Walker v. Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville PLLC et al

Filing 39

ORDER denying 33 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court reaffirms its prior 31 Order and this case remains stayed and administratively closed pending the completion of the alternative dispute resolution process. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 1/28/2025. (amd)

In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
Brunswick Division
BRANDON WALKER, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

CV 224—088

Plaintiff,
v.
MORGAN & MORGAN, JACKSONVILLE
PLLC a/k/a Morgan & Morgan,
Jacksonville LLC and BRAD
MILKWICK,
Defendants.
ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
of the Court’s
Dkt. No. 33.

Order compelling

arbitration of

this matter. 1

Defendants have responded in opposition, and the

motion is ripe for review.

See Dkt. No. 36.
BACKGROUND

After being injured in a motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff
Brandon Walker entered into a representation agreement with the
law

firm

of

Morgan

&

Morgan”)

to

represent

Morgan,
his

Jacksonville

interests

Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 9, 11; Id. at 20.

PLLC

regarding

(“Morgan

the

&

accident.

Plaintiff alleges Morgan &

In the motion, Plaintiff also argues that the Court should
decline jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the local
controversy exception contained in the Class Action Fairness
Act. See Dkt. No. 33 at 9-12. Plaintiff has filed a separate
motion requesting such relief, dkt. no. 32, and the Court
addresses that motion in a separate Order.
1

Morgan and one of its attorneys, Brad Milkwick, mishandled his
case.

See

generally

Dkt.

No.

1-1.

Plaintiff

filed

this

lawsuit, a putative class action, against Morgan & Morgan and
Mr. Milkwick on June 20, 2024 in the Superior Court of Glynn
County, Georgia.
that,

at

the

Id. at 3.
time

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts

Plaintiff

retained

Morgan

&

Morgan

to

represent him, the firm “was not qualified or registered to do
business in Georgia in violation of O.C.G.A. § 14-11-711,” and,
“[t]herefore,

the

collection

of

any

fees

and

expenses

contemplated in the unenforceable fee contract was wrongful, and
Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

the

[Morgan & Morgan].”

Id. ¶ 21.

Morgan

Mr.

& Morgan

and

return

of

such

money

taken

by

Plaintiff brings claims against

Milkwick

for

professional

negligence

(Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), disgorgement of
fees (Count III), declaratory and injunctive relief (Count III), 2
punitive damages (Count IV), and attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation (Count V).
Defendants

removed

compel arbitration.
arbitration

Id. at 14-17.
the

case

to

Dkt. Nos. 1, 8.

provision

in

the

this

Court

and

moved

to

The Court found that the

representation

agreement

was

enforceable and granted the motion, staying these proceedings
until the arbitration’s completion.

Dkt. No. 31.

moved the Court to reconsider that Order.

Plaintiff has

Dkt. No. 33.

The complaint contains two causes of action labeled “Count
III.”
2
2

LEGAL AUTHORITY
“Reconsideration

of

a

prior

order

is

an

extraordinary

remedy, and should be employed sparingly.” Wallace v. Ga. Dep’t
of Transp., No. 7:04-cv-78, 2006 WL 1431589, at *5 (M.D. Ga. May
23, 2006) (citation omitted). “A movant must ‘set forth facts or
law

of

a

strongly

convincing

nature

to

induce

the

court

to

reverse its prior decision.’” Smith ex rel. Smith v. AugustaRichmond Cnty., No. 1:10-CV-126, 2012 WL 1355575, at *1 (S.D.
Ga. Apr. 18, 2012) (quoting Cover v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 148
F.R.D. 294, 294 (M.D. Fla. 1993)). Specifically, reconsideration
is

proper

only

if

there

is:

“(1)

an

intervening

change

in

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3)
the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 1:20CV-100, 2023 WL 5928164, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2023) (quoting
Schiefer v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-206, 2007 WL 2071264, at
*2

(S.D.

Ga.

July

19,

2007)).

“An

error

is

not

‘clear

and

obvious’ if the legal issues are ‘at least arguable.’” Murray v.
ILG Techs., LLC, No. 4:18-CV-110, 2019 WL 498849, at *1 (S.D.
Ga.

Feb.

8,

2019)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

citation

omitted); see also Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess &
Assocs., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985). “A motion for
reconsideration cannot be used to ‘relitigate old matters, raise
argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.’” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
3

F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v.
Village

of

Wellington,

2005)).

“This

Fla.,

prohibition

408

F.3d

includes

new

757,

763

(11th

Cir.

arguments

that

were

previously available, but not pressed.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1442 (11th
Cir. 1998)). Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is
within the sound discretion of the district court. See id. (“A
district court has sound discretion whether to alter or amend a
judgment pursuant to a motion for reconsideration.” (citation
omitted)).
DISCUSSION
In

his

motion

for

reconsideration

of

the

Court’s

Order

compelling arbitration, Plaintiff does not argue an intervening
change in controlling law or the availability of new evidence
mandates a different result.

Williams, 2023 WL 5928164, at *2.

Instead, he argues “the need to correct clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.”

Id.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues the

Court “never addressed . . . that Morgan & Morgan Jax is on
record as stating that arbitration agreements are for ‘corporate
bullies,’”; “never addressed” that the representation agreement
“was void ab initio” because “Morgan & Morgan Jax contracted to
do

illegal

acts

repeatedly

and

profited

from

these

illegal

endeavors”; and overlooked that “informed consent is required in
the context of attorney-client contracts.”
4-7, 8.

