Edenfield v. Gateway Behavioral Health Services
Filing
96
ORDER denying as moot Gateway's 71 Motion to Dismiss; granting Gateway's 79 Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety-Plaintiff's section 1983 fails because Gateway is an arm of the State and not subject to suit thereunder, and Plaintiff's contract claims sound in tort and thus barred by sovereign immunity. There being no claims remaining in this case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/28/2018. (ca)
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CHERYL EDENFIELD, as mother and
legal guardian of QUINCY
EDENFIELD, an incapacitated
adult.
Plaintiff,
No. 2:16-cv-170
V.
GATEWAY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SERVICES,
Defendant,
V.
HEALTHCARE STAFFING, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.
ORDER
Before
the
Court
is
Defendant
Gateway
Behavioral
Health
Service's {^^Gateway") motion for summary judgment,^ dkt. no. 79,
to which Plaintiff Cheryl Edenfield, in her capacity as the mother
and legal guardian of Quincy Edenfield, filed a response, dkt. no.
83.
Also pending before the Court is Gateway's motion to dismiss
for failure to join an indispensable party.
Dkt. No. 71.
The
motions are ripe for review.
^ Gateway's motion is captioned "Defendant Gateway Behavioral Health Services'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings." Dkt. No. 79 at 1. But the content of the
document calls the motion a "Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 56." Id. It is treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, per the text of the motion.
BACKGROUND
Quincy
Edenfield
suffers
from
intellectual
disabilities,
including severe autism. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4. In May 2012, with
assistance from his mother, Cheryl Edenfield, Quincy sought the
resources of Gateway in Hinesville, Georgia.
Gateway
is
developmental
a
public
disability,
agency
and
that
Id.
provides
addictive
mental
disease
underprivileged residents of Southeast Georgia.
health,
treatment
to
Dkt. No. 79-1 at
1. It operates under the control of the Department of Behavioral
Health and Developmental Disabilities (DBHDD), a State agency. Id.
at 2.
Quincy began to split his time between the care of Gateway
and the care of his mother.
Cheryl Edenfield.
lived
in
Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4. During the week, Quincy
Gateway's
roommates.
Id.
On the weekends, Quincy stayed with
Liberty
Group
Homes,
along
with
his
three
The home was maintained, in part, with Federal
Government subsidies.
Dkt. No. 4 at 15. Gateway would pick Quincy
up
take
at
8:30
a.m.
and
behavioral services. See
him
Dkt.
to
its
Hinesville
facility
for
No. 1-3 at 4. Gateway would then
return Quincy to his home at 2:30 p.m. Id.
In the course of arranging their care relationship. Gateway
and Quincy entered into a rental agreement and a transportation
agreement. Dkt. No. 4 at 15. Gateway also devised a ^'Behavioral
Support
Plan" which
included
24/7 in-home
supervision,
in-home
line of sight supervision, off-site supervision, and one-on-one
support in the community; the plan also included a guide to ensure
the safety of Quincy and others. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5.
Gateway
and
Quincy's
relationship
continued
for
nearly
a
year. But sometime around February 2016, Cheryl EJdenfield began
noticing bruises and wounds on Quincy's body. Id. at 6. Then, on
February 27, 2016, Rosetta Scott—an instructor at Gateway—told
another Gateway employee that she had seen Errol Wilkins—a Gateway
instructor—hitting Quincy. Id. at 7. Gateway quickly launched an
investigation into Ms. Scott's allegations. Id. In the course of
that
investigation,
many
employees
reported
having
seen
Mr.
Wilkins hit Quincy. Id. at 7-12.
Cheryl
Edenfield^
(hereinafter ''Plaintiff")
brought
claims
against Gateway sounding in torts, contracts, and civil rights.
Dkt.
No.
1.
The
tort
claims
were
dismissed
based
on
sovereign
immunity, so only two claims remain: the civil rights claim, made
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the contract claim.
See Dkt.
No. 25.
As to the first claim. Plaintiff argues that Gateway violated
Quincy's
procedural
and
substantive
due
process
rights
by its
failure to protect him from Errol Wilkins's abuse, which Plaintiff
asserts was under the color of state law, with Gateway being a
2
Cheryl
Edenfield
was
appointed
Quincy's
Guardian
and
Conservator
Liberty County Probate Court on March 23, 2015. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4.
by
the
state agency.
Dkt. No. 103 at 17.
Gateway argues it is not a
^'person" for purposes of a § 1983 action, and, therefore, cannot
be sued thereunder.
Dkt. No. 79 at 1.
As to the second claim-
negligent breach of contract—Plaintiff alleges that Gateway failed
to provide Quincy with a safe environment pursuant to a written
contract
between
Gateway
and
Quincy.
Dkt.
No.
1-3
at
14-15.
Gateway argues that no such contract exists, and, therefore, it
cannot be held contractually liable. Dkt. No. 85 at 6.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary
judgment is
required
where ""the
movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
A fact is ^'material" if it might ^'affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law." Great Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Anderson, 847 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
248
(1986)).
A
dispute
is
^^genuine" if the '^evidence [is] such that a reasonable jury could
return
a
verdict
for
either
party."
Id.
In
making
this
determination, the court is to view all evidence in the light most
favorable
to
the
nonmoving
party
inferences in that party's favor.
and
draw
all
reasonable
Johnson v. Booker T. Washington
Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The movant must demonstrate
that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nohmoving
party's case. Id. at 325.
If the moving party discharges this
burden,
to
the
burden
shifts
the
nonmovant
to
go
beyond
the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine
issue of fact does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
DISCUSSION
I.
Gateway's Motion to Dismiss
Toward the end of the discovery period in this case. Gateway
filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, in which
it sought to add as a defendant Healthcare Staffing, Inc., who
Gateway alleges was a joint-employer of Errol Wilkins.
61.
Initially,
Plaintiff
opposed
that
motion.
Dkt. No.
Dkt.
No.
67.
Then, Gateway filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join an
indispensable party, i.e. Healthcare Staffing, Inc.
Dkt. No. 71.
Plaintiff subsequently withdrew her objection to Gateway's motion
for leave to file a third-party complaint, dkt. no, 74, and the
Magistrate
Judge
granted
Gateway's
motion,
dkt.
nos.
61,
82.
Accordingly, Gateway's motion to dismiss for failure to join an
indispensable party, dkt. no. 71, is DENIED as moot.
II.
Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Plaintiff brought a claim against Gateway
§ 1983,
rights
alleging
through
that
its
Gateway
^'customs,
violated
policies,
under
Quincy's
and
42
U.S.C.
constitutional
officials
acts,"
including '^grossly inadequate" training, control, and supervision
of its employees.
Dkt. No. 1-3 SI 54; see also id. SISI 51-56.
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part;
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person
within
the
jurisdiction
thereof
to
the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Gateway argues that the claim must fail because
Gateway is not a person but rather an ""arm of the state" incapable
of being sued under § 1983. Dkt. No. 79-1 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 86 at
20-21.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that Gateway is not
an arm of the state, and that even if it is. Gateway can still be
held
accountable
under
§ 1983
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
because
it
waived
any
claim
to
Dkt. No. 83 at 22, 23.
A. Sec-bion 1983's Relationship with the Eleventh Amendment
In general, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state
in federal court.
1524
(llth
Cir.
Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521,
1990).
Eleventh
Amendment
State officials and arms of the State.
immunity
extends
to
See Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
While the Court's § 1983 analysis is informed by the Eleventh
Amendment, the § 1983 analysis is a separate analysis.
Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 {1989} (stating that
^'the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983" are
''separate issues").
In Will, the U.S. Supreme Court squarely
decided whether a state was a person under § 1983 in a context
where the Eleventh Amendment did not apply.
Id. at 63-64.
There,
the petitioner filed a § 1983 action in Michigan state court; the
Eleventh toendment does not apply in state court.
Id. at 64.
After a careful analysis of common usage of the word "person,"
ordinary rules of statutory construction, the purpose of enacting
§ 1983, and legislative history, the Court concluded that "a State
is not a person within the meaning of § 1983" and, thus, could not
be
sued
thereunder.
