Brown v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER granting 19 Motion for Attorney Fees. Fees awarded in the amount of $2,419.92 in attorney's fees and $26.76 in costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 8/31/15. (cmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION
MICHAEL JEROME BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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CV 314-005

ORDER
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On July 20, 2015, United States District Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., granted a
reversal and remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in the above-captioned
social security appeal, and a judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. nos. 17, 18.)
Plaintiff now moves for $2,419.92 in attorney’s fees and $26.76 in costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. no. 19.) In her response, the Acting Commissioner
states that she does not object to the award in the amount requested, but she requests that it
be paid to the prevailing Plaintiff rather than to her counsel. (Doc. no. 20.)
In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), the Supreme Court held, based on the
“plain text” of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), that an EAJA award “is payable to the litigant and is
therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes
the United States.” Based on Ratliff, the proper course is to “award the EAJA fees directly
to [the litigant] as the prevailing party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment

of those fees.” Bostic v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
Indeed, this approach has recently been followed in this District. See Brown v. Astrue, CV
411-152, doc. no. 24 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (awarding EAJA fees to plaintiff without
directing payment to counsel despite plaintiff’s assignment of award to counsel); Scott v.
Colvin, CV 313-004, doc. no. 26 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 11, 2013) (same).
In accord with this practice, the Court awards the EAJA fees to Plaintiff, subject to
offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United States. The Court leaves it “to the
discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff’s assignment of [the] EAJA [award] and pay
[the award] directly to Plaintiff[’s] counsel after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a
federal debt.” Bostic, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; see also see also Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 8:13-CV-2073-T-23TGW, 2015 WL 176027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015)
(allowing EAJA fees “to be paid by virtue of a fee assignment, to plaintiff’s counsel by the
defendant if the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United States Department of the
Treasury”); Griffin v. Astrue, 1:10CV115, 2010 WL 5211548, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16,
2010) (“There is nothing in Ratliff to indicate that it is intended to divest the government of
its discretion to enter into direct payment arrangements where there is no debt to the
government or where funds remain after satisfaction of such debt.”).

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The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion and awards fees in the amount of
$2,419.92 in attorney’s fees and $26.76 in costs (doc. no. 19), but for the reasons discussed
above, the Court will not direct the manner in which the EAJA award is to be paid.
SO ORDERED this 31st day of August, 2015, at Augusta, Georgia.

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