Roosevelt v. Williams
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's 1 Complaint based on his failure to state a claim, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY P laintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal. Any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation is ordered to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 10/30/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 10/16/2017. (csr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
JOHN WILLIAM ROOSEVELT,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:17-cv-116
JEFFREY C. WILLIAMS,
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at the Glynn County Detention Center in Brunswick,
Georgia, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain events which
allegedly occurred in Brunswick, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Docs. 2, 3.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions. For these same reasons, I
RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint based on his failure to state a claim,
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of
dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends he was arrested at his mother’s residence on May 23,
2017, based on several charges of forgery in the fourth degree. (Doc. 1, p. 9.) He was then
transported to the headquarters of the Glynn County Police Department, where he was
questioned about the alleged forgeries and the whereabouts of his mother, Lisa Mansfield.
Plaintiff asserts that on May 25, 2017, Defendant Jeffrey C. Williams charged him with theft by
The following facts and allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint.
taking a motor vehicle which belonged to his mother, even though the vehicle had not been
reported stolen and was at his mother’s residence. (Id.) Plaintiff avers Defendant Williams then
gave perjured testimony to a grand jury, which led to Plaintiff being indicted on June 14, 2017,
for murder, despite a lack of evidence. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains Defendant Williams’ actions
have led to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and defamation of character, as the charges pending
against Plaintiff have been published in social and news media. (Id. at pp. 9–10.) Plaintiff seeks
$100,000.00 in damages for defamation of character and for the costs that he contends he will
incur for relocating to another state, as well as monetary damages for false imprisonment, lost
wages, and deprivation of liberties. (Id. at p. 3.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the
Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff
submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets, shows an inability to pay the
filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled
to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening,
the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . .
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set
of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that
standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys[.]”) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160
(11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding
procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We have never suggested
that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel.”).
Dismissal Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey
The allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint center around his ongoing criminal
proceedings in Glynn County, Georgia. There is no indication from his Complaint that Plaintiff
has been convicted, much less whether that conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated,
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise
overturned. (Doc. 1.) Consequently, this Court is precluded from reviewing his claims by the
decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and
investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The United
States Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff’s claim to a common-law cause of action for
malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal
proceeding be terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983
damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of
his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for
malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote omitted), a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 486–87 (emphasis added).
Under Heck, a plaintiff who is attempting “to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” must make a showing that his
conviction, sentence, or other criminal judgment was reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an
appropriate state tribunal, or called into question in a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Id. If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under
Section 1983. Id. at 489. Furthermore, to the extent a plaintiff contends that a favorable ruling
on his claims would not invalidate his conviction, sentence, confinement, or other criminal
judgment, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this contention in order for his claims to
proceed. Id. at 487. Although Heck involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money
damages, Heck’s holding has been extended to claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief as
well as money damages. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005); Abella v.
Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973) (“[W]e hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
“Under this standard, it is not unusual for a § 1983 claim to be dismissed for failure to
satisfy Heck’s favorable termination requirement.” Desravines v. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs.,
No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2292180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2222170 (M.D. Fla. June 8,
2011) (citing Gray v. Kinsey, No. 3:09–cv–324/LC/MD, 2009 WL 2634205, at *9 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 25, 2009) (finding plaintiff’s claims barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement
where plaintiff sought invalidation of his traffic conviction but failed to appeal the conviction in
state court)); Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“allowing the
plaintiff to circumvent applicable state procedures and collaterally attack her convictions in
federal court is the precise situation that Heck seeks to preclude” because the plaintiff entered
into a plea agreement with knowledge of substantially all of the allegations that now form the
basis of a Section 1983 action for damages); St. Germain v. Isenhower, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1366,
1372 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding plaintiff’s convictions for the lesser-included offenses of false
imprisonment and misdemeanor battery did not constitute a favorable termination and thus
plaintiff’s § 1983 action was precluded by Heck ); see also Cooper v. Georgia, No. CV413-091,
2013 WL 2253214, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by No.
CV413-091, 2013 WL 2660046 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2013); Brown v. Renfroe, No. CV210-003,
2011 WL 902197, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by No.
CV210-003, 2011 WL 892359 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2011), aff’d sub nom., Brown v. Coleman, 439
F. App’x 794 (11th Cir. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff has not shown that any underlying conviction or sentence has been
favorably terminated. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he has not been convicted of the crimes for
which he has been charged, and he seeks monetary compensation. Even though Plaintiff is not
challenging a conviction, he is at least challenging his post-arrest confinement.
