Dallas v. Edge

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court GRANT Respondent's 8 Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS as moot Dallas' 1 Petition, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal , and DENY Dallas in forma pauperis status on appeal. Any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation is ordered to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 4/30/2018). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 4/16/2018. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

MICHAEL DALLAS,
Petitioner,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:18-cv-8

v.
D. EDGE, Warden,
Respondent.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Michael Dallas (“Dallas”), who was formerly housed at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 8.) For the reasons
which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,
DISMISS as moot Dallas’ Petition, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter
the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Dallas in forma pauperis status on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Dallas filed his Petition on February 1, 2018. (Doc. 1.) In his Petition, Dallas asserts the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) failed to give him credit against his federal sentence for nearly nine
months’ time, from November 19, 2004, through August 17, 2005. (Id. at p. 6.) Dallas contends
he should have been released from the BOP’s custody on January 18, 2018. (Id. at pp. 1, 2.)
After Dallas paid the requisite filing fee, this Court directed service of Dallas’ Petition
upon Respondent on February 28, 2018. (Doc. 3.) However, this mailing was returned to the
Court as undeliverable with the notation “Attempted-Not Known, Unable to Forward”. (Doc. 4,

p. 1.) Thus, the Court must determine whether Dallas’ release from BOP custody renders his
Petition moot, whether Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted, and whether his
Petition should be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
I.

Whether Dallas’ Petition is Moot
Article III of the Constitution “extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to only ‘Cases’

and ‘Controversies.’” Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2014). This “caseor-controversy restriction imposes” what is “generally referred to as ‘justiciability’ limitations.”
Id. There are “three strands of justiciability doctrine—standing, ripeness, and mootness—that go
to the heart of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608
F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). With regard
to the mootness strand, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “a federal court has
no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Church
of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
“[a]n issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court
can give meaningful relief.” Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Questions of justiciability are not answered
“simply by looking to the state of affairs at the time the suit was filed. Rather, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the controversy ‘must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
the time the complaint is filed.’” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182,
1189–90 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).

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Dallas has been released from confinement from the BOP’s custody. As Dallas requests
his release from his continued detention in his Petition, and it appears he has been released from
the BOP’s custody, there is no longer a “live controversy” over which the Court can give
meaningful relief. Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, the Court should
GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISS as moot Dallas’ Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
II.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Dallas leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Dallas

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in
the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of
party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal
is filed”). An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal
is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687,
691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a
frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim
or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

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Given the above analysis of Dallas’ Petition and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, there
are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Thus, the Court should DENY Dallas in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss, (doc. 8), DISMISS as moot Dallas’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (doc. 1), DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and
enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Dallas leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United

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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Respondent and Dallas at his
last known address.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of April,
2018.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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