Knox v. Happy Cab, LLC et al
Filing
10
ORDER granting Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Default Judgment, and the amount of damages will be determined at the December 20 hearing. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/21/2017. (ca)
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GLENDA KNOX, on behalf of
herself and those similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
2:17-cv-29
vs.
HAPPY CAB, LLC and STACEY R.
DIXON,
Defendants.
ORDER
This
Knox's
Matter
Motion
comes
for
before
Default
Defendants Happy Cab, LLC
the
Court
Judgment
on
(Dkt.
Plaintiff
No.
9)
Glenda
against
Happy Cab") and Stacey R. Dixon.
Upon due consideration, this Motion is GRANTED, and a hearing is
set for December 20, 2017 at 10:00am to determine the amount of
damages.
gftCTOM. BACKGROUND
According to the
allegations of the
Complaint, Knox
was
employed by Happy Cab as a dispatcher in St. Marys, Georgia, in
Camden County.
Dkt. No. 1 1 7.
Dixon is a corporate officer of
Happy Cab, exercising operational control over its activities.
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(Rev.8/82)
Id. 2 9.
As owner and acting manager of Happy Cab, Dixon has
the power to hire and fire Knox, supervise and control her work
schedule, determine her rate and method of payment, and maintain
employment records.
Id. 2 11.
Defendants provide a mode of
passenger transportation from portal to portal for patrons for a
fee.
Id. 2 21.
Defendants
hired
Plaintiff,
and
she
provided
rapid
transportation response to customer requests within a designated
coverage area.
Id. 2 22.
As part of her job. Plaintiff was
required to arrive at Defendants' place of business to perform
services,
including
customers'
traffic.
pick-up
Id. 2 23.
assisting
locations
drivers
and
with
directions
navigating
them
to
through
Plaintiff alleges that she typically worked
over sixty hours per week and that she was not paid minimum wage
or overtime.
Id. 2 24.
She worked as a dispatcher for Happy
Cab from May 2016 through November 2016, earning $88.00 per day.
Id. 22 26-27.
Defendants never paid her at a rate of time and
one-half her regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty in
a workweek, she alleges.
Id. 2 30.
In a putative class action.
Plaintiff brought claims for violations of the minimum wage and
overtime
provisions
of
the
Fair
Labor Standards
Act
(^^FLSA")
against Happy Cab and Dixon under 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.
Knox
Summons
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sued
to
on
Happy
March
Cab
6,
and
2017.
Dixon
Dkt.
on
No.
March
1.
7
and
She
9,
issued
2017,
respectively.
Dkt. Nos. 4, 5.
The server verified that he
served Dixon on behalf of Happy Cab on March 11, 2017, at 9:30
a.m. and that he served Dixon personally at the same date and
time,
Dkt. No. 6-1.
service.
Dixon is Happy Cab's registered agent for
On May 31, 2017, Knox moved for an entry of default,
which the clerk entered.
Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.
On July 12, 2017,
Knox moved for a default judgment against Happy Cab and Dixon.
Dkt. No. 9.
LEGMi STAND21RD
A court may enter a default judgment when a party fails to
timely respond to a claim for affirmative relief.
P. 55.
Fed. R. Civ.
Before entering a default judgment for damages, the
Court ^^must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint, which are taken as true due to the default, actually
state a substantive cause of action and that there is a
substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the
particular relief sought."
Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer,
218 F. App'x 860, 863 (llth Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see also
Cotton V. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1277-78 (llth
Cir. 2005).
A default is not ^^an absolute confession by the
defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to
recover," but is instead merely **an admission of the facts cited
in the Complaint . . . ."
Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
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(Rev.8/82)
^[1]he
court, in its discretion, may require some proof of facts that
must be established in order to determine liability.'"
Wooten
V. McDonald Transit Ass., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir.
2015) (quoting lOA Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2688 (3d ed. 1998)).
The allegations relating to damages suffered ordinarily are
not accepted as true.
Cir. 2012).
Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F,3d 886, 892 (7th
Rather, ^^djamages must be proved unless they are
liquidated or capable of calculation." Id. (quoting Merrill
Lynch Mortq. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir.
1990)).
It is the Court's duty to ^Metermine both the amount
and character of damages." PNCEF, LLC v. Hendricks Bldq. Supply
LLC, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (S.D. Ala.- 2010) (quoting Virgin
Records Am., Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 n. 5 (S.D.
