Coleman et al v. Middle Georgia Probation LLC

Filing 41

ORDER denying 38 Motion to Certify Issues to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 04/12/2018. (jlh)

Filed
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEQRGI^

DUBLIN DIVISION
RANDY EUGENE COLEMAN,

-y q,

ZuIoAFR 12 AM >00
CLERK-izfL

SO.piS'iVOF GA.

STAR LATOSHA YOUNG, and all

other persons similarlysituated,
Plaintiffs,
CV 315-035

V.

MIDDLE GEORGIA PROBATION, LLC,
Defendant.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Issues

to the Supreme Court of Georgia {doc. no. 38).

For the

following reasons. Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.

I.

BACKGROUND

Under O.C.G.A. 42-8-100(g) (2006) (current version at
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-101 (2016)), the chief judge of any court,

with the approval of the local governing body, had authority
to enter into an agreement with a private company to provide

probation supervision services for misdemeanor offenders.^
Defendant provides such services for the State Court of
Emanuel

County,

Swainsboro,

Georgia,

Georgia,

and

pursuant

the
to

an

Municipal
agreement

Court

of

that

was

^ The amended statute provides that the local governing body, instead of
the chief judge, is a party to the agreement. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-101(a)(1).

executed on April 15, 2011 {"Private Probation Agreement").
(Doc. No. 40, Ex. B, at 92.)

In exchange for Defendant's

services, probationers must pay Defendant fees commensurate
with the rates described in the Private Probation Agreement.
(Id. at 101.)

Plaintiffs Randy Eugene Coleman and Star Latosha Young

were both placed on probation after pleading guilty to
misdemeanor charges in the State Court of Emanuel County and

the Municipal Court of Swainsboro, respectively.

(Id., Exs.

C, E, at 109, 117; Am. Compl., Doc. No. 40, HH 12, 18.)
Pursuant to the terms of their probation. Plaintiffs were

placed under Defendant's supervision and were required to pay

probation supervision fees. (Am. Compl. tf 14, 18.)
On April 7, 2015, Plaintiffs brought this putative class

action alleging that the Private Probation Agreement and
O.C.G.A. 42-8-100(g) violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and Georgia law.^

Plaintiffs contend that

these violations void the Private Probation Agreement and that

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover all probation

supervision fees paid to Defendant.

(Id.

58, 74, 86, 98,

111.)

^ Plaintiffs' counsel have brought similar class action lawsuits against

different private probation companies. See, e.g., Brinson v.—Providence
Cmtv. Corr.. Inc.. 2016 WL 9651775 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016); Keen—v_^
Judicial Alternatives of Ga.. Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015).

On November 12,

2015,

this case

was stayed pending

resolution of the appeal in a similar case, Keen v. Judicial
Alternatives of Ga.. Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga.

2015).

(Doc. No. 28.)

On January 17, 2017, one month after

the Court held a status conference discussing, among other

things, the impact of Eleventh Circuit's decision in Keen v.
Judicial Alternatives of Georgia. Inc., 637 F. App'x 546 (11th

Cir. 2015), the Court granted Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to
amend their complaint.

(Doc. No. 39.)

Plaintiffs now move

the Court to certify the following questions to the Georgia
Supreme Court:

1.

Under

the

Constitution

of

the

State

of

Georgia, is the establishment of the amount of
fees a misdemeanor probationer can be sentenced

to pay for probation supervision a matter for
legislative action by the Georgia legislature?
2.

Does the application of the Georgia Private
Probation Statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100, et sag.,
under the Defendant's contracts offend the due

process clause of the Georgia Constitution?
3.

Is imprisonment of misdemeanor probationers
for failure to pay debts allegedly owed to a

private, for-profit corporation imprisonment for
debt forbidden by Art. 1, Sec. 1, H 23 of the
Constitution of the State of Georgia?
4.

Is

a

contract

with

a

private

company

to

provide probation supervision services to a court
void

under

Georgia

law

if

it

has

not

been

approved by the current local government and the
current chief judge of that court?
5.

Is

a

provide

contract

with

a

private

company

to

probation supervision services to a

Georgia court void if it has not been filed with
the County and Municipal Probation Advisory
Council
of
Georgia
in
accord
with
the
requirements of Rule 503-1-.22 of the Rules and
Regulations of the State of Georgia?
6.

