

Dkt. No. 17 at 15.

But the authorities Cheryl cites

concern other sovereign immunity exceptions.^

See id. at 13-

14

Dep^t

(discussing

Safety

v.

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2));

Davis,

(analyzing O.C.G.A.
Comm^ n,

789

§

S.E.2d

(analyzing O.C.G.A.
fails.

676

§§

S.E.2d

50-21-24(6));
343,

346

Ga.

1,
Grant
(Ga.

50-21-24(2), (6)).

1-2
v.
Ct.

of

(Ga.
Ga.

2009)
Forestry

App.

Her

Pub.

2016)

objection

Cf. Sherin, 494 S.E.2d at 522 (avoiding O.C.G.A. § 50-

21-24(2), given dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7)).

injury was caused by an assault and battery committed by a third party,
the state is immune from suit even if the assault and battery was
facilitated by or resulted from the prior negligent performance of a state
officer or employee." (citing Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.. Sys. of
Ga., 743 S.E.2d 469, 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)).

^ One O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) case considers another exception.

Cowart,

2017 WL 534877, at *2-3 (discussing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2))
.
It did so
for reasons absent here.
Id. at *1-2 (noting plaintiff deleted physicalabuse allegations and replaced them with negligence ones, and did not
appeal dismissals based on O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7))
.
8

The

Court

strongly

sympathizes

with

Cheryl.

But

^Ms]overeign immunity is a harsh doctrine, not an equitable
one.

Indeed,

state

it is

just the opposite

of equity—it is the

declaring that it cannot be sued even

otherwise be liable."

Dev.

omitted).

384,

Gateway's

386 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)

motion

for

judgment

pleadings is GRANTED as to failure to train
negligent

retention,

would

Pak v. Ga. Dep^t of Behavioral Health &

Disabilities, 731 S.E.2d

(citation

where it

and

assault

and

on

the

and supervise,

battery.

Because

Cheryl's desired claim for fraud is also barred, and she only
seeks to add Wilkins as a defendant for this claim, see dkt.

no. 15-1 1 62 et sag. (tacking Wilkins on at end of previous
complaint,

with

only fraud

count following),

her

motion to

amend her complaint, dkt. no. 15, is DENIED as futile.
II. CHERYL'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM SURVIVES.

However, Cheryl's Section 1983 claim will proceed.
relies only on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gateway

concedes

that

if

this

Court

She

Dkt. No. 17 at 22.

finds

Gateway to

be

a

^"person" subject to suit under Section 1983, its motion should
be

denied

Court

as

makes

to

this

such

a

claim.

finding.

Dkt.

No.

Section

14-1

at

14

n.2.

1983 authorizes

The

suits

against "[e]very person who . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within

the

jurisdiction

thereof

to

the

deprivation

of

any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and

laws."

^^person"

42

does

U.S.C. § 1983

not

include

(emphasis

states

or

Gateway claims to be a state agency.

added).

their

The

agencies,

term

and

Will v. Mich. Dep^t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Taylor v. Dep^t of Pub.

Safety,

142

F.

App'x

373,

374-75

(11th

Cir.

2005)

(per

curiam); Dkt. No. 14-1 at 11-14.

This argument is unpersuasive in light of the Eleventh
Circuit's

recent

decision

in

Miller

v.

Advantage

Behavioral

Health Systems, No. 15-15496, 2017 WL 370850 (11th Cir. Jan.

26,

2017)

court

(per

curiam)

considered

the

boards like Gateway.

(unpublished
status

of

opinion)

Georgia

There,

the

community-service

Id. at *1; see also Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2

(describing Gateway as such a board), 13 n.l (noting Miller
decision

weighed

was

pending

Georgia's

when

deeming

Gateway's

such

brief

boards to

was

be

filed).

state

It

entities

against the three factors of local control over them, their
apparent ^'unfettered discretion to design [their] own funding
mix,"
them.

and

limits

on

Id. at *3-7.

of the State."

state

liability

for

judgments

against

It held that the boards are not "arm[s]

Id. at *8.

^ Gateway notes that the Section 1983 claim in Cheryl's complaint calls
Gateway an "agency of the State of Georgia."
14-1

at

13 n.l;

Dkt.

No. 21 at

14.

The

Dkt. No. 1-3 f 53; Dkt. No.

Court deems this

an immaterial

imprecision, and not a concession, given the intervening Miller decision.
10

Miller

'"But

in

was

an

Eleventh

deciphering

of § 1983,

Amendment

congressional

the scope

of

the

case.