Id.
at
64-65.
The
Court
reasoned:
^'[I]n
deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration," id. at 66-67,
and "Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the federalstate balance in that respect," id. at 66 (citing Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979)).
Through enacting § 1983, "Congress did not
provide . . . a federal forum for civil
rights claims
against
States" nor "create a cause of action against States to be brought
in state courts."
Id.
In other words, § 1983 does not create a
cause of action against states in either state or federal courts.
See id.
under
Because arms of the State are treated the same as States
§ 1983,
see
infra,
arms
subject to suit under § 1983.
of
the
State
are
likewise
not
Accordingly, the threshold question
here is not whether Gateway has Eleventh Amendment immunity but
whether Gateway is subject to suit under § 1983.
B. miether Gabeway is a Person under § 1983 or, rather, an Arm
of the State
To prevail on a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff must demonstrate that
Quincy was deprived of his constitutional rights and that Gateway
was the ^^person" who ^^caused [Quincy] to be subjected" to the
deprivation. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985)
(alteration
Court
and
citation
omitted).
The
has made it clear that ""neither a
United
state
States
Supreme
nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are "persons' under § 1983."
Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
§ 1983 purposes.
An arm of the State is not a person for
Id.; see also Tindol v. Ala. Dep't of Rev., 632
F. App'x 1000, 1001 (11th Cir. 2015) (a state and its agencies are
not persons under § 1983).
The Court therefore begins its inquiry
by determining whether Gateway is an arm of the State in Georgia.
""The pertinent inquiry" as to whether an entity is an arm of the
State ""is not into the nature of a corporation's status in the
abstract, but its function or role in a particular context," i.e.
""whether and to what extent [the entity is] contractually acting
as [a] representative[] of the State."
Clinics, Inc.
Cir. 2000).
v.
Beech
Shands Teaching Hosp. &
Street Corp., 208
F.3d
1308, 1311 (11th
We weigh four factors to determine whether Gateway acted as
an arm of the State: "'(1) how state law defines the entity; (2)
what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3)
where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for
judgments against the entity."
1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304,
Whether an entity is an arm of the State
is ultimately a question of federal law, see id., but ^^resolution
of these factors depends, in part, on state law," Liqhtfoot v.
Henry County School District, 771 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 2014).
The burden is on Gateway to demonstrate that the Manders factors
weigh in its favor.
See Miller v. Advantage Behavioral Health
Sys., 677 F. App'x 556, 559 (11th Cir. 2017); Manders, at 1331
(Anderson, J., dissenting) (''[T]he proper question is whether the
sheriff has carried his burden of proving that he is an arm of the
state.").
Here, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim arises from allegedly abusive
treatment
trained,
at
and
the
hands
of
Errol
Wilkins:
supervised
by
Gateway.
The
an
Court
employee
must
hired,
therefore
determine at the outset whether Gateway acted as an arm of the
State
in
making "hiring
and
firing
decisions
in
the
ordinary
course of business" and in conducting training, investigation, and
supervision of its employee. Id. at 559.
In denying Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
the Court previously determined that Gateway could be considered a
person subject to suit under § 1983.
Dkt. No. 25 at 9.
The Court
allowed this case to proceed to the discovery phase based on the
Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement in Miller v. Advantage Behavioral
Health Sys., 677 F. App'x at 556.
The Miller court determined
that Georgia community service boards are not arms of the State.
Id. at 565-66.
As explained below, discovery in this case has
revealed that Gateway is unlike a typical community service board,
so much so that Gateway falls outside the purview of the Miller
holding.
i. Georgia Law's Definition of Coxmaunity Service Boards
The
first
Manders
inquiry
pertains
to
how
Georgia
law
conceptualizes community service boards (^"CSBs") like Gateway.
The
Eleventh
Circuit
recently
answered
this
question.