Does the Georgia Private Probation Statute,
codified

at

O.C.G.A.

§

42-8-100,

et

seg.,

authorize courts to enter into contracts with a

private company under which the private company
is
compensated
solely
by
fees
paid
by
probationers?

7.

Does it offend the due process clause of the

Georgia Constitution for officers of a Georgia
court,

including probation officers,

systemic

conflicts

of

interest,

to have

including

conflicting financial interests?
(Doc. No. 38.)

II.

DISCUSSION

Federal courts may certify "novel, unsettled questions of
state law" to a state's highest court for resolution.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-77

(1997). Indeed, "a federal court should certify the question

to the state supreme court to avoid making unnecessary Erie

^guesses' and to offer the state court the opportunity to
interpret or change existing law."
F.3d

1335,

omitted).

1339

(11th

Cir.

Simmons v. Sonvika, 394

2004)

(internal

quotations

Still, the decision to certify a question is a

matter of discretion and courts should consider, among other

things, the effect of delaying the litigation process.

Smiaiel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 785 F.2d 922, 924 (11th Cir.

1986) ("Although we are Erie-bound, we may exercise an option
to make an educated guess as to how the Florida courts would
resolve the issue."); State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon

Core.. 526 F.2d 266, 275-76 (11th Cir. 1976) (refusing to

certify a

question

of

state

law

because,

inter alia,

litigation had proceeded for more than two and one-half
years).

Additionally,

a

federal

court's

power

to

certify

questions to the state's highest court is constrained by state
law.

Lehman Bros, v. Schein. 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974).

Although Georgia law allows district courts to certify
questions of state law to the Georgia Supreme Court, O.C.G.A.
§ 15-2-9(a), the questions must be narrowly defined and

supported by concrete facts.

Builoch Cntv. Hosp.—Auth.—y_i.

Fowler. 182 S.E.2d 443, 445-46 (Ga. 1971) (refusing to answer

a question that was "so broad and indefinite as to admit of
one answer under one set of circumstances, and a different
answer under another." (internal quotations omitted)).

The

Georgia Supreme Court may choose to answer specific questions,
but it will not resolve an entire case.

Womack v.—U.S.

Fidelitv Guar. Co.. 69 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. 1952).

Like its

federal counterpart, the Georgia Supreme Court is seldom

inclined to issue an advisory opinion.

Hinson v. First Nat^l

Bank in Wavcross. 144 S.E.2d 765, 768 (Ga. 1965).

As a preliminary matter, the Court recognizes that it has
been two years since Plaintiffs first filed their complaint.
(Doc. No. 1.)

The prospect of committing to a process to

could significantly delay resolution should be approached with
caution.

Plaintiffs' briefing contains a bare assertion that the

questions they propose address unresolved issues of state law
that implicate important state interests. Nevertheless, many
of Plaintiffs' questions are broad and are unsupported by
facts in the record. For example. Plaintiffs' third question

is

presumably

an

as-applied

challenge

addressing

the

possibility that the Private Probation Agreement may lead to
the imprisonment of offenders who fail to pay probation
supervision fees.

An as-applied challenge is, of course, a

fact-intensive inquiry.

Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods,

Inc.. 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 {11th Cir. 2009).

Yet Plaintiffs

fail to identify the circumstances under which their failure

to pay supervision fees resulted in their incarceration.
Because the Georgia Supreme Court would refuse to consider

such a question, certification would needlessly waste the
parties' resources.

Even if some of Plaintiffs' questions could be answered

by referencing the current record, certification is still
inappropriate
litigation.

as

this

case

is

in

the

early

stages

of

To date, neither party has briefed the merits of

Plaintiffs' amended complaint.

Additional litigation will

refine any state law issues in this case, which would in turn

save

judicial resources if the Court should ever find

certification is proper.

Plaintiffs have failed to provide narrow, well-defined

questions of state law that could be certified to the Georgia

Supreme Court.

Certifying Plaintiffs' questions before

developing the record in this case would further delay an
already protracted lawsuit.

Accordingly, under the current

record, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Issues to the Supreme
Court of Georgia (doc. no. 38) is DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this /^

of

April, 2018.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE