Dickson v. Anand et al

Filing 23

ORDER granting Defendants' 10 Motion to Dismiss, and denying as moot 14 Motion for a New Hearing. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 11/1/2018. (csr)

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IBts(tnct Contt
tor ttie ^onttiem IBiotrict ot <S>eorgta
iSntnOioick BtbtOtott
DON W. DICKSON, vice
president. Government
Training LLC; and GOVERNMENT
TRAINING, LLC,

CV 218-029

Plaintiffs,
V.

SHELLY C. ANAND; ASSOCIATE

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

Department of Labor; REGIONAL
SOLICITOR, U.S. Department of
Labor; HON. JOHN P. SELLERS,

III, Administrative Law
Judge; HON. STEPHEN R.
HENLEY, Chief Administrative

Law Judge; U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, Southern District of
Georgia-Savannah;
ADMINISTRATOR, Office of
Foreign Labor Certification;
USDOL WAGE AND HOUR DIV.; and

ADMINISTRATOR, Wage and Hour
Division,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss, dkt. no. 10, as well as Plaintiffs' motion for a new

hearing, dkt. no. 14.

A0 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

The motions are ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

At issue in Plaintiffs' Complaint is the U.S. Department of
Labor's (^'DOL") determination, sustained through administrative

litigation, that Government Training, LLC violated its obligation
under the H-lB visa program to pay its worker the required wage
rate as defined in the statute and implementing regulations.

Complaint

challenges the

decision

of the

DOL's

The

Administrative

Review Board, which affirmed an earlier summary decision by an
Administrative Law Judge {^^ALJ") who awarded back wages to the
worker.

Plaintiffs contend that the

impracticality

of

contract

DOL

performance

should

and

have

the

considered

H-lB

worker's

failure to mitigate his losses as defenses that limit Government
Training, LLC's liability.
C.

Anand

of

the

DOL's

Plaintiffs name as Defendants Shelly

Atlanta

Office

of

the

Solicitor;

the

^^Associate Administrator" of the DOL; the ^^Regional Solicitor" of

the DOL; Judge John P. Sellers, III (ALJ); Judge Stephen Henley
(Chief ALJ); the U.S. Attorney's Office in Savannah, Georgia; the
^^Administrator" of the Office of Foreign Labor Certification; the
DOL Wage and Hour division itself; and the ^^Administrator" thereof.
Defendants as a group move to dismiss the Complaint on several
grounds:

first,

pursuant

to

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(5), for lack of proper service on the government as required
by

Rule

4 (i);

party/plaintiff

second,

and,

as

because

a

Dickson

non-lawyer,

is

cannot

not

a

proper

represent

the

interests of Government Training, LLC; third, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to each
Defendant's claim to sovereign immunity; and, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

As explained below. Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal-

court

jurisdiction

^^controversies."

extends

only

to

actual

^^cases"

U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.

and

Rooted in

Article Ill's case or controversy requirement is the doctrine of

standing. McGee v. Solicitor Gen, of Richmond Cty., 727 F.3d 1322,
1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405
F.3d

964,

974

(11th

Cir.

2005)).

Standing

requires

that

a

plaintiff, at the time of filing suit, have ''a ^personal stake' in
the outcome of the litigation."

Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030,

1033 (11th Cir. 1987).

As the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing.

See Bischoff

V. Osceola Cty., 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Lujan
V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).

To do so,

the plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: First, he must
demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in fact—meaning an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is both ^'concrete

and

particularized"

^conjectural'

or

and

^'actual

or

^hypothetical.'"

imminent"

Bochese,

405

rather

F.3d

at

than

980

(quoting Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2000)).

Second, the plaintiff must prove a causal connection

between that injury and the challenged conduct of the defendant,
which

requires

conduct.

that

the

injury

be

^^fairly

traceable" to

Id. (quoting Dillard, 225 F.3d at 1275).

the

Third, and

finally, the plaintiff must show that it is ''^likely,' as opposed
to merely ^speculative,' that the injury will be ^redressed by a
favorable decision.'"

Id. (quoting Dillard, 225 F.3d at 1275).

^^In addition to the three constitutional standing requirements,

*the Supreme Court has held that prudential requirements pose
additional limitations on standing.'" United States v. Blake, 868

F.3d 960, 969 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles,
351 F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003)).

'''One of those prudential

limitations is the rule that a litigant 'generally must assert his

own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'"

Id. (quoting

Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))
.
DISCUSSION

Through their motion to dismiss. Defendants have identified
many issues

with

the

Court's jurisdiction.

Complaint,

service

See Dkt. No. 10.

of

process,

and

this

Plaintiffs do not dispute

those problems or otherwise respond to them; instead. Plaintiff

Dickson

simply

addresses

the

merits

of

the

underlying

administrative proceedings against Plaintiff Government Training,
LLC.

See Dkt. No. 13.

As a threshold matter. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege

sufficient facts to show this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over this action.

Univ. of S. Ala, v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d

405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)

court should inquire into whether

it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage
in the proceedings.

Indeed, it is well settled that a federal

court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte whenever it may be lacking." (citations omitted)).
This case appears to be, essentially, a declaratory judgment

action and/or an appeal of the
against Government Training, LLC.

DOL's administrative decision
See Dkt. No. 1.

Dickson, as

the vice-president of Government Training, LLC, does not allege

any claims on his own behalf, as either a corporate representative
or an individual.

See id.

Indeed, he does not dispute that he

was not a party to the underlying administrative litigation against
Government Training, LLC.

See Dkt. No. 13.

Instead, it appears

he intends to assert claims on behalf of Government Training, LLC

via this pro se action.

See Dkt. No. 1.

In other words, he is

attempting to assert Government Training, LLC s legal rights and
not his own.

Blake, 868 F.3d at 969.

Additionally, while Dickson would be entitled to represent

himself in an action in which he has actually pleaded claims and

facts to

show

standing

to

bring

those

claims,

he, as a

attorney, may not represent Government Training, LLC.

non-

See 28

U.S.C. § 1654; L.R. 83.5(c) (^^Any person who is not admitted to
the bar of this Court . . . and who exercises in this Court any of

the privileges as a member of its bar . . . shall be in contempt
of this Court[.]"); Rowland v. Cal. Men^s Colony, 506 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1993) (^'It has been the law for the better part of two

centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts

only through licensed counsel."); Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764
F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985) (''The rule is well established
that a corporation is an artificial entity that . . . cannot appear

pro se, and must be represented by counsel."); Conaway v. H&R Block
E. Enters., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2017)
("The Court thus cannot entertain any pleadings filed by [the

company] unless it is represented by counsel.").

Accordingly,

because Dickson has not alleged a personal stake in the outcome of
the litigation or standing to bring claims on behalf of Government

Training, LLC, and because Government Training, LLC is not properly
represented
prejudice.

by

counsel,

their

claims

are

DISMISSED

wi'thou't

CONCLUSION

Defendants'

motion

to

dismiss,

dkt.

no.

10,

is

GRANTED.

Plaintiffs' motion for a new hearing, dkt. no. 14, is DENIED as
moot.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED, this 1st day of November, 2018.

HON.'^LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

A0 72A

(Rev. 8/82)