In
Miller, after examining the status of similar CSBs, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that Georgia
law
views
CSBs as arms of the
State. 677 F. App'x at 560. As a CSB, Gateway is considered a
public agency under Georgia law. But this is not the end of the
inquiry—designating CSBs as arms of the state only ''tip[s] the
balance toward a finding that Georgia state law views CSBs [like
Gateway] as arms of the State." Id.
ii. State Control Over Gateway
'^The
second
Manders
factor
requires
us
to
determine
the
degree of control the State maintains over the activity from which
the defendant's alleged liability arises." Id. CSBs in Georgia are
10
typically ^'managed at the local level and without significant
state involvement." Id. at 561. Each CSB's operation is controlled
by a local governing board, consisting of members appointed by the
governing authorities of the counties the CSB serves. See O.C.G.A.
§ 37-2-6(b). The governing board is authorized to both appoint an
executive director and to delegate ^^any power, authority, duty, or
function"
turn,
to
^Mt]he
the
executive
executive
director.
director
Id.
. . .
§
directs
operations of the [CSB]," id., including
staff.
Miller,
neither to
677
review
F.
App'x
at
hiring and
561.
firing
37-2-6.1(a)(1).
the
In
day-to-day
hiring and firing of
The
State
is
authorized
decisions nor to train
or
discipline staff. Id.
Gateway contends that the State's control over its operations
is unlike that of a typical CSB.
It shows that, before and during
the time period at issue, its operations had been taken over by
the State.
Dkt. No. 79-1 at 4.
Gateway argues that the State
retains ultimate control over its operations, noting that (1) in
2013,
the
Governor
utilized
statutory
authority
to
disband
Gateway's Board of Directors, relieving them of their duties; (2)
the
Commissioner
of
DBHDD
terminated
Gateway's
CEO;
(3)
the
Commissioner appointed a new manager, who was an employee of DBHDD
and answered to DBHDD; and (4) in 2015, the Commissioner appointed
a new CEO, who
was an employee of DBHDD and answered to DBHDD.
Dkt. No. 79-1 at 4-5. So, ''from 2013 to the present, all day-to
ll
day operations and the administration of Gateway BHS has been
conducted by the State of Georgia through DBHDD employees."
Id.
at 5.
As such. Gateway argues that—unlike the CSB in Miller—
Gateway
does
not ''retain
substantial autonomy over day-to-day
operations and ordinary personnel management," as a result of the
Governor's disbanding of the
Board
and
DBHDD's subsequent and
ongoing supervision. Miller, 677 at 561.
Plaintiff argues that just because the State exercised its
power to define, investigate, and punish misconduct does not mean
that Gateway's day-to-day operations were in fact controlled by
the state. "[E]very entity and individual in the State is subject
to the control of the State's power to define, investigate, and
punish misconduct." Johnson v. Oqeechee Behavioral Health Servs.,
479 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2007).
The evidence presented clearly established that Gateway is
markedly different than the CSB in Miller on this factor because
of the State's substantial control over Gateway.
Most notably,
DBHDD, with the concurrence of the Governor, exercised its power
under O.C.G.A. § 37-2-10 to appoint a manager to operate Gateway
and to dissolve Gateway's Board. Dkt. No. 79-2 at 2-3. Gateway has
operated under the supervision of DBHDD ever since. Dkt. No. 79-2
at 3 ("Gateway BHS has continued to operate under the direction of
DBHDD
without
a
board
of
directors from
July
2013 through
the
present."). Gateway also presented evidence of State control over
12
minute, day-to-day operations. Dkt. No. 79-4 iSI 5-11. For example,
the state ^^control[s] employment/hiring by requiring Gateway BHS
to conduct criminal background checks on its employees and submit
the results to DBHDD for approval before an employee/contractor
may be hired."
Id. SI 9. Thus, decisions which are typically made
by
governing
a
local
board
"without
significant
state
involvement," Miller, 677 F. App'x at 561, are actually being made
by employees of DBHDD.
most
favorable
to
Even taking this evidence in the light
Plaintiff,
it
is
apparent
that
the
State
exercised meaningful control over Gateway. As such, this second
Manders factor points toward Gateway being an arm of the State,
ill. Gateway's Funding
The third Manders factor requires examination of Gateway's
funding. "[W]e focus primarily on the quantum of funding the State
provides to the defendant entity," Miller, 677 F. App'x at 563,
but we also consider the autonomy, if any, created by the funding
mechanism, Liqhtfoot, 771 F.Sd at 777.
The Eleventh Circuit has
held that an entity's mere receipt of "significant funding from
the State" is not sufficient for this factor to favor an entity's
status as an arm of the State.
Id. at 776.
Gateway does, in fact, receive significant funding from the
State.
The State of Georgia funds the overwhelming majority of
Gateway's
operations;
here,
Georgia
funded
or
controlled
approximately eighty-eight percent (88%) of Gateway's operational
13
budget. Dkt. No. 79-1 at 13. Approximately fifty-three percent
(53%) of Gateway's operating budget is directly from State funds.
Id. 5 5.
which
Additionally, Gateway's
makes
DBHDD.
Id.
up
another
access to Medicaid funding,
thirty-three
percent
(33%), is
through
DBHDD must both approve Gateway as a provider and
audit Gateway's compliance with Medicaid funding regulations.
Id.
In Fiscal Year 2016, the State of Georgia, through DBHDD, provided
Gateway $15,756,761.00 in funding. Id.
Moreover, the State of Georgia exercises meaningful control
over
Gateway's funding.
Gateway has provided evidence that the
State mandates the source of funding and limits Gateway's spending
decisions.
Gateway's
use
of
such
funds is
contingent
upon
its
compliance with DBHDD policies, which govern "every aspect" of its
operations,
including
hiring,
safety
reporting, and service provision.
compliance,
incident
Dkt. No. 79-1 at 3-4. Gateway
cannot issue bonds without the express approval of DBHDD.
No. 79-4 5 11.
Dkt.
DBHDD is responsible for financial auditing of
Gateway and has access to all of its facilities and records on
demand.
spending.
Id. SI 10. Georgia also exercises control over Gateway's
All
revenue/fees
collected
by
Gateway
must
reinvested in DBHDD-approved services to Gateway's clients.
SI 6.
As such.
be
Id.
Gateway has presented the court with sufficient
evidence indicating that the State exercises meaningful control
14
over the source of Gateway's funding and the use of those funds.
See Miller, 677 F. App'x at 563.
Finally, the structural concerns that have prevented this
Court from previously finding that a CSB is an arm of the State as
it relates to funding do not exist in this case. Within Georgia's
statutory
framework,
a
CSB's
board
generally
has
''unfettered
discretion to design its own funding mix," and "[t]his level of
autonomy
precludes
the
State, from
dictating
[a
CSB's]
funding
portfolio and limits the State's control over [a CSB's] financial
decision-making." Id. at 564. In other cases, the
role of the
Board over "financial decision-making—especially in the arena of
personnel management—weighs against" finding an entity an arm of
the State.
Id.
But here, the State of Georgia disbanded the
Governing Board and DBHDD employees were appointed as Gateway's
CEO
and
manager;
thus,
DBHDD
remains
in
control
of
Gateway's
financial decisions. Dkt. No. 79-1 at 4-5.
Even
Plaintiff,
taking
it
is
this
evidence
apparent
in
that
the
Gateway
light
has
most
met
favorable
its
burden
to
of
demonstrating that the State not only provides significant funding
to Gateway but also exercises control over such funding sufficient
to satisfy the third Manders factor.
iv. Responsibili-by for Judgments Against Gateway
The
fourth
and
final
Manders
factor
pertains
to
responsibility for a judgment against the entity in question. The
15
Eleventh
Circuit
important,
has
"though
indicated
not
that
alone
this
factor
is
determinative,"
especially
because
it
"implicates the Eleventh Amendment's core concern that the State
will be in fact obligated to bear and pay adverse judgments."
Keene v. Prine, 477 F. App'x 575, 579 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation
marks
and
citations
omitted).
As
such,
the
fourth
Manders factor is given "great weight." Id.
Georgia
obligations
law
of
a
states
that
community
"the
service
liabilities,
board
shall
debts,
not
and
constitute
liabilities, debts, or obligations of the state or any county or
municipal
corporation
and
neither
the
state
nor
any
county
or
municipal corporation shall be liable for any liability, debt, or
obligation of a community service board." O.C.G.A. § 37-2-6(a).
