Ward v. McIntosh County School District et al
Filing
24
ORDER denying Robinson's 9 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/18/2018. (ca)
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COURTNEY WARD, as next of
friend of J.E., a minor,
CV 218-013
Plaintiff,
V.
MCINTOSH COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT and BOBBY G.
ROBINSON,
Defendants.
ORDER
This Matter comes before the Court on
Defendant Bobby G.
Robinson's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Dkt. No. 9.
review.
This Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
In accordance with the Court's ruling announced at the
Motions Hearing on October 12, 2018, and for the following reasons.
Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations against Defendant Bobby G.
Robinson, a former football coach for Mcintosh County Academy.
Dkt. No. 1 1 6.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Robinson was
made aware of a specific threat of hazing, described as a '"hit,"
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
where an older player on the team would conduct a blindside ^^hit"
against J.E., a younger player on the team, at the next practice.
Id. 55 18-19, 21. The Complaint alleges that after being informed
about the specific threat by Plaintiff, J.E.'s mother, and being
told to address issues of hazing with the football team by school
officials, Robinson elected not to address the specific threat.
Id. 55 21-24, 30.
As a result, the Complaint alleges that J.E.
was the victim of a ^^hit" from an older player at practice, causing
him to sustain injuries. Id. 55 31-32. When confronted by J.E.'s
mother and asked why he did not address this issue before hand to
stop the "hit," Robinson answered that J.E. needed to "toughen
up."
5 33.
Plaintiff brought this suit against Robinson alleging state
claims of negligence per se and intentional infliction of emotional
distress as well as a federal claim of municipal liability against
Mcintosh County School District.^
55 61-82.
In response,
Robinson filed this Motion to Dismiss arguing that he had official
immunity under Georgia law, and even if the claims were not barred
by official immunity. Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted for both state law claims under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Dkt. No. 9.
1 This Order on Robinson's Motion to Dismiss concerns only claims against
Robinson.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
8(a)
requires
that
a
plaintiff s complaint contain ''a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Civ. P. 8(a).
Fed. R.
In order to state a claim for relief, a plaintiffs
complaint must include ^^enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face."
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
''A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Ray v.
Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2016).
However, the Court does not accept as true threadbare recitations
of the elements of the claim and disregards legal conclusions
unsupported by factual allegations.
At
a
minimum,
inferential
a
complaint
allegations
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
should '"contain
respecting
all
the
either
direct
material
or
elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."
Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 128283 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.
for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
DISCUSSION
The 12(b)(6) plausibility standard is not an exceedingly high
bar, and based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff
has met it.
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts at this stage to
avoid having her claims barred by official immunity, and she has
pled sufficient facts to support her claims of negligence per se
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
I.
Official Immunity
Under Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(d),
^^sjchool system employees are entitled to official immunity from
any claim against them ^in their private (individual) capacity,
when they are sued for discretionary acts taken within the scope
of their employment and without actual malice or an actual intent
to injure.'" Davis v. Brantley Cty. Sch. Dist., 780 S.E.2d 60, 62
(Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted).
The parties dispute
whether Robinson's actions were discretionary.
Even if they were
discretionary, dismissal is not proper at this point, because
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts at this stage that if proven
to be true would show that Robinson acted with actual malice or
intent to injure.
Plaintiff is not required to use the term ^^actual malice."
What is required is for Plaintiff to allege specific facts that if
proven true would show actual malice or an intent to injure. Here,
she has done so.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: that Robinson
had "'actual knowledge of hazing activity in general and the
threatened hazing of the Plaintiff" and that he "acted to .
perpetuate the practice of hazing," dkt. no. 1 SI 1; that he
"willfully failed to address the issue or incidents of "hazing'
with the players as instructed and further willfully failed to
address the direct threat of "hazing' to J.E.," id. SI 24; that his
"actions in contributing to, and knowingly allowing for, if not
outright encouraging, student "hazing,' including the incident
involving the J.E., are an actionable criminal offense," id. SI 46;
that his "abuse and endangerment of J.E." and his handling of
J.E.'s injury by telling his mother that "he needed "to toughen
up' was intentional . . . conduct," id. SI 70; and that he "acted
with . . . malice" and "willfully," id. SI 72.