4

Dkt. No. 33 at 1-2,

I.

“Corporate Bullies”

Plaintiff
advertising

argues

the

“stating

Court

that

overlooked

arbitration

Morgan

&

agreements

Morgan’s
are

for

‘corporate bullies.’”

Dkt. No. 33 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 19 at

2

article

(Morgan

stating,

&

Morgan

“These

companies

on

“Mass

Arbitration

Lawsuits”

might

think

arbitration

is

‘business as usual,’ but we think it’s bullying.”).

just

While the

Court’s Order granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
indeed did not mention this advertising, that was purposeful.
“Arbitration in Georgia is a matter of contract. As such,
the

construction

of

an

arbitration

clause

in

a

contract

subject to the ordinary rules of contract construction.”

is

SCSJ

Enters. v. Hansen & Hansen Enters., 734 S.E.2d 214, 218 (Ga. Ct.
App.

2012)

(citation

and

punctuation

omitted).

“Under

the

decisions of [the Eleventh Circuit] and the laws of Georgia,
extrinsic evidence,” like the advertisement, “is not admissible
to contradict the terms of an unambiguous contract.”

Stewart v.

KHD Deutz of Am., Corp., 980 F.2d 698, 702 (11th Cir. 1993).
Here,

there

was

no

need

to

look

to

interpret the arbitration provision.
that

the

to

arbitrate

to

Further, the Court found
public

policy nor substantively or procedurally unconscionable.

Dkt.

neither

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this ground

is DENIED.
II.

was

evidence

against

No. 31.

agreement

extrinsic

Void Ab Initio
5

Plaintiff next argues the Court “overlooked” subsection (a)
of O.C.G.A. § 14-11-711 when it found that Morgan & Morgan’s
failure to register to do business in Georgia did not impair its
ability to contract with Plaintiff.
provision

states,

“A

foreign

Dkt. No. 33 at 5.

limited

liability

That

company

transacting business in this state may not maintain an action,
suit,

or

proceeding

in

a

court

of

this

state

authorized to transact business in this state.”

until

it

is

§ 14-11-711(a).

Plaintiff argues the representation agreement “is void because
it is a contract to do an illegal thing, i.e. represent clients
in maintaining actions, suits, or proceedings in Georgia without
registering

with

the

State.”

Dkt.

No.

33

at

5

(emphasis

removed).
Plaintiff did not make this argument in its response or
surresponse to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.
Nos. 19, 28.

Dkt.

“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to

. . . ‘raise argument . . . that could have been raised prior to
the

entry

of

Plaintiff’s

judgment.’”

argument

is

Wilchombe,
therefore

555

F.3d

improper.

at

957.

Further,

Plaintiff’s argument ignores the Court’s holding that “a party’s
challenge

to

another

provision

of

the

contract,

or

to

the

contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing a
specific agreement to arbitrate.”

Dkt. No. 31 at 7 (quoting

Rent-A-Ctr.,

561

W.,

Inc.

v.

Jackson,

U.S.

63,

70

(2010)).

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this ground is DENIED.
6

III. Informed Consent
Finally, Plaintiff argues “that if the attorney(s) did not
obtain

informed

consent

in

compliance

with

[Georgia

Rule

of

Professional Conduct] 1.4(b), the contract [to arbitrate] would
indeed be void as against public policy.”

Dkt. No. 33 at 8

(citing Innovative Images, LLC v. Summerville, 848 S.E.2d 75
(2020)).
Plaintiff

raised

the

same

argument

in

its

response

to

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, dkt. no. 19 at 7, and
the

Court

addressed

it,

dkt.

reconsideration

cannot

be

matters. . . .’”

Wilchombe,

argument

is

misrepresents

therefore
the

holding

no.

31

at

used

to

‘relitigate

at

957.

Plaintiff’s

improper.

Further,

Plaintiff

of

Images.

555

F.3d

Innovative

10.

“A

motion

There,

for
old

the

Georgia Supreme Court held that “a contract is void as against
public policy when the agreement itself effectuates illegality,”
that is, “no change in the process of entering into such an
agreement

will

render

it

legal

and

fully

enforceable.”

848

S.E.2d at 82.

Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement

is

the

invalid

in

absence

of

informed

consent

and

that

the

arbitration provision would be lawful if Morgan & Morgan had
obtained informed consent—a change in the process of entering
into an agreement.

Dkt. No. 33 at 8.

If a “change in the

process of entering into [an agreement to arbitrate] will render
it legal and fully enforceable,” then it is not void as against
7

public policy.

Innovative Images, 848 S.E.2d at 82.

Finally,

the Georgia Court of Appeals has rejected Plaintiff’s informed
consent argument in a similar case involving Morgan & Morgan.
Morgan & Morgan Atlanta, PLLC v. Brown, 908 S.E.2d 727, 736 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2024) (“[T]he fact that [the plaintiff] did not meet
with an attorney before or at the time he signed the agreement
did

not—either

identified

alone

or

when

circumstances—render

unconscionable.”).

Plaintiff’s

considered
the
motion

along

arbitration
for

with

other

agreement

reconsideration

on

this ground is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s
DENIED.

motion

for

reconsideration,

dkt.

no.

33,

is

The Court reaffirms its prior Order, dkt. no. 31, and

this case remains STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending the
completion of the alternative dispute resolution process.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of January, 2025.

HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

8

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