This
statutory
limitation
of
state
liability
for
against Gateway weighs against finding it to be
any
an
judgment
arm of the
State. See Miller, 677 F. App'x at 564.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that certain special
conditions
may
arise
through
which
the
state
treasury
is
indirectly implicated in the defendant entity's liabilities. These
circumstances include where an office is subject to direct state
control and is financially dependent on the state. See Manders,
338 F.3d at 1327-28. The Eleventh Circuit has also stated that if
the State of Georgia were obligated or incentivized to prop-up a
CSB in the event of its financial distress or insolvency, such an
16
incentive would cut in favor of finding it an arm of the state.
Miller^. 677 F. App'x at 565.
Here,
Plaintiff
simply
argues
that
^'[b]y
statute
and
contract, [Gateway] is wholly liable for any adverse judgment and
State coffers are not touched."
§
37-2-6
('MT]he
Dkt. No. 83 at 24 {citing O.C.G.A
liabilities,
debts,
and
obligations
of
a
community service board shall not constitute liabilities, debts,
or obligations of the state . . . and neither the state nor any
county or municipal corporation shall be liable for any liability,
debt, or obligation of a community service board.")); id. (citing
Regional Contract between Gateway and DBHDD, dkt. no. 79-5 ^ 143,
which requires Gateway to obtain and maintain workers compensation
insurance, commercial general liability insurance, business auto
policy insurance, and commercial umbrella insurance).
Gateway argues that any judgment in this case would result in
(1) an actual drain on the state treasury, via a payment of the
State's
self-insurance
Administrative
Services,
funds
or
managed
(2)
an
by
the
indirect
Department
drain
on
of
state
treasury funds as the judgment would be paid by Gateway's statefunded operating budget. Dkt. No. 79-1 at 14. The evidence shows
that payment would reduce Gateway's budget, the great majority of
which is comprised of State funds. See Dkt. No. 79-2 5 24 (stating
that a
judgment would be paid by Gateway BHS from Gateway BHS's
operating budget"); 79-4 f 13 (same). Second, the State would have
17
the incentive or obligation to step in to assist Gateway to ensure
the
continuation
of
the
provision
of
social
services;
^^the
practical reality is that [Gateway] must recoup that money from
somewhere." See
adverse
judgment
Manders,
338
occurs,
F.3d
both
at
1327
county
(^^If
and
a
significant
state
funds
are
implicated because [defendant] would need to seek a greater total
budget from the county for his office and a greater daily rate
from the State[.]"). Here, a judgment rendered against Gateway
would limit the State's ability to provide needed mental health
and disability services. See Dkt. No. 79-2 at 19-20. Gateway would
need to seek additional funds for its operating
budget at the
election of the state, and those funds would ultimately come from
Georgia taxpayers. Id.
In the context of this particular case, this factor is close,
for
both
ultimate
sides
have
presented
responsibility
for
plausible
judgment.
arguments
regarding
Nevertheless,
even
if
Plaintiff were to prevail on this factor, it would not shift the
overall
calculus
of
the
Manders
factors
in
Plaintiff's
favor.
Considering all of the evidence, the Court finds that Gateway has
satisfied
its
burden
of
demonstrating
all
four
of the
Manders
factors. As such, the agency is an arm of the State.
C. Whether Gateway Contracted Away Its Status as an Ann of the
State
18
Separate and apart from the Manders factors, Plaintiff argues
that Gateway is not an arm of the State because it contractually
agreed
that its
relationship
with
the
State
independent contractor.
Dkt. No. 83 at 22.
the , Regional
entered
Contract
Georgia/DBHDD and Gateway,
into
was that of an
Plaintiff points to
between
which states;.
the
State
of
''Nothing contained in
this contract shall be construed to constitute [Gateway] or any of
its employees, agents, or subcontractors as a partner, employee,
or agent of [DBHDD], nor shall either party to this contract have
any authority to bind the other in any respect, it being intended
that each shall remain an independent contractor."
Dkt. No. 79-5
at 4.
