Scott v. Colvin et al

Filing 22

ORDER granting 19 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $3,357.29 and expenses in the amount of $20.07. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 3/14/16. (cmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION
KENDALL DEANARD SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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CV 314-106

ORDER
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On January 27, 2016, United States District Judge Dudley H. Bowen granted a
reversal and remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in the above-captioned
social security appeal, and a judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. nos. 17, 18.)
Plaintiff now moves for $3,357.29 in attorney’s fees and $20.07 in expenses under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. no. 19.) In her response, the Acting Commissioner
states she does not object to the award in the amount requested. (Doc. no. 21.)
In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), the Supreme Court held, based on the
“plain text” of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), that an EAJA award “is payable to the litigant and is
therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes
the United States.” Based on Ratliff, the proper course is to “award the EAJA fees directly
to [the litigant] as the prevailing party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment
of those fees.” Bostic v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

Indeed, this approach has recently been followed in this District. See Brown v. Astrue, CV
411-152, doc. no. 24 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (awarding EAJA fees to plaintiff without
directing payment to counsel despite plaintiff’s assignment of award to counsel); Scott v.
Colvin, CV 313-004, doc. no. 26 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 11, 2013) (same).
In accord with this practice, the Court awards the EAJA fees to Plaintiff, subject to
offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United States. The Court leaves it “to the
discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff’s assignment of [the] EAJA [award] and pay
[the award] directly to Plaintiff[’s] counsel after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a
federal debt.” Bostic, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 8:13-CV-2073-T-23TGW, 2015 WL 176027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015) (allowing
EAJA fees “to be paid by virtue of a fee assignment, to plaintiff’s counsel by the defendant if
the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United States Department of the Treasury”); Griffin v.
Astrue, 1:10CV115, 2010 WL 5211548, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2010) (“There is nothing
in Ratliff to indicate that it is intended to divest the government of its discretion to enter into
direct payment arrangements where there is no debt to the government or where funds
remain after satisfaction of such debt.”).
The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion and awards fees in the amount of
$3,357.29 and expenses in the amount of $20.07 (doc. no. 19), and, for the reasons discussed

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above, the Court does not direct the manner in which the EAJA award is to be paid.
SO ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2016, at Augusta, Georgia.

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