Masi v. Glynn County Detention Center

Filing 12

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's 1 Complaint, without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND that the C ourt DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 2/22/2017). ORDER directing the service the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 2/8/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

JAMES MASI,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:17-cv-1

v.
GLYNN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER,
Defendant.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s
Order of January 12, 2017, to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 3.) For the following reasons, I
RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, (doc. 1), without prejudice for
Plaintiff’s failure to follow this Court’s Orders and failure to state a claim.

I further

RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Glynn County Detention Center in Brunswick, Georgia,
brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 6, 2017. (Doc. 1.) On January 12,
2017, the Court deferred ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.
(Doc. 3.) In that Order, the Court explained that “a county jail is not a viable defendant under
Section 1983” and that “Plaintiff’s Complaint in its current form fails to state a viable claim, as
the only named Defendant is the Glynn County Detention Center.” (Id. at p. 3.) The Court
instructed Plaintiff to amend his Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of that Order.

(Id. at p. 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amendment was due on or before January 26, 2017.
However, Plaintiff has not submitted an amended complaint. Instead, Plaintiff has submitted
letters to the Court in which he requests paper, envelopes, and shampoo, and letters in which he
reiterates his claims against Glynn County Detention Center, (docs. 4, 5, 10). Plaintiff has also
filed copies of his inmate request forms, (docs. 7–10).
DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this
Court’s directive. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Complaint and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
I.

Dismissal for Failure to Follow this Court’s Order and Failure to State a Claim
A district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte pursuant to either Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its
docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); 1 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cty. Jail, 433 F.
App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V
MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the
involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims,
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005
WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir.
1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua
sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on]
1

In Wabash, the Court held that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without
affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633.

2

willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a
district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and
ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802,
802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)).
It is true that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be
utilized only in extreme situations” and requires that a court “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of
delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser
sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623,
625–26 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x
616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without
prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are
afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619; see
also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this
action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal
without prejudice for failure to prosecute Section 1983 complaint, where plaintiff did not
respond to court order to supply defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251
F. App’x at 620–21 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, because
plaintiffs insisted on going forward with deficient amended complaint rather than complying, or
seeking an extension of time to comply, with court’s order to file second amended complaint);
Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute

3

Section 1983 claims, where plaintiff failed to follow court order to file amended complaint and
court had informed plaintiff that noncompliance could lead to dismissal). By choosing to file six
non-responsive pleadings instead of an amended complaint, Plaintiff has demonstrated a clear
record of delay and disregard for this Court’s Orders, and a sanction other than dismissal would
not suffice to remedy his deficiencies.
Additionally, as laid out in the Court’s prior Orders, the Glynn County Detention Center
is not a viable Defendant. Plaintiff has not named any persons or other proper parties as
defendants. Thus, he has failed to state a claim upon which this Court could grant relief.
Thus, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, (doc. 1), without prejudice, for
failure to follow this Court’s Order and failure to state a claim and DIRECT the Clerk of Court
to CLOSE this case.
II.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is proper to address these issues in the Court’s
order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party
proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is
filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or

4

argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Or, stated another way, an in forma pauperis action
is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY
Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint, without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

5

Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 8th day of February,
2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

6