Heck’s bar to claims is not limited to claims challenging the validity of criminal convictions. It
also applies to detentions absent convictions. See Cohen v. Clemens, 321 F. App’x 739, 741
(10th Cir. 2009) (In the immigration context, “Heck bar[red the plaintiff’s] claims for damages
because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] detention.”);
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging
procedures used to deprive a prison inmate of good time credits); Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410
F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging civil
commitment under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99,
102–03 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Heck to a Section 1983 claim challenging the coercive nature
of a pretrial detainee’s confinement prior to giving a statement regarding pending charges).
For all of these reasons, the Heck decision unquestionably precludes Plaintiff’s claims,
and the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Dismissal Under Younger Abstention
Additionally, insofar as Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene in the state case’s
ongoing proceedings, the Younger abstention doctrine bars Plaintiff’s Complaint. Under the
Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case
where there is an ongoing state action. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). While
Younger involved a federal suit for injunctive relief of the ongoing state proceedings, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also indicated that the Younger abstention doctrine
extends to cases involving Section 1983 claims for monetary damages. See Doby v. Strength,
758 F.2d 1405, 1405–06 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring Younger abstention where plaintiff raised
Fourth Amendment Section 1983 damages claims related to ongoing state criminal proceedings);
see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (intervention in ongoing state court
proceedings is not appropriate as a Section 1983 cause of action when there is ample opportunity
to raise constitutional challenges in those state court proceedings).
Here, because the status of Plaintiff’s indictment is potentially ongoing, any ruling by this
Court as to the constitutionality of Defendant’s actions could substantially interfere with the
results reached in the state court proceeding. See 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255,
1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting the importance of “whether the federal proceeding will interfere
with an ongoing state court proceeding” in determining whether Younger abstention is
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the lack of adequate remedy at law
regarding his claims because he is free to allege the same violations or inaction by Defendant in
his state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. Georgia, No. CV 112-042, 2012 WL 2862157, at *2
(S.D. Ga. May 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 112-042, 2012 WL
2862123 (S.D. Ga. July 11, 2012), aff’d, 512 F. App’x 915 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law with respect to constitutional claims that he could bring
in his pending state criminal case). In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations provide no indication of
irreparable injury, and the hardships associated with having to defend against a criminal
prosecution do not establish it as a matter of law. Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 (“Certain types of
injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single
criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal
sense of that term.”).
For these additional reasons, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims.
Dismissal of State Law Claims
Plaintiff sets forth putative state law claims through his contentions that Defendant
Williams has maliciously prosecuted, slandered, and defamed him. “[I]n any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction,” district courts also have supplemental
jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The
dismissal of [Plaintiff’s] underlying federal question claim does not deprive the court of
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of
Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997). Instead, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),
“the Court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse
state law claims, where the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction,
but the court is not required to dismiss the case.” Id. “Where § 1367(c) applies, considerations
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity may influence the court’s discretion to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” Id. at 1353.
While the Court has the discretion to retain jurisdiction over state law claims after
dismissal of federal claims, the law cautions against doing so. Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d
1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (In its discretion, the district court may dismiss state law claims
after dismissing federal claims; “[m]ore specifically . . . if the federal claims are dismissed prior
to trial, [United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966),] strongly encourages or even
requires dismissal of state claims”) (quotations and citation omitted); accord Granite State
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Cobb Cty., Ga., 193 F. App’x 900, 907 (11th Cir. 2006). When
exercising its discretion, the Court takes into consideration that, “state courts, not federal courts,
should be the final arbiters of state law.” Ingram v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 167 F. App’x
107, 108 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370
F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any
remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”).
As stated above, I recommend that the Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s federal claims.
Consequently, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims and
DISMISS those claims without prejudice.
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel seeking assistance in this case.
(Doc. 3.) In this civil case, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel.
Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App’x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d
1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has broad discretion in making this decision, and
should appoint counsel only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320).
Appointment of counsel in a civil case is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the
assistance of a trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d
1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “the
key” to assessing whether counsel should be appointed “is whether the pro se litigant needs help
in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to the court. Where the facts and issues
are simple, he or she usually will not need such help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 457
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).
The Court has reviewed the record and pleadings in this case and finds no “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel.
While the Court understands that
Plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found that “prisoners do not receive special
consideration notwithstanding the challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated.” Hampton
v. Peeples, No. CV 614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). “Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts’ decisions to refuse appointment of
counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this case for want of exceptional circumstances.”
Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015);
Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 702
(11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App’x at 457; Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 414
(11th Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096; and Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). This case is not
so complex legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting “the essential merits of his
position” to the Court.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.
Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 2
Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that
appeal is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY
Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and his
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Docs. 2, 3.) I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim and DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s
state law claims. I also RECOMMEND the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this
case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of October,
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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