Dickson v. Anand et al
Filing
23
ORDER granting Defendants' 10 Motion to Dismiss, and denying as moot 14 Motion for a New Hearing. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/1/2018. (csr)
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IBts(tnct Contt
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DON W. DICKSON, vice
president. Government
Training LLC; and GOVERNMENT
TRAINING, LLC,
CV 218-029
Plaintiffs,
V.
SHELLY C. ANAND; ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
Department of Labor; REGIONAL
SOLICITOR, U.S. Department of
Labor; HON. JOHN P. SELLERS,
III, Administrative Law
Judge; HON. STEPHEN R.
HENLEY, Chief Administrative
Law Judge; U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, Southern District of
Georgia-Savannah;
ADMINISTRATOR, Office of
Foreign Labor Certification;
USDOL WAGE AND HOUR DIV.; and
ADMINISTRATOR, Wage and Hour
Division,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, dkt. no. 10, as well as Plaintiffs' motion for a new
hearing, dkt. no. 14.
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
The motions are ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
At issue in Plaintiffs' Complaint is the U.S. Department of
Labor's (^'DOL") determination, sustained through administrative
litigation, that Government Training, LLC violated its obligation
under the H-lB visa program to pay its worker the required wage
rate as defined in the statute and implementing regulations.
Complaint
challenges the
decision
of the
DOL's
The
Administrative
Review Board, which affirmed an earlier summary decision by an
Administrative Law Judge {^^ALJ") who awarded back wages to the
worker.
Plaintiffs contend that the
impracticality
of
contract
DOL
performance
should
and
have
the
considered
H-lB
worker's
failure to mitigate his losses as defenses that limit Government
Training, LLC's liability.
C.
Anand
of
the
DOL's
Plaintiffs name as Defendants Shelly
Atlanta
Office
of
the
Solicitor;
the
^^Associate Administrator" of the DOL; the ^^Regional Solicitor" of
the DOL; Judge John P. Sellers, III (ALJ); Judge Stephen Henley
(Chief ALJ); the U.S. Attorney's Office in Savannah, Georgia; the
^^Administrator" of the Office of Foreign Labor Certification; the
DOL Wage and Hour division itself; and the ^^Administrator" thereof.
Defendants as a group move to dismiss the Complaint on several
grounds:
first,
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(5), for lack of proper service on the government as required
by
Rule
4 (i);
party/plaintiff
second,
and,
as
because
a
Dickson
non-lawyer,
is
cannot
not
a
proper
represent
the
interests of Government Training, LLC; third, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to each
Defendant's claim to sovereign immunity; and, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
As explained below. Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal-
court
jurisdiction
^^controversies."
extends
only
to
actual
^^cases"
U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
and
Rooted in
Article Ill's case or controversy requirement is the doctrine of
standing. McGee v. Solicitor Gen, of Richmond Cty., 727 F.3d 1322,
1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405
F.3d
964,
974
(11th
Cir.
2005)).
Standing
requires
that
a
plaintiff, at the time of filing suit, have ''a ^personal stake' in
the outcome of the litigation."
Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030,
1033 (11th Cir. 1987).
As the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing.
See Bischoff
V. Osceola Cty., 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Lujan
V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
To do so,
the plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: First, he must
demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in fact—meaning an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is both ^'concrete
and
particularized"
^conjectural'
or
and
^'actual
or
^hypothetical.'"
imminent"
Bochese,
405
rather
F.3d
at
than
980
(quoting Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
Second, the plaintiff must prove a causal connection
between that injury and the challenged conduct of the defendant,
which
requires
conduct.
that
the
injury
be
^^fairly
traceable" to
Id. (quoting Dillard, 225 F.3d at 1275).
the
Third, and
finally, the plaintiff must show that it is ''^likely,' as opposed
to merely ^speculative,' that the injury will be ^redressed by a
favorable decision.'"
Id. (quoting Dillard, 225 F.3d at 1275).
^^In addition to the three constitutional standing requirements,
*the Supreme Court has held that prudential requirements pose
additional limitations on standing.'" United States v. Blake, 868
F.3d 960, 969 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles,
351 F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003)).
'''One of those prudential
limitations is the rule that a litigant 'generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'"
Id. (quoting
Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))
.
DISCUSSION
Through their motion to dismiss. Defendants have identified
many issues
with
the
Court's jurisdiction.
Complaint,
service
See Dkt. No. 10.
of
process,
and
this
Plaintiffs do not dispute
those problems or otherwise respond to them; instead. Plaintiff
Dickson
simply
addresses
the
merits
of
the
underlying
administrative proceedings against Plaintiff Government Training,
LLC.
See Dkt. No. 13.
As a threshold matter. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege
sufficient facts to show this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over this action.
Univ. of S. Ala, v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d
405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)
court should inquire into whether
it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage
in the proceedings.
Indeed, it is well settled that a federal
court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking." (citations omitted)).
This case appears to be, essentially, a declaratory judgment
action and/or an appeal of the
against Government Training, LLC.
DOL's administrative decision
See Dkt. No. 1.
Dickson, as
the vice-president of Government Training, LLC, does not allege
any claims on his own behalf, as either a corporate representative
or an individual.
See id.
Indeed, he does not dispute that he
was not a party to the underlying administrative litigation against
Government Training, LLC.
See Dkt. No. 13.
Instead, it appears
he intends to assert claims on behalf of Government Training, LLC
via this pro se action.
See Dkt. No. 1.
In other words, he is
attempting to assert Government Training, LLC s legal rights and
not his own.
Blake, 868 F.3d at 969.
Additionally, while Dickson would be entitled to represent
himself in an action in which he has actually pleaded claims and
facts to
show
standing
to
bring
those
claims,
he, as a
attorney, may not represent Government Training, LLC.
non-
See 28
U.S.C. § 1654; L.R. 83.5(c) (^^Any person who is not admitted to
the bar of this Court . . . and who exercises in this Court any of
the privileges as a member of its bar . . . shall be in contempt
of this Court[.]"); Rowland v. Cal. Men^s Colony, 506 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1993) (^'It has been the law for the better part of two
centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts
only through licensed counsel."); Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764
F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985) (''The rule is well established
that a corporation is an artificial entity that . . . cannot appear
pro se, and must be represented by counsel."); Conaway v. H&R Block
E. Enters., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017)
("The Court thus cannot entertain any pleadings filed by [the
company] unless it is represented by counsel.").
Accordingly,
because Dickson has not alleged a personal stake in the outcome of
the litigation or standing to bring claims on behalf of Government
Training, LLC, and because Government Training, LLC is not properly
represented
prejudice.
by
counsel,
their
claims
are
DISMISSED
wi'thou't
CONCLUSION
Defendants'
motion
to
dismiss,
dkt.
no.
10,
is
GRANTED.
Plaintiffs' motion for a new hearing, dkt. no. 14, is DENIED as
moot.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this 1st day of November, 2018.
HON.'^LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
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