See

intent

as

Eleventh

to

id.

at

the

*8.

scope

Amendment

is

a

consideration, and [the Court] decline[s] to adopt a reading

of § 1983 that disregards it."
also

id.

State"

at

70

test).

(adopting
It

Will, .491 U.S. at 66-67; see

Eleventh

instead

follows

Amendment
Miller

by

^^arms

of

holding

the
that

Gateway is a person and not an arm of the State under Section
1983, and so DENIES Gateway's motion as to Cheryl's Section
1983 claim.

III. CHERYL'S CONTRACT-BREACH CLAIM SURVIVES.

It does the same as to Cheryl's contract-breach claim.
Georgia waives sovereign immunity for breaches of its written
contracts.

Ga. Const, art. 1 § 2 ^ IX(c).

The parties here

only dispute whether there was a written contract for Quincy's
behavioral services.

Dkt. No. 14-1 at 18-22; Dkt. No. 17 at

16-24; Dkt. No. 21 at 10-13.

document—or

a

series

of

A written contract has to be one

contemporaneously

signed

documents-

containing the essential elements of a contract: (1) parties
able

to

contract;

subject matter.

(2)

consideration;

(3)

assent;

and

(4)

O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1; Bd. of Regents of Univ.

Sys. of Ga. v. Tyson, 404 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1991).

Cheryl presented evidence of a contract in the form of a

May

10,

2012

''Gateway

Behavioral

11

Health

Services

DD

Orientation Checklist,^'' signed by Cheryl and a staff member,
with tick marks next to ^^Review of program services," ''Intake
Assessment Form," "Consent to Use and Disclose Information,"
"Authorization(s)

for

Release

of

Information," "Consent

for

Services," "Financial Contract," "Consumer handbook," "Client

Rights,

Responsibilities

Procedure,"

"Information

treatment,"

and

planning."
documents,
elements
documents

and

Complaints,
about

"Information

Dkt. No. 17-1.^
and

of

a

that

they

contract,

family

about

Grievance

involvement

individualized

in

treatment

The existence of these other

would
are

Including

reflect

more

plausibly represent a

than

all

four

essential

speculative.

Such

behavioral-services contract

between Quincy and Gateway, and between Gateway and Cheryl for
Quincy's benefit.

Cf. Younqblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton

Cmty. Serv. Bd., 545 S.E.2d 875, 878 (Ga. 2001).®
^ This document can be considered.

Thus,

It is referenced in the complaint and

central to Cheryl's claim.
Dkt. No. 1-3 II 3-3d (describing Gateway's
contractual obligations "[a]t all times pertinent to this lawsuit"), 8
("The parties entered into a contract for Gateway to provide Quincy with

. . . behavioral services.").
The Court can consider it even though it
was attached to Cheryl's response and not to the complaint itself.
Walch
V.

Adjutant

Gen.'s

Dep't

of

Tex.,

533

F.3d

289,

294

(5th

Cir.

2008);

Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc.,
No. 12-CV-884, 2013 WL 3154116, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Wise. June 21, 2013);
Stewart v. Morgan State Univ., Civ. A. No. 11-3605, 2013 WL 425081, at *1

n.l (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2013); Slaughter v. Fred Weber, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d

1054, 1058 n.l (S.D. 111. 2008); cf_^ Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he court may consider a document attached to a
motion to dismiss . . . if [it] is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim
and (2) undisputed. . . . [It] need not be physically attached . . . .").

® Unlike the documents in Youngblood that did not cover the date of the
alleged injury, see id., Gateway does not contest that Quincy was in its
care at the time he was injured.

Dkt. No. 14-1 at 2-4.

The Court also

sees
clear
distinctions
between
this
case
and
Kennedy
v.
Georgia
Department of Human Resources Child Support Enforcement, 648 S.E.2d 727
12

Gateway's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Cheryl's
contract-breach claim is DENIED.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons above. Gateway's Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings, dkt. no. 14, is GRANTED in part, as to Cheryl
Edenfield's

claims

for

failure

to

train

negligent retention, and assault and battery.
part,

as to

Cheryl Edenfield's

Section

and

supervise,

It is DENIED in

1983 claim

claim for negligent breach of contract.

and

her

Cheryl Edenfield's

Motion to Amend the Complaint, dkt. no. 15, DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 15th day of May, 2017.

U
LlfiA GODBEr WqOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

(Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
That case was decided on summary judgment, and the
only alleged contract there did not even have a signature line for the
government defendant.

Id. at 728.
13