Ala. 2007).
Even in the default judgment context, ''[a] court
has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for
any damage award it enters."
Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot,
317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
In considering a default judgment, the Court must examine
(1) jurisdiction, (2) liability, and (3) damages.
321 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
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(Rev. S/82)
See Pitts,
The Court will take up each in turn.
I.
Jurisdiction
The Court cannot enter default judgment against Happy Cab
and Dixon unless it has personal jurisdiction over them and
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Here^ the Complaint
alleges that Happy Cab is a Georgia corporation that has its
headquarters in Camden County, Georgia.
of incorporation is a
general jurisdiction."
Dkt. No. 1 2 8.
Place
^paradig[m]' bas[i]s for the exercise of
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
V. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
What is more, Happy Cab was
served in Georgia through its registered agent for service of
process,
further
Georgia.
Dkt. No. 6-1; see Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Cnty.
of
establishing
Marin,
constitutional
the
495
U.S.
exercise
its
604
of
personal
(1990)
jurisdiction
(holding
personal
in
valid
jurisdiction
and
over
corporate defendant through service of process within the forum
state).
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Happy Cab.
The same is true for Dixon.
She was personally served with
process in Georgia and is subject to personal jurisdiction here,
regardless of whether she resides here.^
Personal jurisdiction
is satisfied.
^ The Complaint alleges that Dixon ^*resides in the State of Georgia." Dkt.
No. 13 9 and worked in St. Marys, Georgia. Id. 3 9. The Complaint does not
make the missing allegation that Dixon is domiciled in St. Marys, but the
Court need not decide where she is domiciled in light of her receipt of
service.
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(Rev.8/82)
So too, is subject matter jurisdiction.
This Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the case because all claims
arise under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216.
Finally,
venue
is
proper
in
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
the
Southern
District
of
Georgia because a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claims occurred in St. Marys, Camden County,
which is located within the Southern District of Georgia.
28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
II.
LI ability
In
order for the Court to grant Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment, Plaintiff must have properly alleged claims
for minimum wage and overtime compensation against Defendants
Happy Cab and Dixon and the Court must be able to determine the
proper
measure
subject
to
of damages.
the
provisions
Specifically,
of
the
FLSA,
Defendants must be
Plaintiff
must
be
entitled to sue under the FLSA, and Plaintiff must show hourly
compensation below the minimum wage and hourly payment below one
and one-half times the regular rate for hours worked in excess
of forty hours.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(C); § 207(a)(2)(C).
A. J^plicability of FLSA to Happy Cab and Dixon
First, Happy Cab and Dixon must be Plaintiff's employer (or
former
employer).
directly
relation
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(Rev.8/B2)
or
to
An
indirectly
an
employer
in
employee."
the
^^includes
interest
any
of
an
29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
person
acting
employer
That
in
means
Plaintiffs suing under the FLSA can recover against corporate
officers
responsible
practices
such
schedules.
as
for compensation
hiring
and
decisions or employment
firing
and
setting
employment
See Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 2007) (holding corporation's president liable under FLSA
where
he
employees
was
to
responsible
attend
wages and schedules).
for
meetings
hiring
unpaid,
and
and
firing,
setting
recjuiring
employees'
Such a person is jointly and severally
liable with the corporation.
Chao, 493 F.3d at 34.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Happy Cab employed her as
a dispatcher in St. Marys, Georgia.
the statutory definition.
Dkt. No. 12 7.
This meets
Knox also alleges that Dixon is the
corporate officer and acting manager of Happy Cab, able to hire
and fire Knox, supervise her work schedule, determine her pay
rate, and maintain employment records. Id. 2 11.
Thus, she too
is an employer as defined in the FLSA.
Second, the overtime provisions apply to every employer who
^^employ[s] any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is
employed
in
an
enterprise
engaged
production of goods for commerce."
in
commerce
Id. § 207(a)(1).
or
in
the
Similarly,
the minimum wage provision applies to every employee **who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for
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(Rev.8/82)
commerce,
or
is
employed
in
an
enterprise
engaged
in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce."
§ 206(a).
^Enterprise'
means
the
related
Id.
activities
performed . . . by any person or persons for a common business
purpose."
§ 203(r)(l).
