Williams v. DeJoy et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying as moot Defendants' 10 Motion to Dismiss; and ordering Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of her claims within twenty days of the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 03/05/2025. (jlh)

In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
Brunswick Division
MICHELLE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

2:24-CV-26

v.
POSTMASTER GENERAL LOUIS
DEJOY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No.
10. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is
DENIED as moot, and Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a more definite
statement of her claims.
BACKGROUND 1
This

case

arises

out

employment

with

the

United

of

Plaintiff

States

Post

Michelle
Office

Williams’s
in

downtown

Brunswick, Georgia. Dkt. No. 5 at 6. On February 2, 2020, Plaintiff

At this stage, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in
a complaint as true[,] and take them in the light most favorable
to [the] plaintiff[.]” Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d
1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007)). Additionally, the Court is required to liberally
construe pro se complaints. Lapinski v. St. Croix Condo. Ass’n,
Inc., 815 F. App’x 496, 497 (11th Cir. 2020).
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strained her back while sorting heavy parcels at work. Id. She
alleges she was not paid for the time she was out of work. Id.
After her injury, the Postal Service assigned Plaintiff to “a
light duty position” at the St. Simons Island, Georgia, Post
Office. Id. Plaintiff worked this position for approximately two
weeks before she “was sent home” because “there was no work for
[her] to do.” Id.
In April 2020, Plaintiff returned to the Brunswick Post Office
“in a full-time window position.” Id. She remained in this role
until September 11, 2020 when she reinjured herself “lifting again”
and has not been able to work since. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges
that her supervisors, managers, and the Postmaster were aware of
this new injury but marked her absent without leave (“AWOL”)
instead

of

“putting

[her]

codes

correctly

in

[the

Office

of

Workers’ Compensation Program (‘OWCP’)].” Id.
Plaintiff brought this action on February 22, 2024 against
five Defendants: (1) Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, (2) the
Postmaster of the Brunswick Post Office, Orelene Garcia, (3) the
Supervisor of Customer Service at the Brunswick Post Office, Dwayne
Gray, (4) the former Manager of Customer Service at the St. Simons
Island Post Office, Patrick Muise, and (5) the Human Resources
Manager for the Gulf Atlantic District, Claudette Ballard. Id. at
9–10. Plaintiff seeks “the money that would be due to [her] if
[she] was still there working” at the Post Office. Id. at 4.
2

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

Dkt. No. 10.

Plaintiff did not respond initially. On January 28, 2025, the Court
ordered Plaintiff to show cause for failure to prosecute. Dkt. No.
13. On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff responded that she has not
abandoned

this

case.

Dkt

No.

14

at

1.

The

Court

construes

Plaintiff’s statement that she is “aware” of “a motion to dismiss
and

[she]

opposed

the

decision

at

that

time”

as

a

general

opposition to the motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. Thus, the Court
takes up the motion to dismiss and does not dismiss the case for
failure to prosecute. See McKelvey v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 789
F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The decision to dismiss for
want of prosecution lies within the trial court’s discretion” and
should be employed only as a “last resort.”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint
to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” In deciding whether a complaint
states a claim for relief, the Court must accept the facts alleged
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2016). Additionally, the Court is required
to liberally construe pro se complaints. Lapinski, 815 F. App’x at
497. “A pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
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lawyers.” Roman v. Tyco Simplex Grinnell, 731 F. App’x 813, 815
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)) (alterations adopted). But the Court should not accept
allegations as true if they merely recite the elements of the claim
and declare that they are met; legal conclusions are not entitled
to a presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67879 (2009).
So

viewed,

inferential

a

complaint

allegations

must

respecting

“contain

either

all

material

the

direct

or

elements

necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”
Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 128283 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr.
for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)). Ultimately,
if “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—
but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
DISCUSSION
“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b),
or

both,

are

often

disparagingly

referred

to

as

‘shotgun

pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The two types of shotgun pleadings
relevant here are those that assert “facts not obviously connected
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to any particular cause of action” and those that do not separate
“each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at 1322–23.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not label the allegations with
a particular cause of action. See Dkt. No. 5 at 3 (bringing this
action under “violations of federal laws” generally). 2 Thus, the
Court concludes that the amended complaint is a shotgun pleading.
Plaintiff must “give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
against

them

Arrington

v.

and

the

Green,

grounds

757

F.

upon

App’x

which
796,

each

797

claim

(11th

rests.”

Cir.

2018)

(internal quotations omitted). To cure the deficiencies, Plaintiff
must connect her factual allegations to some cause of action with
more particularity than “violations of federal laws” generally.
See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.

The Court notes that in its initial screening of complaints filed
by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the Magistrate Judge construed Plaintiff’s case as
“asserting claims under the American with Disabilities Act of
1990.” Dkt. No. 4 at 1; but see Dkt. No. 1 at 3 (Plaintiff’s first
complaint invoking Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Title I of the American with Disabilities Act prohibits
employment discrimination “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a).2 Federal employees, such as USPS postal workers, have
no remedy for employment discrimination under the ADA. Id.
§ 12111(5)(B)(i) (excluding the United States from the definition
of employer); see also Rio v. Runyon, 972 F. Supp. 1446, 1454 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (“As a federal employee, Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy
for alleged disability discrimination in connection with her
employment is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)), aff’d Rio v. Henderson, 159 F.3d 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998).
2

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When a court concludes “that the complaint [is] a shotgun
pleading and that plaintiffs failed to connect their causes of
action to the facts alleged, the proper remedy [is] to order
repleading sua sponte.” Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464
F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 F. App’x 253, 259 n.8
(11th Cir. 2009) (“When presented with a shotgun complaint, the
district court should order repleading sua sponte.” (citation
omitted)). 3 “Where it appears a more carefully drafted complaint
might state a claim upon which relief can be granted, . . . a
district court should give a plaintiff an opportunity to amend
[her] complaint instead of dismissing it, even if the plaintiff
did not file a motion to amend or request leave to amend.” Muhammad
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 567 F. App’x 851, 853 (11th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d
1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo
Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc))
(discussing standards for pro se litigants). Thus, Plaintiff shall
be granted an opportunity to amend to sufficiently identify the

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s initial complaint was labeled
“Complaint for Employment Discrimination,” but when Plaintiff
filed the amended complaint, the initial “complaint (and its
attached exhibits) became a legal nullity.” Hoefling v. City of
Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016).
3

6

legal cause(s) of action and specify the factual allegations that
support each claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dkt. no.
10, is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a more definite
statement of her claims within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order. Plaintiff’s failure to do so will result in dismissal
of this action. Further, Plaintiff is warned that her failure to
clearly assert sufficient facts connected to a particular claim
for relief in a coherent manner will result in dismissal of this
case.
SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2025.

_________________________________
HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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