Plaintiff argues that, because DBHDD and Gateway entered into
a contract which defined Gateway as a contractor for services, it,
as a matter of law, cannot be an arm of the State (and, thus, it
can be sued under § 1983).
However, simply because Gateway and
DBHDD entered into a contract which labels Gateway an independent
contractor does not mean that, under the law. Gateway is indeed an
independent contractor.
an
arm
of
the
State
As discussed above, whether an entity is
is
ultimately
a
question
of
federal law.
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309.
Moreover, countless employers have entered into independent
contractor agreements with individuals only for a court to later
determine that, under the law, the individuals are not independent
19
contractors but employees. See, e.g.^ Orton v. Masquerade, Inc.,
716 S.E.2d 764, 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (stating the test to
determine
an
independent
contractor
includes
^'whether
the
employer, under the contract . . . has the right to direct the
time, the manner, the methods, and the means of the execution of
the work, as contra-distinguished from the right to insist upon
the contractor producing results according to the contract" or
'Mp]ut another way, the test is essentially whether the contractor
has a bona fide existence apart from the employer or functions
instead as the employer's alter ego").
Similarly, entities such as DBHDD often use form independent
contractor agreements in their dealings with other entities to
attempt to shield themselves from liability that might otherwise
attach should the relationship of the parties be deemed one of,
for example, employer and agent.
Again, though, when determining
the nature of the relationship between Gateway and DBHDD, it is
not
the
contract
which
controls,
relationship between the two.
but
the
reality
of
the
And, here, the Court has determined
that, under the Manders factors. Gateway is an arm of the State of
Georgia.
Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 203 F.Sd at 1311
(stating that the inquiry regarding an entity's status as an arm
of the State ^'is not into the nature of a corporation's status in
the abstract, but its function or role in a particular context,"
20
i.e. ''whether and to what extent [the entity is] contractually
acting as [a] representative[] of the State").
Accordingly, Gateway is an arm of the State and, in turn, not
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, the Court need not
determine whether Gateway waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
because Gateway need not rely on the Eleventh Amendment to shield
itself from this claim.^
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is DISMISSED.
Ill. Plaintiff s Contract Claims
Plaintiff alleges that there was a contract between Quincy
and
Gateway
in
which
Gateway
agreed
to
provide
Quincy
with
behavioral services.'^ Dkt. No. 1-3 SI 8. But Gateway asserts that
the
various
administrative
and
treatment
records
cited
by
Plaintiff do not constitute a contract because they (1) do not
contain all the necessary terms of a contract, and (2) are not
signed contemporaneous writings. Dkt. No. 79-1 at 24. Moreover,
Gateway alleges. Plaintiff's contract claims are barred by State
sovereign immunity. Id. at 22.
3 Because Gateway is not subject to suit under § 1983, the Court need not
address Plaintiff's argument that Gateway waived its immunity by removing the
case to this Court, dkt. no. 83 at 22, 23, or waived its immunity to the extent
of its general liability insurance policy coverage, id. at 18-19.
^ These documents include: Gateway's Regional Contract with DBHDD, Gateway's
mission
statement.
Gateway's
notice
of '"Consumer
Rights," Plaintiff's
Behavioral Support Plan, Plaintiff's treatment "Safety plan," Plaintiff's
"Standard Room and Board" contract, "Commuting Transportation Agreement,"
"Consumer Responsibilities" statement. Plaintiff's "Mental Retardation Waiver
Program
-
Freedom
of
Choice
-
(Statement
of
Informed
Consent)," "Gateway
Behavioral Health Services Policy Statement Number 9.2" relating to "Consumer
Complaints and Rights of Appeals Process," Plaintiff's Consumer Consent to
Treatment Form, Gateway's Consumer Handbook, and "Gateway Behavioral
Services DD Orientation Checklist." See Dkt. Nos. 1-3, 79-3, 79-5, 83.
21
Health
^^Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to
be sued
without its consent." Va. Off, for
Stewart,
563
U.S.
247,
253
(2011).
Prot.