And
^enterprise
engaged
in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce'" includes
one
*^whose
annual
gross
volume
of
sales
is
not
less
than
$500,000" and one who "has employees engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials
that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person."
Id. § 203(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Here, Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to satisfy
these requirements.
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
individually
in
engaged
commerce
by
accepting
payments from
customers based on credit cards issued by out-of-state banks,
making and answering phone calls, and working with products from
out-of-state.
Id. 5 17.
It alleges that Defendants made gross
earnings of at least $500,000 annually.
Id. 5 15.
This was
further supported by Plaintiff s sworn affidavit where she adds
that
Defendants'
company "is
very
profitable," operating
two
different locations and "prominently display[ing] charts of each
location's yearly earnings."
Dkt. No. 9-1 S 11.
Knox alleges
that Defendants had at least two employees engaged in commerce
by means of CB radios and portable payment devices and that she
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(Rev.8/82)
8
herself
was
engaged
in
commerce
by
accepting
payments
from
customers based on credit cards issued by out-of-state banks,
making and answering phone calls, and working with products from
out-of-state.
Dkt. No. 1
17-18.
Lastly, Defendants had at
least two employees routinely ordering materials or supplies
from
out-of-state
vendors,
transacting
with
out-of-state
persons, and Plaintiff directed' interstate travel of Defendants'
customers through interstate highways and roads.
Id. 21 18, 20.
In light of these allegations and supporting evidence, the
Court is satisfied that FLSA applies to Defendants in their
employment relationship with Plaintiff.
B. Violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions
The FLSA requires covered employers to pay each employee at
a rate of at least $7.25 an hour.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(C).
It
further requires them to compensate each employee at a rate of
one and one-half times the regular rate for hours worked in
excess of forty hours in a given workweek.
Here,
the
Court
is
satisfied
that
Id. § 207(a)(1).
Defendants
violated
the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA by compensating
Plaintiff
at
a
rate
of
less
than
$7.25
and
by
failing
to
compensate Plaintiff at a rate of one and one-half times the
regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
she
was
hourly, at a rate of $88 per day.
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(Rev.8/82)
paid
daily,
Id. 2 27.
rather
than
Her affidavit
elaborates that she typically worked 14 hours per day.
9-1 S 7.
$6.29.
Dkt. No.
That means she was compensated at an hourly rate of
This is less than the minimum wage requirement of $7.25.
Knox also stated that she typically worked 98 hours per week,
but that her compensation did not increase for the hours worked
in excess of 40 hours.
9, 10.
Dkt. No. 1 22 29-30; Dkt. No. 9-1 22 7,
Therefore, Defendants failed to make proper minimum wage
and overtime payments to Plaintiff.
Ill.
Damages
Employers
who
violate
the
minimum
wage
and
overtime
provisions of the FLSA are liable to the affected employee in
the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, their unpaid overtime
compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Overtime
payment
means
one
and
employee's ^^regular rate" of payment.
However,
when
an
employee's
one-half
times
the
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
compensation
is
less
than
the
minimum wage permitted by the FLSA, the minimum wage constitutes
the ^'regular rate" at which the employee is employed.
Drake v.
Hirsch, 40 F. Supp. 290, 295 (N.D. Ga. 1941); see also Perez v.
ZL Restaurant Corp., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1072 (D.N.M. 2014)
(*MT]he regular rate cannot be lower than the minimum wage.");
Gomez
v.
Avendano,
2014
WL
12608619,
*7
(S.D.
Tex.
2014),
amended on other grounds (''[S]ince the [p]laintiffs have alleged
10
both that they are owed overtime wages and that their ^regular
rate' of pay is below the minimum wage, overtime wages cannot be
calculated
with
the
rate
of
pay
actually
received
by
[the
p]laintiffs.").
To calculate the proper measure of damages when no records
are available,
imprecise evidence on quantum can provide a
*sufficient basis' for damages."
Reeves v. Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 616 F.2d 1342, 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
In this case, the
Court can award damages to Plaintiff if they are not speculative
but capable of calculation.
As such, a hearing on damages is
hereby set for December 20, 2017 at 10:00am.
The Clerk of Court
is directed to serve both Defendants with notice of the hearing.
CONGLUSION
Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED, and the
amount of damages will be determined at the December 20 hearing.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of November, 2017.
HONf^LISA GODBEfer WOOD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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