Coleman et al v. Middle Georgia Probation LLC

Filing 45

ORDER that this case be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close this case and terminate all motions and deadlines. Costs are assessed against Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 08/31/2018. (thb)

FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

AUG,|iSTA Q!V.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGJEgs^g j\yg|
3

3:05

DUBLIN DIVISION

RANDY EUGENE COLEMAN,

STAR LATOSHA YOUNG, and all
other persons similarly
situated.

CLERK

*
•k

SO.D

■k
■k
•k
•k

Plaintiffs,

•k
k

V.

CV

315-035

k
k

MIDDLE GEORGIA PROBATION, LLC,

k
k

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiffs filed the captioned case seeking a declaration

that O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100, et seq. ,
Statute")

was

("Georgia Private Probation

unconstitutional under the

United States

and

Georgia Constitutions and asking for damages for any probation
fees Plaintiffs were required to pay Defendant.
No.

i,

Court

5 62. )
raised

(Compi., Doc.

In the Court's Order of July 30,
sua

sponte

the

issue

of

2018,

subject

the

matter

jurisdiction and invited Plaintiffs to submit a concise brief
on the issue.

(Doc.

No.

43. )

Upon the existing record,

the

Court finds it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over

this controversy.
captioned case

For reasons stated more fully below,

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

subject matter jurisdiction.

the

for lack of

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Defendant Middle Georgia Probation, LLC.
1.)

This

was

one

of

numerous

(Compl., Doc. No.

similar

suits

filed

by

Plaintiffs' counsel in the District seeking certification of

a class of probationers under supervision of private probation
companies, requesting declaratory relief that the Georgia
Private Probation Statute was unconstitutional, and asking for

damages under a state law "Money Had and Received" claim.
See, e.g.. Brinson v. Providence Cmtv. Corr.. 2016 WL 9651775

(S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2016); Keen v. Judicial Alternatives of

Ga.. Inc.. 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015).

On November

12, 2015, the instant case was stayed pending resolution of
Keen v. Judicial Alternatives of Ga.. Inc.

(Doc. No. 28.)

Once the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Keen^ became final, the
stay was vacated.

(Doc. No. 42.)

In the interim. Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend

their complaint and filed their Amended Complaint on January
17, 2018.

Plaintiffs withdrew the claim for declaratory

relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2201 and instead rely solely on

28 U.S.C. § 1331 to provide subject matter jurisdiction. (Am.

Compl.,

Doc.

No.

40.)

In

withdrawing

the

claim

for

declaratory relief. Plaintiffs restyled that cause of action

^ See Keen v. Judicial Alternatives of Georgia. Inc., 637

F. App'x 546 (11th Cir. 2015).

into Count I labeled "Constitutionality Under the Fourteenth
Amendment." (Id. ff 52-66.) Also, Plaintiffs incorporated the

same allegations of their previous Money Had and Received
claim into Count I of the Amended Complaint.

(Id. SIf 57-63.)

Finally, since April 23, 2015, neither named Plaintiff is
still serving probation or under the supervision of Defendant.
(Aff. of Kevin Goodwin, Doc. No. 34.)

In light of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Keen and
the subsequent withdrawal of the claim for a declaratory

judgment in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the Court raised
sua sponte the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

(Doc.

No. 43.)

Lower

federal

courts

can

exercise

subject

matter

jurisdiction only over certain types of cases for which there
has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction.

Smith v. GTE

Corp.. 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001).

Without a

statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a federal
court

is

powerless

to

act,

and

therefore

a

court

must

"zealously insure" that it has jurisdiction over a case. Id.;
see also Cadet v. Bulger. 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir.

2004)("Federal courts are obligated to inquire into subject-

matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking."
(internal quotations omitted)).

Plaintiffs contend 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal

question statute,

provides jurisdiction

because they are

challenging the Georgia Private Probation Statute under the
Fourteenth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution,

Plaintiffs employ the four-part test laid out in Gunn v.
Minton.

568

U.S.

251,

258

(2013),

arguing the

constitutional law is central to this case.

issue

of

Gunn permits

federal jurisdiction over a state law claim "if a federal
issue is: (1) necessarily raised (2) actually disputed, (3)
substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court

without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress."

Id.

The Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Gunn test

do not provide the basis for it to exercise jurisdiction over
this case.

In one of the companion suits to this action, the

Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, expressed serious doubts that
§ 1331 and Gunn could provide subject matter jurisdiction.
Brinson v. Providence Cmtv. Corr., 703 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th

Cir. 2017).

The court explained that it did "not bode well

for Brinson that only a 'special and small category of cases'
satisfies the Gunn test."

Id. (quoting Gunn, 568 U.S. at

258).

Moreover, Plaintiffs' requested relief under federal law,

although no longer styled as a declaratory judgment action, is

still prospective by nature.

Plaintiffs request "the Court

hold that The Georgia Private Probation Statute, as written
and

as

applied,

is

unconstitutional in

Fourteenth Amendment."

violation

(Am. Compl. SI 115.)

of the

"For a plaintiff

seeking prospective relief to have standing, he ^must show a
sufficient

likelihood

that

he

will

be

affected

by

the

allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.'" McGee v. Solicitor
Gen, of Richmond Cntv.. Ga.. 727 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.

2013) (quoting Koziara v. City of Casselberrv, 392 F.3d 1302,
1305 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Here, Plaintiffs, having been released from probation and

the

supervision

of

Defendant,

cannot

show

a

sufficient

likelihood of being convicted in a state court and being

placed on probation.

See Keen, 637 F. App'x at 548 (finding

the plaintiff "failed to allege that he faced an actual,
imminent injury that would confer standing to challenge the
[Georgia Private Probation Statute]" because he was no longer

on probation); see also Brinspn, 703 F. App'x at 877.

Thus,

even if Plaintiffs could satisfy the four-part Gunn test, they

do

not

have

standing

to

challenge

the

Georgia

Private

Probation Statute under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that this case be
DISMISSED

WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

for

lack

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case and

TERMINATE

all

motions

and

deadlines.

Costs

are

assessed

against Plaintiffs.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

SA

day of

August, 2018.

UNITED STATE/ DISTRICT JUDGE