Georgia
&
Advocacy v.
waives
sovereign
immunity only for breaches of written contracts. See Ga. Const,
art. I, § 2, SI IX (''The state's defense of sovereign immunity is
hereby waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any
written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by the
state or its departments and agencies."). Plaintiff has the burden
of establishing a written contract between the parties. Sherin v.
Dep't
of
("[T]he
Human
Res.,
494
S.E.2d
518, 522 (Ga.
party seeking to benefit from the
Ct.
App.
1997)
waiver of sovereign
immunity bears the burden of proof.").
The
main
document
relied
upon
by
Plaintiff for
assigning
contractual liability to Gateway is the Regional Contract between
Gateway and DBHDD.
Quincy is
a
Dkt. No. 79-5 at 4.
third-party beneficiary to
Plaintiff argues that
the
contract,
wherein,
according to Plaintiff, Gateway promised to "follow all policies
of DBHDD," "keep Quincy free from abuse," "report each occurrence
[of abuse] immediately," and hire no "felons or people with the
background of Errol Wilkins." Dkt. NO. 83 at 10-11, 13.
Gateway breached its promises.
Plaintiff argues.
its sovereign immunity and can
be
Quincy as a third-party beneficiary.
22
Because
Gateway waived
held contractually liable to
In Alverson v. Employees^
Retirement System of Georgia, the
Georgia Court of Appeals describes two cases which this Court
finds analogous to this case.
The first is Burton v. DeKalb
County, 434 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
was a
state employee
who slipped
There, the plaintiff
and fell in
water that had
accumulated in a building owned and maintained by DeKalb County
under contract with the State.
injuries sustained.
The plaintiff sued the county for
She sought to avoid the bar of sovereign
immunity by arguing that she was suing the county for breach of
its maintenance contract with the State.
The Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected the argument that plaintiff had standing to sue
as a third-party beneficiary of the contract, holding that the
action sounded in tort and was barred by sovereign immunity.
In the second case, Merk v. DeKalb County, 486 S.E.2d 66 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997), the plaintiff was a DeKalb County homeowner whose
house was flooded by sewage.
She also sued the county on a breach
of contract theory, claiming that she and the county were parties
to a written contract for water and sewer services established by
county code.
Concluding that the county code did not contain all
the necessary terms of a contract, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that plaintiff's action, though couched in contract, actually
sounded
in
tort
and,
like
Burton,
immunity.
23
was
barred
by
sovereign
Here,
Plaintiff's
contract
claim,
like
those
of
the
plaintiffs in Burton and Merk, undeniably sounds in tort.
The
Complaint actually labels the claim as one for ^^negligent breach
of a contract."
describe
failure
Dkt. No. 1-3 at 14.
Gateway's
to
maintain
alleged
a
The Complaint goes on to
negligent
safe
and
(tort)
secure
actions,
environment,
hiring, negligent supervision, and battery.
i.e.
a
negligent
Id. SI 44.
As such,
the Court concludes that they share the fate of the tort claims
previously dismissed by the Court, dkt. no. 25, and are barred by
sovereign
immunity.
Accordingly,
the
Court
GRANTS
Gateway's
summary judgment motion as to the contract claims.^
CONCLUSION
Defendant Gateway's motion for summary judgment, dkt. no. 79,
is
GRANTED
in
its
entirety—Plaintiff's
§
1983
fails
because
Gateway is an arm of the State and not subject to suit thereunder,
and Plaintiff's contract claims sound in tort and are thus barred
by
sovereign
immunity.
Gateway's
motion
to
indispensable party, dkt. no. 71, is DENIED as moot.
dismiss
an
There being
no claims remaining in this case, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to close the case.
5 The same analysis applies to the other ^'contracts" referenced by Plaintiff—
her claims are couched in contract but sound in tort. Moreover, of the various
documents referenced by Plaintiff, see dkt. no. 79-3, the only document that
contains the four
essential elements" of a
Board" contract, id. at 13-14.
contract
is the "Standard
Room and
However, the contract was for housing services,
and Plaintiff has not alleged that Gateway breached any obligations it had
under the contract to provide Quincy with housing. See Dkt. No. 1-3.
24
so ORDERED, this 28th day of November, 2018.
HON. <5n:SA GODBEYtWOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
25
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