Owens v. Wong et al

Filing 26

ORDER granting Defendants' 8 , 16 Motions to Dismiss. Defendant Wong's motion for sanctions, doc 8 is denied. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 1/19/2023. (ca)

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 1 of 9

In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
Brunswick Division
LARAEL K. OWENS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CV 222-082

LIBERTY WONG, in her official
capacity, and CHARLES P. ROSE,
JR., in his official capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant
Charles Rose, Jr., dkt. no. 16, and a motion to dismiss and
request for sanctions filed by Defendant Liberty Wong, dkt. no.
8.

Plaintiff Larael Owens has responded in opposition to both

motions, dkt. nos. 11, 19.
BACKGROUND
On October 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Divorce and Child
Custody case in the Superior Court of Long County, Civil Action
No. SUV2020000165, which was assigned to Defendant Judge Charles
P. Rose, Jr.
Plaintiff’s

Dkt. No. 8-1.
wife

in

the

Defendant Liberty Wong represented

divorce

action.

After

a

temporary

hearing granting Plaintiff’s wife temporary physical custody of
the parties’ minor daughter and ordering Plaintiff to pay child

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 2 of 9

support during the pendency of the proceedings, Plaintiff filed
with the Superior Court of Long County an Affidavit alleging
that he is not a “U.S. person” and is a “foreign sovereign,”
ostensibly

arguing

temporary order.
divorce

and

that

he

is

not

Dkt. No. 8-2.

child

custody

case

subject

to

that

court’s

Dissatisfied as to how the
progressed,

specifically

a

Guardian Ad Litem Report recommending that the mother continue
in the role of primary caregiver, see dkt. no. 1-1 at 1-17,
Plaintiff

filed

this

case

to

enjoin

the

moving forward. See generally Dkt. No. 1.

divorce

action

from

The divorce action is

still pending, and Judge Rose has yet to file any final orders
regarding child support, child custody, or visitation.

Dkt. No.

16-1 at 3.
Here, Plaintiff asserts two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983:

“The Social Security on File with Georgia DOR and the

Court is Fraudulent” (Count 1), dkt. no. 1 at 4, and “Violation
of [Plaintiff’s] Parent Fundamental Rights” (Count 2), id. at 9.
More specifically, Plaintiff claims that his federal rights will
be violated if Defendants enforce Judge Rose’s temporary order
requiring

Plaintiff

to

pay

child

support

because

he

is

not

subject to Social Security and forcing him to pay would be a
misuse of the Internal Revenue Code.

Id. at 4.

Additionally,

Plaintiff claims the temporary custody arrangement violates his
constitutional rights.

Id. at 9.
2

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 3 of 9

Defendants move to dismiss this action for, inter alia,
lack

of

subject

ripeness.

matter

jurisdiction,

specifically,

lack

of

See Dkt. No. 16-1 at 2, 13-14.
LEGAL AUTHORITY

Under

Rule

12(b)(1)

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a claim because the
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Such a motion
may be made at any stage of the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).

two

Attacks

on

forms:

(1)

attacks.

subject
facial

matter

jurisdiction

attacks,

and

(2)

come

in

factual

[ ]

Facial attacks on a complaint “require the court
merely

to

look

and

sufficiently

alleged

jurisdiction,

and

the

see
a

if

basis

the
of

allegations

plaintiff
subject

in

has

matter

[plaintiff's]

complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the
motion.” [ ] Factual attacks challenge “the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective
of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings,
such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” [ ]
This circuit has explained that in a factual attack,
the presumption of truthfulness afforded a plaintiff
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does
3

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 4 of 9

not

attach,

and

the

court

175

F.3d

is

free

to

weigh

the

evidence[.]
Scarfo

v.

Ginsberg,

957,

960

(11th

Cir.

1999)

(citations omitted).
Because
Court's

Defendants

subject

matter

have

made

a

jurisdiction,

factual
the

attack

Court

may

on

the

consider

matters outside the pleadings in resolving this motion.
DISCUSSION
I.

Ripeness
“The

determination

of

ripeness

‘goes

to

whether

the

district court ha[s] subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case.’”

Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d

586, 591 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of
Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)).

“‘The

ripeness doctrine involves consideration of both jurisdictional
and

prudential

concerns.’”

Id.

at

589

Sikes, 730 F.2d 644, 648 (11th Cir. 1984)).
United
federal

States

Constitution

courts

to

cases

limits
and

the

(quoting

Johnson

v.

“Article III of the
jurisdiction

controversies

of

of

the

sufficient

concreteness to evidence a ripeness for review.”

Id. (citing

U.S.

Prof'l

Const.

art.

III,

§

2,

cl.

1;

Hallandale

Fire

Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 759
(llth Cir. 1991)).

“‘Even when the constitutional minimum has

been met, however, prudential considerations may still counsel
4

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 5 of 9

judicial restraint.’”