In other words, the
Complaint alleges that Robinson was aware of a specific threat
against J.E., intentionally chose not to address that threat, and,
when asked why he chose not to do so, responded that it was because
J.E. needed "to toughen up." At this stage, these allegations are
sufficient to state a plausible claim of relief that Robinson acted
with actual malice toward or with intent to injure J.E., and thus,
Robinson's Motion to Dismiss with respect to official immunity is
DENIED.
II.
Negligence Per Se
"Negligence per se arises "when a statute is violated, the
person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the
statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was
the harm the statute was intended to guard against.'"
Chancey v.
Peachtree Pest Control Co., 655 S.E.2d 228, 231 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(citations
omitted).
Furthermore,
''[t]he
violation
of
a
regulation . . . can likewise establish that a defendant breached
a duty owed to a plaintiff as a matter of law." McLain v. Mariner
health Care, Inc., 631 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a plausible claim of negligence per
se.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Code of Ethics for
Educators (a Georgia regulation) creates a duty for Robinson to
not commit a crime of moral turpitude or commit any act of child
abuse, that Robinson's abuse and endangerment of J.E. by allowing
or encouraging the ^^hit" or crime of ^^hazing" to occur violated
this regulation, that J.E. was within the class of persons the
regulation was intended to protect, that the harm in this case was
the harm the regulation was intended to protect against, and that
Robinson's violation of the regulation directly and proximately
caused J.E. to suffer damages.
64-68.
Dkt. No. 1
31, 33, 46, 61-62,
For these reasons. Plaintiff's negligence per se claim is
plausible on its face and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with
respect to that claim is DENIED.
Ill. Inten-bional Infliction of Emotional Distress
^^Four
elements
must
be
present
to
support
a
claim
of
intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) The conduct must
be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional
distress must be severe."
Sevcech v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 474
S.E.2d 4, 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
{citations omitted).
Here,
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible claim
of
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress.
Plaintiff
alleges that Robinson's conduct of knowing about a specific threat
of hazing to J.E., being told to address hazing generally by school
officials, failing to address the hazing, intentionally allowing
the ''hit" to occur to J.E., and responding to J.E.'s mother about
why he did not stop the "hit" by saying that J.E. needed "to
toughen up" was intentional and outrageous.
Dkt. No. 1
1, 69-
70. Plaintiff alleges that this intentional and outrageous conduct
of intentionally allowing or encouraging the "hit" to take place
directly and proximately caused emotional distress to J.E. Id.
55 1, 46, 71. Finally, Plaintiff alleges severe emotional distress
in claiming that as a result of Robinson's actions, J.E. suffered
a concussive brain injury and bruised ribs, was required to undergo
medical treatment, missed several weeks of school, suffered from
headaches and behavioral and emotional changes including anger
management issues, and was subjected to bullying.
Dkt. No. 1
giSI 34, 71.
Defendant's reliance on cases in which summary judgment was
granted because no medical treatment was rendered are inapposite.
Most of those cases deal with evidence at the summary judgment
phase, while others dismiss cases where neither medical nor
psychological treatment was sought. Here, we are at the motion to
dismiss
phase.
Here, severe injury is alleged
and medical
treatment allegedly was sought.
Plaintiff
has
pled
a
plausible
claim
of
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, including an allegation that
J.E. sought medical treatment.
Dkt. No. 1 5 71.
As a result.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to that claim is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
It may be that discovery will undercut some of the factual
allegations; it may not.
warranted.
At this point, dismissal is not
The allegations are sufficient.
For these reasons,
Robinson's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this
day of October, 2018.
/, LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
flTED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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