Id. (quoting Action Alliance of Senior

Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 940 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1986))
(citing Johnson, 730 F.2d at 648).
“The

ripeness

doctrine

protects

federal

courts

from

engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the
review of potential or abstract disputes.”

Id.

“‘The doctrine

seeks to avoid entangling courts in the hazards of premature
adjudication.’”

Id. (quoting Felmeister v. Office of Attorney

Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 1988)) (citing Abbott Lab. v.
Gardner,

387

U.S.

136,

148

(1967)).

“The

ripeness

inquiry

requires a determination of (l) the fitness of the issues for
judicial

decision,

and

(2)

the

withholding court consideration.”

hardship

to

the

parties

of

Id. (citing Abbott, 387 U.S.

at 149; Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)).
“The

fitness

prong

is

typically

concerned

with

questions

of

‘finality, definiteness, and the extent to which resolution of
the

challenge

depends

sufficiently developed.’”

upon

facts

that

may

not

yet

be

Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618

F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrell v. Fla. Bar,
608 F.3d 1241, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010)). “The hardship prong asks
about

the

costs

to

the

complaining

party

of

delaying

until conditions for deciding the controversy are ideal.”

review
Id.

“Courts must resolve ‘whether there is sufficient injury to
meet Article III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if
5

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 6 of 9

so, whether the claim is sufficiently mature, and the issues
sufficiently

defined

and

concrete,

decisionmaking by the court.’”

to

permit

effective

Digital Props. 121 F.3d at 589

(quoting Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524).
After considering the circumstances surrounding the pending
state court divorce action, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims
are not ripe for judicial review in this Court.

Plaintiff is

attempting to appeal a state court’s temporary order.

Under the

fitness prong of the ripeness inquiry, a temporary order does
not signal finality or definiteness.

Mulhall, 618 F.3d at 1291.

The resolution of Plaintiff’s challenge to the temporary child
support

obligation

depends

upon

develop.

how

and
the

the

temporary

remainder

of

visitation
the

divorce

arrangement
proceedings

For the Court to analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims, it would have to speculate as to any final order imposed
by the state court.

Doing so would “entangle[ the] court[] in

the hazards of premature adjudication.”

Digital Props., 121

F.3d at 589.
Further, under the hardship prong of the ripeness inquiry,
the Court finds the cost to Plaintiff of delaying review of his
claims

until

significant.

the

divorce

proceedings

are

final

are

not

The state court’s temporary order allows Plaintiff

visitation with his minor child from Thursdays at 5 p.m. to
Mondays at 8 a.m. every other week.
6

It also requires Plaintiff

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 7 of 9

to pay only three hundred dollars per month in child support.
Such temporarily imposed conditions are commonplace in a divorce
proceeding.
Having found both the fitness and hardship prongs of the
ripeness inquiry weigh in favor of this Court not deciding the
merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s
claims are not ripe for judicial review, and this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to decide them.
F.3d

at

591.

Accordingly,

Digital Props., 121

Defendants’

motions

to

dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint, dkt. nos. 8, 16, are GRANTED.
II.

Request for Sanctions

In

addition

to

moving

for

dismissal

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint, Defendant Wong moves the Court to impose sanctions
against Plaintiff for filing this lawsuit.

Wong argues that

Plaintiff’s claims are based on a sovereign citizen theory, a
theory which courts have rejected and recognized as frivolous
and a waste of judicial resources.

Dkt. No. 8 at 5.

“Courts have the inherent power to police those appearing
before them.”

Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc.,

851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991)).
with

restraint

appropriate
process.’”

and

sanction

“This power ‘must be exercised

discretion’

and

for

which

conduct

used

‘to

an

the

judicial

Id. (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45).

“A court

7

abuses

fashion

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 8 of 9

may exercise this power ‘to sanction the willful disobedience of
a court order, and to sanction a party who has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’”

Id.

(quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 382 (2013)
(citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46)).

“The dual purpose of

this power is to vindicate judicial authority without resorting
to a contempt of court sanction and to make the prevailing party
whole.”

Id. (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).

“The key to

unlocking a court's inherent power is a finding of bad faith.”
Id.

(citing

Sciarretta

v.

Lincoln

1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015)).
of proving bad faith.

Nat’l

Life

Ins.,

778

F.3d

The moving party bears the burden

See Wandner v. Am. Airlines, 79 F. Supp.

3d 1285, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
Here,

at

this

juncture,

the

Court

finds

insufficient

evidence of bad faith on the part of Plaintiff in filing this
lawsuit.

Accordingly, Defendant Wong’s motion for sanctions,

dkt. no. 8, is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Because

Plaintiff’s

claims

are

not

ripe

for

review,

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, dkt. nos. 8, 16, are GRANTED,
and

Plaintiff’s

claims

DISMISSED

are

without

prejudice.

However, Defendant Wong’s motion for sanctions, dkt. no. 8, is
DENIED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

8

Case 2:22-cv-00082-LGW-BWC Document 26 Filed 01/19/23 Page 9 of 9

SO ORDERED, this 19th day of January, 2023.

HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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